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ROMAN STOICISM 



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ROMAN STOICISM 



BEING LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE 

STOIC PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIAL 

REFERENCE TO ITS DEVELOPMENT 

WITHIN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 



^\ BY 

E> VERNON ARNOLD, Litt.D. 

n 

PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES 
AND FORMERLY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 



Cambridge : 

at the University Press 
191 1 



^'^ 



^^ ^ 



CambriUge: 

PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 



I) 



I 



HENRICO JACKSON, Litt.D. 

DILECTISSIMO PRAECEPTORI 



PREFACE 



THIS book is the outcome of a course of lectures delivered 
by me in successive years to Latin Honours students in 
accordance with the regulations of the University of Wales. It 
is therefore primarily intended for the assistance of classical 
students ; but it may perhaps appeal in its present form to a 
somewhat wider circle. 

At the time that the book was begun the best systematic 
exposition of the Stoic philosophy available for English readers 
was to be found in Prof E. Zeller's Stoics Epicureans and 
Sceptics, translated by O. J. Reichel (Longmans, 1892). This 
work, admirable in detail, is nevertheless somewhat inadequate 
to the subject, which appeared to its learned author as a mere 
sequel to the much more important philosophical systems of 
Plato and Aristotle. Since its first appearance many qualified 
writers have been inclined to assign a higher rank to Stoicism, 
amongst whom L. Stein, A. Schmekel, and Hans von 
Arnim in the German-speaking countries, and A. C. Pearson, 
G. H. Rendall, and R. D. HiCKS in our own, are perhaps 
most conspicuous. 

The view taken in this book corresponds generally to that 
taken by the writers named. Shortly expressed, it regards 
Stoicism as the bridge between ancient and modern philo- 
sophical thought ; a position which appears to be accepted by 



Vlll PREFACE 

W. L. Davidson writing on behalf of students of modern 
philosophy. Mr Hicks and Mr Davidson have recently published 
works dealing with the Stoic philosophy as a whole ; but as 
neither of these quite covers the ground marked out for this 
book, I believe that room will be found for a further presentation 
of the subject 

To the writers named and to many others, my obligations 
are great, and their extent is generally indicated in the Index. 
I owe a more intimate debt to Mr A. C. PEARSON and 
Prof Alfred Caldecott, who have given me ungrudgingly 
of their knowledge and counsel during the whole period of the 
preparation of this book. 

The appearance of H. von Arnim's ' Stoicorum veterum 
fragmenta ' made available to me a mass of material from 
Greek sources, and has (I hope) made this book less imperfect 
on the side of Greek than it would otherwise have been. For 
the quotations in the notes from the Greek and the less-known 
Latin authors I have generally given references to von Arnim's 
collections, which will doubtless be more accessible to most of 
my readers than the original writers. These references include 
those to the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, for which 
von Arnim is in the main indebted to the earlier work of 
Pearson. 

So general a treatment of the subject as is here presented 
must necessarily leave room for correction and amplification 
in its various branches, and I trust that I am pointing out to 
younger students a field in which a rich harvest may yet be 
gleaned. To such students the appended Bibliography, though 
necessarily incomplete, may be of use as an introduction to the 
considerable literature which is available to them. 

The concluding chapter makes its appeal not so much to 
classical students, as such, as to those who are interested in 
the problem of Christian origins ; the further problems of the 



PREFACE IX 

influence of Stoicism on modern literature and philosophy, 
though at first included in my programme, I have not ventured 
to enter upon. But I hope that at least I have been able to 
show that the interest of classical studies, even as regards 
Hellenistic philosophy, does not lie wholly in the past. 

My sincere thanks are due to the Council of the University 
College of North Wales for granting me special assistance in 
my College duties during the Spring term of 1910, in order 
that I might give more time to this book ; to the Syndics of 
the Cambridge University Press for undertaking its publication; 
and to Mr Clay and his expert staff for the admirable execution 
of the printing. 

E. VERNON ARNOLD 



25 Jatuiary 191 1 



l\ 



CORRIGENDA ET NOTANDA 

In the text the accentuation of Greek words should be corrected as 
follows : 

P. 117, 1. 10, XP^^"'-'- P' ^39) 1- 6, fiipojv. P. 423, I. r6, dydirt}. 

For the quotations in the notes from Greek writers, more precise refer- 
ences will usually be found in the sections named of von Arnim's Stoicoruin 
veterutn fragmenta. In addition the following amplifications or corrections 
are needed : 

P. 105, n. 44; Clem. Strom, ii 21, 129. P. 133, n. 38; Nem. nat. horn, vi 
13. P. 142, n. 86; Sext. math, vii 184. P. 158, n. 17; Simp. Arist. cat. 
p. 269, 14 K; Cens. fr. i, i. P. 159, n. 20; Simp. Arist. cat. p. 350, 16 K. 
P. 160, n. 30 ; for rbvos the word \670s is now read, making the quotation 
inapplicable. P. 161, n. 133 ; add the words roi^s iv eavrtf \6yovs. The refer- 
ence is to Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 306, 23 K. P. 164, n. 45 ; Simp. Arist. cat. p. 
66, 32 K ; n. 47, ib. p. 165, 32 K. P. 166, n. 60; ib. p. 269, 14 K. P. i68, 
n. 75; ib. p. 165, 32 K. P. 173, n. no; Qi\tx\. const, art. tried, p. 253 K; n. 
Ill, meth. med. i 2 p. 16 K. P. 185, n. 79 ; for oVd read xnvh. P. 187, n. 86 ; 
Sext. math, viii 271. P. 193, n. 130; Nemes. 7iat. horn, xxxviii 95. P. 196, 
n. 145; Galen de temp. p. 617 K. P. 222, n. 33; Corn. N. D. ii. P. 224, 
n. 47 ; Sext. math, vii 93. P. 251, n. 76; Galen plac. Hipp, et Plat. p. 242 K. 
P. 255, n. 86; for fuyixa read fxiy/jca. P. 264, n. 139; to the quotation from 
Comm. in Liic. ix 6 add ' et esse sic immortales ut non moriantur sed resolvan- 
tur.' P. 298, n. 184 ; Alex. Aph. defato 28, p. 199, 18 B. 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. 






I. 


The World-Religions .... 


II. 


Heraclitus and Socrates 




III. 


The Academy and the Porch 




IV. 


The Preaching of Stoicism . 




V. 


The Stoic Sect in Rome 




VI. 


Of Reason and Speech 




VII. 


The Foundations of Physics 




V^III. 


The Universe .... 




IX. 


The Supreme Problems 




X. 


Religion 




XI. 


The Kingdom of the Soul 




XII. 


The Law for Humanity 




XIII. 


Daily Duties 




XIV. 


Sin and Weakness 




XV. 


Counsels of Perfection . 




XVI. 


Stoicism in Roman History and Literature 


XVII. 


The Stoic Strain in Christianity . 





Bibliography : 

I. Ancient Writers and Philosophers 
II. Modern Writers . . . . 



PAGE 

I 
29 

S3 

99 ^ 
128 

155 

175 -H'' 
198 
216 



General Index 
Greek Index 



238 

273 
301 

330 
357 
380 



437 
445 

451 
466 



//• 



-^ 



CHAPTER I. 

THE WORLD-RELIGIONS. 

1. The present work treats of a subject of outstanding 
Roman litera- interest in the literature which is associated with 
^"'■^- the history of the Roman State, and which is 

expressed partly in Hellenistic Greek, partly in Latin. In the 
generations preceding our own, classical study has, to a large 
extent, attended to form rather than to matter, to expression 
rather than to content. To-day it is beginning to take a wider 
outlook. We are learning to look on literature as an unveiling 
of the human mind in its various stages of development, and as 
a key to the true meaning of history. The literature of Greece 
proper does not cease to attract us by its originality, charm, and 
variety ; but the new interest may yet find its fullest satisfaction 
in Roman literature ; for of all ancient peoples the Romans 
achieved most, and their achievements have been the most 
enduring. It was the Roman who joined the ends of the world 
by his roads and his bridges, poured into crowded towns unfail- 
ing supplies of corn and perennial streams of pure water, cleared 
the countryside of highwaymen, converted enemies into neigh- 
bours, created ideals of brotherhood under which the nations 
were united by common laws and unfettered marriage relations, 
and so shaped a new religion that if it shattered an empire it 
yet became the mother of many nations. We are the inheritors 
of Roman civilization ; and if we have far surpassed it in 
scientific knowledge and material plenty, we are not equally 
confident that we possess better mental balance, or more com- 
plete social harmony. In this direction the problems of Roman 
life are the problems of Western life to-day ; and the methods 

A. I 



"2 ROMAN STOICISM 

by which they were approached in the Roman world deserve 
more than ever to be studied by us. Such a study, if it is to be 
in any true sense historical, must break through the convention 
by which ancient Greece and Rome have come to be treated as 
a world apart; it must seek its starting point in the distant past, 
and count that of chief importance which will bear fruit in the 
ages that follow. 

2. Great achievements are born of strong convictions ; and 
Beliefs of the Roman statcsmcu, jurists, soldiers, and engineers 
Romans. ^^j^^ ^^^ learn to ' scorn delights and live laborious 

days ' without some strong impulse from within. These inner 
convictions do not come to the surface everywhere in the Latin 
literature with which we are most familiar. The Roman orator 
or poet is generally content to express a conventional view of 
religion and morals, whilst he conceals his real thoughts in a 
spirit of reticence and almost of shame. Yet here and there 
every attentive reader will catch the accent of sincerity, some- 
times in the less restrained conversation of the lower classes, 
sometimes in flights of poetic imagination, or again in instruction 
designed for the young. In this way we learn that the Romans 
of the last century of the republic and of the first century of the 
principate were profoundly concerned, not so much with ques- 
tions connected with the safety of their empire or the justice 
of their form of government, as with problems in which all 
mankind has a common interest. What is truth, and how can 
it be ascertained ? What is this universe in which we dwell, 
and by whom and how was it made ? What are the beings 
called gods, and do they concern themselves with the affairs of 
men ? What is man's nature, his duty, and his destiny ? These 
the Romans called the problems of philosophy, and they eagerly 
sought for definite and practical solutions to them^ Such 
solutions when embodied in theoretical systems we still call 
' philosophies ' ; but when such systems are developed in a 
practical form and claim the obedience of large bodies of men 
they become religions. Stoicism is in the first instance a 
philosophy, and amongst its many competitors that one which 

^ See below, § 441. 

r I ■ 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 3. 

appealed most successfully to the judgment of men who played 
a leading part in the Roman world ; but as its acceptance 
becomes more general, it begins to assume all the features of a 
religioii. All Latin literature is thickly strewn with allusions to 
Stoicism and the systems which were its rivals, and thus bears 
witness to the widespread interest which they excited. 

3. The Romans learnt philosophy from Greek teachers ; 
Origin of ^"^ they werc not free from a sense of shame in 
Philosophy. ^i^^g sitting at the feet of the children of a 
conquered race. But they acknowledged their obligations in 
a generous spirit ; and from Roman literature an impression has 
arisen, which is still widespread, that Greece was the birthplace 
of philosophy, and that its triumphs must be placed to the credit 
of Hellenic culture. But to the Hellenes themselves philosophy 
equally appeared as a foreign fashion, assailing their national 
beliefs and dangerous to their established morality ; and of its 
teachers many of the most distinguished were immigrants from 
Asia Minor. Thus Greece itself appears only as a halting-place 
in the movement of philosophy ; and we are carried more and 
more to the East as we seek to discover its origin. Yet at the 
time with which we are concerned it had also spread to the 
extreme West. ' The Magi,' says Aristotle, ' taught the Persians 
philosophy ; the Chaldaeans taught it to the Babylonians and 
Assyrians ; the Gymnosophists to the Indians ; the Druids 
and Semnothei to the Gauls and Celts^.' It was a world-wide 
stirring of the human intellect, and we must attempt to outline 
its meaning more completely. 

4. Philosophy, in the sense in which Aristotle uses the 

term, appears to be a general name for a P"reat 

National and ' rr & fc> 

World- change in man's intellectual attitude towards his 

e igions. environment, corresponding to a definite era in the 

history of civilization. Before philosophy came nationalism, the 
habit of thinking according to clan and race; and nationalism 
remains on record for us in the numerous national religions in 
which each people does reverence to the deity which lives within 
its borders and goes forth to fight with its armies. Philosophy 

I ^ Diog. L. Prooem. i. 

I — 2 



4 ROMAN STOICISM 

is at once broader in its outlook and more intimate in its appeal. 
It breaks down the barriers of race, and includes the whole world 
in its survey ; but on the other hand it justifies the individual in 
asserting his own thoughts and choosing his own way of life. 
Thus philosophy on its arrival appears in each particular country 
as a disintegrating force ; it strikes at the roots of patriotism and 
piety, and challenges equally the authority of king and of priest. 
But everywhere in turn philosophy, as it gains ground, begins to 
construct a new patriotism and a new piety, and gradually takes 
concrete shape as a new religion. To us, as we look backwards 
to the past, the track of philosophy is recorded by a series of 
religions, all alike marked with the note of world-wide outlook, 
reverence for reason, and the sentiment of human sympathy. 
The era of philosophy is the era of the world-religions. It 
belongs to that millennium when from China to Ireland men 
of good will and bold spirit realized that they all looked up 
toward one sky, breathed one air, and travelled on one all- 
encircling sea ; when they dreamed that before long all men 
should be united in one kingdom, converse in one language, and 
obey the one unchanging law of reason. 

5. The general importance and direction of this movement 
will best be seen if we select for consideration a 

Spread of the . r i i i i • • • i • i • 

World- certam number of the world-religions m which it 

e igions. ^^^ from time to time embodied. Aristotle has 

already called our attention to the 'philosophies' of the 
Chaldaeans, the Persians, and the Indians ; amongst these 
last Buddhism at least was a movement which had shaken 
off limitations of race and class. To these he has added 
the Druids, whom we may well keep in mind if only because 
they are representatives of Western Europe. Stoicism best 
represents the part played by the Greco-Roman world, and 
Judaism and Christianity come under consideration as forces 
with which Stoicism in the course of its history came into close 
contact. The Greeks little realized that they were being carried 
along in so mighty a stream. Regarding themselves as isolated 
and elevated, the sole pioneers of civilization in a ' barbarian ' 
world, the beliefs of neighbouring peoples seemed to them 
beneath their notice. To this prejudice they clung in spite 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 5 

of the protests of their own men of learning^; the Romans 
inherited it from them ; and though the Europe of the Middle 
Ages and of to-day professes an Oriental faith, its religious 
survey is still limited and its critical power impaired by the 
same assumption of superior wisdom. Our information is how- 
ever wider than that of the ancient world, and our sympathies 
are beginning to be quickened ; and we are thus in a position 
to trace generally the history of these seven religions. In this 
work we shall use, as far as possible, the classical authorities, 
supplementing them (where deficient) from other sources. 

6. The oldest of these philosophical or religious systems is 
that of the Chaldaeans, as the Romans termed a 

Chaldaism. ,,.,., 

pastoral, star-gaznig foik* presumably identical 
with the people which, in or about the year 2800 B.C.®, mapped 
out the constellations as we now know them, traced the orbits 
of the planets®, and predicted their future movements. This 
work was not carried out entirely in the spirit of modern science ; 
it was further stimulated by the belief that the skies displayed 
a written message to mankind. But the nature of that message, 
of which fragments are possibly embodied in the names of the 
constellations, was not preserved to the Romans by any tradition. 
Two principles seem to have survived, those of the inexorable 
tie between cause and effect called ' fate'',' and of the inter- 
dependence of events in heaven and on earths Hence arose 
the hope of prophetic insight into the future ; and the people 
of Babylon, under Chaldaean influence, are said to have spent 

* Gomperz, Greek Thmkei's, ii p. 161 ; and below, § 94. 

■* ' principes Chaldaei, qui in patentibus campis colebant, stellarum motus et vias 
et coetus intuentes, quid ex his efficeretur observaverunt ' Gellius, N. A. xiv i, 8. 

® Sir E. W^alter Maunder, in the Nineteettth Century for September 1900. 

® ' quinque stellarum potestates Chaldaeorum observatio excepit ' Seneca, N. Q. 
ii 32, 6. 

"^ This is well described by Cicero, translating from a Stoic source : ' cum fato 
omnia fiant, si quis mortalis possit esse, qui colligationem causarum omnium perspiciat 
animo, nihil eum profecto fallat. qui enim teneat causas rerum futurarum, idem 
necesse est omnia teneat quae futura sint' Div. i 56, 127. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that this general conception of ' fate ' or ' destiny ' is deduced from the 
unchanging movements of the heavenly bodies. 

* ' videbis quinque sidera diversas agentia vias ; ex horum levissimis motibus 
fortunae populorum dependent' Sen. Dial, vi 18, 3. 



6 ROMAN STOICISM 

four hundred and seventy years in collecting observations of 
the history of boys born under particular combinations of the 
heavenly bodies^ We are not acquainted with the results of 
these observations; but undoubtedly they established a profession 
of astrologers, whose craft it was to observe the position of sun, 
moon and stars at a man's birth or at some other critical hour, 
and thence to deduce his future character or career. These 
wanderers, called by the Romans * Chaldaei ' or ' Mathematici,' 
spread over all Europe, and founded a lucrative trade on men's 
fears and ambitions. Philosophers studied their methods, and 
did not always entirely deny their validity^". In society the 
astrologer is a common figure"; he found his way to the 
chambers of princes ^^, and was regularly consulted by con- 
spirators. The dramatic scene in Walter Scott's Betrothed is 
as true in character to Roman times as to the Middle Ages. 
Roman literature is full of allusions to the horoscope^^. But 
whether we attribute these practices to fraud or to self-deception, 
there is every reason to believe that they only form a diseased 
outgrowth from a system which at an earlier time was of much 
wider import. 

7. The popular expression ' magic ' still recalls to us the 

system of which the Magi of Persia were the pro- 

fessed exponents, and of which the Romans had a 

knowledge which is to a large extent confirmed from other 

sources. This system we shall here call ' Persism,' in order to 

^ ' aiunt quadringenta septuaginta niilia annorum in periclitandis experiundisque 
pueris, quicunque essent nati, Babylonios posuisse ' Cic. Div. ii 46, 97. I assume 
that the original tradition named the smaller number suggested above. 

^^ 'duo apud Chaldaeos studuisse se dicunt, Epigenes et Apollonius Myndius' 
Sen. N. Q. vii 4, i ; ' Diogenes Stoicus [Chaldaeis] concedit, aliquid ut praedicere 
possint ' Cic. Div. ii 43, 90. Seneca concludes against their authority, observing 
(i) that a proper horoscope should include all the stars in the heaven at the moment 
of birth, and (ii) that twins should always have the same fortune, which is obviously 
untrue; see N. Q. ii 32, 6 to 8, Ben. vii i, 5. 

^^ ' tu ne quaesieris (scire nefas), quern mihi, quem tibi | finem di dederint, 
Leuconoe, nee Babylonios | temptaris numeros' Hor. C. 1 11, 1-3. 

^^ See the interesting tale of Thrasyllus and Tiberius in Tac. Ann. vi 21, to 
which the author affects to give some credit. 

^* e.g., 'seu Libra seu me Scorpios adspicit | formidulosus, pars violentior | natalis 
horae, seu tyrannus | Hesperiae Capricornus undae, | utrumque nostrum incredibili 
mode I consentit astrum' Hor. C. ii 17, 17-22. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 7 

free ourselves of the popular associations still connected with 
such terms as Magism, Parsee-ism, and so forth ; meaning by 
' Persism ' the teaching of Zarathustra (the Latin Zoroastres) as 
it affected the Greek and Latin world. Persism has its roots in 
the older nationalism, inasmuch as its deity is one who takes 
sides with his believer and brings him victory in war ; but on 
the other hand it grows into a world-religion because that which 
begins as a conflict between races gradually changes into a 
struggle between right and wrong. It is based also on the 
Chaldaean system, in so far as it looks up to the heaven as the 
object of human reverence and to the sun, moon and planets as 
at least the symbols of human destiny ; but here again the out- 
look is transformed, for in the place of impersonal and inexorable 
forces we find a company of celestial beings, intimately concerned 
in the affairs of men, and engaged in an ardent struggle for the 
victory of the better side. The meaning of Persism and its 
immense influence on the Greco-Roman world are still so little 
realized that it is necessary here to deal with the subject with 
some fulness. 

8. The Greeks and Romans refer to the teachings of 
Zarathustra as of immemorial antiquity'*; whilst 

Zarathustra. 

on the other hand the direct Persian tradition 
(existing in a written form from about the year 800 A.D.) 
ascribes them to a date 258 years before the era of Alexander's 
invasion of Persia'^ The best modern authorities incline to 
the Persian view, thus giving the date of about 600 B.C. to 
Zarathustra, and making him roughly a contemporary of the 
Buddha and Confucius'". On the other hand considerations, 
partly of the general history of religion, partly of the linguistic 
and metrical character of such fragments of Zarathustra's 
writings as still remain, indicate a date earlier than this by 
many hundred years 'I Zarathustra belonged to the tribe of 
the Magi, who maintained religious practices of which the 

^* ' Eudoxus, qui inter sapientiae sectas clarissimam utilissimamque [artem 
magicam] intellegi voluit, Zoroastrem hunc sex millibus annorum ante Platonis 
mortem fuisse prodidit : sic et Aristoteles ' Pliny, yV". I/, xxx 2, i ; cf. Diog. L. 
Prooem. 2 and 8. 

'^ Williams-Jackson, Zoroaster, p. 161. '® ih. p. 174. 

1'' K. Geldner, F.ncycl, Brit. ed. x, article ' Zoroaster.' 



8 ROMAN STOICISM 

nature can only be inferred from such of them as survived the 
prophet's reforms^^; in their general character they cannot have 
differed widely from those recorded in the Rigveda. In the 
midst of this system Zarathustra came forward as a reformer. 
He was deeply learned in the doctrines of the Chaldaeans", and 
was an ardent student of astronomy-". In a period of solitary 
contemplation in the desert ^\ it was revealed to him that a great 
and wise being, named Ahura Mazda, was the creator and ruler 
of heaven and earth'^l Upon him attend Angels who do him 
service ; whilst the spirit of Mischief and his attendants cease- 
lessly work to oppose his purposes. Ahura is the light, his 
enemy is the darkness^*. The struggle between them is that 
between right and wrong, and in it every man must take one or 
the other side. His soul will survive what men call death, and 
receive an everlasting reward according to his deeds. After 
quitting the mortal body, the soul will pass over the Bridge 
of Judgment, and will there be turned aside to the right or to 
the left; if it has been virtuous, to enter Paradise, but if vicious, 
the House of Falsehood. Full of this doctrine, Zarathustra 
enters the court of King Vishtaspa, and converts him and his 
court. The monarch in turn sets out to convert the unbelieving 
world by the sword, and the War of Religion begins. 

9. We cannot trace the long history of the War of Religion 

Spread of through its wholc course, but in the end we find 

Persism. ^|^^^ ^^^q Religion has welded together the great 

kingdom of Persia, and its warlike zeal is directed towards 

establishing throughout the world the worship of the ' God of 

heaven,' and the destruction of all images, whether in the shape 

^^ Williams-Jackson, p. 7. 

^^ ' Magiam... cuius scientiae saeculis priscis multa ex Chaldaeorum arcanis 
Bactrianus addidit Zoroastres ' Amm. Marc, xxiii 6, 32. 

^ [Zoroastres] ' primus dicitur mundi principia siderumque motus diligentissime 
spectasse ' Justinus, Iftsi. Phil, i i, 9 (Williams-Jackson, p. 237): 'astris multum 
et frequenter intentus ' Clem. Rom. Recogn. iv 27. 

^1 ' tradunt Zoroastrem in desertis caseo vixisse ' Pliny, N. H. xi 97. 

^^ ' [Ahura Mazda] created the paths of the sun and the stars ; he made the moon 
to wax and wane ' ( Yasna 43, 3) ; 'he made the light and the darkness ' (ib. 5); 'he 
is the father of the good ' (ib. 46, 2). 

^^ ' TiwpoacrTpT)^ 6 /jLayos . . .Trpocraire<l)aii'eTO, rov fiev ioiKifai (purl /j.d\i(TTa tuiv aiffdrj- 
rwc, rbv S' ifj,iraKiv (rKdrip /cat dyvolg. ' Plat. Isid. et Osir, 46. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 9 

of men or of beasts, as dishonouring to the divine nature. In 
the sixth century B.C. Babylon opposed the Reh'gion in the east, 
and Lydia in the west ; both fell before Cyrus the Great. The 
fall of Babylon set free the Jews, who accepted the king's 
commission to establish the Religion in Jerusalem^^ and (at a 
rather later date) in Egypt ^^i on the other hand that of Lydia 
exposed the Hellenes, a people devoted to idol-worship, to the 
fury of the image-breakers^l The battles of Marathon and 
Salamis checked the warlike advance of Persism, and the 
victories of Alexander suppressed its outward observance and 
destroyed its literature and its priesthood. But in this period 
of apparent depression some at least of its doctrines were 
winning still wider acceptance than before. 

10. The departure of the Persians from Europe was the 
Persism in- signal for an outburst of enthusiasm in Greece for 

vades Greece. ^^^ ^j^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^-^ WOrship with the aid of 

images. Yet, unfavourable as the time might seem, a mono- 
theistic sentiment developed apace in Hellas, which we shall 
follow more closely in the next chapter^. Even Herodotus, 
writing as a fair-minded historian, no longer regards the Persians 
as impious, but realizes that they are actuated by conviction^l 

^* ' Thus saith Cyrus, king of Persia : — all the kingdoms of the earth hath the 
Lord, the God of heaven, given me ; and he hath charged me to build him an house 
in Jerusalem' Ezra i 2. 

^ See the interesting papyri records recently discovered in Elephantine, and 
published by Dr Sachau of Berlin. A general account of them is given by 
Prof. Driver in the London Guardian for Nov. 6, 1907. 

■■^^ Cicero rightly appreciated the religious character of the Persian invasions : 
' delubra humanis consecrata simulacris Persae nefaria putaverunt ; eamque unam ob 
causam Xerxes inflammari Atheniensium fana iussisse dicitur, quod deos, quorum 
domus esset omnis hie mundus, inclusos parietibus contineri nefas esse duceret ' Rep. 
iii 9, I4. So Themistocles as represented by Herodotus: 'the gods and heroes 
grudged that one man should become king both of Asia and of Europe, and he a 
man unholy and presumptuous, one who made no difference between things sacred 
and things profane, burning and casting down the images of the gods ' History 
viii 109 (Macaulay's translation). 

^ See below, § 41. 

^^ ' Images and temples and altars they do not account it lawful to erect, nay, they 
even charge with folly those who do these things ; and this, as it seems to me, 
because they do not account the gods to be in the likeness of men, as do the 
Hellenes. But it is their wont to perform sacrifices to Zeus, going up to the most 
lofty of the mountains, and the whole circle of the heavens they call Zeus : and they 
sacrifice to the Sun and the Moon and the Earth, to Fire and to Water and to the 



lO ROMAN STOICISM 

Socrates was an outspoken defender of all the main articles of 
the Religion, to the horror of nationalists like Aristophanes, 
who not unjustly accused him of corrupting the loyalty of the 
youth of Athens to the institutions of their mother city. 
Xenophon, the most intimate of his disciples, translated this 
bias into action, and joined with the 10,000 Greeks in a vain 
effort to re-establish the strength of Persia : he did not even 
hesitate to engage in war against his native land. To him 
Cyrus the Persian was a greater hero than any Homeric warrior 
or Greek sage ; and from Cyrus he drew the belief in the im- 
mortality of the soul which from this time on is one of the chief 
subjects of philosophic speculation. 

11. The Romans had not the same national motives as the 
„ . , Greeks to feel an antipathy to Persism. For the 

Persism wel- "^ •' 

corned in doctrinc of monotheism they had probably been 

Rome. . 

prepared by their Etruscan sovereigns, and the 
temple of Capitoline Jove kept before their eyes a symbol of 
this sentiment. But in the Roman period Persian sovereignty 
had receded to the far distance, and the doctrines of Persism 
only reached Rome through the Greek language and in Greek 
form. Thus of the doctrines of the Evil Spirit, the war between 
Good and Evil, and the future punishment of the wicked, only 
faint echoes ever reached the Roman ear. On the other hand 
the doctrines of the divine government of the world and of the 
immortality of the soul made a deep impression ; and Cicero 
in a well-known passage repeats and amplifies the account 
Xenophon gives in his Cyropaedia of the dying words of Cyrus, 
which is doubtless to some extent coloured by recollections of 
the death of Socrates : 

' We read in Xenophon that Cyrus the elder on his death-bed spoke as 
follows — " Do not think, my very dear children, that when I quit you I shall 
no longer be in existence. So long as I was with you, you never saw my 
soul, but you realized from my actions that it dwelt in this my body. 
Believe then that it will still exist, even if you see nothingof it. Honours 
would not continue to be paid to great men after death, did not their souls 
assist us to maintain their memory in freshness. I have never been able to 
persuade myself that souls live whilst they are enclosed in mortal bodies, 

Winds; these are the only gods to whom they have sacrificed ever from the first' 
History i 131 (Macaulay's translation). 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 11 

and die when they issue from them ; nor that the soul becomes dull at the 
moment it leaves this dull body ; I believe that when it has freed itself from 
all contact with the body and has begun to exist in purity and perfection, 
then it becomes wise. Further, when the framework of humanity is broken 
up in death, we see clearly whither each of its parts speeds away, for all go 
to the elements from which they have sprung ; the soul alone is not seen 
by us either whilst it is with us or when it departs. Lastly nothing 
resembles death so closely as sleep. But men's souls, whilst they them- 
selves sleep, most clearly reveal their divine nature ; for then, being set free 
from their prison house, they often foresee things to come. From this we may 
gather what their properties will be, when they have utterly freed themselves 
from the fetters of the body. If then this is so, do reverence to me as a 
god ; but if the soul is destined to perish with the body, still do reverence to 
the gods, who guard and rule all this beauteous world, and while so doing 
keep up the memory of me in loyal and unalterable affection." So spoke 
Cyrus on his death-bed 2".' 

12. The Per.sian doctrine of the ' Angels ' seems to have 
The manifold been verv httle understood either in Greece or at 
deity. Romc, but, as we shall see in the course of this" 

book, it profoundly influenced the course of religious history. 
The 'Angels' or good Spirits of Persism are, from one point 
of view, identical with the Creator himself, forms under which 
he manifests himself to men. Their names are all those 
of abstractions : the Good Mind, the Best Reason, the Desired 
Kingdom, Holy Humility, Salvation, and Immortality'^''. On 
the other hand, they gradually assume to the worshipper who 
contemplates them the appearance of separate personalities, 
dwelling, like the Creator himself, in an atmosphere of heavenly 
Glory. Thus a system which is in principle strictly mono- 
theistic gradually developes into one in which the deity is 
sevenfold, as in the following hymn from the later part of the 

Avesta : 

'We praise the heavenly Glory, 
The mighty, the god-given. 
The praiseworthy, the life-giving, 
Healing, strengthening, watching 
High above the other creatures. 

^ Cic. Sen. 22, 79 to 81, after Xen. Cyr. viii 7. 

^^ In the hymns of Zarathustra we can only trace the beginnings of this system, as 
in the following: 'All-wise Lord, all-powerful one, and thou Piety, and Righteous- 
ness, Good Mind and the Kingdom, listen ye to me and prosper my every beginning ' 
Vasna 33, 11. 



12 ROMAN STOICISM 

The Glory that belongs to the Immortal Spirits, 
The rulers, that act by a look alone, 
The lofty, all-powerful ones, 
The strong servants of the All-wise, 
That live for ever, and work justice. 

All seven have the same Thought, 
All seven have the same Word, 
All seven have the same Deed. 
One Thought, one Word, one Deed, one Father and Master 
The All-wise, the Creator^^' 

Of these ' Angels ' one was destined to play a considerable 
part in several of the world-religions ; namely that which the 
Persians called the ' Best Reason,' and which the Greeks knew 
as Wisdom ((TO(f)ia) or the Word (X6yo<;). Sometimes an aspect 
of the Deity, sometimes an emanation from him, and then again 
a distinguishable personality, this figure is again and again 
presented to our consideration. The personification of abstrac- 
tions appealed with special force to the Romans, for from the 
earliest periods of their history they had raised temples to Faith 
{fides\ Concord {concordid), and other deified virtues ; and its 
character can perhaps best be appreciated by reference to the 
personification of Light in Christian hymnology, both ancient 
and modern : 

' Hail, gladdening Light, of his pure glory poured 
Who is the immortal Father, heavenly, blest^^!' 
' Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom 
Lead thou me on"*^.' 

13. Amongst the subsidiary, but still important, doctrines of 
Sanctity of the Persism, is that of the sanctity of the four elements, 
elements. Earth, air, fire and water are alike holy. Hence 

the dead must not be buried, for that would be to defile the 
earth ; nor burned, for that would be to defile fire^ ; nor may 
any impurity be thrown into the water. This respect for the 

*^ Yasht xix 15, 16. The translation follows Geldner, Drei Yasht aus dem 
Zendavesta, p. 15. 

^^ Ancient Greek hymn, ^ws iXapov ayias do^rjs, translated by J. Keble. 

33 J. H. Newman. 

^* ' Zoroaster taught the Persians neither to burn their dead, nor otherwise 
to defile fire.' Xanthos (B.C. 465-425), as quoted by Nicolaus of Damascus (ist 
century B.C.). 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 1 3 

elements often appeared to strangers as worship of them*^ 
Between the elements they sometimes discriminated, considering 
earth and water as more akin to darkness and the evil spirit, but 
fire and air to light and the good spirit^®. The element of fire 
they held in special reverence, so that at all times they have 
been called fire-worshippers^^ More careful observers have 
always recognised them as monotheists, distinguished by a 
certain rapturous language in their description of the deity 
which they refused to picture in any concrete shape^l They 
were also zealous that their teaching should find its expression 
in a healthy social and political life^''. In the education of the 
young they laid a special stress on speaking the truth*". 

14. ' The Gymnosophists taught philosophy to the people 
Alexander in °^ India *\' Who are the teachers thus indicated ? 
the East. ^j^ answcr may be found, though of a later date, 

in Plutarch's ' Life of Alexander,' where he describes the 
meeting of Alexander with some eminent gymnosophists, who 
had stirred up opposition to his rule: — 

'[-Alexander] captured ten of the Indian philosophers called Gymnoso- 
phistae^^ ; who had been instrumental in causing Sabbas to revolt, and had 
done much mischief to the Macedonians. These men are renowned for 
their short, pithy answers, and Alexander put difficult questions to all of 
them, telling them that he would first put to death the man who answered 
him worst, and so the rest in order. 

^^ See § 10, note 28 ; Strabo xv 3, 16. 

■^^ 'Zarathustra said : — the earthly demon is water derived from earth ; the 
heavenly demon is fire mixed witli air' Origen, contra haereses, i col. 3025. 

^^ 'The Persians first worsliipped fire as a god in heaven' Clemens Romanus, 
Horn, ix 4 f. 

°^ 'Zoroaster the Magian says: — God is the primal, the incorruptible, the eternal, 
the unbegotten, the indivisible, the incomparable, the charioteer of all good, he that 
cannot be bribed, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise ; he is also the father of 
good laws and justice, the self-taught, the natural, perfect, and wise, the only dis- 
coverer of the sacred and natural ' Euseb. Praep. ev. i 10. 

^^ ' Fi-om the writings of Zoroaster it is inferred that he divided philosophy into 
three parts, physics, economics, and politics' Schol. on First Alcibiades, p. 122 A 
(Williams-Jackson, p. 231). 

^^ ' They educate their children, beginning at five years old and going on till 
twenty, in three things only ; in riding, in shooting, and in speaking the truth ' 
Ilerod. i 136. ^ See above, § 3. 

*^ Alexander had reached the river Hyphasis, the modern Bias. 



14 ROMAN STOICISM 

The first was asked whether he thought the living or the dead to be the 
more numerous. He answered " The Hving, for the dead are not." 

The second was asked, "Which breeds the largest animals, the sea or the 
land?" He answered "The land, for the sea is only a part of it." 

The third was asked, "Which is the cleverest of beasts?" He answered 
" That which man has not yet discovered." 

The fourth was asked why he made Sabbas rebel. He answered 
*' Because I wished him either to live or to die with honour." 

The fifth was asked, which he thought was first, the day or the night. 
He answered " The day was first, by one day." As he saw that the king was 
surprised by this answer, he added " Impossible questions require impossible 
answers." 

Alexander now asked the sixth how a man could make himself most 
beloved. He answered " By being very powerful, and yet not feared by his 
subjects." 

Of the remaining three, the first was asked how a man could become a 
god. He answered " By doing that which it is impossible for a man to do." 

The next was asked which was the stronger, life or death. He answered 
*' Life, because it endures such terrible suffering." 

The last, being asked how long it was honourable for a man to live, 
answered " As long as he thinks it better for him to live than to die." 

The king loaded them with presents, and dismissed them*^.' 

15. In these * gymnosophists ' it is easy to recognise a type 

familiar to Indian antiquity. These men, who have 

oCmnoso- almost dispensed with clothing and know nothing 

l.^'!^l- , of the luxuries or even the conveniences of life, are 

Buddhists? ' 

nevertheless influential leaders of the people. They, 
like the Persians, have broken away from the old religions; they 
talk lightly of the gods, and do not guide their actions by any 
decrees supposed divine. The sight of human sorrow fills them 
with sympathy for the ills of life, and makes them doubt whether 
death is not the better choice. Their ethical standard is high, 
and includes both courage and gentleness. That they are 
Buddhist monks is probable enough, but not certain, because 
India contained at this time many sects professing similar 
principles. But the teaching of Gautama, the Buddha or ' en- 
lightened,' represents to us in the most definite form the nature 
of this propaganda. It implies a revolt against national rivalries, 
ritualist observances, and polytheistic beliefs ; it is severely 

^^ Plutarch's Life of Alexander, ch. Ixiv (translation by Aubrey Stewart and 
George Long, London, 1892). 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS I 5 

practical, and inculcates obedience to reason and universal 
benevolence ; and it is spread from East to West by devoted 
bands of ascetic missionaries. 

16. The fundamental teachings of Buddhism appear clearly 
in the traditional account of the Sermon of Benares : 

'This is the holy truth of Sorrow ; birth is Sorrow, age is Sorrow, disease 

is Sorrow, death is Sorrow ; to be joined with the unloved 

teaching '^ Sorrow, to be parted from the loved is Sorrow ; to lose 

one's desire is Sorrow ; shortly, the five-fold clinging to 

existence is Sorrow. 

This is the holy truth of the Origin of Sorrow ; it is the thirst to be, 
leading from birth to birth, finding its pleasure here and there ; the thirst for 
pleasure, the thirst to be, the thirst to be prosperous. 

This is the holy truth of the Removing of Sorrow ; the removal of the 
thirst by destroying desire, by letting it go, by cutting oneself off from it, 
separating from it, giving it no place. 

This is the holy truth of the Path to the Removing of Sorrow ; it is the 
holy Path of eight branches, which is called Right Belief, Right Aspiration, 
Right Word, Right Act, Right Life, Right Effort, Right Meditation, Right 
Annihilation of Self**.' 

Specially characteristic of Buddhism is that gentleness of 
temper, instinctively opposed to all anger and cruelty, which no 
provocation can turn aside. We read in the Dhammapada : 

' Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time ; hatred ceases by love ; 
this is an old rule. Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome 
evil by good ; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth *^.' 

17. The doctrines of Buddhism were not inculcated in 
Buddhists and India alone. From the first it was a missionary 

ynics. religion ; and its emissaries must often have 

appeared in the Hellenistic world, promising ' to seekers after 
God eternal communion with his very essence, to the weary 
pessimist eternal forgetfulness*^' From contemporary Indian 
inscriptions we learn of missionaries sent out by Agoka, the 
first great Buddhist king of India, ' with healing herbs and yet 

■** Mahavagga i 6, 19 to 22, after H. Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 139, and the trans- 
lation in S. B. E. xiii pp. 95, 96. 

^^ Dhammapada i 5 and xvii 123 (.S". B. E. x pp. 5, 58). 

■**' Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 164. These alternative interpretations 
■"f the doctrine of Nirvana must not be accepted as uncontroversial. 



l6 ROMAN STOICISM 

more healing doctrine'^'' to Ptolemy II king of Egypt, Antiochus 
of Syria, and others, before the year 250 B.C. ; and this mission 
can have been but one out of many. It thus appears very 
remarkable that we have no record of Buddhist communities 
established in the Greco-Roman world. But if the name of 
Gautama remained unknown to the West, and his community 
had no formal adherents, the manner of life of his apostles did 
not lack imitators. In the Cynic preacher the Buddhist monk 
reappears. In Greek literature he is usually an object of 
ridicule ; his uncouth appearance, his pitiable poverty, and his 
unconventional speech give constant opportunity for the wit of 
his critics. But the Cynics carried with them not only the out- 
ward garb of the Buddhist monks, but also their lofty ethical 
standard, their keen sympathy with human troubles, and their 
indifference to purely speculative problems^l In spite of the 
contempt heaped upon them (or perhaps in consequence of it) 
they gradually won respect and admiration as the sincere friends 
and helpers of the poor. Thus Buddhism at its best is pictured 
for us in the sketches drawn by Epictetus of Diogenes and the 
Cynic preachers of his own day, of which the following are 
examples : 

' Did Diogenes love nobody, who was so kind and so much a lover of 
all that for mankind in general he willingly undertook so much labour and 
bodily suffering ? He did love mankind, but how ? As became a minister of 
God, at the same time caring for men, and being also subject to God. For 
this reason all the earth was his country, and not one particular place ; and 
when he was taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates and 
friends there, but even he became familiar with the pirates and tried to 
improve them ; and being sold afterwards he lived in Corinth as before at 
Athens. Thus is freedom acquired *3.' 

'And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who is naked, 
houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a slave, without a city, can pass 
a life that flows easily ? See, God has sent you a man to shew you it is 
possible. Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, without 
possessions, without a slave ; I sleep on the ground ; I have no wife, no 
children, no praetorium, but only the earth and heavens, and one poor 
cloak. And what do I want ? Am I not without sorrow ? Am I not without 
fear? Am I not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object of 

■"^ Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 163; V. A. Smith, Acoka, p. 174. 

*•* See Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 155-162, and below, § 52. 

^ Epict. Disc, iii 24, 64 to 66 (Long's translation). •■ 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 1/ 

my desire, or ever falling into that which I would avoid ? did I ever blame 
God or man ? did I ever accuse any man ? did any of you ever see me 
with sorrowful countenance ? 

This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, this their 
purpose^**.' 

Except that a simple form of theism has replaced the 
Buddhist atheism, there is hardly a word here that we might 
not expect from a Buddhist monk. 

18. The Stoic philosophy was founded by Zeno of Citium 
(350-260 B.C.). Although he lived and taught at 

Stoicism. . . 

Athens, his youth was spent m a city that was half 
Phoenician, and many of his most distinguished followers had 
a like association with the Eastern world. The system deals 
with all the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, 
and Buddhism. Like the first, it insists that there exists an 
unchanging Destiny, according to which events throughout the 
universe are predetermined from all eternity. Like the second, 
it sets up as claiming the worship and allegiance of men a 
Supreme Deity, who governs the world with boundless power 
and benevolent will, and is manifested to men as the Logos or 
'divine Word.' In its interpretation of the physical universe it 
accepts as a first principle a living and creative fire, ultimately 
identical with the deity, and containing the germs of the whole 
creation. It sees in the will of man an independent, and divine 
power, subject to no compulsion from without, but attaining its 
highest and best by willing submission to the Supreme Being. 
In its practical ethics, though it does not advocate the suppres- 
sion of all desires, it so far agrees with Buddhism as to hold 
that happiness is only found in the subordination of individual 
claims to the voice of universal reason. Finally, its teachers 
are actively engaged in propagating its doctrines and guiding 
its disciples. Stoicism has, in short, the inward and outward 
characteristics of the other great movements we have described, 
and may claim without presumption to be reckoned amongst 
the world-religions". 

''" ib. iii 22, 45 to 50. 

^1 ' The system that stood to Pagan Rome more nearly than anything else in the 
place of a religion' Crossley, M. Aurelius, iv Pref. p.. xii. 'Its history resembles 
that of a religion rather than a speculative system ' Rendall, M. Aurelius, Pref. p. xv. 

A. 2 



l8 ROMAN STOICISM 

19. If however we reckon Stoicism amongst the world- 

religions, we must not forget that of all of them- 

Comprehen- ... ... , . i , , . . 111 

siveness of the it IS the most philosophical, and this in a double 
icvi w. sense. In the first place the founders of Stoicism 

are conscious of the problems to which preceding schools of 
thought have endeavoured to find answers, and attempt to 
reconcile or at any rate to bring into relation the answers which 
their predecessors have found. Secondly they are greatly 
occupied with intellectual problems, and clearness of thought 
is to them almost equally important with rightness of thought. 
The theory of Fate which we have attributed to the Chaldaeans 
is to the plain man irreconcileable with the doctrine of the 
government of the world by a Supreme Deity ; yet the Stoics 
hold both dogmas. The theory of the freedom of the human 
will is a limitation equally of the dominion of Fate and of that 
of the Deity: the Stoics maintain the freedom of the human 
will and refuse to admit the limitation of either power. The 
Persians maintained that the power of the principle of Good 
was balanced by that of the principle of Evil ; and from this 
they drew what seemed to be the legitimate conclusion that 
man may choose to obey the one or the other, to do good or to 
do evil. The Stoics omitted the principle of Evil altogether 
from their scheme, and yet maintained the theory of the moral 
choice. To understand the Stoic system it is necessary to know 
exactly in what balance its different elements were maintained, 
and to avoid identifying it with other systems, ancient or modern, 
which are more sharply cut. Thus when it is commonly asserted 
that Stoicism on its religious side is Pantheism, the very brevity 
of this summary must create suspicion. Certainly the Stoics 
frequently speak of the universe as divine ; but they hold with 
equal firmness the doctrines that the universe is governed by 
Providence, and that human perversity may thwart the divine 
purpose, both being doctrines which in ancient as in modern 
times are associated with Theism, and held to be inconsistent 
with pantheistic views. 

20. A similar difficulty confronts us when we ask whether 
God and the the deity of the Stoics is to be considered as per- 
'Word,' sonal. All the terms commonly used in associatioi| 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS I9 

with a personal deity are adopted by the Stoics : their god is 
Lord and Father. But then they use with equal freedom terms 
commonly associated with materialism : for the Supreme Being 
is to them body or stuff, a primitive fire which converts itself 
by natural laws into every form of being. For this reason the 
Stoics are commonly called materialists, and yet the main body 
of their teaching is contrary to that usually associated with 
materialism *l Further, beside the personal and the material 
conceptions of the Deity, they adopted and developed a con- 
ception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other 
systems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of 
deity to the divine Word, which from one point of view is the 
deity himself, and from another is something which emanates 
from him and is in some way distinct. Thus the term ' God,' 
which to children and child-like religions appears so simple, is 
in the Stoic system extraordinarily complex; and its full content 
cannot be grasped without a willingness to revise the meaning 
of many conceptions which seem firmly established, such as 
those of personality, material, and quality. If we are to suppose 
that the Stoir-e-Sw— r-^"" ^^ ^^^ Word arose ultimately from 
similar conceptions in Hebraism or Persism, by which the voice 
of a personal God attained to a quasi-independent personality, 
we must allow that the Stoics made use of this term with a 
boldness and consistency which from the time of their appearance 
brought it into the forefront of religious and metaphysical con- 
troversy. Through the Stoics the doctrine of the Word passed 
into the systems of Judaism and Christianity, to perform in 
each the like service by reconciling doctrines apparently con- 
tradictory. Of all the systems we may perhaps say that 
Stoicism makes the fewest new assertions or negations, but 
introduces the most numerous interpretations. 

21. We have comparatively little means of judging of the 
Influence of influence of Stoicism in the world of Asia Minor, 
Stoicism. 1^^^ incidentally we may infer that it was very con- 

siderable. In Athens the moral earnestness of its teachers found 
little response in public feeling, whilst it laid the exponents of 

^^ See below, § 173. 



20 ROMAN STOICISM 

its tenets open to many a sharp thrust from keen critics whose 
constructive powers were after all inferior. In Rome itself 
Stoicism took root rapidly. The brilliant circle that gathered 
round Scipio Africanus the younger was imbued with its ideals ; 
Cato, the leading republican of the first century B.C., was a 
living representative of its principles ; and Cicero and Brutus, 
with many others less known to fame, were greatly influenced 
by it. In the first century of the principate Stoicism imparted 
a halo of heroism to a political and social opposition which 
otherwise would evoke little sympathy ^^; in the second century 
A.D. its influence was thrown on the side of .the government ; 
the civilized world was ruled under its flag, and its principles 
were embodied in successive codes of law which are not yet 
extinct. Its direct supremacy was not long-lived ; for at the 
very time when a Stoic philosopher sits in the seat of the 
Caesars its followers seem to be losing their hold on its most 
"'^Tp^trKn-As^tUX\^s. It came into sharp conflict with Christianity 
on matters of outWcJri observance ; but in the cores of the two I 
systems there was much 'ilTrem:§i^ and from Stoic homes were | 
drawn the most intelligent advocates of uis^-iit?v7e'/rclth. .. .^ 

22. By Judaism we mean here the way of thinking which 
Judaism ^^^ prevalent in the Jewish world from the date of 
the return from Babylon to that of the destruction 
of Jerusalem. Judaism was of course by no means restricted to 
the soil of Palestine ; it was carried by the diffusion of the 
Jewish race to all the coasts of the Mediterranean ; besides its 
national centre at Jerusalem, it included a great centre of learn- 
ing at Alexandria, and its branches, as we have seen^^, extended 
to the south of Egypt. The chief external impulse which 
affected it was the spread of Persism. The two systems agreed 

^' ' Patricians, as we call them, only too often fail in natural affection ' M. Aurel. 
To himself, i 12 (Rendall's translation). See also below, §§ 442, 443. 

^■^ ' Dying, [Stoicism] bequeathed no small part of its disciplines, its dogmas, and 
its phraseology to the Christianity by which it was ingathered ' Kendall, M. Aurelhis, 
Pref. p. XV. ' Tkebasis of Christian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical ' 
Hatch, Hibberi Lectures, p. 170. '[The post-Aristotelian period] supplied the scientific 
mould into which Christianity in the early years of its growth was cast, and bearing 
the shape of which it has come down to us ' O. J. Reichel in his Preface to the 
translation of Zeller's Stoics, etc. 

^^ See above, § 9. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 21 

in their belief in a God of heaven, and in their dislike to idol- 
worship ; and it can be no matter of wonder if one party at 
least among the Jews readily accepted the more strictly Persian 
doctrines of the ministry of angels, the struggle between good 
and evil, the immortality of the soul, and the reward after death, 
as well as such observances as the washing of hands^''. Strong 
Persian influence has been traced in the book of Daniel^ and as 
Jewish speculation developed at Alexandria, it took up the use 
of the Greek language, and so came into touch with the 
influences that were moulding thought throughout Asia Minor^^ 
The most interesting and elevated production of Alexandrine 
Judaism is the book known as the Wisdom of Solomon, probably 
composed in the first century B.C.^^ 

23. The author of this book, whilst himself a firm adherent 
'The Wisdom of monotheism, shews a not altogether intolerant 
of Solomon. appreciation of those systems in which either the 
heavenly bodies or the elements seem to occupy the most 
important place : — 

1. For verily all men by nature were but vain who had no perception 

of God, 
And from the good things that are seen they gained not power 

to know him that is, 
Neither by giving heed to the works did they recognise the 

artificer ; 

2. But either fire, or wind, or swift air. 

Or circling stars, or raging water, or the luminaries of heaven, 
They thought to /be gods that rule the world. 

3. And if it was througn- delight in their beauty that they took them to 

be the gods, 
Let them know how much better than these is their sovereign 

Lord : 
For the first author of beauty created them : 

^^ It is not admitted by the best authorities that the term 'Pharisee' is in any 
way connected with the name of 'Persian' or its modern equivalent ' Parsee.' But 
the resemblance in beliefs and habits is very striking, especially if we contrast the 
Pharisees with their Sadducee opponents. ' The Sadducees say that there is no resur- 
rection, neither angel, nor spirit ; but the Pharisees confess both ' Acts xxiii 8. 

*'' D. A. Bertholet, ' The value of the history of religions,' Hofniletic Review, 
Nov. 1908. 

'^ See Fairweather, Backgi-ound of the Gospels, ch. vii (on ' the apocalyptic move- 
ment and literature '). *" ib. p. 337. 



L/ 



22 ROMAN STOICISM 

4. But if it was through astonishment at their power and influence, 

Let them understand from them how much more powerful is he 
that formed them : 

5. For from the greatness of the beauty even of created things 

In like proportion does man form the image of their first maker. 

6. But yet for these men there is but small blame, 

For they too peradventure do but go astray 

While they are seeking God and desiring to find him. 

Wisdom of Solomott, xiii 1-6. 

The same author rises to still greater heights when he per- 
sonifies Wisdom or Philosophy as a Spirit attendant upon, and 
almost identified with the deity. Here his language resembles 
that of the Avestic hymns, describing the angels attendant upon ' 
Ahura Mazda «": — 

22. For there is in Wisdom a spirit quick of understanding, holy, 

Alone in kind, manifold, 

Subtil, freely moving, 

Clear in utterance, unpolluted, 

Distinct, unharmed. 

Loving what is good, keen, unhindered, 

23. Beneficent, loving toward man, 

Stedfast, sure, free from care. 

All-powerful^ all-surveying, 

And penetrating through all spirits 

That are quick of understanding, pure, most subtil : 

24. For wisdom is more mobile than any motion : 

Yea, she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her 
pureness. 

25. For she is a breath of the power of God, 

And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty : 
Therefore can nothing defiled find entrance into her. 

26. For she is an effiilgence from everlasting light, 

And an unspotted mirror of the working of God, 
And an image of his goodness. 

27. And she, being one, hath power to do all things : 

And remaining in herself, reneweth all things, 
And from generation to generation passing into holy souls 
She maketh men friends of God, and prophets ; 
29. For she is fairei than the sun. 

And above all the constellations of the stars. 

Wisdom of Solomon, vii 22-29. 

** See above, § 12. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 23 

24. The fusion of Greek and Judaic modes of thought is 

most complete in the works of Philo the Tew 

Philo the Jew. ^ _ _ -' 

(c. 20 B.C. — 54 A.D.). This writer in commenting 
upon the books of the Old Testament, finds himself able by way 
of interpretation to introduce large parts of Greek philosophies. 
The place of Wisdom in the writer last named is taken in his 
works by the Logos or 'Word^^'; and the 'Word' is many times 
described as an emanation of the deity, after the Persian 
fashion**^. Without anticipating the further discussion of this 
philosophical conception, we may well notice here how charac- 
teristic it is of an age which paid boundless homage to reason, 
and how it supplies a counterpoise to conceptions of the deity 
which are rigidly personal. But Philo is of still more direct 
service to the study of Stoicism, because he had so completely 
absorbed the system that, where other authorities fail us, we 
may often trust to his expositions for a knowledge of deta''? 
of the Stoic system . .. ' 

Another work of about the same period is the Fourth book 
of the Maccabees, in which Stoic ethics, only slightly disguised, 
are illustrated from Jewish history. In this fusion of Hebraic 
and Hellenistic thought, unfortunately interrupted by political 
convulsions, eminent modern Jews have recognised the natural! 
development of the teaching of the Hebrew prophets''^ 

25. The foregoing discussions will already have suggested 

that Christianity is bound by intimate ties to the 

Christianity. 111 

other world-religions ; though it is beyond our 
present purpose to examine the precise nature of those ties. 
It is pre-eminently concerned with the breaking down of Jewish 
nationalism, and its constant appeal to ' the truth ' is essentially 
the same as the appeal of kindred systems to ' wisdom ' or 
'philosophy.' The Lord's Prayer, addressed to the 'Father in 
heaven,' and with its further references to ' The Name,' ' The 
Kingdom,' ' The Will,' ' temptation,' and ' the Evil One,' reflects 

®^ Heinze, Lehre voin Logos, pp. 251, 252. 

^2 ' The Logos is related to God as Wisdom, and is the full expression of the 
Divine mind. He is the sheckinah or glory of God, the first-born Son of God, the 
second God' Fairweather, Background of the Gospels, p. 358. 

^ Friedlander, Die religiosen Bewegungen innerhalb des Juddisnius, 1905. 



24 ROMAN STOICISM 

the principal conceptions of Persism, of which we are again 
reminded in the Apocalypse by the reference to the ' seven 
spirits of God"'*.' The Sermon on the Mount has been, not 
without reason, compared to the Buddhist sermon of Benares. 
With Stoicism Christianity has special ties, both direct and 
indirect. Its chief apostle was Paul of Tarsus, who was brought 
up in a city from which more than one eminent Stoic teacher 
had proceeded®^ and whose ways of thinking are penetrated by 
Stoic conceptions. The most profound exponent of its theology 
("fhe author of the Gospel according to Joht) placed in the fore- 
front of his system the doctrine of the ' Word ' which directly 
or (more probably) indirectly he derived from Stoic sources. 
The early church writers felt the kinship of thought without 
perceiving the historical relation. To them Cicero in his Stoic 
works was ' anima naturaliter Christiana ' ; and they could only 
explain the lofty teachings of Seneca by the belief that he was 
a secret convert of the apostle Paul*'®. Parallelism between Stoic \ 
and Christian phraseology is indeed so frequently traced that it j 
may be well to emphasize the need of caution. It is not by 
single phrases, often reflecting only the general temper of the 
times, that we can judge the relation of the two systems; it is 
necessary also to take into account the general framework and 
the fundamental principles of each. 

26. Of the systems named by Aristotle far the least known 
to us is Druidism. It appeared to Caesar and other 

Druidism. 

Romans to be the national religion of the Gauls 
and Britons, exactly as Magism appeared to the Greeks to be 
the national religion of the Persians. But other evidence indi- 
cates that Druidism was a reformed religion or philosophy, not 
unlike Persism in its principles. The training of Druidical 
students was long and arduous ; it claimed to introduce them to 
a knowledge of heavenly deities denied to the rest of the world, 

®^ ' There were seven lamps of fire burning before the throne, which are the 
seven Spirits of God ' Revelation iv 5. 

®s Of these Antipater of Tarsus is the best known, for whom see § no ; others are 
Heraclides, Archedemus, Zeno of Tarsus, Nestor, Athenodorus, etc., for whom see 
Index of Proper Names. 

®® Winckler, Der Stoicismus, p. ■2; Lightfoot, Philippians, pp. 270, 271. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 25 

and to reveal to them the immortality of the soul. Our best 
authority is the Latin poet Lucan : — 

' To you alone it has been granted to know the gods and the powers 
of heaven ; or (it may be) to you alone to know them wrongly. You dwell 
in deep forests and far-away groves : according to your teaching the shades 
do not make their way to the still regions of Erebus or the grey realm of 
Dis below ; the same spirit guides a new body in another world ; if you 
know well what you say, then death is but an interlude in life. If not, at 
least the peoples, on whom the northern star gazes directly, are happy in 
their illusion ; for the greatest of terrors, the fear of death, is nothing to 
them. Hence it comes that their warriors' hearts are ready to meet the 
sword, and their souls have a welcome for death, and they scorn to be 
thrifty with life, in which they can claim a second share''''.' 

Druidism, like Stoicism, seems to have prepared its adherents 
for a specially ready acceptance of Christianity. 

27. The story of the world-religions, with their countless 
prophets, teachers, confessors and martyrs, has its 
reach^Tyet°* tragic side. We ask what was attained by so much 
study and self-denial, such courageous defiance of 
custom and prejudice, such bold strivings after the unattainable, 
so many hardly spent lives and premature deaths, and feel 
puzzled to find a reply. To the problems proposed the world- 
religions gave in turn every possible answer. Some found life 
sweet, others bitter ; some bowed before the inexorable rule of 
destiny, others believed in a personal and benevolent government 
of the universe; some looked forward to a life after death, others 
hoped for annihilation. Their theories crystallized into dogmas, 
and as such became the banners under which national hatreds 
once more sought outlet in bloodshed. Their adherents sacrificed 
everything in the hope of reaching certain and scientific truth, 
and, at the end of all, religion still appears the whole world over 
to be in conflict with science, and the thousand years during 
which Wisdom was counted more precious than riches are often 
looked back upon as a time of human aberration and childish- 
ness. It is not to be denied that thousands of noble spirits 
set out during this period for a goal that they never reached; 
and those who are inclined to destructive criticism may plausibly 
characterise their enterprise as vanity. 

^^ Lucan, Phars. i 452-462. 



26 ROMAN STOICISM 

28. It is the task of literary research to pierce through this 

limited view, and to trace the real effect of philo- 
Inwi'rd*'' ^*'" sophical effort on the life of individuals and nations. 

All over the civilized world it raised a race of heroes, 
struggling- not for power or splendour as in the epoch of barbarism, 
but for the good of their fellow-men. It gave a new value to life, 
and trampled under foot the fear of death. It united the nations, 
and spread the reign of law and justice. Where its influence has 
weakened, the world has not changed for the better; so that the 
very failures of the world-religions most attest their value. India 
has relapsed from Buddhism, its own noblest work, to its earlier 
creeds, and they still bar its path against social progress. Europe, 
no longer united by the sentiment of a catholic religion, and in- 
creasingly indifferent to literary sympathies, is falling back into 
the slough of frontier impediments and racial hatreds. From 
all this there is no way out except in the old-fashioned quest of 
truth and good will, 

29. Both in ancient and in modern times the importance of 

Stoicism has been very variously estimated, accord- 
sto^icis^m ^ °^ '"S ^^ ^^^ critic has set up a purely literary standard, 

or has taken into account historical influence. To 
those who look upon philosophy as it is embodied in books, and 
forms a subject for mental contemplation and aesthetic enjoy- 
ment, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have always seemed 
of far higher rank. As contributions to the progress of humanity, 
in politics and law, in social order and in the inventive adapta- 
-tion of material surroundings, they can hardly claim to approach 
any one of the systems discussed in this chapter. But it is with 
no wish to depreciate the great masterpieces of Hellenic culture 
that we now set against the criticisms of some of its ardent 
advocates the maturer judgment of writers who have approached 
with greater sympathy the study of the Hellenistic and Roman 
worlds. * Iir Plato and Aristotle,' says Zeller, ' Greek philosophy 
reached its greatest perfection *'l' ' Its bloom was short-lived®'/ 
' Greece was brought into contact with the Eastern nations, 
whereby it became subject to a back-current of Oriental 
thought'^''.' ' With the decline of political independence the 

^8 Stoics, etc., p. I. *" ib. p. lo. ^** ib. pp. 13, 14. 



THE WORLD-RELIGIONS 2/ 

mental powers of the nation were broken past remedy ''^^ 
' What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy 
would become practical, if indeed it were studied at alF^?' To 
minds of another temper it does not seem so fatal that ' philo- 
sophy should become practical' ' It should be insisted,' says 
Prof. Mahaffy, 'that the greatest practical inheritance the Greeks 
left in philosophy was not the splendour of Plato, or the vast 
erudition of Aristotle, but the practical systems of Zeno and 
Epicurus, and the scepticism of Pyrrho. In our own day every 
man is either a Stoic, an Epicurean, or a Sceptic''^' The great- 
ness of Stoicism in particular was eloquently recognised by a 
French writer of the eighteenth century : ' elle seule savait faire 
les citoyens, elle seule faisait les grands hommes, elle seule faisait 
les grands empereurs^'*!' With these tributes may be compared 
that paid by a writer who approaches the subject from the stand- 
point of modern philosophy and theology. ' [Stoicism] has 
perennial fascination ; and there are not wanting signs that it 
appeals with special attractiveness to cultured minds at the 
present day. It has both speculative and practical value ; its 
analysis of human nature and its theory of knowledge, no less 
than its ethical teaching, giving insight into the problems of the 
universe and the right mode of guiding life. As an important 
stage in the march of philosophical thought, and as a luminous 
chapter in the history of natural theology, it solicits our attention 
and will repay our study^^' 

30. Judgments so contradictory reveal the fact that ancient 
divergencies of philosophic sympathies have their 
stokfsm*^*'^^ counterparts to-day ; and perhaps in studying and 
judging the systems of antiquity a little more is 
needed of the sympathy and interpretative elasticity which every 
man unconsciously uses in maintaining the political, philosophic 
and religious views to which he is attracted by inheritance or 
personal conviction. Thus to understand Stoicism fully a man 
must himself become for the time being a Stoic. As such he 

^^ ib. p. 15. ''2 ib. p. 16. 

^^ Greek Life and Thought, Introd., pp. xxxvii, xxxviii. 
^* Montesquieu, Esprit des his, ii 24. 
^* W. L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. v. 



28 ROMAN STOICISM 

will no longer bind himself by the letter of the school authorities. 
In many a phrase they use he will recognise an obsolete habit 
of thought, an exaggerated opposition, a weak compliance in the 
face of dominant opinions, or a mistaken reliance upon what 
once seemed logical conclusions. At other points he will see 
difficulties felt to which an answer can now easily be supplied. 
At each step he will ask, not so much what the Stoics thought, 
but what a Stoic must necessarily think. Whilst constantly 
referring to the original authorities, he will allow much to be 
forgotten, and in other cases he will draw out more meaning 
than the writers themselves set in their words. If he can walk, 
boldly but not without caution, on this path, he will assuredly 
find that Stoicism throws light on all the great questions to 
which men still seek answers, and that to some at least it still 
holds out a beckoninsf hand. 



CHAPTER II. 

HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES. 

31. We have seen already that the great problems of which 
Stoicism propounds one solution were agitated 

Greek thought. r r fc> ^ ^ 

during the millennium which preceded the Christian 
era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the one hand, and 
in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other. To the 
beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date; 
but the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved 
from East to West. But just at the same time the influence of 
Greek art and literature spreads from West to East ; and it is 
to the crossing and interweaving of these two movements that 
we owe almost all the light thrown on this part of the history of 
human thought. The early history of Stoicism has reached us 
entirely through the Greek language, and is bound up with the 
history of Greek literature and philosophy \ But long before 
Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in kind 
had reached Greece ; and the whole of early Greek literature, 
and especially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discus- 
sion of the physical and ethical problems to which Stoicism 
addressed itself. From the storehouse of this earlier literature 
the Stoics drew many of their arguments and illustrations ; the 
speculations of Heraclitus and the life of Socrates were especially 
rich in suggestions to them. The study of Greek literature and 
philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for a full 
appreciation of Stoicism ; and the way has been made easier of 

^ ' Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious conscious- 
ness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West ' Lightfoot, Philippians, 
p. 274. 



30 ROMAN STOICISM 

late by excellent treatises, happily available in the English 
language, dealing with the general development of philosophic 
and religious thought in Greece^. Here it is only possible to 
refer quite shortly to those writers and teachers to whom Stoicism 
is most directly indebted. 

32. Although the Homeric poems include representations 
^ of gods and men corresponding to the epoch of 

national gods and to other still earlier stages of 
human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least the 
dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the 
gods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background ; 
and though heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move 
in an atmosphere of greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of 
them are restrained both in word and in act by a strong feeling 
of self-respect, the al8co<; or shamefastness which entirely differen- 
tiates them from the heroes of folk-lore ; in particular, the 
typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness, and sexual unrestraint 
are amongst the things of which it is a shame to speak without 
reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape ; yet they 
are somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly 
brilliance in which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems 
to encircle also the heights where the gods dwell on mount 
Olympus^ Gradually too there comes to light amidst the 
picture of the many gods something resembling a supreme 
power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (alcra, fiolpa), 
sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly 
of all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods^ 
Thus Zeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men®; 
he is the dispenser of happiness to men, ' to the good and the 
evil, to each one as he willV and the distributor of gracious 

2 Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz' Greek Thiiikers (transl. 
by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam's Religions teac/iers 
■of Greece (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908). 

* ' Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it ' 
Hom. Od. 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang's transl.). See also Adam, Religious Teachers, 

V- 31- 

■* ' It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of 

Zeus' Od. 5, 103. 

5 //. 24, 308; Od. 14, 404. ^ ib. 6, 188. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 3 I 

gifts^ unbounded in power^ and in knowledge^ The gods 
again, in spite of the many tales of violence attached to their 
names, exercise a moral governance over the world. ' They 
love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice and the 
righteous acts of men^°'; 'in the likeness of strangers from far 
countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through 
the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of 
men".' 

Whilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly 
object to Homer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor 
worthy of their nature, there was on the other hand much in the 
Iliad and Odyssey^ and particularly in the latter, which was in 
harmony with philosophical conceptions. It was not without 
reason that the Stoics themselves made of Ulysses, who in 
Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example of the man 
of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who 
through self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his 
way to the goal". From this starting-point the whole of the 
Odyssey is converted into a 'Pilgrim's Progress'; the enchantress 
Circe represents the temptations of gluttony, which turns men 
into swine ^^; the chant of the Sirens is an allegory of the entice- 
ments of sensual pleasure. 

33. In Hesiod (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt 
^ to construct a history of the universe; his Theogony 

is the forerunner of the Cosmology which later on 
is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the company of the 
personal gods we find not only the personified lights of heaven, 
Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and 
Ocean, Night and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and 
Death, all bearing witness to the emergence of the spirit of 
speculation. In Hesiod again we first find the description of 
the ' watchmen of Jove,' who are no longer the gods themselves 
as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings, corresponding 
to the Persian angels and the Sat/iove? of later Greek. 

^ Od. 8, 170. ' ib. 4, 237. 

^ ib. 20, 75. 1* ib. 14, 84. 

1^ ib. 17, 485. " See below, § 325. 

^^ So already Socrates understood it ; Xen. Mem. i 3, 7. 



32 ROMAN STOICISM 

'Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen over 
mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness, walking all 
ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist^*.' 

But it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly 
a forerunner of the Stoic school : for neither the warlike valour 
nor the graceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the 
stern sense of justice and the downright hard work of the plain 
man. 

' Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the sweat of 
the brow ; long and steep is the path that reaches to her, and rough at the 
beginning ; but when you reach the highest point, hard though it is, in the 
end it becomes easy^^' 

34. Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of 
The Orphic the ' Orphic ' movement, belonging to the sixth 
poems. century B.C., and exercising a wide influence over 

various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries. For 
an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere^®; 
here we can only notice that it continued the cosmological 
speculations of Hesiod's Theogony, and in particular developed 
a strain of pantheism which is echoed in the Stoic poets. 
According to an Orphic poet 

'Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the male and the 
female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day ; he is the one force, the one 
great deity, the creator, the alluring power of love ; for all these things are 
immanent in the person of Zeus i''.' 

Here amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see 
the budding principle of philosophic monism, the reaching after 
a unity which will comprehend all things. To the same school 
is attributed the doctrine that ' the human soul is originally and 
essentially divine^**.' 

35. To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek 
The Hyio- philosophcrs who are known to us by name. In 
zoists. ^11 Q^ these the early polytheism is either abandoned 

^^ Hesiod, Works and Days, 252-255 ; and see below, § 254. 
1^ ib. 289-292, quoted Xen. Mem. ii i, 20. 

^® For instance, to Adam, Religious Teachers, Lect. v ; Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 
bk. i, ch. ii. 

^'' Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel). 
^'^ Adam, p. 114. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 33 

or becomes so dim in its outlines that the origin and governing 
force of the universe is sought in quite other directions. The 
philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem of the 
elements. Thales of Miletus was a man of many attainments; 
he had travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an 
active political reformer. To him water was the primary sub- 
stance, from which all others proceeded and to which they 
returned ^^. Anaximander of the same town was the first who 
undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known world. 
To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the 
same as any visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of 
undefined character (airecpov), capable of assuming in turn all 
shapes^". Anaximenes (once more of Miletus) assumed air as 
the first principle, and derived the other elements from it by 
processes of condensation (TrvKvcocrc^) and rarefaction". But on 
one point all the Ionian philosophers were agreed : the primary 
substance was the cause of its own motion ; they were ' hylo- 
zoists,' since they hold that matter (uXt;) is a living thing 
(^Q)ov). They are from the standpoint of physics ' monists,' as 
opposed to those who hold matter and life, or matter and force, 
to be two things eternally distinct, and are therefore ' dualists ' 
in their theory ^^. 

36. To the same sixth century belong two other notable 
philosophers. PYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 
575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had travelled 
widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of a 
tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half 
religious and half political, which in its original form was not 
long-lived. But a widespread tradition remained as to his 

^^ Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i pp. 46-48. 

20 ib. 48-56. 21 if,, _^6_5g. 

^2 The terms ' monism ' and ' dualism ' have recently become the watchwords of 
opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they 
stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. 
For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, 
thought is impossible; so far we are all 'dualists.' Yet as soon as we fix our 
attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some 
kind of ultimate reconciliation ; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become 
'monists.' Similarly the broad monistic principle 'all things are one' is meaningless 
apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language. 

A. -x 



34 ROMAN STOICISM 

doctrines, in which the theory of Numbers held a leading position. 
Pythagoras appears to have been a good mathematician and 
astronomer, and followers of his school were at an early date led 
to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis and the 
central position of the sun in the planetary system ^^ His name 
is also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, 
which we may suppose him to have derived ultimately from 
some Indian source ; and to the same country we must look as 
having suggested to him and his followers the practice of abstain- 
ing from animal food^"*. 

37. If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, 
it might seem as if the old mythologies and theo- 

Xenophanes. ° y ea 

gonies were already dead. But in fact the battle 
was yet to come. Xenophanes of Colophon (born circ. 580 B.C.) 
witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering 
progress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the 
power of the invader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, 
and finally settled in Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the 
founder of the Eleatic school. But in his religious convictions 
he was whole-heartedly on the Persian side. ' There is one God, 
greatest amongst gods^^ and men, not like mortal men in bodily 
shape or in mind^V Thus the worship of many gods and that 
of images of the deity are alike condemned ; and it is probable 
that in this false worship he found the cause of his country's 
fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic of 
the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as 
teachers of immorality, since they ' ascribed to the gods theft, 
adultery, and deceit, and all acts that are counted shame and blame 
amongst men^,' With keen criticism he pointed out that myths 
as to the birth of the gods dishonoured them just as much as if 
they related their deaths ; for on either supposition there is a 
time when the gods do not exisf^**. The conception of the deity 
formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism or Nature- 

-^ See below, §§ 71, 195. ^* Gomperz, i 127. 

^ This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204. 

2*' Xen. apud Euseb. Praep. ev. xiii 13. 

^^ Xenophanes apud Sext. maih. ix 193. 

2^ Id. apud Arist. Hhei. ii 23. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 35 

worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity ; but the 
fragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this 
point clear^. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his 
reHgious zeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic 
principle of an ultimate Unity in all things. 

38. With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach 
Heraciitus Heraclitus of Ephesus, a philosopher of the 
highest importance to us, since the Stoics after- 
wards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own 
system of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century 
were all examined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him ; 
his own solutions of the problems of the world are set forth in 
a prophetic strain, impressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, 
and lending itself to much variety of interpretation. For the 
opinions of the crowd, who are misled by their senses, he had no 
respect^" ; but even learning does not ensure intelligence^^ 
unless men are willing to be guided by the 'Word,' the universal 
reason*^. The senses shew us in the universe a perpetual flowing : 
fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to earth (in rainfall), 
which is the downward path ; earth changes to water (rising 
mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path^^ Behind 
these changes the Word points to that which is one and un- 
changing^"*. Anaximander did well when he pointed to the 
unlimited as the primary stuff, but it is better to describe it as 
an ' everliving fire^l' Out of this fire all things come, and into 
it they shall all be resolved^®. Of this ever-living fire a spark is 

-^ On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211. 

'^^ 'Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit' Heracl. 
/■>. 4 (By water), 107 (Diels). 

•*^ ' Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, 
Xenophanes and Hecataeus' /^r. 16 B, 40 D. 

^'^ 'The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private under- 
standing' Fr. 92 B, 2 D. 

^■* ' All things move and nothing remains ' Plato CraL 402 A. 

^* ' Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things 
are one' Fr. 1 B, 50 D. 

^^ ' All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and 
goods with gold' Fr. 22 B, 90 D; 'neither God nor man created this World-order 
(k^o-^os), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living 
fire' Fr. 20 B, 30 D. 

^^ ' The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them ' Fr. 26 B, 66 D. 

3—2 



36 ROMAN STOICISM 

buried in each man's body; whilst the body Hves, this spark, 
the soul, may be said to be dead^''; but when the body dies it 
escapes from its prison, and enters again on its proper Hfe. 
The 'Word' is from everlasting^^; through the Word all things 
happen^' ; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in 
the physical world and in the soul of man. For man's soul 
there is a moral law, which can be reached only by studying 
the plan of the world in which we live'"'. But of this law 
men are continually forgetful ; they live as in a dream, un- 
conscious of it ; it calls to them once and again, but they do 
not hear if^ Most of all it is needed in the government of the 
state ; for ' he who speaks with understanding must take his 
foothold on what is common to all ; for all human laws are 
nourished by the one divine law".' 

39. The general import of the physical teaching of 
Heraclitus, and the indebtedness of the Stoics to 
it, have long been recognised : the bearing of this 
teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable 
matter. Does Heraclitus by the ' Logos ' which he so often 
names mean merely his own reasoning and message .'' is he 
speaking of the common reason of mankind ? or does the 
term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction, a divine power 
through which the world is created and governed ? For the 
fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before 
Heraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. 
The latest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up 
in three propositions : first, the ' Logos ' is eternal, being both 
pre-existent and everlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes ; 
secondly, all things both in the material and in the spiritual 
world happen through the ' Logos ' ; it is a cosmic principle, 

3^ 'Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our 
souls revive and live' Sext. Pyrrh. inst., iii 230 {Fr. 78 B, 88 d). 

^^ 'This Word is always existent' Fr, 2 B, i D. 39 ^-^^ 

^^ ' There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are 
steered through all' Fr. 19 B, 41 D. 

^1 ' Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even 
after they have heard it. ...Other men do not observe what they do when they are 
awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep ' Fr. 2 B, i D. 

^^ Fr. 91 B, 114 D. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 37 

* common ' or ' universal ' ; and in the third place, it is the duty 
of man to obey this 'Logos,' and so to place himself in harmony 
with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with 
many recent writers, he adopts the translation ' the Word ' as 
on the whole the most adequate*^. Even the Romans found 
it impossible to translate \6ryo<i by any single word, and they 
therefore adopted the phrase ratio et oratio (reason and speech) ; 
in modern language it seems clearly to include also the broad 
notion of ' Universal Law ' or the ' Laws of Nature.' If we can 
rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in the 
interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a 
great creative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by 
bold generalizations such diverse provinces as those of physics, 
religion, and ethics; 'he was the first [in Greece, we must under- 
stand] to build bridges, which have never since been destroyed, 
between the natural and the spiritual life**,' It is to the Stoics 
almost alone that we owe it that teaching so suggestive and 
so practical was converted into a powerful social and intellectual 
force. 

40. The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus 
has very naturally suggested that his doctrine is 

Zarathustra ^ ^ ^^ 

and borrowed from that of Zarathustra^^ The historical 

Heraclitus. . r i i i • 

Circumstances are not uniavourable to this sugges- 
tion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and 
definitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very 
time at which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion 
was akin to a religious crusade, and had for a principal aim the 
stamping out of the idle and superstitious habit of worshipping 
images, by which (according to the Persians) the true God was 
dishonoured. The elevated character of the Persian religion 
could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already dissatisfied 
with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the 
resemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of 
Heraclitus is not restricted to the language used of the divine 
fire ; the doctrines of an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the 

*^ Adam, pp. 217-222. ^* Gomperz, i p. 63. 

^^ See Gladisch, Herakleitos tmd Zoroaster ; Ueberweg, Grtmdriss, p. 39 ; above, 
§ 13- 



38 ROMAN STOICISM 

\6yo<; or Word, and of the distinction between the immortal 
soul and the corruptible body, are common to both. But the 
differences between the two systems are almost equally striking. 
Heraclitus is a monist ; according to him all existences are 
ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, every- 
where opposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful ; 
his system is dualisf^^ Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, 
Heraclitus is cosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find 
no trace of the belief in Judgment after death, in Heaven, or 
in Hell. We may in fact well believe that Heraclitus was 
acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it, but we 
have not the means to determine what the extent of that 
influence was. It is related of him that he received (but declined) 
an invitation to the court of Darius ; and that his dead body was 
given up to be torn to pieces by dogs in the Persian fashion ■^'^ 

41. The development of philosophic thought at Athens 
-Pjjg was, as we have noticed, much complicated by the 

tragedians. political relations of Greece to Persia. Although 
the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was decisively 
repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the 
centre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories 
of Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian 
statesmen and warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not 
only maintained their political independence, but saved the 
images of their gods from imminent destruction. A revival of 
polytheistic zeal took place, as might have been expected. The 
wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly expended in the 
achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor's art, and their 
housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines 
strikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The 
same Aeschylus who (in his Persae) celebrates the defeat of the 
national enemy, a few years later (in his Agameimio7i) questions 
whether the Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek 
title of Zeus, and the Greek method of worshipping him^^ 

^^^ Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades 
(see his p. 26, note 39). 

^^^ Clem. Strom, i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75). 
'**• Agam. 155-161, 167-171. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 39 

His more conservative successor Sophocles was contented, in 
the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate from the old myths 
all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature. Euripides adopts 
a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact 
fidelity, he 'assails the resulting picture of the gods v !ai 
scathing censure and flat contradiction'*''.' With equal vigour 
he attacks the privileges of noble birth, and defends the rights 
of the slave ; he has a keen sympathy for all the misfortunes 
that dog man's life ; but his ethical teaching in no way derives 
its sanction from any theology. The Hellenes have lost con- 
fidence in their inherited outlook on the world. 

42. The same problems which the poets discussed in the 
city theatre were during the fifth century B.C. the 

The Sophists. , ., , - , - , . 

daily themes ot a class oi men now becommg so 
numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These 
were the ' sophists,' who combined the functions now performed 
partly by the university professor, partly by the public journalist'*^ 
Dependent for their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as 
they could attract, and therefore sensitive enough to the applause 
of the moment, they were distinguished from the philosophers 
by a closer touch with the public opinion of the day, and 
a keener desire for immediate results. Their contribution 
to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating with 
particular care the art of words, they created a medium by 
which philosophic thought could reach the crowd of men 
of average education ; eager advocates of virtue and political 
progress, they gave new hopes to a people which, in spite of 
its material successes, was beginning to despair because of the 
decay of its old moral and civic principles. In ProdicuS of 
Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of the 
period of the principate*': 

'A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they heard 
his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the frail body that 
contained it. Now he would describe the hardships of human existence; 

*'' Gomperz, ii p. 13. 

^ ' Half professor and half journalist — this is the best formula that we can devise 
to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.' Gomperz, i p. 414. 
^^ See below, §§ 124, 130, and 131. 



40 ROMAN STOICISM 

now he would recount all the ages of man, beginning with the new-born 
child, who greets his new home with wailing, and tracing his course to the 
second childhood and the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at 
death as a stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his 
tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free movement of his 
limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus, he sought to arm his 
disciples against the horrors of death by explaining that death concerned 
neither the living nor the dead. As long as we live, death does not exist ; 
as soon as we die, we ourselves exist no longer^''.' 

To Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the 
parting of the ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure 
on the other, each invite him to join company with her". This 
tale we shall find to be a favourite with the Roman philosophers. 
The same Prodicus introduced a doctrine afterwards taken up 
by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession, that of the * in- 
difference' of external advantages as distinct from the use to 
which they are applied. He also propounded theories as to the 
origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as 
personifications of the powers of nature, others as deified 
benefactors of the human race^^; theories which later on were 
adopted with zeal by the Stoic Persaeus^l To another sophist, 
HiPPlAS of Elis, we owe the doctrine of the ' self-sufficiency ' of 
virtue, again adopted both by Cynics and Stoics^''. Antiphon 
was not only the writer of an ' Art of Consolation,' but also of 
a treatise of extraordinary eloquence on political concord and 
the importance of education. ' If a noble disposition be planted 
in a young mind, it will engender a flower that will endure to 
the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be withered by 
drought ^^' 

43. Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted Anaxa- 

The GORAS, born at Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a 

Materialists. diligent student of the Ionic philosophers. But in 

his explanation of nature he broke away from ' hylozoism ' and 

introduced a dualism of mind and matter. ' From eternity all 

things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them®".' 

^ Gomperz, i p. 428. ®^ Xen. Mem. ii i, 21 to 34. 

'^ Gomperz, i p. 430. ®^ See below, § 89. 

®* Gomperz, i p. 433. ^5 ^^^ p_ ^27. 
^" Arist. P/ij/s. viii i ; and see below, § 173. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 4I 

More famous was his contemporary EmpedocleS of Agrigentum, 
whose name is still held in honour by the citizens of that town. 
In him we first find the list of elements reaching to four, earth, 
air, fire, and water ; and the doctrine that visible objects consist 
of combinations of the elements in varying proportions, first 
brought together by Love, then separated by Hatred, Just in 
so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single origin 
for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of the 
more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was 
carried further by Leucippus and Democritus, both of 
Abdera, who for the four elements substituted invisible atoms, 
of countless variety, moving by reason of their own weight in 
an empty space. This simple and powerful analysis is capable 
of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena, and with 
comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in 
chemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the 
neighbouring sciences of physics and botany. When however 
(as has frequently been the case both in ancient and modern 
times) the attempt is made to build upon it a general philo- 
sophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion of matter 
in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena 
of mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly 
correspond to the attitude of mind now called materialism, 
because in them the atoms, endowed with the material properties 
of solidity, shape, and weight alone, are conceived to be the 
only true existences, all others being secondary and derivative. 
This materialism (with some significant qualifications) was a 
century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and is of im- 
portance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic 
system of physics. 

44. The value of these scientific speculations was not for 
the time being fully recognised at Athens. It was 
in the atmosphere of sophistic discussion, not free 
from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise of civic and 
even of martial virtue that SoCRATES of Athens (circ. 469-399 
B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example 
of the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave 
almost to rashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. 



42 ROMAN STOICISM 

As a magistrate he discharged his duty unflinchingly. After 
the battle of Arginusae the ten Athenian generals were said to 
have neglected the duty of succouring certain disabled ships 
and the people loudly demanded that all should be condemned 
to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding 
senators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal 
procedure ^^^ Again, when Athens was under the rule of the 
Thirty, Socrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders^^ 
But when himself condemned to death, he refused to seize an 
opportunity for flight which was given him ; for this, he said, 
would be to disobey the laws of his country '^^ 

His private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens 
was now wealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered 
together for festive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed 
the greatest moderation in eating and drinking : such a course, 
he said, was the better for health and also produced more real 
pleasure. Over the grosser temptations of the senses he had 
won a complete victory^^. His temper was calm and even ; he 
was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor did he allow 
himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal 
habits, though simple, were careful : he did not approve any 
neglect either of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress. 

Thus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self- 
control {Icrxv's Kol KpaTo<i) ; and by his character, even more than 
by his speculation, exercised an influence which extended widely 
over many centuries. 

45. The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the 
set formulae of a philosophic school. But clearly 

His teaching. . ... 

it was locussed upon the lite oi men in the city 
and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the 
phenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the 
universe. So Cicero well says of him that * Socrates called 
philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it 
into the houses and cities of men, compelling men to enquire 
concerning life and morals and things good and evil*^"' ; and 

5«a Xen. Afem. i i, i8. ^'' Plato, A/>oL p. 32. 

'^ Plato, Crifo, p. 44 sqq. ^* Gomperz, ii p. 48. 

"" Cic. Ac. i 4, 15 ; Tusc, disp. v 4, ro. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 43 

Seneca that he ' recalled the whole of philosophy to moral 
questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish 
between good and evil**\' He had no higher object than to send 
out young men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to 
take an active part in the affairs of the community, and to this 
course he urged them individually and insistently^'l But it 
must not be supposed that he put on one side problems con- 
cerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the constitution 
and government of the universe. His views on these points 
carried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated 
by him not as personal opinions, but as points upon which he 
desired to share the convictions of his neighbours, if only they 
could assure him that reason was on their side. 

46. Socrates more than any other man possessed the art 
Re son °^ persuasivc reasoning, thereby making his com- 

the guide. panions wiser and better men. First he asked that 
terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should know 
what the nature is of each thing that exists''^, and should examine 
himself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced 
the practice of induction {iiraKTiKol \6yoi\ by which men make 
larger the outlook of their minds, understand one thing by 
comparison with another, and arrange the matter of their 
thought by classes^. By induction we arrive at general truths : 
not however by any mechanical or mathematical process, but 
(at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that 
is, by a kind of divine enlightenment^ He who has accustomed 
himself to think with deliberation, to look on the little in its 
relation to the great, and to attune himself to the divine will, 
goes out into the world strengthened in self-restraint, in argu- 
mentative power, and in active goodwill to his fellow-men. 

Most directly this method appeals to the future statesman. 
Of those who seek the society of Socrates many intend to 

«i Sen. £j>. 71, 7. 62 xen. Mem. iii 7. 

^ Xen. Mem. iv 6, i ; Epict. Disc, i "j, 11. 

** Xen. Mem. iv 5, 12 ; Arist. Mei. xiii 4. 

^ Xen. Mem. iv 7, 10. The Socratic fxavTiKT) must not be taken too seriously ; 
it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, 
akin to our modern use of the term ' genius ' in connexion with achievements in 
poetry and art. 



44 ROMAN STOICISM 

become generals or magistrates. Let them consider well what 
these words mean. Is not a pilot one who knows how to steer 
a ship .'' a cook one who knows how to prepare food ? must we 
not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide 
the state .-' And how can he know this but by study and 
training ? Must we not then say generally that all arts depend 
on knowledge, and knowledge on study ? Do we not reach the 
general truths that 'virtue is knowledge' and that 'virtue can be 
taught ' ? We may hesitate as to how to apply these principles 
to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on 
this point ; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never 
fails to warn him when his mind is turned towards a course 
which the gods disapprove. 

47. In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates 
His dualism could find no satisfaction. But one day he dis- 
in physics. covcred with pleasure the words of Anaxagoras : 
■*it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all things^^.' 
Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe, in 
which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the 
beginning there existed a chaos of unordered dead meaning- 
less matter, and also mind, the principle of life, meaning, and 
order. Mind touched matter, and the universe sprang into 
being. Mind controls matter, and thus the universe continues 
to exist. The proof is found in the providential adaptation of 
the world for the life and comfort of mankind : for it is only 
consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work 
of mind*'^ He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears 
to hear with, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the 
organs of sight and smell ; he implanted in him a love of his 
offspring, and in the offspring a love of its parents ; and lastly 
endowed him with a soul capable of understanding and worship- 
ping his maker. For the divine power Socrates uses quite 
indifferently the words ' god ' and ' gods ' : but his belief is 
essentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he 

^^ Plato, Phaedo, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; 
at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in 
disregarding all physical speculations. 

^'' Xen. Me>n. i 4, 4. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 45 

has ceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon 
their altars in good-humoured conformity with the law, and 
even adopts the popular term ' divination ''^' though in a sense 
very different to that in which the official priesthood used it. 

In the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar 
dualism. Man consists of body and soul : the soul is lord and 
king over the body, and indeed may rightly be called divine, if 
anything that has touch with humanity is such''^ 

48. The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely domi- 
His ietism "ated by his religious principles. The gods, he 
held, know all things, our words, our deeds, and the 
secrets of our hearts : they are everywhere present and give 
counsel to men concerning the whole of life''". The first duty of 
man is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by 
prayer, asking them to give us the good and deliver us from the 
evil, but not qualifying the prayer by any instruction to the gods 
as to what is good or evil ; for this the gods themselves know 
besf^ In these words then we may pray : * Zeus our king, give 
us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not; what is evil, 
even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us".' 

In this spirit of what we should to-day call ' pietism ' we 
must interpret his principle that ' virtue is knowledge''^' This 
not only asserts that no one can rightly practise any art unless 
he has studied and understands it, but also that no one can 
rightly understand an art without practising it. We say that 
there are men who know what is good and right, but do not 
perform it ; but this is not so ; for such men in truth think that 
some other course is good for them. Only the wise and pious 
man has a right understanding ; others cannot do good even if 
they try''^ ; and when they do evil, even that they do without 
willing if^ 

In its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came 
into collision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. 

®^ ib. i 4, 2. ^^ ib. i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14 ; Cic. N. D. ii 6, 18. 

'0 ib. i I, 19. 71 ij,_ 72 Plato, Ale. ii 143 A. 

''^ Xen. Mem. iii 9, 4 and 5. ''* ib. 

■^^ ouSeis eKOjc d/j.apra.vei; see Plato Prot. p. 345 D, Apol.-p. 25, Xen. Mem. iv2, 20. 
No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he 
is ignorant of the good. 



46 ROMAN STOICISM 

To say the least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of 
kings. He distinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, 
saying that the rule of one man with the assent of his subjects 
and in accordance with the laws was kingship, but without such 
assent and according to the man's arbitrary will was tyranny. But 
under whatever constitutional form government was carried on, 
Socrates asserted that those who knew the business of govern- 
ment were alone the true rulers, and that the will of the crowd, 
if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and 
impious"". 

49. So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in 
wh Socrates Athens till his seventieth year was past, and then 
was con- (jigfj \~,y ^he hands of the public executioner. This 

demned. "^ 

fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed 
almost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses 
amazement that the jurors should have condemned a man so 
modest and so wise, and so practical a benefactor of the 
Athenian people''''. Modern historians, with a wider knowledge 
of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates was allowed to 
live so long^'l The accusers complained that Socrates offended 
by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new deities, 
and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view 
of conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply 
justified. Clearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official 
gods of the city, but also in the deities it worshipped most 
earnestly, democracy and empire. Not only did he introduce 
new deities, but it might fairly be argued that he was introducing 
the most essential parts of the religion of the national enemy, 
Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical doctrines upon young 
men of the highest families in Athens, he might well be the 
cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served than 

''^ In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and 
practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam ; 
Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized 
that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and 
working hypotheses or ' divinations.' 

7' Mem. i i, i. 

^^ Grote, History of Greece, ch. Ixviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic represen- 
tation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school ; Greek Thinkers, ii pp. 94-97. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 4/ 

before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on 
wide observation and general truths could not be considered to 
make them less dangerous. Athens had already passed the 
time when its political power could be of service to its neigh- 
bours ; it had not reached that when it could be content with 
intellectual influence ; Socrates, just because he was in harmony 
with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its 
present. 

50. It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, 
The com- ^^^^ ^^ trace even in outline the positive teaching 
panions of of Socratcs. The severe self-repression with which 
he controlled his senses was exercised by him no 
less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape 
of irony {eipa>veia), that is, the continual withholding of his 
personal convictions, and obstetrics (fiaievrtK')]), the readiness to 
assist others in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus 
he was a great educator rather than a great teacher. For 
whilst he held that virtue alone was worthy of investigation, and 
that virtue was essentially wisdom, he professed to be entirely at 
a loss where to find this wisdom for himself; he left it to his 
pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus whilst 
men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened 
to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. 
Of the various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without 
committing himself to any one, his pupils took up each in turn 
and endeavoured to construct out of it a system ^^. These 
systems were in the sharpest possible contrast one with another, 
but they have certain points in common. All the teachers 
retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards their 
common master ; each was convinced that he alone possessed 
the secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from 
the physical speculations of which the ripe fruit was already 
being gathered in by the Atomists. The portal of knowledge 
was to all of them the right use of the reasoning power ; the 
shrine itself was the discipline of virtue, the attainment of happi- 
ness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such were the Socratic 

^^ ' ex illius [SocratisJ variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus 
alius aliud apprehenderat ' Cic. de Orat. iii i6, 6r. 



48 ROMAN STOICISM 

schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply divided 
into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century 
had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again 
established its importance. 

51. Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to 
The c nics ^^^ Stoic System. Of these the Cynic school^ 
founded by Antisthenes of Athens (circ. 440- 
365 B.C.) and developed by DiOGENES of Sinope, is its immediate 
precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the 
moral earnestness^" and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates ; 
and for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the 
master's favourite pupil. The lives both of these men and of 
their successors were marked by simplicity and self-abnegation^ 
and they devoted themselves with true missionary zeal to the 
reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of the figure of 
Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still 
lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the 
picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not 
without an element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us 
the man as he appeared to his own disciples. 

The breach with the state-religion which was latent in 
Socrates was displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antis- 
thenes, following in the track of the ardent Xenophanes,^ 
declared that the popular gods were many, but the god of 
nature was one^^ ; he denounced the use of images^^ ; and he 
and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism ®^ 
Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism^^ 
which treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured 
contempt on the glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. 
Nor did the Cynics consider the civilization of their times as 
merely indifferent ; they treated it as the source of all social evils, 
and looked for a remedy in the return to a ' natural ' life, to 
the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage unspoilt by 

^" Trapi, [Sw/cpdrovy] to KaprepLKhv Xa/3wi' koL to airad^s fiyXaicras Diog. L. vi 2. 
*^ ' Antisthenes... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens ' Cic. N', Z>. 

i 13. 32. 

*" ov5els [^eo;*] eldivai ej elKdvos MvaTai Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 46 C. 
^^ Epict. Disc, iii 22, 91. ®* See below, § 303. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 49 

education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially 
appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and 
which has been well described as ' the philosophy of the prole- 
tariate of the Greek world ^l' 

52. The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop 
Cynic intui- with its attack upon Greek institutions ; it assailed 
tionism. ^Y^Q citadel of reason itself Socrates had renounced 

physics ; the Cynics considered that dialectic was equally un- 
necessary^". For the doctrine of general concepts and the exercise 
of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists ; 
horses they could see, but not ' horsiness.' In their ethics they 
held to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that 'virtue is knowledge/ 
'virtue can be taught' and 'no one willingly sins'; and they laid 
special stress on the ' sufficiency ' (avrdpKeLa) of virtue, which to 
produce happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition 
to itself except a Socratic strength of character (^coKpaTiKr) 
l(T-)(y<iY'^. But in reality they identified virtue with this will- 
power, and entirely dispensed with knowledge ; virtue was to 
them a matter of instinct, not of scientific investigation. They 
appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical school 
which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is 
at the present time, under ever- varying titles, the most in- 
fluential of all. In practice, the virtue which specially appealed 
to the Cynics was that of ' liberty,' the claim of each man at 
every moment to do and say that which seems to him right, 
without regard to the will of sovereigns, the conventions of 
society, or the feelings of his neighbour ; the claim made at all 
times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are 
just or unjust, reckless or farseeing. 

53. Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics ; a 
Limits of doctrine which exercises a widespread influence 

ymsm. bccause of its extreme simplicity, which is extra- 

ordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which it is 
appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing 

^•' Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Gottling's book, Diogenes der Cyniker oder die 
Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats (Halle 1851). 

*=" dp4crK€i aiuTois rbv XoytKov /cat roc (pvaiKov rdnov Trepiatpeiv Diog. L. vi 103. 
^^ id. vi 1 1 . 



50 ROMAN STOICISM 

is more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism ; the 
Cynics were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. 
In their willing self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the 
example set by Buddhist monks, but they were probably much 
inferior to them in the appreciation of natural beauty and the 
simple pleasures of life. As compared with their master Socrates, 
they lacked his genial presence, literary taste, and kindly toler- 
ance ; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the type of 
Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride 
in their country, their birth, and their literary studies^. 

54. The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective 
. use of literature to disseminate their views ; but 

Xenophon. ' 

in the works of Xenophon of Athens (440-circ. 
350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost exactly 
from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal 
friend of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for 
intellectual subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military 
adventure, and his interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely 
relieved him of any scruples which patriotism might have im- 
posed upon him in this direction, leaving him free at one time 
to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another to join with 
the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen. From 
adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of 
the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took 
part in person) and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an 
interest which in no way depends upon their accuracy. The 
account which he gives of Socrates in his Meinorabilia {aTToixvn]- 
ixovevixara) is not always to be depended upon ; it is at the best 
a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher ; but it 
is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other 
sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great 
influence it exercised over Latin literature. 

55. In the opposite direction Aristippus of Cyrene shared 
The cyrenaics ^^^ Sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt 

his moral earnestness or his zeal for the good of 
others. He refused altogether the earnest appeal of Socrates 

^ See Plato, Theaet. 155 E, Soph. 251 B; Aristotle, Met. vii 3, 7. 



HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES 5 1 

that he should take part in poHtics. ' It seems to me,' he says, 
' to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do to 
find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with 
this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens 
with all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts 
if he is not successful.' Aristippus revolted altogether from the 
ascetic form in which the Cynics represented his master's 
teaching, and held that the wise man, by self-restraint and 
liberal training, attained to the truest pleasure, and that such 
pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as his followers 
were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of 
Epicurus ; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage 
between Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict 
between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. 

56. The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly 
The Me- front these ethical interests and devoted itself 
ganans. mainly to the problems of dialectic. From the 

Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine of 
the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and 
which it identified with the One God proclaimed by Xeno- 
phanes and his followers of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric 
school we are therefore chiefly indebted for the assertion of the 
philosophical principle of monism ; the same school drew the 
necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in any real sense 
existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived an 
interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly 
occupied with the solution of fallacies : amongst the followers of 
this school we first meet with the puzzles of 'the heap' {Sorites), 
' the liar ' (^P seiidomenos), and others upon which in later times 
Chrysippus and other Stoics sharpened their wits^l DiODORUS 
the Megarian set out certain propositions with regard to the 
relation of the possible and the necessary which are of critical 
importance in connexion with the problem of free-will'^". Finally 
Stilpo, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C., and who made 
a violent attack upon Plato's theory of ideas, adopted an ethical 

*^ See below, § 163. 

* See below, §§ 220 and 22 r. 



52 ROMAN STOICISM 

standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics*'^ and counted amongst 
his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed 
amongst his contemporaries a boundless reputation ; princes and 
peoples -vied in doing him honour"-; but we have scarcely any 
record of his teaching, and know him almost exclusively as one 
who contributed to form the mind of Zeno. 

57. With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not 
Advance of conccmed ; the consideration of Plato and Aristotle 
Philosophy. ^^^^ their respective followers we must leave to 
another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow from 
being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is 
gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of 
city and class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as 
regards its subject-matter and its principles. But its range is 
now becoming better defined, and in the period that is approach- 
ing we shall find determined attempts to reach a comprehensive 
solution of the problems presented to enquiring minds. 

*^ ' hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest ; noster sapiens vincit qui- 
dem incommodum omne, sed sentit ; illorum ne sentit quidem ' Sen. £p. 9, 3. 
"^ Gomperz, ii p. 196. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH. 

58. Before a hundred years had passed since the death 
of Socrates, the face of the Greek world had been 

Political 

changes of the Completely changed. Athens, Lacedaemon, Corinth, 
Thebes, which had been great powers, had sunk 
into comparative insignificance ; their preeminence was gone, 
and even of their independence but little remained. Throughout 
Greece proper the Macedonian was master. But if the old- 
fashioned politician suffered a bitter disappointment, and the 
adherents of the old polytheism despaired of the future, there 
was rich compensation for the young and the hopeful. Petty 
wars between neighbouring cities, with their wearisome refrain 
' and the men they killed, and the women and children they 
enslaved \' began to be less common; internal and still more 
murderous strife between bigoted oligarchs or democrats began 
to be checked from without. For the enlightened Greek a new 
world of enterprise had been opened up in the East. Alexander 
the Great had not only conquered Asia Minor, and established 
everywhere the Greek language and a Greek bureaucracy; he 
had opened the way to the far East, and pointed out India and 
even China as fields for the merchant and the colonizer. His 
work had been partly frustrated by the disorders that followed 
his death ; but if achievement was thus hindered, hopes were not 
so quickly extinguished. These new hopes were not likely to 
be accompanied by any lasting regrets for the disappearance 
of ancient systems of government now regarded as effete or 

. . ^ Thucydides, passim. 



54 ROMAN STOICISM 

ridiculous, or of inherited mythologies which were at every point 
in conflict with the moral sense^. 

59. The same historic events which opened the East to 
East and Hellenic adventurers also made the way into 
^^^^^- Europe easy for the Oriental. As the soldier and 

the administrator travelled eastward, so the merchant and the 
philosopher pushed his way to the West. Not merely in Persia 
had ancient superstitions been swept away by reforming zeal ; 
the Jews were now spreading from town to town the enthusiasm 
of a universalized religion which was ridding itself of bloody 
sacrifices ; and, for the time at least, the humane philosophy of 
the Buddha was dominant in India, was being preached far and 
wide by self-sacrificing monks, and was inspiring the policy of 
great monarchies. We find it hard to picture the clashing of 
ideals, enthusiasms, and ambitions which was at this time taking 
place in all the great cities of the old world ; but it is certain 
that in the universal excitement the old distinctions of Greek 
and barbarian, Jew and Gentile, rich and poor, free and slave, 
man and woman were everywhere becoming weakened, and 
community of thought and temperament were beginning to 
reunite on a new basis individuals who had broken loose from 
the ties of ancient society. 

60. During this fourth century B.C. the foundations were 
New schools l^id of the four philosophical schools which were 
of philosophy, destined to vie one with another for the allegiance 
of the Roman world. The Socratic schools which we have 
already mentioned, those of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, did not 
perhaps altogether die out ; in particular the Cynic missionaries 
appear to have been a social force until the second century B.C. 
But their intellectual basis was too narrow to admit of their 
effective transplantation to new soil. At the end of the century 
each gave place to a new school, which preserved the central 
doctrines of its predecessor. The Socratic paradoxes were 
handed on from the Cynics to the Stoics ; the doctrine that 
pleasure is the good was accepted by Epicurus. Stoics and 
Epicureans disputed with a bitterness as yet unequalled, finding 

2 Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, ch. I. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 55 

themselves just as much opposed upon the subjects of logic and 
physics, which they introduced anew into popular philosophy, as 
upon the questions of ethics on which their antipathies were 
inherited. Between them stood two schools which had mean- 
while established themselves. Plato, himself a companion of 
Socrates, founded the Academy at Athens about 380 B.C. ; and 
if he did not impress his own teaching upon it with absolute 
fixity, still the school flourished under a succession of leaders, 
always proud of the fame of its founder, and rendering him at 
least a nominal allegiance. From the Academy branched off 
the school of the Peripatetics, founded by Plato's pupil Aristotle 
about 350 B.C. After Aristotle's death this school gravitated 
towards the Academics, and in later centuries there seemed little 
difference, if any, between the two. If Stoicism may be called 
the child of Cynism, it largely drew nourishment from these two 
schools and their founders. Some account of the teaching of 
Plato and Aristotle is therefore needed here, partly because of 
the great importance of both in the general history of philosophy, 
partly because of their direct influence upon the subject of this 
book. On account of the much greater prominence of the 
Academy in the later history we shall often use this term to refer 
to the general teaching of the two allied schools. 

61. Of all the companions of Socrates far the most famous 
is Plato of Athens (427-347 B.C.), the founder 
of the philosophical association known as the 
' Academy.' In the general judgment of lovers of Greek letters 
he stands out not merely as a great master of Attic prose style, 
but also as the ablest exponent of the true mind of Socrates^, 
and the most brilliant light of Greek philosophy*. On the 
first point this judgment stands unchallenged; for delicate and 
good-natured wit, felicity of illustration and suggestiveness of 
thought the Platonic dialogues are unrivalled. But it is only 
in his earlier writings that we can accept Plato as a repre- 

3 ' Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken 
rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity' Ueberweg, Eng. transl. 
i p. 89. 

* 'The philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle' 
Zeller, Stoics etc., p. ii. 'The bloom of Greek philosophy was short lived' ib. p. lo. 



56 ROMAN STOICISM 

sentative of Socrates ; after the death of his master he travelled 
for many years in Egypt, Lower Italy, and Sicily, and absorbed 
in particular much of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. The 
theory of ' ideas,' the special characteristic of Plato's later work, 
is not strictly Socratic. Neither, we must add, is it of first- 
rate importance in the history of human thought ; from our 
point of view it lies apart from the main current both of specula- 
tion and of practice. It was a still-born theory, not accepted 
even by Plato's successors in the control of the Academy^ We 
are therefore very little concerned with the direct teaching of 
Plato ; but all the more readily it should be acknowledged that 
the Stoics were often indebted to him for help in the treatment 
of important details, and that the Platonic attitude remained 
for them a factor of which they needed continuously to take 
account. 

62. A striking feature of the Platonic dialogues is that their 
Plato's results are usually negative. First the opinions of 

realism. ^hc crowd, thcn those of Socrates' contemporaries 

the 'sophists' and of the other Socratic schools are subjected 
to a cross-examination, under which they are one and all 
shewn to be unreasonable. This cross-examination is quite in 
the Socratic spirit, and is before all things a mental gymnastic, 
training the dialectician to observe with keener eye and to 
discuss with apter tongue than his fellows. Gradually there 
emerges from a mass of doubts something like a positive theory 
that Plato is prepared to adopt. The true reasoning is that of 
induction from the particular to the general, from the individual 
to the class. In the class name we come upon the true being of 
the individual, and by a right definition of it we discern what 
each thing really is. The ' idea,' which corresponds to the class 
name, is alone really existent ; the individual is a more or less 
imperfect imitation of it (fjLifi7]ai<;). In this way Plato found 
what seemed to him a solution of a difficulty which Socrates 
hardly felt, that of explaining the participation (/juede^i^) of 

^ The phrases 'cum Platone errare,' 'amicus Plato, magis arnica Veritas' agree 
in expressing the general incredulity with which Platonism was received in the ancient 
world. In our own days an ill-balanced sympathy for Platonic dogma is often 
a serious hindrance to philosophic progress. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 57 

the particular in the general (vTrodea-a or iSea). Thus where 
ordinary men see 'horses,' and Antisthenes holds that they are 
right, Plato sees ' horsiness,' or the idea of ' horse.' In the 
language of medieval philosophy Plato is a realist, that is, one 
who holds that our Ideas are more than what men mean when 
they say 'mere ideas'; that they are Realities, and have their 
being in a truly existing world ; and that in knowing them we 
know what is. But just as Plato holds that general conceptions 
are alone true and real, so he necessarily maintains that objects 
perceivable by the senses are only half-real, and that the ordinary 
man lives in a world of illusions. Thus the thoughts of the 
philosopher are separated by an abyss from the world in which 
men live and die. 

63. Upon the basis of the individual ' ideas ' Plato builds up 
God and the ^X ^ process of classification and induction higher 
s°"^- and smaller classes of ideas, until we begin to see 

the vision of a single idea, a class which includes all classes, a 
supreme ' being ' from which all being is derived. This highest 
idea is variously suggested by the names ' the Good,' ' the 
Beautiful,' ' the One.' By a sudden transformation it becomes 
the Creator {hr]fjiLovpr^6<i) of the universe. Containing in itself 
all being, it needs for its operation some kind of formless and 
inert matter ; for this the name airetpov, 'the unlimited,' is taken 
from Anaximander. The whole created universe may be con- 
sidered as the joint production of the 'idea' and the 'unlimited'; 
and the cosmology of Anaxagoras, ' all things were together, 
and mind came and ordered them,' is substantially justified. 
The world thus created is both good and beautiful, for it is made 
by a good Creator on the best of patterns. 

The human soul is of triple nature. The highest part, the 
rational soul (to XoyLcrriKov), is seated in the head ; the emotional 
soul (to 6v/j,oei8i<;) in the heart ; the appetitive soul (to eTnOvfit]- 
TLKov) in the belly. Over these two lower souls the reasoning 
part should hold control, as a driver over two unruly steeds''. 
The rational soul has existed before birth, and may hope for 
immortality, for it is knit up with the idea of 'being.' Ultimately 

8 See further, § 284. 



58 ROMAN STOICISM 

it may even attain to perfection, if it is purified as by fire from 
baser elements that have attached themselves to it. 

64. Plato himself does not formulate an ethical ideal of the 
Ethics and Same precision that his successors used, but we infer 
Politics. from his works a goal towards which he points 

Thus the ethical end for each man is the greatest possible 
participation in the idea of the good, the closest attainable 
imitation of the deity. The virtue of each part of the human 
soul lies in the fit performance of its proper work ; that of the 
reasoning soul is Wisdom {ao^ia) ; of the emotional soul 
Courage (dvSpela); of the appetitive soul Soberness (o-eo^po- 
crvvT]). Over all (it is hinted rather than stated) rules the 
supreme virtue of Justice (SiKaioa-vvT)), assigning to each part 
its proper function. Thus the four cardinal virtues are deduced 
as a practical application from the Platonic psychology. The 
high position assigned to Justice leads up to the practical 
doctrine of Moderation (fierpiorrji;) ; even the virtues are 
restricted both in their intensity and in their spheres of work, 
and if any virtue passes its proper limit it becomes changed into 
the vice that borders on it. Thus the ideal of practical life 
is the ' moderate man,' calm, considerate, and self-respecting, 
touched with a warm flow of feeling, but never carried away 
into excitement ; and even this ideal is strictly subordinate to 
that of the life of philosophic contemplation. 

The ideal State is modelled on the individual man. To the 
three parts of the soul correspond three classes of citizens ; the 
rulers, whose virtue is Wisdom ; the guardians, on whom 
Courage is incumbent ; the labourers and tradesmen, who owe 
the State Soberness and obedience. Thus the political system 
to which Plato leans is that of an Aristocracy ; for the middle 
class in his state has only an executive part in the government, 
and the lower orders are entirely excluded from it. 

65. By far the greatest of Plato's pupils was ARISTOTLE of 
Stagira (^84.-^22 B.C.), who introduced into philo- 

Aristotle. f \J ^ J , ^', , , ,. ^ , 

sophy, now convulsed by the disputes 01 the 
disciples of Socrates, a spirit of reconciliation. From his point 
of view the various contentions are not so much erroneous as 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 59 

defective. To attain the truth we need first to collect the 
various opinions that are commonly held, and then to seek the 
reconciling formula of which each one is a partial statement. 

66. In his investigation Aristotle did not altogether break 
The ten ^^^^ Plato's theory of ideas, but brought them 

categories. from a transcendental world into touch with common 
life. He held fast to the method of induction (iirajcoyrj) from 
the particular to the general, and agreed that we reach the true 
nature of each thing when we have determined the class-con- 
ception. But the class-conception or idea (ISea), though the 
most real existence, does not exist independently, but only 
in and through the particulars, which compose the class. 
Having thus come to see that there are gradations of existence, 
we need to inquire what these are ; and to classify the various 
kinds of judgment with regard to which we inquire whether they 
are true or false. Now by observation we find that judgments 
or predications have ten different shapes, to which therefore 
there must correspond ten kinds of existence. These are the 
well-known ' categories ' of Aristotle, and are as follows : 

(i) ' substance,' as when we say ' this is a man,' ' a horse ' ; 

(ii) ' quantity,' as that he is ' six feet high ' ; 

(iii) ' quality,' as ' a grammarian ' ; 

(iv) ' relation,' as ' twice as much ' ; 

(v) ' place,' as ' at Athens ' ; 

(vi) ' time,' as ' last year ' ; 

(vii) * position,' as ' lying down ' ; 

(viii) ' possession,' as ' with a sword ' ; 

(ix) * action,' as ' cuts ' ; and 

(x) ' passion,' as ' is cut ' or ' is burned.' 
Aristotle thus reinstates the credit of the common man ; he it is 
who possesses the substance of truth and gives it habitual ex- 
pression by speech, even roughly indicating the various kinds of 
existence by different forms of words. It is now indicated that 
a study of grammar is required as the foundation of logic. 

Aristotle also greatly advanced the study of that kind of 
reasoning which proceeds from the general to the particular, and 



6o ROMAN STOICISM 

which is best expressed in terms of the ' syllogism ' (avWo- 
jiaiLLo^), of which he defined the various forms. 

67. In the study of physics Aristotle picks up the thread 
The four which Socrates had dropped deliberately, that is, 
causes. |-j^g teaching of the Ionic philosophers. Either 

directly from Empedocles, or from a consensus of opinion now 
fairly established, he accepted the doctrine of the four elements 
{crToiyela)^ earth, water, air, and fire ; but to these he added a 
fifth (Tre/xTTToi' (rroiyelov, qiiinta essentia), the aether, which fills 
the celestial spaces. Behind this analysis lies the more important 
problem of cosmology, the question how this world comes to be. 
Collecting once more the opinions commonly held, Aristotle 
concludes that four questions are usually asked, and that in them 
the search is being made for four ' causes,' which will solve the 
respective questions. The four causes are : 

(i) the Creator, or 'efficient cause,' answering the question; 

— Who made the world .'' 
(ii) the Substance, or 'material cause'; — of what did he 

make it ? 
(iii) the Plan, or 'modal cause'; — according to what design .'' 
(iv) the End, or 'final cause'; — for what purpose?'' 

Reviewing these ' causes ' Aristotle concludes that the first, third, 
and fourth are ultimately one, the Creator containing in his own 
nature both the plan and the purpose of his work^ The solution 
is therefore dualistic, and agrees substantially with that of Plato ; 
the ultimate existences are (i) an informing power, and (ii) matter 
that has the potentiality of accepting form. 

In consequence of this dualism of Aristotle the term 'matter' 
(i;X,77, materia) has ever since possessed associations which did 
not belong to it in the time of the hylozoists. Matter now 
begins to suggest something lifeless, inert, and unintelligent ; 
and to be sharply contrasted not only with such conceptions as 
' God ' and ' mind,' but also with motion and force. For this 
■reason the Stoics in reintroducing monism preferred a new term, 
as we shall see below^. 

'' See below, § 179. ^ Aristotle, Physics, ii 7. ^ See below, § 173. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 6l 

68. What God is to the universe, that the soul is to the 
„. . body, which is a ' httle universe".' But the reason- 

1 ne micro- J ' 

cosm. jj^g p^j-^ q|- ^YiQ soul only is entirely distinct ; this 

is of divine nature, and has entered the body from without ; it is 
at once its formative principle, its plan, and its end. The lower 
parts of the soul are knit up with the body, and must perish with 
it. So far Aristotle's teaching differs little from that of Plato ; 
but a new point of view is introduced when he speaks of the 
soul as subject to ' diseases ' (TraO^/xara), and thus assigns to the 
practical philosopher a social function as the comrade of the 
physician. Amongst the diseases he specially names Pity and 
Fear, which assail the emotional part of the soul. Their cure is 
found in ' purging ' {Kadapat^), that is to say in their complete 
expulsion from the soul, as reason and circumstances may- 
require ; but Aristotle by no means considers that the analogy 
between body and soul is complete, or that the emotions should 
always be regarded as injurious". 

69. In setting forth an ideal for human activity Aristotle 
Ethics and conccives that other philosophers have differed 
Politics. more in words than in substance, and he hopes 

to reconcile them through the new term ' blessedness ' {ev- 
Saifiovio). This blessedness is attained when the soul is 
actively employed in a virtuous way, and when it is so cir- 
cumstanced that it commands the instruments of such action, 
that is, in a life which is adequately furnished. On such activity 
pleasure must assuredly attend, and it is therefore needless to 
seek it of set purpose. Further, virtue appears personified in 
the ' true gentleman ' (koXo'? Kajado'?), who ever avoids vicious 
extremes, and finds his highest satisfaction in pure contemplation, 
just as the Creator himself lives to contemplate the world he has 
produced ^l 

■^'* ei 5' iv fyy TOVTO Svvarhv yevicrdai, ri KwXijei to aiiTo av/i^TJvai /cat /card to ttSlv ; 
ei yap ev fxiKpi^ KhcfiMp yiveTai, /cat ii> fxeydXip Ar. Phys. viii 2, 252 b. 

" See Ueberweg's note, i (Eng. trans., pp. 178-180; tenth German edition, 
pp. 238-240), and below, § 362. 

^2 ' vitae autem degendae ratio maxima quidem illis [Peripateticis] placuit quieta, 
in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum ; quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, 
sapiente visa est dignissima' Cic. Fin. v 4, 11. 



62 ROMAN STOICISM 

In politics Aristotle can find ground for approving in turn of 
monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, according to the circum- 
stances of each state. We cannot however but feel that his 
sympathies point most towards monarchy, and that his personal 
association with Alexander the Great was in full harmony with 
his inmost convictions. As a means of government he advocates 
before all things the education of the young. 

70. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, comprehen- 
sociai prepos- sive in their range, brilliant and varied in their 
sessions. colouring, nevertheless appeal effectively only to 
a limited circle. Socrates had been the companion of rich 
and poor alike ; Plato and Aristotle addressed themselves to 
men of wealth, position, and taste. Their sympathies appear 
clearly in their political systems, in which the sovereign or the 
aristocracy is considered fit to play a part, whilst the many are 
practically excluded from the commonwealth, sometimes as a 
harnjless flock which needs kindly shepherding, and at other times 
as a dangerous crowd which must be deceived or enslaved for 
its own good. These prepossessions, which we shall find 
reappearing within the Stoic system, appear to weaken the 
practical forcefulness of both philosophies. In the ideal 
character the Socratic ' force ' has disappeared, and ' self- 
restraint ' alone is the standard of virtue ; the just man moves 
quietly and conventionally through life, perhaps escaping blame, 
but hardly achieving distinction. In resuming the study of 
ontology, which Socrates had treated as a ' mist from Ionia,' 
bright fancies had been elaborated rather than dominating 
conceptions ; the deity of Aristotle seems but a faint reflex of 
the god of Socrates and the Cynics, and neither the ' idea ' of 
Plato or the 'matter' of Aristotle is so well fitted for the world's 
hard work as the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. The 
teachers who succeeded to the control of the two schools inclined 
more and more to engross themselves in special studies, and to 
leave on one side the great controversial problems. 

71. The followers of Plato were known as the 'Academics': 
The Aca- amongst them we must distinguish between the 
demies. members of the ' old Academy,' as Cicero terms 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 63 

them^^ and those who followed the innovations of Arcesilaus. 
The old Academy chiefly developed the ethical side of Plato's 
teaching, finding that the path of virtue is indicated by 
the natural capacities of the individual. Thus Xenocrates 
of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) taught that each man's happiness 
resulted from the virtue proper to him (oUeia apeTrjy* ; whilst 
POLEMO of Athens (head of the school 314-270 B.C.) is said by 
Cicero to have defined it as consisting in ' virtuous living, aided 
by those advantages to which nature first draws us,' thereby 
practically adopting the standard of Aristotle ^^ The teaching 
of Polemo had a direct influence upon that of Zeno the founder 
of Stoicism. 

But with the first successes of Stoicism the Academy revived 
its dialectical position, in strong opposition to the dogmatism of 
the new school. Arcesilaus of Pitane in Aeolia (315-240 B.C.) 
revived the Socratic cross-examination, always opposing himself 
to any theory that might be propounded to him, and drawing 
the conclusion that truth could never be certainly known ^•'. 
Life must therefore be guided by considerations of probability, 
and the ethical standard is that ' of which a reasonable defence 
may be made^''.' This sceptical attitude was carried still further 
by Carneades of Cyrene (214-129 B.C.), whose acute criticism 
told upon the Stoic leaders of his time, and forced them to 
abandon some of their most important positions. From this 
time a reconciliation between the two schools set in^l 

72. The members of the Peripatetic school founded by 
The Peri- AHstotle are of less importance to us. The 
patetics. Romans found little difference between their teach- 

^^ See note 15, below. " Clem. Strom, ii p. 419 a. 

^° ' honeste autem vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, 
et vetus Academia censuit (ut indicant scripta Polemonis), et Aristoteles eiusque 
amici hue proxime videntur accedere' Cic. Ac. ii 42, 131. Here Prof. J. S. Reid 
suggests that Polemo may merely have used the phrase /card. <f)i(nv ^rjv, as opposed to 
Kara d^aiv (conventionally). 

^^ 'quern [sc. Arcesilan] ferunt...primum instituisse, non quid ipse sentiret 
ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare ' Cic. de Or. iii 18, 
67. ' Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, 
quod Socrates sibi reliquisset ' Ac. i 12, 45. 

" '[cuius] ratio probabilis possit reddi ' Cic. Fin.\\\ 17, 58. See farther below, 
§§ I05> 332. ^^ See especially §§ 113 and 123. 



64 ROMAN STOICISM 

ing and that of the earlier Academy. Cicero mentions that 
the Stoic Panaetius was a keen student of two of the pupils 
of Aristotle, Theophrastus (his successor as head of the 
Peripatetic school) and DlCAEARCHUS^^; amongst later teachers 
in whose views he is interested he names Hieronymus, 
who held that the supreme good was freedom from pain^"; 
Callipho, who combined virtue with pleasure, and DiODORUS 
who combined it with freedom from pain^^; and amongst his 
contemporaries Staseas of Naples, who stated the same 
doctrines in a slightly different form--, and Cratippus, whom 
he selected as a teacher for his own son^^. It was a common 
complaint of these teachers that the Stoics had stolen their 
doctrines wholesale, and (as is the way with thieves) had altered 
the names only-^ All these writers however agree in denying 
the doctrine which Zeno accepted from the Cynics that ' virtue 
is sufficient for happiness,' and lay stress upon the supply of 
external goods (-x^oprjyca) as needed to admit of the active 
exercise of virtue. They were diligent students of the written 
works of their founder, and thus opened the way for the work 
of erudition and interpretation which found its centre in 
Alexandria in a later period. 

73. Amidst the conflict of these schools Zeno grew up. 
Born in Citium on the island of Cyprus in 336 B.C., 
in the same year in which Alexander became 
king of Macedon, he heard as a boy of the Greek conquest of 
the East, and was only 13 years of age when its course was 
checked by the death of Alexander. Of the town of Citium the 
inhabitants were partly Greek, partly Phoenician ; and Zeno, 
whether or not he was of Phoenician blood, certainly derived 

^^ Cic. Fin. iv 28, 79. 

^•^ ' non dolere... Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit' id. v 25, 73. 

2^ ' at vero Callipho, et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamavisset, 
alter vacuitatem doloris : neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata 
maxime ' id. 

^2 id. 25, 75. '^3 Of. i I, I. 

^ ' [Stoici] quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram a nobis, sed totam ad se 
nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. atque, ut reliqui fures, earum rerum, quas 
ceperunt, signa commutant, sic illi, ut sententiis nostris pro suis uterentur, npmina, 
tanquam rerum notas, mutaverunt ' /nn. v 25, 74. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 65 

from his environment something of the character of the enter- 
prising and much-travelled Phoenician nation, and imparted 
this trait to the school which he founded. He was nicknamed 
by his contemporaries ' the Phoenician,' and the title clung to 
his foUowers^^ His father was a merchant of purple, and often 
travelled in the one direction to Tyre and Sidon, in the other as 
far as Athens, whence he brought back a number of ' Socratic 
books,' which were eagerly read by the young Zeno, and in 
time attracted him to the famous Greek city^*. We may pre- 
sume that when he first came to Athens he intended to carry 
further his studies without abandoning his calling ; but when 
news reached him of the wreck of the ship which carried all his 
goods, he welcomed it as a call to devote himself entirely to 
philosophy-l His first step in Athens was to seek out the man 
who best represented the character of Socrates, as represented 
in Xenophon's Memoirs; and it is said that a bookseller accord- 
ingly pointed him to Crates of Thebes^^ the pupil and (it 
would seem) the successor of Diogenes as acknowledged head 
of the Cynic school. 

74. Our authorities busy themselves chiefly with narrating 
Zeno joins the the cccentricities of Crates, who wore warm clothing 
Cynics. jj^ summer and rags in winter, entered the theatre 

as the audience were coming out, and drank water instead of 
wine. But doubtless, like his predecessors in the Cynic school, 
he was a man of the true Socratic character, who had trained 
himself to bear hunger and thirst, heat and cold, flattery and 
abuse. His life and wisdom won him the love of the high-born 
Hipparchia, who turned from her wealthy and noble suitors, 
choosing instead the poverty of Crates, who had abandoned all 
his possessions. In his company she went from house to house, 
knocking at all doors in turn, sometimes admonishing the in- 
mates of their sins, sometimes sharing with them their meals ^^. 

^^ Tirivoiva tov ioiviKa, Athen. Deipnos. xiii 2 ; 'tuus ille Poenulus,' 'e Phoenicia 
profecti ' Cic. Fin. iv 20, 56. 

'^^ Diog. L. vii 31 and 32. 

-'' ' nimtiato naufragio Zeno noster, cum omnia sua audiret submersa : iubet, 
inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari' Sen. Dial, ix 14, 3. 

-^ Diog. L. vii 3. 

-^ Diog. L. vi 96 and 97. 

A. 5 



66 ROMAN STOICISM 

In such a life Zeno recognised the forcefulness of Socrates, and 
in the dogmas of the Cynic school he reached the foundation on 
which that life was built. From that foundation neither Zeno 
nor his true followers ever departed, and thus Stoicism embodied 
and spread the fundamental dogmas of Cynism, that the indi- 
vidual alone is really existent, that virtue is the supreme good, 
and that the wise man, though a beggar, is truly a king. 

75. Whilst still an adherent of the Cynic school^", Zeno 
Zeno's Re- wrote his IloXireia or Republic, which is evidently 
public. ^j^ attack on Plato's work with the same title^^ If 

this work does not reveal to us the fully developed philosopher, 
it at least shews us better than any other evidence what the man 
Zeno was. His ideal was the establishment of a perfect State, a 
completion of the work in which Alexander had failed ; and he 
found a starting-point in a treatise by Antisthenes on the same 
subject. The ideal State must embrace the whole world, so that 
a man no longer says, ' I am of Athens,' or ' of Sidon,' but ' I 
am a citizen of the world ^-.' Its laws must be those which are 
prescribed by nature, not by convention. It will have no images 
or temples, for these are unworthy of the nature of the deity ; no 
sacrifices, because he cannot be pleased by costly gifts ; no law- 
courts, for its citizens will do one another no harm; no statues, 
for the virtues of its inhabitants will be its adornment ^^ ; no 
gymnasia, for its youth must not waste their time in idle 
exercises ^^ 

The people will not be divided into classes (and here Plato's 
Republic is contradicted), for all alike will be wise men^^; nor 
will men and women be clothed differently, or shamefacedly hide 
any part of their bodies^®. No man will speak of a woman as 
his property, for women will belong to the community only^^ 
As for the dead, men will not trouble whether they bury them 

^^ ib. vii 4. 

^^ avriypaxj/e irpos Tr\v Tlkaroovos Ylo\iTela.v Plut. Sto. rep. 8, 2 (Arnim i 260). 

^^ This doctrine can be traced back to Diogenes and even to Socrates : see below, 

§303- 

^* rots TToXets KoaiJ.eLv ovk dvad7ifj.acFi.v, dWa rals tGiv oIkovvtwv dperais Stob. iv 1, 88. 

®* See below, § 305. 

^^ TrapLffrdvTa TroXtras tovs crirovdaiovs fj.6vov Diog. L. vii 33. 

^® See below, § 318. ^'' § 306. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 6/ 

(as the Greeks), burn them (as the Indians), or give them to the 
birds (as the Persians) ; for it matters not at all what happens to 
men's dead bodies ^^ but whether their souls shall reach the 
abodes of the blest, or need hereafter to be purged by fire from 
the foulness they have contracted through contact with the body^*. 
To conclude, Love shall be master throughout the State, being 
as it were a God cooperating for the good of the whole*"; and 
the wise man shall be a citizen in it, not a missionary, and shall 
be surrounded with wife and children ^^ 

76. Zeno, after writing his Republic, took up a position more 
zeno seeks independent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, 
knowledge. avoid noticiug that the coming of his model King- 
dom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of the philosophers, 
their disagreement one with another, and their lack of clear 
proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of 
dialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic 
teachers would allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea 
of uniting the Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from 
all sources, and turned first to Stilpo, who then represented the 
Megarian school'*'. Crates, we are told, tried to drag him back 
from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno retorted that argument 
would be more to the point". From this time he no longer 
restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also for 
argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The 
foundations of his state must be surely laid, not upon the 
changing tide of opinion, but on the rock of knowledge. That 
a wise man should hesitate, change his views, withdraw his 
advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach^. If indeed virtue, 
the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that know- 
ledge is within the reach of man? 

•^ §307. '■^ §§ 296, 297. *» § 304. 'M 315- 

*^ See above, § 56. 

^^ He said ' O Crates, the best handle of philosophers is that by the ear ; 
persuade me if you can, and lead me that way ; if you use violence, my body will 
stay with you, but my soul will be with Stilpo ' Diog. L. vii 24. 

^ ' errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem 
et uno nomine omnia, quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute 
sapientiaque [Zeno] removebat ' Cic. Ac, i ir, 42. 

5-2 



68 ROMAN STOICISM 

77. The chief cause of error, Zeno found, lay in hasty 
„ , ^. assertion ; and this he held was a fault not so much 

Zeno s theory ' 

of knowledge. Qf ^he intellect as of the will. In the simplest case 
the senses present to the mind a ' picture ' {^avraaia, visum), 
carrying with it the suggestion of a statement (e.g. 'that is a 
horse'). But it is for the man to consider well whether this 
suggestion is true, and only to give his ' assent ' (auyKarddeat^;, 
adseiisus) when he is so assured. Assent is an act of the will, 
and therefore in our power. Of a picture to which he has given 
his assent the wise man should retain a firm hold ; it then 
becomes an item of ' comprehension ' ((fjavTaaia KaTaXrjTTTCK'^, 
comprehensid), and may be stored in the memory, thus preparing 
the way for further acquisitions of knowledge, which in the end 
combine in ' scientific knowledge ' {iwiaTrjixr], scientid). 

This theory is little more than an exhortation against the 
prevailing error of hasty thought {ho^a, opinio) ; but it made a 
very deep impression, especially as enforced by Zeno's gestures. 
He stretched out his fingers and shewed the open palm, saying 
' Such is a picture.' He partially contracted his fingers, and 
said ' This is assent.' Making a closed fist, he said ' This is 
comprehension.' Then closing in the left hand over the right 
he pressed his fist tight, and said ' This is science, and only the 
wise man can attain to it*^.' 

We have no reason to suppose that this theory was in any 
way suggested by Stilpo, from whom however Zeno probably 
learnt to attach importance to the formal part of reasoning, 
such as ' definition ' and the use of the syllogism. With Stilpo he 
shared an aversion to the Platonic theory of ideas, maintaining 
that ideas are by no means realities but have only a ' kind of 
existence ' in our minds, or (as we should call it to-day) a 
' subjective existence*®.' 

^^ ' hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. nam cum extensis digitis adversam 
manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huiusmodi est.' deinde cum paulum digitos 
contraxerat, ' adsensus huiusmodi.' tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, 
comprehensionem illam esse dicebat ; cum autem laevam manum admoverat et 
ilium pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat : cuius 
compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem' Cic. Ac. ii 47, 145. 

46 See below, § 188. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 69 

78. In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we 

may imagine, entered a new world. He left behind 

Zeno studies "^ '^ 

under the rough manners, the stinging retorts, and the 

Polemo. - , „ . , T- . . ._ 

narrow culture 01 the Cynics and liristics^s to sit 
with other intelligent students'*^ at the feet of a man of cultured 
manners ^^ and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and 
Sophocles^" had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge 
of the works of Plato and Aristotle, was himself a great writer^^ 
and yet consistently taught that not learning, but a natural and 
healthy life was the end to be attained. That Zeno profited 
much from his studies under Polemo we may conjecture from 
Polemo's good-natured complaint, ' I see well what you are 
after : you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, 
which you dress in Phoenician clothes ^l' From this time it 
became a conventional complaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen 
from that of the Academics : yet the sharp conflict between the 
two schools shews that this cannot apply to essentials. But in 
two important matters at least Zeno must have been indebted 
to Academic teaching. This school had elaborated the doctrine 
of Anaxagoras, which so attracted Socrates, that the world 
began with the working of mind upon unordered matter. So 
too, according to all our authorities, Zeno taught that there are 
two beginnings, the active which is identified with the deity or 
Logos, and the passive which is inert matter, or substance 
without quality^. This doctrine appears to pledge Zeno to a 
dualistic view of the universe. 

79. On the other hand the Platonic teaching on the soul 
'Soul is ^^s reversed by Zeno. He denied the opposition 
body.' between soul and body. ' Soul is breath^"*,' he 

taught, and 'soul is body^^' With Plato's threefold division 
of the soul he would have nothing to do ; rather he maintained 

'"' So the Megarians were commonly called on account of their disputatious 
methods. 

■•* As for instance Arcesilaus ; ^ApKeaiXaos 6 iK ttjs 'AKadyj/xias, Ti-qvuvos rod 
Ktrt^ws (TvffxoKa.(TTr]s irapa. Ilo\ifj.o}VL Strabo xiii p. 614 (Arnim i 10). 

« Diog. L. iv 18. 60 ^-^^ 2o_ 51 ^^^ 

52 Diog. L. vii 25. 5=* See below, § 189. ^^ See § 268, note 2. 

55 o'i ye awb XpvaiTnrov /cat Titjvuvos 4>LK6ao<poi /cat Trdvres 6<Toi aw/xa ttjv ^vxv^ 
voovffi Iamb, de an. (Stob. i 49, 33). 



yo ROMAN STOICISM 

that the soul has eight parts^®, each displaying itself in a distinct 
power or capacity, whilst all of them are qualities or operations 
of one soul in various relations®^. In this part of his philosophy 
Zeno appears as a strong monist, and his debt to the Platonists 
is necessarily restricted to details. 

80. It would seem then that Zeno after seeking for philo- 
zeno studies sophic Safety for some twenty years in one harbour 
Heraciitus. after another had so far made shipwreck. But 
from this shipwreck of his intellectual hopes he could afterwards 
count the beginning of a fair voyage^'^. As he eagerly discussed 
with his younger fellow-student Arcesilaus the teaching of their 
master Polemon, he took courage to point out its weak points^^, 
and began to quote in his own defence not only his previous 
teachers Crates and Stilpo, but also the works of Heraciitus^". 
He thus broke down the barrier which Socrates had set up 
against the Ionic philosophers. From Heraciitus Zeno drew 
two doctrines of first-rate importance ; the first, that of the 
eternal fire®^ and its mutation into the elements in turn**^ ; the 
second (already referred to) that of the Logos '^'^ It is evident 
that the Heraclitean doctrine of fire breaks down the distinction 
between God and the world, active and passive, soul and body ; 
and is therefore inconsistent with the dualism which Zeno had 

^^ Ti-qvojv 6 HiTWKos oKTa/j-epfj (p-qffiv elvat ttjv ^pvxw Nemes. nat. honi. p. 96 
(Arnim i 143). 

^"^ 61 dwb Ti-qvuivos OKTa/jLeprj rr)v ypvxV" Siado^d^ovai., irepl [tjV] ras dwd/xeis elvai, 
irXeiovai, wairep iv Tip Tiye/xoviKip evvwapxovcrGiv (pavraaias ffvyKaradicrecjs dp/mrjs \6yov 
Iamb. dean. (Arnim i 143). See below, § 270. 

^^ tGiv -wpoeipr^fjLevwv ijKovffev ^'ws iruiv elKoaiv ' 'iva /cat (paaiv dvTov eiirelv ' vvv evwXdriKa, 
ore vevavdyriKa Diog. L. vii 4. It must not however be assumed that Zeno himself 
used the phrase in this sense : see the other references in Arnim i 277. 

^^ ' iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas. Sed Zeno cum 
Arcesilam anteiret aetate, valdeque subtiliter dissereret et pei^acute moveretur, 
corrigere conatiis est disciplinam ' Cic. Ac. i 9, 34 and 35. 

^^ iwel crvfKpoiTwi'Tes irapd HoX^fj-wvi i<J3L\oTifji.7)dr)(jav dXKrfKoLS, <Tv/j,irapi\a^ov eh 
Tr]v Trpos dWrfKovs fidxv fiev 'Hpd/cXetroj' Kal liTiXiruva afia /cat Kpdrrjra Euseb. 
Praep. ev. xiv 5, 11 (quoting Numenius) (Arnim i 11). 

^ Zeno often calls it aether: ' Zenon...aethera... interim vult omnium esse 
principium ' Min. Felix xix p. 58 : Cleanthes calls it spirit, see below, § 100. ' The 
fire of Heraciitus becomes aether or -wvp rexfiKdv — for this distinction is unknown to 
the Ephesian — and is thereby spiritualised and rarefied ' Pearson, Fragments, Intr. 
pp. 22, 23. 

^2 See below, § 196. ®^ See above, § 39. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 7I 

partly borrowed from Plato. It is not clear whether Zeno 
attained to clearness on this point ; but in the general teaching 
of the Stoics the monistic doctrine prevailed^. Hence God is 
not separate from body, but is himself body in its purest form*^^ 
The Logos or divine reason is the power which pervades and 
gives shape to the universe®*^; and this Logos is identical with 
the deity, that is with the primitive and creative Fire®'^. The 
Logos (6p06^ \6yq<i, vera ratio') brings into harmony the parts of 
philosophy ; for it is also on the one hand the guide to right 
reasoning*^*; on the other hand the law which prescribes what is 
right for th'e State and for the individual^". 

81. When Zeno definitely accepted the teaching of He- 
zeno opens racHtus, he felt bound to break finally with the 
his school. school of Polemo, and he founded soon after 
300 B.C. a school of his own, which was rapidly crowded. 
His followers were at first called Zenonians, but afterwards 
Stoics, from the ' picture porch ' (so called because it was 
decorated with paintings by Polygnotus) in which he delivered 
his lectures. He now applied himself afresh to the problem of 
ethics. Whilst still adhering to the Cynic views that ' virtue is 
the only good,' and that ' example is more potent than precept,' 
he entirely rejected the intuitional basis which the Cynics had 
accepted, deciding in favour of the claims of reason. He found 
his ideal in 'consistency' {ofjioXoyta, convenientia)'^^; as the Logos 
or Word rules in the universe, so should it also in the individual. 
Those who live by a single and harmonious principle possess 

^ Stein, Psychologie, i 62 sqq. 

^^ Xpi;(rt7r7ros koX 7ir}vuiv viredevTo koI aiirol dpxw P'-^" ^^ov tQv irdvTuiv, aQ^a ovra 
TO Kadapdirarov Hippolyt. Philos. 21, i (Arnim i 153). 

^^ ' rationem quandam per naturam omnem rerum pertinentem vi divina esse 
affectam putat ' Cic. N. D. i 14, 36. 

^'^ ' Zeno [deum nuncupat] naturalem divinamque legem ' Lact. Div. hist, i 5, 20. 

^* oXKoL de Tives tGiv dpxo-i-orepwv "Ltw'CkGiv tov opOov \6yov KpiTriptov dTroXelirovatv, 
tds 6 Ilocr€i8d}VLos iv T(^ trepl Kpirripiov (pTjui Diog. L. vii 54 (quoting Diodes Magnes). 
It is much disputed who the authorities are to which Posidonius here refers. 

^^ ' Zeno naturalem legem divinam esse censet eamque vim obtinere recta 
imperantem prohibentemque contraria' Cic. JV. D. i 14, 36. 

™ TO de T^Xoi 6 fjiev Ti-qvixiv oiirws ciTr^SwKe, to ofJioXoyovfievus ^v^ ' tovto 5' iari 
Kad' 'iva Xbyov Kal cri/Mpuvov ^rjv, cos tQv jxaxofJ-ivu^ ^JivTuy KaKohai-iiovoijVTWv Stob. 
ii 7, 6 a. ' summum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod ofioXoyiav Stoici, 
nos appellemus convenientiam ' Cic. Pin. iii 6, 21. 



72 ROMAN STOICISM 

divine favour and an even flow of life''^; those that follow con- 
flicting practices are ill-starred''^. In this consistency there is 
found virtue, and (here again he follows the Cynics) virtue is 
sufficient for happiness ''^ and has no need of any external 
support. 

82. But whilst the virtue of the Cynics is something de- 
„. ,, tached and self-contained, and is 'natural' only 

His theory ' -' 

of virtue. jii the scnsc that it is not determined by custom 
or authority, that of Zeno is bound up with the whole scheme 
of the universe. For the universe puts before men certain 
things, which though rightly named ' indifferent ' by the Cynics, 
and wrongly named 'good' by the Academics, have yet a certain 
value (a^t'o., aestiniatio), and are a natural goal for men's actions''"*. 
Such are health, prosperity, good name, and other things which 
the Academics named ' things according to nature ' {ra Kara 
<f)vaiv). These Zeno took over, not as a part of his theory of 
virtue, but as the basis of it'''; and for things having value 
introduced the term ' of high degree ' (Trpotjyfxeva), and for their 
opposites the term ' of low degree ' {diro'jrpo'qyfjbeva), these terms 
being borrowed from court life. Thus virtue alone is queen, 
and all things naturally desired are subject to her command^®. 
The end of life is therefore to live consistently, keeping in view 
the aims set before us by nature, or shortly, to live * consistently 
with nature.' Our authorities do not agree as to whether Zeno 
or Cleanthes was the first to use this phrase''''; but there can be 
no doubt that the doctrine is that of Zeno, that it is a funda- 
mental part of the Stoic system, and that it was maintained 
unaltered by all orthodox Stoics. On the other hand the 

''1 evbaifj-ovla 5' iarlv eiipoia ^iov Stob. ii 7, 6 e. 

''^ See note 70 above. ''■' See below, § 322. 

''^ For a fuller treatment see below, §§ 319-321. 

"^ o^Xi i^"-'- ^W^" To^TOLS (sc. Peripateticis) TjKoXovOTjcrev vwoTiOifievoi^ crroLxe'ia Trjs 
evSai/jLovias ttjv (pvaiv Kal to Kara (pdaiv ; Plut. comm. not. 23, I ; ' [a Polemone] quae 
essent principia naturae acceperat' Cic. Fin. iv 16, 45. 

^® ra fxkv [oi5i'] ttoWtii' ix'^^"''"'- o.^'i-'^v irpo-qyixiva, Xiyeadai, ra Sk iroW-qv aira^iav 
<awoirpo7}yiJ.iva, 7ir}vo3vos ravras ras ovo/xacrlas de/xepov wpwrov rois Trpdy/xaffi Stob. ii 
7, 7g ; see also below, § 320. 

'■'■ Diogenes Laertius says distinctly that Zeno used the phrase, and names the 
book in which he found it; Diog. L. vii 87. On the other hand Stobaeus (ii 7, 6 a) 
attributes it to Cleanthes. ■ 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 73 

Academics and Peripatetics ridiculed these new and barbarous 
terms 7rpor]<y/u,eva and dTroTrporjj/xeva, and their view has generally- 
been supported both in ancient and modern times''^ We cannot 
however question the right of Zeno to reserve a special term for 
that which is morally good ; he was in fact feeling his way 
towards the position, still imperfectly recognized, that the 
language of common life is inadequate to the exact expression 
of philosophic principles''^ 

83. In expounding his system Zeno made much use of the 
zeno's syi- syllogism, thereby laying the foundations of a new 
logisms. style of oratory, consisting of short and pointed 

clauses, which became a characteristic of his school^". He no 
doubt regarded this form as a sure method of attaining truth ; 
but even at the present day the principle that truth can only be 
reached from facts and not from words is not everywhere ad- 
mitted. The syllogisms of Zeno have all their weak points, and 
as a rule the term which is common to the major and minor 
premisses suffers a shift of meaning. These syllogisms can 
no longer convince us, and even in antiquity they were severely 
criticized. But they are excellent aids to the memory, and so 
serve the same end as the catechisms of the Reformation period. 
Amongst the syllogisms attributed to Zeno are these : ' That 
which has reason is better than that which has not reason ; but 
nothing is better than the universe ; therefore the universe has 
reason^^' ' No one trusts a secret to a drunken man ; but one 
trusts a secret to a good man ; therefore a good man will not be 
drunken *l' ' No evil is accompanied by glory ; but death is 
accompanied by glory; therefore death is no evil^l' Such 
syllogisms were embedded in the numerous works of Zeno, of 

"^^ 'Zeno Citieus, advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex' Cic. Ti/sc. v 12, 34. 

'^^ See below, § 165. 

^^ ' ilia vetus Zenonis brevis, et ut tibi videbatur, acuta conclusio ' Cic. JV. D. iii 
9, 22. 

^^ TO \oyiKov Tou fjA] \oyiKov Kpevrrbv iariv ' oibev 8i ye koct/jlov Kpeirrdv icmv ' 
XoyiKov dpa 6 Kdanos Sext. math, ix 104 (Arnim i iii); see also below, § 202. 

^^ * ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit ; viro autem bono committit ; ergo 
vir bonus ebrius non erit ' Sen. Ep. 83, 9 ; for the original see Arnim i 229. 

^'^ ' nullum malum gloriosum est ; mors autem gloriosa est ; mors ergo non est 
malum ' Sen. Ep. 82, 9. 



74 ROMAN STOICISM 

which many were certainly extant as late as the time of 
Epictetus^^ 

84. At the very time when Zeno was elaborating the 
Epicurus and doctrincs of the Porch, another school of equal 
Arcesiiaus. eminence was established at Athens by EPICURUS 
(341-207 B.C.) in his Gardens. Epicurus combined the ethical 
principle of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is the end of life, with 
the atomistic philosophy of Democritus ; he had no respect 
for the study of dialectic, but placed the criterion of truth in 
the observations of the senses, leaving little room for the parti- 
cipation of mind or will. Thus in every part of philosophy 
his teaching was opposed to that of Zeno, and the two 
schools during their whole existence were in the sharpest 
conflict. We may nevertheless notice some points of contact 
between them. Both founded, or conceived that they founded 
their ethical doctrine upon physical proofs ; that is, both main- 
tained that the end of life which they put forward was that 
prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they agreed in 
removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the 
pursuit of natural science. Both again were positive teachers, 
or (in the language of the ancients) propounders of dogmas ; 
and here they came into conflict with the Academic school, 
which maintained, and was soon about to emphasize, the critical 
spirit of Socrates and Plato. For in the last years of Zeno's life 
his old fellow-pupil Arcesiiaus became head of the Academic 
school (270 B.C.), and at once directed his teaching against Zeno's 
theory of knowledge^^ Following the practice of Socrates and 
of Plato's dialogues, he argued against every point of view 
presented, and concluded that certain truth could not be known 
by man^®. He pressed Zeno closely as to his definition of 
' comprehension,' and induced him to add a clause which, in the 
opinion of his opponent, shewed the worthlessness of the whole 

^ ' If you would know, read Zeno's writings, and you will see ' Epict. Disc, i 
20, 14. 

^ ' cum Zenone, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit ' Cic. Ac. i 
12, 44. 

^^ 'Arcesilas primum...ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoe 
maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit ' Cic. 
de Or. iii 18, 67. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 75 

doctrine*''. Thus was raised the question of the Kptrrjpiov or test 
of truth, which for at least a century to come sharply divided the 
schools ^^ 

85. The conflict between these three schools, which from 
zeno at ^his time on greatly surpassed all others in import- 
Athens, ance, did not embitter the political life of Athens. 

The citizens watched with amusement the competition of the 
schools for numbers and influence, and drew their profit from 
the crowds of foreigners who were drawn to Athens by its 
growing fame as a centre of adult education. To the heads of 
the schools they were ready to pay every mark of respect. With 
Zeno they deposited the keys of their gates, and they awarded 
him during his life-time a gold crown and a bronze statue. His 
fame spread abroad, and those of his fellow-citizens of Citium 
who were then resident at Sidon claimed a share in it. In his 
old age the high-minded Antigonus Gonatas (who occupied the 
throne of Macedonia with varying fortune from 278 to 239 B.C.) 
looked to him for advice and help. But no offers of public 
employment could draw Zeno himself from his simple life and 
the young companions who surrounded him : like Socrates, he 
thought that he could best serve the State by sending out others 
to take part in its duties^l He died in the year 264 B.C.'^^ having 
been engaged in teaching for more than 30 years from the time 
when he 'discovered the truth ^\' 

86. The vote which the Athenians passed in honour of Zeno, 
Honours paid shortly bcfore his death, deserves record by its con- 
^° ^^^- trast with that by which their predecessors had 
condemned Socrates. It ran somewhat as follows : 

*'' ' hie Zenonem vidisse acute, nullum esse visum quod percipi posset, si id tale 
esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non est, posset esse, recte 
consensit Arcesilas ; ad definitionem additum [sc. quale non possit esse a falso]. 
incubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a vero, ut non 
eiusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse' Cic. Ac. ii 24, 77. 

®* See below, § 157. 

®^ ' compositus sequor Zenona Cleanthen Chrysippuni, quorum tamen nemo ad 
rempublicam accessit, et nemo non misit ' Sen. Dial, ix i, 10 ; see also viii 6, 4. 

^^ Pearson, Introd. p. i. 

®^ Trpoo'efj.apT>jp7]tT[ev eavT<^] t7]v evpecriv ttjs dXrjdelas Sext. mai/i. \ii ^21. Pearson, 
Introd. p. 4. 



^6 ROMAN STOICISM 

' Whereas Zeno the son of Mnaseas from Citium has spent many years 
in this city in the pursuit of philosophy ; and has been throughout a good 
man in all respects ; and has encouraged the young men who resorted to 
him in virtue and temperance, and has sped them on the right path ; and 
has made his own life an example to all men, for it has been consistent with 
the teaching he has set forth ; 

Now it seems good to the people of Athens to commend Zeno the son of 
Mnaseas from Citium, and to crown him with a golden crown (in accordance 
with the law) for his virtue and temperance, and to build him a tomb on the 
Ceramicus at the public expense. And the people shall elect five Athenian 
citizens to provide for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb. 
And the town clerk shall engrave this vote on two pillars, and shall set up 
one in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And the treasurer shall make 
due allotment of the expense, that all men may see that the people of Athens 
honours good men both in their life time and after their death^^.' 

We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this tribute. 
It is true that all the charges brought against Socrates hold even 
more forcibly as against Zeno. But the spirit of political and 
religious independence was now dead, and the advantage of the 
philosophical schools to the fame and business interests of the 
city had become clearer ; so that nothing prevented any longer 
the open recognition of Zeno's virtues and eminence. Who will 
may also read in the decree a belated mark of respect to the 
memory of Socrates, 

87. In this sketch of the life of Zeno no attempt has been 
Zeno'sbreadth made to give a complete view of his philosophy; 
of view. |-,y^ ^ fg^y landmarks have been indicated, by which 

it may be possible to distinguish which parts of it were his own, 
which were taken over from others, and how all were gradually 
combined in one whole. Zeno had not the kind of originality 
which begins by assuming a general principle, and then explains 
all things human and divine by deductions from it. Instead of 
this he gathered together (as Aristotle had done before, but with 
a very different bias) what seemed most sound and illuminating 
in the teaching of all the schools which surrounded him. He 
did this in a positive spirit, feeling assured that truth exists and 
is discernible, and must be consistent in all its parts. We seem 
unable to say that in his writings he attained to this consistency, 

^^ Diog. L. vii lo and ii. 



THE ACADEMY AND THE PORCH 77 

but at least he worked steadily towards it. The effort for con- 
sistency led him in the direction of monistic principle, though 
his points of departure both in physics and in ethics are dualistic. 
But the teaching of Zeno does not lend itself to that kind of 
study which assigns all new facts to compartments of thought 
ready labelled in advance, nor can it be summarized by any of 
the technical terms which are in use in modern philosophical 
thought Enough has perhaps been said to shew that, great as 
was the debt of Zeno to his predecessors, he was no mere imitator 
or plagiarist ; the history of the following centuries will shew 
that he had in some sense touched the pulses of human life more 
truly than any of his contemporaries. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE PREACHING OF STOICISM. 

88. During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round 
him a number of men of practical and speculative 

The com- . 

panions Capacity, not unworthy of comparison with the 

companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the 
immediate tie between them. Some took an active part in the 
work of government ; others followed their teacher's example, 
and became the founders of independent schools of thought ; a 
few devoted themselves to strengthening and extending Zeno's 
system ; and many were doubtless engaged in useful employ- 
ment of which no record has reached us. Zeno's work had not 
yet been exposed to the test of time, and another century was 
to pass before it could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of 
permanent importance. Towards the schools of the Cynics, the 
Megarians, and the Academics, from which its principles were 
so largely derived, the attitude of the hearers of Zeno was that 
of a friendly interchange of opinions, in which sharp controversy 
stopped short of enmity ; the followers of Aristotle (the Peri- 
patetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished from the 
Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in 
opposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans ; the champions of 
virtue could hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. 
Individual teachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic 
teaching still called themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno's 
hearers who adopted Cyrenaic views was contemptuously branded 
as ' the deserter^' 

^ See below, § 95. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 79 

89. The most intimate companion ^ of Zeno was Persaeus 
of Citium (circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow- 
townsman of Zeno, and, as good authorities assert, 
at first his personal servant (otVerT??)' and afterwards his fellow- 
lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he' took service, together 
with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of Mace- 
donia^ Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. 
King Antigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his 
wife, child, and property, and found that he was not entirely 
indifferent to external circumstances^ He adapted himself 
easily to court life, and is said to have written a treatise on the 
theory of the banquet, in which he did not rise above the moral 
standard of his neighbours**. Nor did he disdain to hoax Aristo 
of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that ' the wise man 
never opines ' ; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and 
then sent another to demand it back''. Another Socratic para- 
dox, that ' the wise man is sure to be a good general,' he 
endeavoured to maintain by his personal example^ Antigonus 
placed him in command of the acropolis at Corinth, which was 
nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in 243 B.C. According 
to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack, and after- 
wards put to death by the conqueror'^ ; others relate that he 
escaped to Cenchreae^". As a philosopher he is of little import- 
ance ; but Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that 
amongst the gods were men raised to the sky for their services 
to mankind (which was an accepted Stoic doctrine), but also 
that objects useful to man had been deified". 

^ fjid\i<7Ta fiev ovv tGjv [xadryrdv vwb tov Zitjvuvos rjyairaTo 6 Uepcraios Ind. Sto. 
Here. col. xii 3 (Arnim i 437). 

* ' Zenonis Stoici servus, qui Persaeus vocatus est ' A. Gellius iV. A. ii r8, 8. 
rjv yap ovtws oUeTTjs yeyovCcs tov Ztjpcjvos, Cos Ntw'as 6 Nt/cae;)? laropei ev ry rrepl tQv 
<f)ikocr6(f)Wv icrropiq. Kai "Liar'uav 6 'AXe^avSpeiis ev rais Aiadox^is Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 
452). On the other hand 'nullum [servum fuisse] Zenoni... satis constat' Sen. Dta/. 
xii 12, 4. 

* Arnim i 439, 440. ^ id. 449. ^ Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). 
^ Diog. L. vii 162. * Athen. as above. 

^ Paus. ii 8, 4 ; vii 8, 3 (Arnim i 442). 

^" Plut. Arat. 23, 3. According to Plutarch he afterwards admitted that he had 
been wrongly taught as to the 'good general.' 

^^ ' Persaeus eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum 
esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas ' 
Cic. N. D. i 15, 38. Persaeus derived the theory from Prodicus ; Philod. de piet. 9 
(Arnim i 448), and above, § 42. 



80 ROMAN STOICISM 

90. Two other companions of Zeno also took service under 

Antigonus, apparently at the same time. Of these 
Philonides of. Thebes^^ is otherwise unknown to 
us. The other was Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, author of the well- 
known poem The Phaenomena, an astronomical treatise afterwards 
translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil in his 
Georgics. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were 
probably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions 
reached Virgil. The most interesting part for us is the Intro- 
duction, in which he interprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity 
who dwells in sea and land, in markets and streets: whose family 
is mankind; and whose providence has set the stars in the heaven 
to regulate the seasons of the year and to be a guide to the 
farmer and the sailor^^ The spirit of this poem is closely akin 
to that of the hymn of Cleanthes. 

91. Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part 

in political life. Sphaerus from the Bosphorus 

Sphaerus. , . . . _,, tt-i 

(circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to Cleomenes 111, 
king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the laws 
of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred 
to the education of the youth and the taking of meals in common". 
With these he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic 
model, in which the sovereign was to side with the poor against 
the rich^^ But in 221 B.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, 
and was compelled to take refuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes),. 
king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his way to the same court. 
The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the position of a 
disregarded suppliant'^; but Sphaerus appears to have found a 
congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic 
learning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the 
circle that gathered round the Museum ^^ He gained a special 
reputation by the excellence of his definitions^^ From an anec- 

^^ Diog. L. vii 9. 

1^ eK Atos dpxw/teo-^a, tov ovd^Tror' dvdpes iQfxef \ &ppr]Tov ' fieffral de Ai6s Tracrat 
fxev dyviai, \ Trdaai 5' dvOpunruv dyopai, neffrij de OdXacraa \ kcu Xtfxives ' iravrri Sb 
Albs Kexpv/^^00, TrdvTes. \ tov yap kuI yivoi icrfiiv ' 6 5' ijinos avOpcoTroicrtv | 5e|ta 
(j-qixa'wei, \aovs 8' eirt ^pyov iyeipa \ fUfJivrjffKwv j3i6toio : Aratus, Phaen. Pref. 

" Plut. Cleo. II, 2. ^^ Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 222. 

1^ ib. p. 245. ^'' Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 44. 

^^ ' Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici ' Cic. Tusc. disp. 
iv 24, 53. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 8l 

dote related of him we must infer that whilst adhering to Zeno's 
doctrine that the wise man will not opine, he accepted reasonable 
assurance (to evXoyov) as a sufficient guide in daily life^^ He 
appears to have laid special stress upon the unity of virtue, main- 
taining that the separate virtues are but appearances of virtue 
or knowledge in different spheres of action '''. 

92. Herillus of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently 
referred to by Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly 
distinguishable from those of the Academy, in that 
he made knowledge the highest good^^ and taught that separate 
from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed inferior ends 
of action (u7roTeXtSe<?)^^ It does not, however, appear clearly 
that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, 
had defined the virtues as being ' knowledge displayed in 
different spheres of action,' and the aim of Herillus, ' to live 
according to the standard of life accompanied by knowledge^V 
points in the direction of practical rather than of speculative 
wisdom. His 'subordinate aims' appear also to correspond 
with Zeno's ' things of high degree ' (irpoiry/jLeva), and are 
defined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted 
upon birth, as food, life, strength {irpwra Kara (pvaiv)"^; they 
serve only for ' ends ' (reXr)) for men who have not yet attained 
to wisdom ^^ This doctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic 
doctrine as developed somewhat later^*'. 

^^ See below, § 332. 

^^ 'fortitude est...conservatio stabilis iudici in iis rebus, quae formidolosae 
videntur... [haec definitio erat] Sphaeri ' Cic. as above. The principle was accepted 
by all Stoics, see below, § 323. 

^^ ' omitto...Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit ; qui cum 
Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone' 
Cic. Ac. ii 42, 129. See also Fzft. iv 14, 36. 

^^ 'sin ea [quae virtus leget quaeque reiciet] non neglegemus neque tamen ad 
finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberrabimus ; facit enim 
ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum' Mn. iv 15, 40. 

^■^ ^Tjv del iravTa ava^^povra wpos to /xer' iTnaTTfifiris ^ijv Diog. L. vii 165. 

^ VTTOTeXls 5' iffrl to irpGiTov olKelov tov faou iro-Oos, d0' ov KaTTjp^aTO avvaLcr- 
Bdveffdai to ^<2ou ttjs <TV(TTa<xiws aiWov, ovircj \oyiKov [6V] aXX' dXoyov Stob. ii 7, 3 c. 

^ 8ia(pip€iv d^ T^Xos Kal iiiroTeKida ' tt]s fJ-ev yap Kal toi)s fJ-rj <TO(povs (XTOxd^ecrdat, 
TOV di p.6vov TOV (jo(pbv Diog. L. vii 165. 

^'' The best discussion is by Hirzel, Untersuchungen, ii 46 sqq. He considers the 
teaching of Herillus to have inclined to Cynism rather than to Platonism, and to 
have been substantially identical with that of Aristo. 

A. 6 



82 ROMAN STOICISM 

93. i^RISTO of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly 
from Zeno's teaching, falling back generally on 
Cynic views. He was no favourite of Zeno, who 
called him a chatterbox^'': and in later life he was accused of 
becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was in power'^^, 
and of luxury in his personal habits ^l But his success as a 
teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called 
themselves Aristonians. 

He appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the 
doctrine of ' comprehension ' ; and if on this subject he was 
worsted for the moment by Persaeus^", he retaliated on some 
Academic by asking : ' do you see who is sitting next you .'' ' 
The Academic replied ' I do not' ' Are you blind, then,' said 
Aristo ; 'where are your eyes^^?' Still he considered any 
systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time ; like 
spiders' webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no 
use^-^. With regard to physics he was openly agnostic ^•^; of the 
nature of the gods he thought we could know nothing, not even 
whether the deity were animate or no^. Ethics alone remained; 
but this part of philosophy he reduced by omitting all practical 
precepts, as introducing the element of uncertainty^'. In ethics 
proper he rejects the theory of ' things of high degree ' 
(-Trporjjfjiiva), observing that this term does not harmonize with 
the treatment of advantages as ' indifferent,' but comes danger- 
ously near to calling them ' good"".' Virtue, or rather know- 
ledge, is, as he maintains, the only good ; and all that lies 
between good and evil is alike indifferent^^ The highest good 

^ \d\ov iiriKoket. Diog. L. vii i8. ^^ Athen. vi 58 (Arnim i 342). 

2^ id. vii 14 (Arnim i 341). ^° See above, § 89. 

^1 Diog. L. vii 163. ^^ id. vii 161. 

3^ ' nihil istorum [physicorum] sciri putat posse ' Cic. Ac. ii 39, 123. 

^^ ' qui neque formam del intellegi posse censeat, neque in dis sensum esse dicat ; 
dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit' Cic. JV. D. i 14, 37. 

^^ 'Aristo moralem quoque...quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit' Sen. Ep. 89, 13. 
' hanc partem [quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta] levem existimat, et quae 
non descendat in pectus usque ' ib. 94, 2 : in this letter the whole subject is very fully 
discussed. 

^® iaov yap eavL rb irporjyfjLevov avTTjv Xiyeip dSMcpopov Tifi ayadbv a^iovv, Kal 
<rxe5d»' 6v6/Ji.aTL (jlovov dia^ipop Sext. fua^/i. xi 64 (Arnim i 361). 

87 ' Aristonis...sententia, non esse res uUas praeter virtutes et vitia, inter quas 
quicquam omnino interesset ' Cic. Fin. iv 17, 47. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 83 

may therefore be defined as a state of indifference (d8ia<f>opia) 
towards all such things^. 

Aristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic 
doctrine when he maintained the unity of virtue. ' The soul,' 
he said, ' has one power only, that of reasoning ; one virtue only, 
the knowledge of good and evil. When we need to choose the 
good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge Soberness ; 
when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom ; 
Courage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments ; 
and when it gives every man his due, Justice^'l' But in deciding 
his action the wise man will be bound by no theories : he can do 
whatever comes into his head, provided only he keep himself 
free from distress, fear and greed *°. 

The popularity of these views was repressed by the activity 
of Chrysippus ; in Cicero's time they were, in cultivated society, 
extinct^\ But from the numerous references to Aristo in litera- 
ture it is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten ; and 
when there took place the revival of the Cynic tone which we 
see illustrated in the writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, 
Aristo is again treated with high respect^l 

94. An eminent pupil of Aristo was ERATOSTHENES of 
Cyrene, the grammarian, whom he won over from 

Eratosthenes. , ^ • 1 1 t- 1 1 1 11 

the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes undoubtedly 
represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic school 
towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the 
prejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and bar- 
barians *^ He was invited by Ptolemy HI (Euergetes) to be 
chief librarian of the Museum at Alexandria, and tutor to the 
crown-prince, and has left us an epigram in honour of this great 

^ ' huic [sc. Aristoni] summum bonum est, in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, 
quae ddiacpopia ab ipso dicitur' Cic. Ac. ii 42, 130. 

^^ Galen, Hipp, et Plat, vii 1 (Arniin i 374). Chrysippus is said to have com- 
plained that he made the various virtues (xxecets or variations of a single virtue (Plut. 
Sto. rep. vii 3) ; nevertheless the same doctrine frequently reappears in Stoic \yriters. 

40 'vives, inquit Aristo, niagnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cunque visum, ages : 
nunquam angere, nunquam cupies, nunquam timebis ' Cic. Fiti. iv 25, 69. 

^^ ' Aristonis.-.iampridem explosa sententia est ' Off. i 2, 6 ; cf. Fin. iv ry, 47. 

^-^ N. Saal, p. 37 sqq. For fuller discussions of Aristo see Hirzel, Uiitersuchzingen, 
ii p. 44, and Dyrofif, Ethik, pp. 43 sqq., 356 sqq. 

^^ Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, ii p. 161. 

6—2 



84 ROMAN STOICISM 

patron of learning and philosophy^. Amongst other followers of 
Aristo we hear specially of Apollophanes of Antiochia'*®. 

95. Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno DiONYSlUS of 

Heraclea abandoned his principles, and went over 

Dionysius. ^ , r ■ i r i a 

irom the camp oi virtue to that oi pleasure. A 
painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine 
that 'pain is no evil^".' His secession was used by Antiochus as 
an argument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain 
knowledge^l That his life after he became a Cyrenaic was 
openly scandalous'*^ we need not too readily believe : such 
accusations may easily be mere deductions from his supposed 
philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to have been a 
particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus^l 

Of the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names 
of, amongst others, Athenodorus of Soli^", Callippus of 
Corinth^", PosiDONius of Alexandria^", and Zeno of Sidon^". 
The last, if he existed, must be kept distinct from other Zenos, 
such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of Chrysippus, and Zeno of 
Sidon the Epicurean philosopher. 

96. We come last amongst Zeno's hearers to Cleanthes of 

Assos in Asia Minor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded 
Zeno as head of the school when already advanced 
in years, and presided over it for a whole generation. In personal 
character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes, and 
Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance®^; 
and if he did not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was 
deeply impressed upon him^l He studied Zeno's life even more 
attentively than his doctrines ; lived with him, watched his hours 

^ Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies, p. 207. 

^^ Athen. vii 14 (Arnim i 408). 

■*^ ' nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter 
oculorum dolorem ; quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret ! 
illud audierat nee tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset ' 
Cic. Fin. v 31, 94 ; riXos eTire rrjv i]5ov7]P 5ia ireplaraaw d(p0a\/iiias Diog. L. vii 166. 

■^^ '[quaerebat Antiochus], Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset,... 
honestum quod esset, id solum bonum esse, an...honesti inane nomen esse, volup- 
tatem esse summum bonum' Cic. ^c. ii 22, 71. 

^8 Diog. L. vii 167 ; Athen. x 50 (Arnim i 428). 

■^ Diog. L. vii 167. 50 Diog. L. vii 38. 

5' He drew water by night that he might study philosophy by day, according» to 
Diog. L. vii 168. 'Cleanthes aquam traxit et rigando horto locavit manus' Sen. 
£p. 44. 3- ®^ I>iog- L. vii 37. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 85 

of retirement, inquired whether his actions corresponded to his 
teaching®^. Himself a man of the people, he ardently desired to 
spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose verse as the 
best means to express clearly his meaning and win access to 
men's ears'^. He remained constant to Zeno's teaching-^^, but 
he inspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more 
consistent detail. He is before all things the theologian of 
Stoicism. The belief in the deity, which in the fragments of 
Zeno's teaching appears merely formal and argumentative, be- 
comes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and dominating. God 
is the creator and the director of the world ; his Logos gives 
it order and harmony. In God's designs it is the privilege and 
duty of man to co-operate ; but since he is possessed of free 
will, it is also within his power to make a futile opposition. In 
this way the good and the bad stand in definite contrast. 
Finally, right knowledge and right action are only possible by 
association with the deity through praise and prayer. 

97. It is our good fortune to possess several complete 
poems of Cleanthes, which are of more value to us 

His poetry. 

towards appreciating his standpoint than a hundred 
detached sentences would be. The hymn to Zeus^^ is the most 
important, and its likeness to the opening of Aratus'/'/^^a:^;/^;;^^;?^'''' 
will not escape notice. 

Hym.71 to Zeus. 
Supreme of gods, by titles manifold 
Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold 

Eternal dominance. Nature's author, Zeus, 
Guiding a universe by Law controlled ; 2 

Hail ! for 'tis meet that men should call on thee 
Whose seed we are ; and ours the destiny 

Alone of all that lives and moves on earth, 
A mirror of thy deity^^ to be. 5 

^^ ' Zenonein Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset : vitae enim eius 
interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit ilium, an ex formula sua viveret ' Sen. Ep. 6, 6. 

^* ' sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit ' Sen. JSp. 108, 10. 

^' eVi TU)v avTuv efxeive SoyfidTuv Diog. L. vii i68. 

^^ Stob. i r, 12 (Arnim i 537). ^'' See above, § 90. 

^^ I follow the reading yevofieada, deov. The words 7^1'os e<rixiv in the text are 
surely a reminiscence of Aratus, Phaen. 5 (so Pearson, p. 276), and ^eoO ixlfji-qixa is 
confirmed by Musonius ap. Stob. Flor. 117, 8 (see below, § 419). Mr Pearson now 
suggests to me that the MS reading r)xov may represent the correction of a pious 
scribe, ic XYt i-s- 'IijtroO 'KpiffTov, for deov. See below, § 244. 



86 ROMAN STOICISM 

Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise ; 
For at thy word, on their appointed ways 

The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth 
Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys, 8 

Who boldest in thy hands invincible 
So dread a minister to work thy will — 

The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast 
Thro' all the powers of nature strikes a chill •^''* — ii 

Whereby thou guid'st the universal force. 

Reason, through all things interfused, whose course 

Commingles with the great and lesser*^" lights — 
Thyself of all the sovran and the source : 14 

For nought is done on earth apart from thee. 
Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea ; 
Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men 
Whose own hearts lead them to perversity. 17 

But skill to make the crooked straight is thine. 
To turn disorder to a fair design ; 

Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight, 
For ill and good thy power doth so combine 20 

That out of all appears in unity 
Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee 

And disregard, who long for happiness, 
Yet God's great Law can neither hear nor see ; 24 

Ill-fated folk ! for would they but obey 
With understanding heart, from day to day 

Their life were full of blessing, but they turn 
Each to his sin, by folly led astray. 26 

Glory would some thro' bitter strife attain 
And some are eager after lawless gain ; 

Some lust for sensual delights, but each 
Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain. 31 

But, Zeus all-bountiful ! the thunder-flame 
And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim : 

From ignorance deliver us, that leads 
The sons of men to sorrow and to shame. 33 



^* The translation follows Pearson's ipplyaaiv. Arnim reads '^pya, reXelrai. Even 
the meaning is quite uncertain here. 

^^ iM€yd\(i) fiLKpois re (Dials) seems the nearest reading to the MS, so that the 
word ' great ' above refers to the sun only. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 87 

Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul 
And grant that Wisdom may our life control, 

Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world 
Upon the path of justice to its goal. 35 

So winning honour thee shall we requite 
With honour, lauding still thy works of might ; 

Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this — 
The universal Law to praise aright. 39 

Translated by W. H, Porter. 

98. Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with 
fate, and points the same moral as to human duty : 

Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny, 
What way soe'er ye have appointed me ! 
I follow unafraid : yea, though the will 
Turn recreant, I needs must follow still ^1. 

In other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth 
with clearness and emphasis : 

' Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a sudden ; 
fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no judgment and no 
modesty ; for the crowd does not possess shrewd just and fair judgment, 
but amongst the few you may perchance find this ''2.' 

'Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is orderly, 
just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair, necessary, severe, upright, 
always of advantage ; fearless, painless, profitable, without smart ; helpful, 
pleasing, sure, friendly, honourable, consistent ; noble, not puffed up, pains- 
taking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time, blameless, unchanging ^^.' 

' He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the while has 
desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets opportunity^*.' 

In the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical 
paradox of the highest importance to Stoicism : that good and 
evil are set in the will and the intention, and are not dependent 
upon the action ''I 

®^ Sl^ov 5i fx, (5 ZeO, Kal crtj y' i] Trewpia/xivr], | oiroi iroO' vfuv eifii biaTera-yixivos. \ 
ws e^o/jLai y' doKvos ' fjv 5i ye fu) di\(j3 \ kukos yev6/xevos, oiid^v ijTTov 'i\j/oixai Epict. 
Manual ^'>,; 'due, o parens celsique dominator poll, | quocunque placuit ; nulla 
parendi mora est. | adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens, | malusque patiar, 
quod pati licuit bono. | ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt ' Sen. Ep. 107, 11. 
The translation given above is by G. H. Rendall {M. Aurel. Introd. p. Ixvii). 

®'^ Clem. Strom, v 3, 17 (Arnim i 559). 

*^ Clem. Protrept. vi 72 (Arnim i 557). '°^ Stob. iii 6, 3 (Arnim i 573). 

^5 See below, § 317. 



88 ROMAN STOICISM 

99. To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of 
Originality Zeno. Persaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside 
of Cleanthes. from the direct pursuit of philosophy, and their 

contact with science and politics might easily sully the purity 
of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted Academic 
doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius had 
actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that the 
far-reaching sweep of Zeno's intellect had no real hold on his 
companions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old land- 
marks. We must not suppose from this that he was a man of 
no originality*'''; his language and his style at least are his own. 
Nor on the other hand can we go all the way with some recent 
writers, who attribute to him exclusively large parts of the Stoic 
system"''. Our authorities commonly refer either to Zeno alone, 
or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly, as vouching for 
accepted Stoic doctrine ; and we are hardly entitled to lay great 
stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the author- 
ship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the 
independence of his teaching ; especially as we can in many 
instances see that our authorities delight in attributing a differ- 
ence of meaning to the Stoic masters, when in reality there is 
nothing more to be found than a difference of phrasing*'^ It is 
however clear that Stoicism did not assume its complete form in 
the hands of its first propagator ; and to a limited extent we can 
see the directions in which his teaching was amplified by his 
successors. 

100. Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical specu- 
la. . f lations of Heraclitus, on whose writings he com- 

Fnysics oi ' o 

Cleanthes. poscd four books"^, and in particular in the bearing 
of his speculations upon the nature of the deity. The belief in 
the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the world, is 
attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno''''; but on the 
other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more 

^ As, for instance, Zeller does when he writes ' Cleanthes was adapted to uphold 
liis master's teaching, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of 
establishing it on a wider basis' Stoics, p. 41. 

^ Hirzel, Untersuchnngen, ii pp. 134 sqq. ; Stein, Psychologic der Stoa, i 65-72, 
162-171, ii 316-332. 

^* Sen. Ep. 113, 23. ^* Diog. L. vii 174. ''^ ib. 134. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 89 

pronounced in the later writer''^ Hence from the first Cleanthes 
endeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of 
Heraclitus, the creative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed 
the new term 'flame' (<p\6^y^; at other times he identified it 
with the sky^^, with the sun"**, and with the principle of heat''^; 
and finally adopted the term 'spirit' (irvevfxa, spiriUts), which has 
ever since held its place in the discussion of natural theology. 
This term appears to have been at first intended to combine the 
conceptions of the creative fire and of the Logos^'^, but it gradu- 
ally came to have distinctive associations of its own. Like fire, 
'spirit' is to the Stoics a substance, stuff, or body akin to the 
element of air, but associated with warmth and elasticity ; it is 
conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating it as the 
deity ; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the 
soup''. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its 'tension' 
(Toi'09, inteniio), by means of which its creative power pushes 
forward from the centre to the circumference : as for instance in 
the human body walking is efi"ected by ' spirit exercising tension 
towards the feef^' The theory of ' tension ' has an immediate 
application to ethics. When the soul has sufficient tension to 
perform its proper work, it operates according to the virtues of 
Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness ; but when the tension 
is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by 
the emotions''^ 

101. To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the 

Theology of govcmment both of the universe and of the indi- 

cieanthes. vidual. Zeuo indeed is said to have used the term 

'q'y€[xoviK6v (^principale, principaUis)^, which we may translate by 

"^ ' Cleanthes ipsum mundum...deum dicit esse ' Cic. N. D. i 14, 37. 

^^ Arnim i 497, 511. 

^^ ' ultimum et altissimum et omnia complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur ' 
Cic. as in note 71. 

''* Cic. N. D. ii 15, 41. 

^^ ' sic res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant, contineant in se vim 
caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere' ih. 9, 23. 

^^ ' haec (quae Zeno dixit Xoyoi/ esse) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit quem 
permeatorem universitatis affirmat ' Tert. Apol. 21 (Arnim i 533). 

^^ The substance of this doctrine is attributed to Zeno also: Tiy\vwv...-Kvevixa 
ivdipiiov elvat tt]v \pvxvv Diog. L. vii 157. 

^* See below, § 277. 79 Pearson, Introd. p. 45 ; below, § 362. 

^^ Arnim i 143. 



90 ROMAN STOICISM 

' ruling power,' or shortly (following the Latin) by ' principate^V 
for the highest power of the human soul ; Cleanthes sought a 
similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have found 
it in the sun^l By thus using the term in a double sense he 
implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms 
' macrocosm ' and ' microcosm,' and which leads up to the defini- 
tion of God as the 'soul of the universe^l' Cleanthes further 
speaks of the universe itself as god^^; but before describing him 
as a pantheist it is well to consider that this is only one form out 
of many in which he expresses his creed. He was also the first 
to give the four proofs of the existence of the deity upon which 
all discussions of the 'evidences of Natural Religion' have been 
based down to the present day, and which we shall further 
discuss in a later chapter^. 

The pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of 
bigotry, destined to have serious consequences in the final 
developments of Stoicism, and to reappear in the history of 
the middle ages with distressing intensity ; he was bitterly op- 
posed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe as an 
impiety^". 

102. Thus even though we can no longer discriminate 
Weakness sharply bctwccn the teaching of Zeno and that of 
of Stoicism. Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose that 
the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour 
and copiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that 
a man of such powers failed to attract hearers or to retain a 
hold upon them. But in his extreme old age it seems that the 
majority were drawn aside either to the ingenious arguments of 
Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more independent teaching 
of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of Stoicism seemed 

^^ There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using this term 
both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the soul, and historically for 
the system of government founded by Augustus. There is a genuine analogy between 
the two, though it is not developed by the Latin writers. Seneca uses principale only. 

®^ ■qyefJt.oviKbv 5e tov Kdcrfiov KXedvdei fiev TJpeffe rov yfKLov elvai Euseb. pr. ev. xv 
15, 7 (Arnim i 499) ; and see below, § 201. 

^ KXedi/^^js \rhv B€ov\ rr\v roC kSct/mov ypvxv" Aet. i 7, 17 (Arnim i 532) ; ' totius 
naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen [dei]' Cic. JV. D. i 14, 37. 

^* ' Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse ' ib. 

^ Cic. N. D. ii 5, 13-15 ; and see below, ch. x. ^ See below, § 195. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 9I 

threatened ; its critics were not to be contented v/ith rhetoric or 
poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it was 
saved and estabh'shed by a younger man, Chrysippus of Soli 
(280-206 B.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally 
zealous and more in harmony with the tastes and demands of 
the younger generation. 

103c Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, 
and his appearance is doubtless a sign of the active 

Chrysippus. . . , ., , 1 • 1 r 

niterest m philosophy which for some centuries 
marks the neighbourhood of the important town of Tarsus. 
Born in' 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent 
teachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these 
Aristo seems to have been the most popular, and surprise was 
expressed that Chrysippus did not join his school. ' Had I 
followed the many,' he replied, ' I should not have become a 
philosopher^''.' His convictions drew him to Cleanthes, but he 
felt much impatience with his methods. This state of mind he 
must have expressed freely, for in after life he reproached himself 
that he had not behaved more kindly towards his teacher in his 
old age^^. Confident in his own powers, he desired to relieve 
Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made 
upon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics'^. It is well known 
that he asked his m.aster to supply him with his dogmas only 
saying that he himself would find the proofs^". Chrysippus 
probably outlived his opponents, and during the time when he 
was head of the school (232-206 B.C.) only found himself opposed 
by men of mediocre talents. He devoted his whole energies to 
strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine. He not only 
gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to recom- 
mend it to his hearers^\ From his facile pen there poured an 
endless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality 
or for style, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the 

'^ ei Toh TToXXoiS, etTre, TrpoaeTxov, ovk av e0iXo(r60?7<Ta Diog. L. vii 182. 

'^ 67W 5e T&XKa fia.Kdpi.oi ir4(pVK' avrip \ ir\r]u els KXedvdriv' tovto 5' ovk evdaifAOVLO 
Diog. L. vii 179. 

89 id. 182. 90 zd. 179. 

91 ' num contentus est [Chrysippus] docere, rem ostendere, definire, explorare ? 
non est contentus : verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat, praemunit, iterat, 
differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit, personas fingit, orationem suam alii 
accommodat ' Pronto, ep. ad Ant. p. 146 (Arnim ii 27). 



92 ROMAN STOICISM 

standard of Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers 
round him, and before his death it could truly be said that he 
had saved the Stoa^l 

104. In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great 
Dialectic of usc of the syllogism, thus reverting to the practice 
Chrysippus. ^f 2eno as opposed to the more poetical style of 

Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic reasoning very 
contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By his contem- 
poraries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that ' if the 
gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of 
Chrysippus"^.' On the other hand members of his own school 
complained that he often stated his opponents' case more forcibly 
than his own"'*. The Romans mix their praise with censure, and 
find that he sometimes entangles himself in the threads of his own 
argument'^; and we ourselves cannot fail to notice that when his 
major and minor premisses are compared, the meaning of the 
common term has usually shifted^®. But if Chrysippus did not 
provide a final solution to great problems, he at least adapted 
the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by his use of 
syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of 
fallacies*''. 

105. Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range 
Opposition of of the Stoic philosophy, their special colour is 
the Academy. largely duc to the interests of his own time. The 
stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge had produced a 

"^ odev (paclv kir avTov Xexd^jvat, el fir] yap rjv Xpvcrnnros, ovk av ■jjc crroci Diog. L. 
vii 183. 

*'* Diog. L. vii 180. 

^^ 'de quo queri solent Stoici, duni studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et 
perspicuitatem...ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse ; itaque ab eo armatum 
esse Carneaden' Cic. Ac. ii 27, 87 ; cf. Pint. S^o. rep. x 3 and 4. 

^■^ ' ab Chrysippo nihil magnixm nee magnificum desideravi, qui suo quodam more 
loquitur, ut omnia verborum momentis, non rerum ponderibus examinet' Cic. Rep. iii 
8, 12; 'ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur ' de Fato 4, 7; 'Chrysippus, penes quem 
subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans verilatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur 
et verbis non ultra quam ad intellectum satis est utitur, totum librum his ineptiis 
replet' Sen. Ben. i 3, 8; 'magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius 
acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur ' ib. 4, i. 

^® ' quod est bonum, omne laudabile est ; quod autem laudabile est, omne est 
honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est' Cic. Fin. iii 8, 27. 

*' See below, §§ 162, 163. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 93 

reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had succeeded 
Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching of 
Plato's later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had 
been one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in 
most of the Platonic dialogues"*. He attacked with the utmost 
vigour Zeno's doctrine of ' comprehension '; and further argued 
that certain knowledge is unnecessary for practical life, of which 
probability, that is, such action as can find reasonable justifica- 
tion, is the sufficient guide"^ Chrysippus defended with the 
utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of knowledge, based 
upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures"" ; but the teaching of 
Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see) was 
ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system. 

106. Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy 
Spread of ^o meet than the Academy. During the weakness 

Epicureanism, ^hich bcfcl the Stoic school in the middle of the 
third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won an 
enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had 
inherited from the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of 
Zeno but all sober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set 
up Pleasure as the queen of life, and had converted the virtues 
into her handmaidens "i; and so far was he from taking interest 
in model states, that he advised his hearers to hold aloof alto- 
gether from public life. Worst of all, his followers only smiled 
at the reproofs that were showered upon them. They formed 
among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united society ; 
their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their 
entertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses 
of their self-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism 
seemed to be quite gone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians 
had ceased to exist, 

88 'Arcesilas primum...ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc 
maxima arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit ' Cic. 
de Orat. iii i8, 67. See above, § 71. 

8^ 6 Trpocr^x^'' '''^ evXdyqj Karopdiliaei koL evdaifiovrjcrei Sext. math, vii 158. 

i"" ' cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora et certiora esse 
dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur, quam quae somniantibus' Cic. Div. ii 61, 126; 
see further, § 147. 

•'"^ See below, § 346. 



94 ROMAN STOICISM 

107. Under these circumstances the remaining schools began 
Alliance of the ^o look One to another for support, and were even 
three schools. brought into a kind of aUiance. The adherents of 
the Academy and the Porch, in particular, began to meet in 
friendly discussion, and sometimes defined anew their doctrines 
so as to minimize points of difference, sometimes directly modi- 
fied them by way of concession to opposed arguments. This 
process resulted in a toning down of Stoicism in every part of its 
system. The Stoic teachers began to disregard or push into the 
background those characteristic doctrines which had been em- 
bodied in the Socratic paradoxes and enforced by the Cynic 
propaganda. Thus their teaching gave less offence to the lax 
crowd, and at the same time (it must be admitted) less support 
to the striving few ; but its tone was now so modest that men of 
gentle and judicious temperament were attracted to Stoicism for 
the first time. Stoicism began now to shew itself receptive of 
literary influences, especially as regards the works of Plato and 
Aristotle, and even appreciative of artistic ideals. Such was 
the tendency of the system during both the second and the first 
centuries B.C.; but it is more difficult to estimate the extent of the 
deviation. Terms like evKpacria 'well proportioned mixture^"^,' 
evpoia 'even flow"V evrovia 'due tone"^' avijLcfxovla ' harmony^''^,' 
are attributed even to the earliest masters : whilst it is abun- 
dantly clear that the .Socratic and Cynic paradoxes formed at 
all times part of the generally accepted view of Stoic doctrine. 

108. It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs 

further investigation, to what extent this approxi- 

Chrysippus "^ ^ '■ 

inclines to the matiou betwccn the doctrines of the Academy and 
the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysip- 
pus. On the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a 
man of distinctly orthodox temperament; he firmly opposed the 
Cynizing heresies of Aristo, and strongly defended the Stoic 
theory of knowledge against the Academy. But our knowledge 
of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in volume, is lacking in 
precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very imperfectly 

^"^ See Pearson, C/e. fr. 42. 

'"* According to Stob. ii 7, 6 e this term was used by all the Stoic teachers. 

^"^ Used by Chrysippus, see Arnim iii 473. i**^ Diog. L. vii 88. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 95 

distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of the 
two earher masters ; and the doctrines which are regarded as 
common to all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in 
the language of Chrysippus, whose works remained for centuries 
the recognised standard of orthodoxy. Even so there are few 
distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus which do not seem to be 
foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some earlier teacher. 
Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching there was 
a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic character, 
and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears 
when he defines the supreme good as ' a life according to nature, 
that is, both general nature and our individual human nature""/ 
and adds, ' for our individual natures are parts of the nature of 
the all"^.' This approaches the doctrine of ' virtue appropriate 
to the individual ' (ucKeia aper-q), as taught by the Academics"®. 
A still more striking concession is his permission to men engaged 
in practical life to describe advantages as 'good things,' provided 
they are carefully distinguished from the supreme good"^ 

109. The weakening hold of the Stoics upon the principles 
Successors of o^ their founder first becomes evident in the depart- 
chrysippus. mcnt of physics. Thus it is an essential part of the 
theory which the Stoics borrowed from Heraclitus, that as the 
whole universe has proceeded from the all-creative fire, so it 
must in due course be re-absorbed in it, this periodical re- 
absorption being technically known as the ' conflagration ' 
{iK7rvp(ocn<;). On the other hand the followers of Aristotle, 
following dualistic principles, placed God and the universe in 
eternal contrast, and held both to be immortal. Ingenious con- 
troversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their deity 
exercised his providence during the periodic intervals in which 
the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments 
had an immediate effect. BOETHUS of Sidon, a contemporary 
of Chrysippus, abandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this 

If*" (pvcnv 5^ XpvffiTnros /xh i^aKovei, ■§ aKoKovdcas del ^^v, ttjv re Koiv-qv Kai tStws ttjv 
dvdpuirivriv ib. vii 89. 

^'*'' it-ipt] yap eicriv ai rj/j-^repai <f>v<T€t.s rijs rod S\ov ib. 87. 

108 See above, § 71. 

109 didwcri Tois ^ovXa/iivois to, irpo7]yfx.iva KoKeiv dyadd Plut. Sio. rep. 30, 4. 



96 ROMAN STOICISM 

subject""; Zeno of Tarsus, who had been with his father 
DiOSCORlDES a pupil of Chrysippus, and who succeeded him 
as head of the school, discreetly ' suspended his judgment ' upon 
the point"\ But whatever its theoretical embarrassments, the 
Stoic school continued to prosper. Zeno of Tarsus wrote but 
few books, but had more disciples than any other "^; he was 
succeeded by Seleucus of the Tigris "^ and he in turn by 
Diogenes"'*, Antipater, and Panaetius. The last of these main- 
tained Zeno's ' suspense of judgment"'^' on the question of the 
conflagration ; but after his death the Stoics quietly returned to 
the older opinion. 

110. Diogenes of Seleucia (circ. 238-150 B.C. ; often called 
Diogenes and ' ^f Babylon,' or simply Diogenes Stoicus), and 
Antipater. Antipater of Tarsus (circ. 200-129 B.C.), were 

both men of eminence in the history of Stoicism"*, but they 
were unequally matched against Carneades (218-128 B.C.), who 
was head of the Academic school about the same time, and who 
proclaimed the doctrine of a universal suspension of judgment. 
The many volumes of Chrysippus gave Carneades ample oppor- 
tunities for the exercise of his critical powers ; and Antipater, 
unable or unwilling to meet him in open argument, fell himself 
into the evil habit of book-writing"''. Both these teachers 
specially interested themselves in questions of casuistry. 
Diogenes, who defined the good as ' reasonableness in the 
choice of natural ends"V adopted practically that interpretation 
of ' reasonableness ' in which divine reason has the least part, 
and human plausibility the freest play"^ Thus he discusses 
the problems whether the seller of a house ought to inform the 

11" Philo, inc. immd. 15, p. 248 (Arnim iii Boeth. 7). 

m Tov (xkv yap to6tov [sc. Chrysippi] fxaOrjTjjv /cat diddoxov rijs ffxoX^s Zrjvwvd. 
(j>a<ji.v ewLax^^v ""^P^ ''"^s eKirupoba-ews tlov oXuu Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels (Arnim iii Z. T. 5). 

"2 Diog. L. vii 35. 113 ind. g^Q^ fje,.^ col. 48 (Arnim iii Z. T. 2). 

11^ See Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 50. "^ See below, § 115. 

11^ ' aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, 
discipulo eius, homini acutissimo ' Cic. OJ^. iii 12, 51; 'Antipater inter magnos 
[Stoicae] sectae auctores' Sen. £j>. 92, 5. 

11^ Plut. de garr. 23. 

118 TO ev\oyi(TTeiv ev rrj rwc Kara (pijaiv iKXoyrj Diog. L. vii 88 ; for the Academic 
view see § 71 above. 

"^ See below, §§ 159, 332. 



THE PREACHING OF STOICISM 97 

purchaser of its defects, and whether a man upon whom false 
coins have been passed may transfer them to his neighbour^^". 
Exactly as Carneades^^\ he finds 'reasonable excuse' for the less 
scrupulous course. Antipater on the other hand holds that a 
man's duty to his neighbour requires perfect frankness^^^; yet he 
is said to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of the self- 
sufficiency of virtue, and to have held that external goods are a 
part (though only a small part) of the supreme good^-^. 

111. We may now shortly mention some less important 
Stoic teachers, chiefly of the early part of the 

Lesser Stoics. . , . , , 

second century B.C., smce their number alone is 
an indication of the wide influence of the sect. Aristocreon, 
said to have been the nephew of Chrysippus, set up a statue in 
his honour, as the man who could cut his way through the knots 
tied by the Academics^^*. Zenodotus was a pupil of Diogenes, 
and wrote an epigram on Zeno : he at least defended the 'manly 
doctrine ' of the founder, and recalled the principle of the 
sufficiency of virtue^-'. Apollodorus of Seleucia on the 
Tigris ^"^"^ (sometimes called Ephillus^-''), another pupil of Diogenes, 
leant towards Cynic views ; for he declared that ' the wise man 
will be a Cynic, for this is a short cut to virtue ^^*'; an opinion 
afterwards adopted by the Stoics generally^-". He also wrote on 
physics. A third pupil of Diogenes was Apollodorus of 
Athens^^". Closely associated with Antipater is Archedemus 
of Tarsus ; like his fellow-townsman, he was greatly devoted to 
dialectics'^' ; in ethics he appears to have inclined strongly to 
Academic views, holding that the end of life was the regular 

'»! Cic. Off. iii 13, 54; 23, 91. 

'2' Rep. iii 20, 30. 

'-^ ' tu cum hominibus consulere debeas, ...celabis homines' Off. iii 13, 52. 

'^ ' Antipater... aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum' Sen. 
Ep. 92, 5. 

12'' Plut. Sto. rep. 2, 5. '^^ Diog. L. vii 30. 

'■^^ Arnim iii p. 259 ; see also Pauly-Wissowa iuh voce. 

'-'' So Diog. L. vii 39, where however others read ' AwoWddupos Kal SuXXos. 

'■^* Diog. L. vii 121. ^^^ id. vi 104. 

'■^* Ind. Stoic. Here. col. 53 : also a pupil of Antipater ; to be distinguished 
from an Apollodorus of Athens who was an Epicurean ; Diog. L. vii 18 r. 

'^' 'duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archedemus, opiniosissimi 
homines' Cic. Ac, ii 47, 143. 

A. 7 



98 ROMAN STOICISM 

performance of daily duties^^^. Just about the time we have 
now reached (the middle of the second century B.C.) Eumenes II 
founded the great library at Pergamus, intended to rival that of 
Alexandria. As librarian he installed a Stoic philosopher, 
Crates of Mallos, who devoted much of his time to gram- 
matical inquiries, and endeavoured to bring Homer into accord 
with the Stoic views on geography ^^'; he is the first Stoic of 
whom we hear at Rome, which he visited about 159 B.C. Being 
detained there by an accident, he employed his time in giving 
lectures on literature^^; and his pupil Panaetius was destined 
to introduce Stoicism to Roman society. Lastly we may men- 
tion Heraclides of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater, said to have 
broken away from the teaching of the school by denying that 
all sins are equaP'^l Athenodorus of Tarsus, who held the 
same view, belongs to a later generation^^l Of uncertain date 
are Basilides, who pushed his monism so far as to declare that 
all things, even statements, are bodies^^^; EUDROMUS, who wrote 
on the elements of ethics^^^; and Crinis, who interested himself 
in logic^^^ 

132 Tj-dvTa TO, KaOrjKovra iTnreKodvTa ^rjv Diog. L. vii 88. 

123 Sandys, Classical Schola7'ship, i pp. 155, 156. ^^"^ ib. p. 157. 

^25 Diog. L. vii 121. ^36 See below, §§ 122, 123. 

^37 Amim iii p. 268. ^^^ Diog. L. vii 39. ^^9 n^^ yg^ 



CHAPTER V. 

THE STOIC SECT IN ROME. 

112. In the third century B.C. Stoicism won adherents slowly 
Growth of the ^^^ ^"^ ^Y °"^' ^^ individuals were convinced by 
Stoic 'sect.' reasoning and example. In the second century its 
progress became more rapid, for it was reinforced by inheritance 
and social influence. Fathers handed down its doctrine to their 
sons, and teachers to their pupils. Groups of men united by a 
common respect for the school and its founders began to associ- 
ate together, not only at Athens, but also (as we may well infer 
froni the list of names given at the end of the last chapter) at such 
centres as Pergamus, Babylon, Seleucia, Tarsus, Sidon-, and even 
Alexandria^ Thus out of the school there grew up the ' sect ' 
{sectd) ; that is, a society of men drawn from different nations and 
ranks, but sharing the same convictions, united by a bond of 
brotherhood, and feeling their way towards mutual consolation 
and support ; a company going through life on the same path, 
and prepared to submit to a common authority^ The spread of 
the sect was rapid though quiet ; and as we cannot expect to 
trace its history from place to place, we are unable to say when 
first it found adherents at Rome. But early in the second 
century B.C. Rome entered into close political relations with two 
of the most highly civilized states of Asia Minor, Pergamus and 
Rhodes ; and through the men of learning and taste who were 
associated with these communities Stoicism was introduced to 

^ Dill, Roman Society, p. 340. 

^ 'omnis natura habet quasi viam quandam et sectam quam sequatur' Cic. N. D. 
ii 22, 57. ' est tuae piudentiae sequi eius auctoritatem, cuius sectam atque imperium 
secutus es ' ad Fam. xiii 4, 2. ' The sense of the word has been obscured by a false 
popular etymology which has connected the word with the Latin secare 'to cut,' 
Skeat, Etymological Dictionary, p. 537. 

7—2 



lOO ROMAN STOICISM 

the ruling class at the centre of the new empire, to win there an 
easy conquest which proved no slight compensation for the 
political subordination of the states from which its emissaries 
had sprung. 

113. We have already noticed^ that the Stoic Crates, the 
head of the library established at Pergamus, visited 

Panaetius. . . 

Rome in 159 B.C. and there gave lectures on litera- 
ture, in which he may perhaps have taken occasion to expound 
at least the chief doctrines of the Stoic school. Only a few years 
later, in 155 B.C., the celebrated embassy from Athens, which 
included the heads of three of the chief philosophical schools 
at that time, arrived in Rome. Diogenes of Seleucia represented 
the Stoics, Critolaus the Peripatetics, and Carneades the Acade- 
mic school ; and all three expounded their respective theories 
before enormous audiences. We are told that Diogenes made 
a good impression by his sober and temperate style*. Thus 
the way was prepared for the more permanent influence of 
Panaetius of Rhodes (circ. 189-109 b.c.)1 He was a gentleman 
of position in the wealthy and well-governed island state, and in 
early youth pursued his studies at Pergamus, so that he was 
probably attracted to the school by Crates'*. From Pergamus he 
passed to Athens, where he found established the three teachers 
already named, and attached himself to Diogenes'', and after his 
death to his successor Antipater^ His writings shew that he was 
also much influenced by the teaching of Carneades. But more 
than any of his predecessors he appreciated philosophy in its 
literary form. Plato, the ' Homer of philosophers,' he held in 
veneration"; from Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and 
Dicaearchus he constantly quoted^". His admiration for these 

^ See above, § iii. 

* ' dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria ' A. Gellius N. A. vi (vii) 14, 10. 

•' For a full account of his life and teaching see Schmekel, Philosophic dei 
mittleren Stoa, pp. 1-9. 

^ Strabo xiv 5, 16. ^ Ind. Stoic. Here. col. 51. 

^ ' discipulus Antipatri Panaetius ' Cic. Div. i 3, 6. 

" ' credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti ? quern omnibus locis 
divinum, quem sapientissimum, quern sanctissimum, quern Homerum philosophomm 
appellat ' Tusc. disp. i 32, 79. 

~^^ Fin. iv 28, 79. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME IQI 

philosophers greatly influenced his style, and caused him to 
reject the stiff" and paradoxical form used by his predecessors"; 
it also led to the surrender of some characteristic Stoic doctrines 
Yf in favour of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle^-. His studies 
extended to every branch of philosophy, including astronomy^^ 
and politics^^ The latter interest brought him into association 
with Polybius the historian, with whom he held frequent discus- 
sions as to the best form of government ; the two learned and 
experienced Greeks agreed in their admiration for the constitution 
of Rome^^ Panaetius visited Rome, and there became the 
intimate friend of Scipio Africanus minor : this friendship must 
ri have begun before the year 140 B.C., when Panaetius accompanied 
// Scipio on a mission to settle the affairs of the East^*^; it lasted 
till the death of Scipio in 129 B.C. Round Scipio and his Greek 
friends Polybius and Panaetius there gathered a society of the 
noblest and most intelligent men of Rome ; and in this circle 
the Latin language as well as Greek philosophy found a new 
birth. At the time of Scipio's death Panaetius became the head 
of the Stoic school at Athens, and held this position till his 
own death twenty years later i''. Amongst his friends and pupils 
were men who took a leading part in the government of their 
native cities ^l 

114. Panaetius may well be regarded as the founder of 

His ethical Roman Stoicism, and is of special interest to us as 

teaching. ^j^g Writer of the treatise (Trepl Ka6r}KovTo<i) which 

Cicero has freely translated in his de Officiis. He sets before us 

1^ ' tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nee acerbitatem sententiarum nee 
disserendi spinas probavit ' ib. 

12 riv yap iffxvpus (piXoTrXdruu Kai (piXoapuTTOTeXrjs, d[XXa /c]at irap[€ved]uKe tuv 
ZiTjvuvldojIv Ti 6i[a T7)\v ' AKadrj/Miap Kal [top Ilepi7r]arov. Ind. Here. col. 6i, quoted 
by Schmekel, p. 379. 

1* ' quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus ! qui cum cetera, turn 
haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere' Cic. /\ep. i 10, 15. 

^^ ' ain' tandem ? etiam a Stoicis ista [de optima republica] tractata sunt ? non 
sane, nisi a [Diogene Stoico] et postea a Panaetio ' Le^: iii 6, 14. 

^^ See below, § 310, note 52. 

^^ ' [accept] Publi Africani in legatione ilia nobili Panaetium unum omnino 
comitem fuisse' Cic. ^<r. ii 2, 5. 

^^ This date is determined on circumstantial evidence by Schmekel, pp. 2, 3. 

^^ ' Scylax Halicarnasseus, familiaris Panaeti, excellens in astrologia, idemque in 
regenda sua civitate princeps ' Cic. Di'v. ii 42 , 88. 



I02 ROMAN STOICISM 

Stoicism as the school which will train the scholar, the gentleman, 
and the statesman, whilst he shrinks from those bolder doctrines, 
borrowed from the Cynic school, which conflict with that which 
\is conventional, or, as their opponents say, with that which is 
ibecoming. The central doctrine that virtue is knowledge, and 
fls the sole and sufficient good, he accepts as the plain teaching 

iof nature; and with it the paradox that thewise^man never 
errs^^. Yet even these maxims are somewhat toned down as he 
expresses them ; and external advantages appear to him worthy 
of pursuit, not only as giving a meaning to virtue and providing 
a field for its exercise, but also for their own sake, so long as 
they do not conflict with virtue^" ; and he perhaps hesitated to 
assert positively that 'pain is no evil^\' ; In his treatises the 
figure of the wise man is withdrawn to the background ; he is 
practically concerned only with the 'probationer' (o TrpoKoirTwv), 
who is making some advance in the direction of wisdom. This 
advance is not made by acts of perfect virtue, but by regular 
performance of 'services' (KadrJKovTa, officio), the simple and 
daily duties which come in the way of the good citizen ^l 
Further, scientific investigation must not become the main 
end of life, as perhaps it seemed to Aristotle ; it is permitted 
only as a recreation in the well-earned intervals between the 
calls of active life^^ 

115. It does not appear that Panaetius devoted much atten- 
His views on tion to logic^* ; on the other hand he was much 
physics. occupied with that part of philosophy which deals 

^'^ ' omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupidinem ; in qua 
excellere pulchrum putamus ; labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi, et malum et turpe 
ducimus ' Off. 16, i8; 'cum sit Is [Panaetius], qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod 
honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam utilitatis, eorum neque 
accessione meliorem vitam fieri, neque decessione peiorem' ib. iii 3, 12. 

^^ ' quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, id habet banc, ut opinor, sententiam, 
cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita 
legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent ' Off. iii 3, 13. 

^^ 'Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet...nusquam 
posuit non esse malum dolorem' Fin. iv 9, 23 ; see however below, § 322, note 132, 

^ See below, ch. xiii. 

2^ ' cuius [veri investigationis] studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium 
est. virtutis enim laus ornnis in actione consistit ; a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe, 
multique dantur ad studia reditus ' Cic. Off. 16, 19. 

2^ He was however a skilled grammarian ; see Schmekel, p. 207. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME ^ IO3 

with the history of the universe and its government by divine 
providence^^ The HeracUtean theory he appears to have left 
altogether on one side ; for he rejected the theory of the confla- 
gration^^, as Boethus had done before him, accepting the objection 
of Carneades that ' if everything turned into fire, the fire would 
go out for lack of fuel^.' He therefore joined the Peripatetics in 
holding that the universe is immortal^®; but since again Carneades 
has shown that ' no living thing is immortal,' it follows that the 
world is not an animal, nor is the deity its souP^ Upon all 
these subjects Panaetius ceased to maintain Stoic doctrines; and, 
alone amongst Stoic teachers, he ' suspended his judgment ' as to 
the reality of divination^". 

116. Similar concessions to his opponents mark his treat- 
Concession in meut in detail of ethics. Thus he takes from 
ethics. Aristotle the view that ' virtue is a mean between 

two vices'; and this doctrine, so alien from true Stoic principle, 
forms the basis of the treatment which we find adopted in the 
de Officiis. The theory of the four ' cardinal virtues,' Wisdom, 
Justice, Courage, and Soberness, was probably common property 
at this time ; but whereas in Cynism Courage and in the earlier 
Stoicism Wisdom are the dominant virtues, in the theory of 
Panaetius Soberness, identified with decorum, far exceeds the 
rest in practical importance. Thus the triumph won by Panaetius 
for the name of Stoicism was purchased by the sacrifice not only 
of its physics, but very largely of its ethics also ; and the success 
of the new system might not unfairly be described as a victory 
of literature over logic, of reasonableness over reason, and of 
compromise over consistency. However this may be, Panaetius 
undoubtedly succeeded in presenting Greek philosophy to his 

^^ He wrote a book ' on providence ' ; how far he or Posidonius is Cicero's 
authority for the treatment of the subject in Nat. de. ii has been much disputed ; on 
this point see Schmekel, p. 8, n. 4. 

^^ ' id de quo Panaetium addubitare dicebant, ut ad extremum omnis mundus 
ignesceret' Cic. N. D. ii 46, 118. 

^ Schmekel, p. 309, and below, § 211. 

^^ Ila^'atTios mdavuTipav eTvai vo/xi^ei Kai /jlELWov dp^ffKovcrav avT<^ t7]v didi6T7)Ta, 
ToO K6anov 7) TTjv tQv o\ut> els irvp nera^dKrqv Ar. Did. fr. 36 (Diels). 

^^ Schmekel, p. 309. 

^* ' vim esse divinandi [Panaetius] dubitare se dixit ' Cic. Div. i 3, 6. 



I04 ROMAN STOICISM 

Roman friends in a form in which it recommended itself alike 
to their reasoning powers and to their moral sense. 

117. The virtual, though not the nominal, successor of 

Panaetius was POSIDONIUS of Rhodes^i (circ. 135- 

Posidonius. 

51 B.C.^^), who after studymg under Panaetms at 
Athens travelled widely, finally settling at Rhodes, and there 
took an active part in political life. Like his master, he was 
a devoted student of Plato, and he wrote a commentary on the 
Tirnaeus. In this commentary he developes a new theory of the 
universe, which he asserts to be that which Plato had learnt from 
the Pythagoreans, and to be at root the same as that taught by 
the Stoics. The starting-point is the [xovd'^ or unit ; from this 
are evolved the numbers and the elements by a principle of flux, 
as in the system of Heraclitus^l The unity and the first of the 
numbers, the two, differ as force and matter ; so that the dualism 
of Aristotle is here definitely subordinated to a supreme monism. 
This study of Posidonius is therefore incidentally of high im- 
portance as a side-light on Stoic metaphysics and cosmology. 
In addition he wrote on almost all the principal divisions of 
philosophy, thus acquiring a brilliant reputation, particularly in 
the eyes of the philosophic nobles of Rome. Cicero made his 
acquaintance at Rhodes in 78 B.C., and refers to him more often 
in his works than to any other of his instructors^*. Pompey, in 
the midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble 
to visit him^l Amongst his Roman visitors and admirers were 
also Velleius, Cotta, and Lucilius^l A century later, Seneca 
looked back to him as one of those who had made the largest 
contribution to philosophy*''. 

118. As compared with the more scientific Panaetius, Posi- 

donius marks a reaction in favour of the religious 

His teaching. . . i /-r 

Side of Stoicism *l Thus it comes about that Cicero 
bases on his work ' on gods ' {irepl Oeayv) his own statement of the 

^^ He came from Apamea in Syria, but is often described as ' of Rhodes,' as the 
latter part of his life was spent there. 

^^ Schmekel, pp. 9, 10. ^* id. p. 428. 

^* Reid, Cic. Acad, Introd. p. 5. *^ Cic. Tttsc. disp. ii 25, 6t. 

'^^ N. D. i 44, 123; ii 34, 88. 

'^ ' ecce Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his qui plurimum philosophiae con- 
tulerunt ' Sen. Ep. 90, 20. ^^ See below, § 195. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME ^ IO5 

Stoic theology in the second book of his de Natura deorum^K 
Posidonius restores the theory of Divination, as to which Panae- 
tius had held the gravest doubts"*". He strongly asserts the 
divine origin of the soul, and accepts the Persian view that in 
this life it is imprisoned in the body". He affirmed the future 
conflagration ^2, and found this theory not inconsistent with a 
belief in the pre-existence and the immortality of the individual 
soul. 

In physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine 
of the Logos, and it appears that it passed directly from him to 
Philo of Alexandria, and so into Judaeo-Christian speculation. 
In ethics he maintained the sufficiency of virtue*", and re-defined 
it in the spirit of Cleanthes rather than of Chrysippus*''. In the 
practical application of such doctrines to cases of conscience he 
disliked the lax views of Diogenes, and sided rather with 
Antipater and Panaetius*^ Finally he held that the ideal 
Republic had already been achieved in the golden age, when 
the wise had ruled for the protection and happiness of their 
subjects**'. 

119. Hecato of Rhodes was also a pupil of Panaetius : 
he wrote books on ethics and casuistry which were 

Hecato. 1 1 r i 

largely used by Cicero and by Seneca, both of whom 
frequently refer to him by name. In laying the foundations of his 
ethics he distinguishes between the ' theoretic virtues,' such as 
Wisdom, Justice, Courage and Soberness, which call for the assent 
of the individual, and are possessed only by the wise man, and the 
corresponding ' non-theoretic virtues,' which are dispositions of 
body found also amongst the unwise ; as health which corre- 
sponds to temperance, and so forth*''. By this extension of the 

■** Also the de Divinatione and the first half of Tusc. disp. i ; Schmekel, 
p. 98, etc. 

**• ' de divinatione libros edidit...quinque noster Posidonius ' Cic. Div. i 3, 6. 

*i ' animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt, disiunguntque se a societate divina, vinclis 
corporis impediti ' ib. 49, no. 

*^ ' deflagrationem futuram aliquando caeli atque terrarum ' ib. ^^, in. 

*•* See § 322, note 132. 

** 6 IlocraSttJ^'ios [to riXos elvai elire} to ^rjv OeoipovvTa T7]v tGjv HXuv akr]9(i.av koI 
TOL^iv Clem. Strom, ii p. 416 B (Schmekel, p. 270) ; see also below, § 321, note 125. 

*^ Schmekel, p. 62. ■^ See below, § 214. 

*'^ Diog. L. vii 90; Schmekel, pp. 291, 292. 



I06 ROMAN STOICISM 

conception of virtue the doctrine of its sufficiency is rendered 
easy of acceptance'*^. In the practical apph'cation of his theory 
he laid great stress on the doctrine of ' relations ' (o-^^ecret?), that 
is on duties towards parent, wife, child, slave, country, and so 
forth^". In order to be in a position to perform these duties a 
man is entitled to care for his own life and property*^". He need 
not be too careful to provide for his slaves if provisions are 
dear^^; nor should he too hastily give up for another his chance 
of escape from a shipwreck*'-. Hecato therefore seems rather to 
side with Diogenes in questions of casuistry, taking a lax view 
where Antipater and Panaetius would be inclined to a more 
altruistic standpoint. 

120. The three teachers of Rhodes appear to us as men of 
great learning and of wide interests, and not with- 

The unsec- . 

tarian phiio- out Original force ; on the other hand we cannot say 
that they made any very large contributions towards 
the discussion of the great problems of philosophy. Apart 
from them we find little trace of creative ability in the school 
during the first century B.C. There were however numerous 
teachers occupied in expounding and defending the doctrines of 
the school, and their special interest lay in the controversies 
between the Porch and the Academy. From these there re- 
sulted a temporary fusion of the two schools. Their respective 
names and dogmas remained unaltered ; but attention was no 
longer given to the great differences of principle which divided 
them. Learning, politics, and social influences alike were at work, 
not to solve the great controversies, but to throw a mist over 
them. From these circumstances there emerged the type which 
we now call the 'eclectic,' but which the Romans called simply 
the 'philosopher'; that is, the man. who drew practical wisdom 
from all sources alike, binding himself to the dogmas of no 
school, but winning his way by aptness of discourse and sympathy 

•*^ Diog. L. vii 127. 

^ Schmekel, p. 294. ^^ See below, § 352. 

^ ' plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum ; sitne boni 
viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non alere? in utramque partem disputat, 
sed tamen ad extremum utilitate officium dirigit magis quam humanitate ' Cic. Off. 
iii 23, 89. 

®^ ib. 23, 90. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME ^ 10/ 

of manner to social importances^. We have but a limited interest 
at the present day in these ephemeral reputations ; the type is 
still with us, both in the preacher whose sympathies are given 
with equal readiness to half-a-dozen warring denominations, and 
in the politician who emphasizes his connexion by birth with 
three or four nationalities and as many grades of society. Nor 
are we called upon to question the usefulness of this blurring of 
differences. We must however remark that so far as our imme- 
diate subject is concerned, the fusion was equivalent to a defeat 
of Stoicism by the Academy. That nothing can be definitely 
proved ; that a man may choose his principles at the bidding of 
his fancy ; that an argument may be sufficiently sound for prac- 
tical purposes even when there exists a counter-argument of 
almost equal strength ; that the problems of dialectics, physics, 1 

and ethics may be discussed separately, instead of being treated * 

as parts of one whole ; all these are the points for which the 
Academic contended with as much consistency as his system 
allowed, and which every philosopher, whether or not he called 
himself a Stoic, conceded when he began to combine the teach- 
ings of diverse systems. 

121. After the death of Panaetius the school at Athens 
appears to have been conducted by DARDANUSand 
Mnesarchus, both of Athens, jointly^*; later we 
find at its head DiONYSlUS of Cyrene, who enjoyed a great 
reputation as a mathematician, and was a vigorous opponent of 
Demetrius the Epicurean^^ About the same time=^ Atheno- 
DORUS the elder of Tarsus (circ. 130-60 B.C.) became librarian 
at Pergamus ; he made use of his position to erase from Zeno's 
works those passages (probably from the Republic) which were 
repugnant to the Stoic teaching of his own time ; he was how- 
ever detected and the passages in question were restored s''. It 
appears also that he counselled withdrawal from the vexations of 
public life, a policy by no means consistent with the teaching of 8 

^ 'nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, | quo me cunque rapit tempestas, 
deferor hospes ' Hor. Ep. i i, 14 and 15. 

" 'qui erant Athenis turn principes Stoicorum ' Cic. Ac. ii 22, 69; cf. de Or. i 

II. 45- 

^® Ind. Stoic. Here. col. 52 (Schmekel, p. 16) ; but see Pauly-Wissovva s. v. 
^ i.e. the earlier part of the first century B.C. ^^ Diog. L. vii 34. 



I08 ROMAN STOICISM 

Zeno, and for which he is rebuked by Seneca'^ From him we 
first hear the practical precept which both Seneca and Juvenal 
echo, to ask nothing of the gods that you cannot ask openly''^ 
In his old age he left Pergamus and came to reside at Rome 
with M. Porcius Cato in B.C. 70. Amongst the younger friends 
of Cato were Antipater of Tyre, who wrote on practical ethics, 
and died at Athens about 45 B.C.®"; and Apollonides, with 
whom he conversed on the subject of suicide shortly before his 
death *'\ From DiODOTUS Cicero received instruction in Stoicism 
before 88 B.C."- ; he conceived a great affection for him, and 
invited him to live in his house*^^: he remained there till his 
death in 59 B.C., when he left Cicero a considerable property*'^ 
In his old age he was blind, but he continued his studies, and in 
particular that of mathematics, as ardently as ever''^ APOLLO- 
NIUS of Tyre M'rote a biography of Zeno, from which Diogenes 
Laertius often quotes *^''. To this period perhaps belongs 
HiEROCLES, who was bitterly opposed to Epicurus on account 
of his choosing pleasure as the end of life, and still more for 
his denial of providence''^ 

122. We have little reason to regret that only fragments at 
most remain to us of the works of these philosophers, 

Cicero. ... 

since CiCERO presents to us a comprehensive view 
not only of the doctrines they professed, but also of the criticisms 
v/hich their opponents passed upon them, and again of the 
replies they made to these criticisms. In carrying out this work 
for Stoicism and its rival systems Cicero not only created the 
philosophic terminology of the future by his translations of 
technical terms from Greek into Latin, but also established a 

®^ ' mihi nimis videtur submisisse temporibus se Athenodorus, nimis cito refugisse ' 
Sen. Dial, ix 4, i. 

®' ' apud Athenodorum inveni : — tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum 
cum eo perveneris, ut nihil deum roges, nisi quod rogare possis palam ' Ep. 10, 5. 
But it is possible that the quotations are from the younger Athenodorus. 

^^ Cic. Off. ii 24, 86 ; but some think that Cato's friend was an earlier Antipater. 

"^ Plutarch, Cato minor 65-67 and 69. ^"^ Reid, Acade?nics, p. 2. 

^* ' Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, queni a puero audivi, qui mecum vivit tot annos, 
qui habitat apud me, quem et admiror et diligo ?' Cic. Ac. ii 36, 115. 

®* ad Att. ii 20, 6. ^^ Tusc. disp. v 39, 113. ^^ vii i, 2, 24 and 28. 

^^ ' verba haec Hieroclis Stoici, viri sancti et gravis : T\hovh\ riXos, trbpvj}'! 86yfia • 
ovK ScrTiv TrpbvoLa, ovd^ irdpvris d6y/jLa ' A. Gellius, JV. A. ix 5, 8. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME IO9 

new style of philosophic discussion. By the friendly tone of his 
dialogues, placed in the mouths of men whose common interest 
in Greek studies made the divergencies of the schools to which 
they belonged a secondary matter; by the amplitude of his style, 
which gives itself time and space to approach a difficult concep- 
tion from many points of view ; and by the simplicity of his 
language and illustrations, which assumes that every philosophical 
contention can be plainly and forcibly put before the average 
man of letters, he has set an example of the art of exposition 
which has perhaps not been surpassed since****. His most 
systematic expositions of Stoic doctrine are as follows. In the 
Acadeinica a general view of Zeno's teaching is given by 
M. Varro (i 10, 35 to 11,42), and the Stoic logic, as accepted 
by Antiochus"^, is defended by L. Licinius Lucullus (ii i, i to 
19, 6'^). In the de Nalura deorinn (bk ii) the Stoic physics is 
explained by Q. Lucilius Balbus ; in the de Finibiis (bk iii) the 
Stoic ethics by M. Porcius Cato, as the most distinguished Roman 
who has adopted them as a standard of life. In the de Officiis 
Cicero adopts the form of a letter addressed to his son when 
studying at Athens, and avowedly adapts the substance of the 
work of Panaetius already mentioned, supplementing it from a 
memorandum of the teaching of Posidonius which was specially 
prepared for him by Athenodorus CalvuS^"; this book deals 
with ethics mainly in its practical applications. In many of his 
other works, such as the de Amicitia, de Senectute, Tiisculan 
disputations, de Fato, de Divinatione, and Paradoxa, Cicero makes 
use of Stoic material without giving professedly an exposition of 
the Stoic system. 

123. The school to which Cicero finally attached himself 
was that founded by AntioCHUS of Ascalon (circ. 125 -50 B.C.) ^\ 

^^ For a fair-minded estimate of Cicero's services to philosophy see Reid, Academics 
of Cicero, pp. 20-28. 

^^ See next section. 

^" ' de tertio [cum utile et honestum inter se pugnare videantur] nihil scripsit 
[Panaetius]. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi, 
et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi, ut ad me to. KecpdXata mitteret ' Cic. ad Alt. xvi 
II, 4. 'Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere ; misit enim satis bellum v-n-6fxvqp.a.' 
lb. 14, 4. 

^1 He was head of the Academy at Athens, where Cicero heard him in the year 
79-78 B.C., and was patronized by Lucullus. 



no ROMAN STOICISM 

who under the name of the ' old Academy ' taught doctrines 
which were practically indistinguishable from those of the 
diluted Stoicism which now prevailed, avoiding only the dog- 
matic temper and a few of the paradoxes of the Stoics'"^. This 
appears to have been the prevailing tone of philosophical 
discussion from the fall of the Republic to the death of Augustus. 
Brutus (the ' tyrannicide '), though family and political associa- 
tions have linked his name with that of Cato, was in his 
philosophical opinions a follower of Antiochus''^ Not very 
different were probably the views of two teachers, nominally 
Stoics, who held high positions in the household of Augustus. 
Athenodorus the younger of Tarsus (possibly the same as 
the Athenodorus Calvus mentioned in the last section) was a 
pupil of Posidonius, and whilst teaching at Apollonia counted 
amongst his pupils Julius Caesar's great-nephew Octavius, who 
was afterwards to become the emperor Augustus. Octavius 
took his teacher with him to Rome, and he had the credit of 
exercising a restraining influence on his patron. In B.C. 30 he 
was sent in his old age to reform the government of his native 
city Tarsus. He appears to have written chiefly on popular 
moral subjects'"^. Areius DiDYMUS of Alexandria^^ who was 
Areius ^^^ ^ longer period installed in the household of 

Didymus. Augustus''*', is of interest to us as the first of those 
who made excerpts from the works of earlier writers, and to him we 
owe most of the Stoic fragments found in the work of Stobaeus. 
He probably depended in the first instance on the writings of 
Antiochus of Ascalon. He was instrumental in saving his native 
town Alexandria when taken by Augustus in B.C. 30. It is 

''- 'eadem dicit quae Stoici ' Cic. Ac. ii 22, 69. ' erat, si perpauca mutavisset, 
germanissimus Stoicus ' zi>. 42, 132. See further J. S. Reid, Academics of Cicero, 
Introd. pp. 15-19, and notes to Ac. ii 39, 123 and 40, 126. 

''" ' Brutus tuus, auctore Aristo et Antiocho, non sentit hoc [sc. nihil esse, nisi 
virtutem, bonum]' Tusc.disp. v 8, 21. 'si addubitas, ad Brutum transeamus, est enim 
is quoque Antiochius ' ad Att. xiii 25, 3. See also below, § 432. 

7^ ' tu nihil errabis, si paulo diligentius (ut quid sit evyeveia, quid e^oxn intelligas), 
Athenodorus Sandonis filius quid de his rebus dicat, attenderis' ad Fam. iii 7, 5. 

''•'' For the identification of the writer Didymus with Areius the ' philosophus ' of 
Augustus, see Diels, Proleg. pp. 80-88. 

''^ ' [Augustus] eruditione etiam varia repletus per Arei philosophi filiorumque eius 
Dionysi et Nicanoris contubernium ' Suet. Aug. 89. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME - III 

probable enough that his ' Epitome ' was prepared for the use of 
Augustus, and provided the material for philosophical discussions 
at the banquet, such as those to which Horace so often refers'■^ 
Seneca tells us that he was acquainted with the inmost thoughts 
of the family of Augustus, and reports the language in which he 
consoled Livia upon the death of her son Drusus''^ (B.C. 9). He 
was succeeded by Theon of Alexandria, also a Stoic, who took 
a special interest in physiology. 

124. We know from Horace that in the time of Augustus 
Stoic philosophers were found not only at the court, but also in 
the public lecture-room, and at the street-corners. Such were 
Stertinius''", of whom the commentators say that he was the 
author of 120 books on Stoicism^"; Crispinus^^, said to have been 
a bad poet*^; and Damasippus^l In Horace's amusing sketches 
we find the Stoic as he appeared to the unconverted. He has 
sore eyes, or else a troublesome cough ^^; he presses his teaching 
upon his hearers unreasonably and unseasonably. But in the 
reign of Tiberius we find these popular lecturers held in very 
high esteem. One of the most eminent was Attalus, of whom 

Seneca the philosopher gives us a glowing account. 

Seneca was the first each day to besiege the door 
of his school, and the last to leave through it. This philosopher 
must have exercised an extraordinary influence over the young 
men of his time. In his mouth the paradox ' the wise man is a 
king' seemed a modest statement; his pupils were half disposed 
to regard him as a god^l When he declaimed on the misery of 
human life, a deep pity for their fellow-men fell upon them ; 
when he extolled poverty, they felt disposed to renounce their 
wealth ; when he recommended ?he simple life, they readily 
abandoned the use of meat and wine, of unguents and of warm 

"^ Sat. ii 6, 73-76. 

''^ Sen. Dial, vi 4 and 5 ; see below, § 377. 

'■'* ' Empedocles, an Stertinium deliret acumen' Hor. Ep. i 11, 20; 'insanis et 
tu, stultique prope omnes, | si quid Stertinius veri crepat ' Sat. ii 3, 32 and 33. 
^^ Teuffel, Rom. Lit. 250, 4. 

^^ ' ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes ' Hor. Sat. i i, 120 and 121. 
^^ Teuffel, as above, 3. ^^ Hor. Sat. ii 3. 

»* Hor. Ep. i r, 108. 
^■^ ' sublimem altioremque humano fastigio [Attalum] credidi' Sen. Ep. 108, 13. 



112 ROMAN STOICISM 

taths^". Seneca quotes from him in full an address on the vanity 
of wealth, which shews his teaching to be very similar to that of 
the more famous Musonius®^ He attached a special value to 
the discipline which hardships bring with them^l He incurred 
the dislike of Seianus, who defrauded him of his property and 
reduced him to the position of a peasant^^. 

125. Our attention is next attracted by L. Annaeus 
CORNUTUS (circ. 20-66 A.D.), who was born in 

Cornutus. i , , r 1 a 

Africa, and entered the house of the Annaei, pre- 
sumably as a slave. There he received his freedom, and became 
the teacher of the two poets Persius and Lucan ; of these the 
former has left us an attractive account of his personality"". He 
wrote in Greek, and one of his works, ' On the Nature of the 
Gods,' is still extant. This book is a development of the system 
which we see followed by Cicero in the de Natura deormn (based 
upon Posidonius), by which a reconciliation is effected between 
the Stoic physics and the popular mythology. By means of 
etymology and allegory, all that is incredible or offensive in the 
old legends of the gods is metamorphosed into a rationalistic 
explanation of the phenomena of the universe. Thus Zeus is 
the soul of the universe, because he is the cause of life in all 
living things, Zeus being derived from 'Cr]v ' live.' Apollo is the 
sun, and Artemis the moon : Prometheus the providence that 
rules in the universe. Pan is the universe. Cronos consumes 
all his offspring except Zeus, for time consumes all except what 
is eternal. Hera, the air ('Hpa from dr/p) is sister and wife of 
Zeus, because the elements of fire and air are intimately as- 
sociated. The popularity of such a treatise goes far to explain 
to us the close connexion now becoming established between 
the Stoic philosophy and the practices of Roman religion. 

«« Sen. £p. 108, 14-16. 

^'' id. no, 14-20. 

^ ' Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat ; malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in deliciis 
habeat ' id. 67, 15. 

^'' Sen. Rhet. Suas. 2, 12. 

"" ' teneros tu suscipis annos | Socratico, Cornule, sinu... tecum etenim longos 
memini consumere soles, | et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes. | unum opus et 
requiem pariter disponimus ambo, | atque verecunda laxamus seria mensa. | ...nescio 
quod certe est, quod me tibi temperat, astrum ' Pers. Sat. v 36-51. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME ' II3 

126. Roughly contemporary with Annaeus Cornutus, but 
perhaps rather older, was the famous Latin writer 

Seneca. 

L. Annaeus Seneca (circ. 4 B.C.-65 a.d.). Born in 
Corduba in Spain, he may have inherited simple tastes from, his 
provincial origin ; but it was the eloquence of Attains which 
moved him to a deliberate choice of the philosophic life^\ Under 
this influence he was at one time tempted to throw away his 
wealth; whilst the Pythagorean philosopher Sotion induced him 
to become for a time a vegetarian ^^. To the end of his days he 
adhered to the ' simple life ' ; he felt an aversion to wine, oysters, 
and all luxurious food ; he discarded hot baths and soft chairs 
as debilitating ; and of perfumes he would have only the best, 
that is, none at all^l He was an ardent lover of books, and 
appears to us as the last Roman who made a systematic study 
of Stoicism in the original authorities, and thus grasped the 
system in its full extent. He did not however claim, like his 
teacher Attains, to be a wise man ; far from that, he laments 
that he is still in the deep waters of wickedness^. In an age 
when a governmental career was freely open to talent, Seneca's 
powers and industry carried him to high political station, and 
greatly increased his inherited wealth. He played a part in the 
court of Claudius, and in time became the tutor, and ultimately 
the minister, of Nero. He did not possess the zeal of a reformer, 
and doubtless tolerated many an abuse, and often bowed his 
head before power even when linked with tyranny ^^ But if he 
did not imitate the unbending stiffness of Cato, we have still no 
reason to credit the personal calumnies that pursued him at 
.court. Had his career as a whole been a discredit to his philo- 
sophical profession, we may feel sure that Juvenal would never 
have overlooked so sensational a contrast. For the last few 
years of his life he resigned political power, that he might devote 
himself to what he deemed a more important task, the exposition 

^^ See above, § 124. ^^ Sen. £p. 108, 17. 

^^ ib. 13-23. 

^ ' sapientem esse me dico ? minime ' Dial, xii 5,2;' multum ab homine 
tolerabili, nedum a perfecto, absum ' Ep. 57, 3; 'ego in alto vitiorum omnium sum' 
Dial, vii 17, 4. 

^^ ' si respublica corruptior est quam ut adiuvari possit,...non nitetur sapiens in 
supervacuum ' ib. viii 3, 3. 



114 ROMAN STOICISM : 

of the practical teaching of Stoicism"*'. Finally he was, or ap- 
peared to be, drawn into a plot against the emperor, and was 
called upon in consequence to put an end to his life. 

127. The literary style of Seneca was severely criticized 
by critics almost contemporary with him. Gellius 

His style. ■' . . _ ^ -^ 

tells us that in his time it was by many not thought 
worth while to read his writings, because the style was found 
to be vulgar, the matter characteristic of half-educated men, 
the argument petty and exaggerated"''. Quintilian finds that 
much of his work is admirable, but much also is tainted by a 
striving for cheap effect and a want of solid knowledge"^; and 
he thinks him in no way comparable to Cicero"". This judgment 
is generally maintained in the world of modern scholarship, 
with the result that Seneca's works are not read in our schools 
and universities, and are little known even to professional 
scholars. On the other side we may set the extraordinary 
popularity of Seneca both in his own times"" and in those of 
the Renascence. It is possible to argue that his style represents 
the true tendency of the Latin language in his day, and that it 
is in the direct line towards the modern style of French prose, 
generally considered the best in the world. As regards his 
matter it is not possible to deny that he repeats the same moral 
teaching many times in slightly altered form'"\ and that he 
seldom gives us a continuous or thorough treatment of any 
important subject"-. His writings may well be compared with 
articles in our periodical literature and the hebdomadal pro- 
ductions of our pulpits ; they aim at immediate effect rather 

^'° ' in hoc me recondidi et fores clusi, ut prodesse pluribus possem. posteroriim 
negotium ago. illis aliqua, quae possint prodesse, conscribo. salutares admonitiones 
litteris mando, esse illas efficaces in meis ulceribus expertus. rectum iter, quod sero 
cognovi et lassus errando, aliis monstro' Ep. 8, i to 3. 

"'' 'cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius vulgaria 
videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique impetu sint aut levi et 
causidicali argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et plebeia ' A. Gellius, N. A. xii 2, i. 

"* Quint. Inst. Orat. x i, 125-158. 

*^ ' potioribus praeferri non sinebam ' ib. 126. 

i"'" ' turn autem hie solus fere in manibus adulescentium fuit ' ib. 125. 

1"' ' eandem sententiam miliens alio atque alio amictu indutam referunt ' Fronto, 

p. i.=i7- 

1""^ How capable Seneca was of continuous exposition we may gather from his 
excellent discussion of the ' causes ' of Aristotle and Plato, in Epistle 65 : see below. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME - II5 

than at the slow, building up of ordered knowledge. Just for 
that reason they admirably illustrate for us Stoicism in its 
practical application to daily life ; and the extraordinary 
popularity which they enjoyed for many centuries seems to 
shew that they are in touch with deeply-rooted instincts of 
humanity. 

128. Seneca claims to be an independent thinker, only 
jjjg adopting the views of Stoic masters because their 
independence, arguments convincc him"*. Still he does not use 
the liberty he claims to assert any new principles, but only to 
deviate occasionally in the direction of popular views. Thus 
he frequently adopts some dogma of Epicurus or some Cynic 
paradox to point a moral, and appears unconscious of the deep- 
lying differences which keep these schools apart from Stoicism ; 
and only in reply to some challenge does he state with any 
care the Stoic position. This is particularly the case with the 
problem of wealth, which both Epicurean and Cynic disparage, 
but the true Stoic is called upon to defend as a ' thing of high 
degree.' Yet when Seneca is called upon to defend his own 
possession of wealth he states his case with admirable clearness. 

129. It is perhaps partly due to his style that it appears 
■Weakening ^^ timcs as if Seucca's hold on Stoic doctrine was 
of Stoicism. often wcak. He has no real belief in conviction 

and scientific knowledge : ' if we try to be exact everywhere, 
we shall need to keep silence ; for there is something to be said 
against most statements"*.' For the detailed Stoic system of 
logic he feels only contempt"^ In physics however his interest 
is keen, probably under the influence of his favourite Posidonius. 
he sets forth with great clearness the theory of tone (t6i>o^, 
inteiitidy^^ : he eloquently maintains the existence of gods, 

■"*•' ' non quia mihi legem dixerim nihil contra dictum Zenonis Chrysippive com- 
mittere, sed quia res ipsa patitur me ire in illorum sententiam ' Sen. Dial, viii 3, i ; 
' nostram [opinionem] accipe. nostram autem cum dico, non adligo me ad unum 
aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus. est et mihi censendi ius' ib. vii 3, 2. 

'^^ ' si omnia argumenta ad obrussam coeperimus exigere, silentium indicetur ; 
pauca enim admodum sunt sine adversario' Sen. N. Q. iv 5, i. 

^•^^ ' non tempero mihi, quominus onines nostrorum ineptias proferam ' zl>. iv 6, i. 

i"" See the notes to § 177. 

8—2 



Il6 ROMAN STOICISM 

abandoning the traditional proofs, and basing his conviction 
upon the moral sense in man"'': he holds firmly to the doctrine 
of the conflagration"**. Still we have constant reason to doubt 
whether these beliefs are linked together in his mind by any 
consistent principle. His ethics are marked by a similar weak- 
ness : the Socratic ' strength and force ' is wanting, and is 
replaced by a spirit of quietism and resignation. The important 
position which he has filled in Roman politics awakens no 
enthusiasm in himself, nor does the greatness of the Roman 
empire excite his admiration. His heart is in his books ; to 
them he gives up entirely his closing years. His wise man 
will not go out of the way to mix in politics ; rather he will 
carefully consider how he may avoid the dangers of social 
strife"^. This enfeebled moral teaching is found also in the 
successors of Seneca, and in modern literature is constantly 
quoted as true Stoic doctrine. But though Seneca's philosophy 
finds him many an excuse for his retirement, he would have 
been a more faithful disciple of Zeno and Cleanthes if he had 
borne the burden of public life to the end. 

130. To the same period as Seneca belongs C. MUSONIUS 
RUFUS, in whom however we observe distinctly, 

Musonius. . 11111 

what we may conjecture had also been the case 
with Attains, that ethical teaching is becoming divorced from 
philosophical theory, and so the Cynic standpoint approached. 
Musonius was a preacher with a singular impressiveness of 
address. Speaking from the heart on matters of direct moral 
import, he won respect even from those who were least willing to 
be guided by him. He disdained the applause of his hearers, 
desiring instead to see each one tremble, blush, exult, or stand 
bewildered according as the address affected him"". * If you 

w ' si hominem videris int-erritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus, inter adversa 
•felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superiore loco homines videntem, ex 
aequo deos, non subibit te eius veneratio?...non potest res tanta sine adminiculo 
numinis stare' Ep. 41, 4 and 5. 

"8 See below, § 209, note 112. 

1"^ ' idem facit sapiens ; nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens, ne cavere 
videatur' Ep. 14, 8; ' circumspiciendum ergo nobis est, quomodo a vulgo tuti esse 
possimus ' ib/^. 

^" A. (3-ellius, N. A.v \, I and 4. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME - llj 

have leisure to praise me,' he said to his pupils, ' I am speaking to 
no purpose.' 'Accordingly,' said one of them, 'he used to speak 
in such a way that every one who was sitting there supposed 
that some one had accused him before Rufus : he so touched 
on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's 
faults"^' Amongst his pupils were Aulus Gellius the anti- 
quarian, Epictetus, and a certain Pollio who made a collection 
of his sayings (dTro/xvrjfiovev/jiara Movcrcoviov), of which extracts 
have been preserved for us by Stobaeus. They consist of moral 
maxims (xpeiai), such as ' Live each day as if your last"-,' 
* Nothing is more pleasurable than temperance"^' and dis- 
courses or ' diatribes ' (Siarpi/Sal) dealing with subjects such as 
discipline, endurance, marriage, obedience to parents, and so 
forth"'*. In elevation of standard these writings stand higher 
than those of the early Stoics ; and the influence of Musonius 
was so great that we may almost regard him as a third founder 
of the philosophy. 

131. In public life Musonius played a conspicuous part ; 
His part ^^ ^^^ ^^^ Cato of his generation, trusted by all 

in politics. parties for his absolute rectitude of character, and 
respected for his fearlessness ; but he was much less out of 
touch with the real conditions of the Roman world. When in 
A.D. 62 Rubellius Plautus found himself unable to quiet Nero's 
suspicions of his loyalty, it was believed that Musonius en- 
couraged him to await his end calmly, rather than attempt 
rebellion "^ After the conspiracy of Piso, Musonius was 
banished from Rome by Nero, together with most, of the 
eminent personalities of the capital"®. On Nero's death he 
returned to Rome, and when the armies of Vespasian and 
Vitellius were fighting in the suburbs of the city, the senate 
sent delegates to propose terms of peace. Musonius joined 
them, and ventured to address the common soldiers, expatiat- 
ing on the blessings of peace, and sternly reproving thenT\ 
for carrying arms. He was roughly handled and forced to 

"^ Epict. Disc, iii 23, 29. ^^^ Stob. iii i, 48. "^ id. 5, 21. 

^^^ Specimens are given helow, especially in ch. xv. 
"^ Tac. Anjz. xiv 59 ; Henderson, Nero, p. 143. 
^^® Tac. Ann. xv 71. 



Il8 ROMAN STOICISM 

desist. Tacitus speaks severely of this unseasonable display 
of philosophy"''; and certainly Rome would not have been the 
gainer if the issue had remained undecided"®. But that such 
an attempt was possible in defiance of all military discipline 
speaks much both for the courage of the speaker and for the 
respect in which his profession was held. Musonius continued 
to play an honourable part in public life during the reign of 
Vespasian, and retained the confidence of the emperor even at 
a time when his advisers secured his assent to a measure for 
expelling other philosophers from the capital"". 

132. In the reigns of Titus and his successors pupils and 
Euphrates converts of Musouius played not inconspicuous parts 
and Dio. jji public life. Amongst them was one EUPHRATES, 
of Tyre or Epiphania (circ. 35-118 A.D.), who in his day won 
all hearts and convinced all judgments. ' Some persons,' says 
Epictetus, one of his fellow-pupils, ' having seen a philosopher, 
and having heard one speak like Euphrates — and yet who can 
speak like him? — wish to be philosophers themselves ^2°.' Pliny 
made his acquaintance in his native land, and was filled with 
affection for the man. He found his style dignified and sublime ; 
but especially he noticed its sweetness, which attracted even his 
opponents. His personal appearance was even more charming ; 
he was tall, handsome, and the proprietor of a long and venerable 
beard. His private life was beyond reproach, and he was devoted 
to the education of his family of two sons and one daughter^". 
He appears to have completely achieved the reconciliation of 
philosophy with worldly success. 

More ascetic in temper was DiO of Prusa (circ. 40-117 A.D.), 
who was first an opponent but afterwards a follower of 
Musonius^^. A Stoic in theory, a Cynic in practice, he assumed 
the shabby cloak, and wandered as a physician of souls. His 
eloquence succeeded in calming a mutiny of soldiers which 

"7 Hist, iii 81. 

'^^'^ ' reipublicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci ' ib. 86. 

"^ See below, § 447. 1^" Disc.'m. 15, 8; Manual 29. ^'^^ Pliny, Ep. i 10. 

^'■^^ ' quid nostra memoria Euphrates, Dio, Timocrates, Athenodotus ? quid horum 
magister Musonius ? nonne summa facundia praediti, neque minus sapientiae quam 
eloquentiae gloria incluti extiterunt ? ' Fronto, Ep. ad Aw-, i i (Naber, p. 115). 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME II 9 

followed on the death of Domitian, and won for him from a 
following generation the title of the ' golden-mouthed.' He was 
held in high honour both by Nerva and by Trajan. A large 
number of his harangues are still extant. ^^^ 

133. The influence of such teachers was at any rate wide- 
spread, and if we suspect that Stoicism was already 

Epictetus. ,..../ 

losmg its mtensive force as it extended the sphere 
of its influence, in this it did but obey what we shall see to be 
its own law of creative activity ^^^. We still have to consider 
the two teachers who are of all the most famous and the most 
familiar ; not however because they most truly express the 
substance of Stoicism, but because they have most deeply 
touched the feelings of humanity. These are EPICTETUS 
of Hierapolis (circ, 50-130 a.d.) and Marcus Aurelius, who 
later succeeded to the principate. The contrast between their 
positions has often excited comment, since Epictetus was 
born a slave, and only obtained his freedom in mature years, 
that is, after the death of Nero in 68 A.D. In reality it is 
characteristic of the times that so many men of foreign and 
even servile origin rose to positions of eminence and became 
the associates and teachers of men of high official rank. In 
the great slave households, in particular, of imperial Rome 
unequalled opportunities lay open to talent ; the ' educational 
ladder' was everywhere set up to encourage the youth to 
make the best of his gifts. Further, just as young nobles were 
frequently enamoured of slave girls, so far superior to the ladies 
of their own class in wit, gentleness of manners, and loyalty in 
the face of all terrors and temptations^-^; so their elders found 
a delight in the company of the thoughtful and intellectual men 
who came to the front through the competition of the slave 
schools. Thus the emperor Claudius chose his ministers amongst 
his freedmen, provoking thereby the sneers of the Roman aris- 
tocracy, but greatly advancing the good government of the 
Roman empire ; and it was Epaphroditus, himself a freed man 
of Nero, who sent the young Epictetus to study at the feet of 

^^ See Leben und Werke Dion's von Prusa, by H. von Arnim. Berlin, 1898. 

124 See below, § 216. 

125 See the story of Epicharis in connexion with the conspiracy of Piso, in Tac. 
Attn. XV 57. 



I20 ROMAN STOICISM 

Musonius Rufus. Epictetus was a man of warm feelings and 
clear head ; his addresses, recorded for us by his hearer Arrian, 
serve admirably to stimulate the domestic virtues and to keep 
alive the religious spirit; but his teaching lacks the force which 
befits the tcaining of a statesman or a king. In logic he inclines 
too much to suspense of judgment, in ethics to resignation. 
But he^did not altogether miss the Socratic force : in his youth 
he ^had gone about inquiring of his neighbours if their souls 
were in good health, and even when they replied 'What is this 
to you, my good man ? Who are you ? ' he had persisted in giving 
trouble. Only when they raised their hands and gave him 
blows had he recognised that there was something wanting in 
his method ^^^ Other young philosophers, he felt, lacked this 
energy, and were men of words, not deeds^^''. Like other 
philosophers, he was expelled from Rome by Domitian in 
A.D. 89, when he retired to Nicopolis ; there he gave lectures 
till the time of his death^^s. 

134. Epictetus was a vigorous opponent of the group of 
young philosophers who delighted to display their 

His Cynism. .... ^ , „ . , . , 

talent upon the mtricacies of the Stoic logic, and 
in his early youth he was taken to task by his teacher Musonius 
for underrating this part of philosophy ^^. He came however to 
see the great importance of a thorough training in the methods 
of reasoning, so that in practical life a man should distinguish 
the false from the true, as he distinguishes good coins from bad. 
In physics he lays stress chiefly on theology, and the ' will of 
God ' fills a large place in his conception of the government of 
the world. In his treatment of practical ethics he makes free 
use of illustrations from the social life of his own day : he finds 
examples of Socratic strength in the athlete and the gladiator ; 
and he makes it clear that the true philosopher is not (as many 
believe the Stoics to hold) a man devoid of natural feeling, but 
on the contrary affectionate and considerate in all the relations 

^■^^ Epict. Disc, ii 12, 17 to 25. 

^^^ 'plerosque istos, qui philosophari viderentur, philosophos esse eiuscemodi 
" avev rod irpdrTeLv, /x^xpi- tou Xiyeiv " ; id significat "factis procul, verbis tenus' 
A. Gellius, JV. A. xvii rg, r. 

1^8 ib. XV II, 4 and 5. 

^^ Epict. Disc, i 7, 32 and 33. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME ' 121 

of life. He has a special respect for the Cynic, who appears in 
his lectures not as the representative of a differing philosophical 
system, but as philanthropist, teacher, comforter, and missionary. 
There is indeed in the addresses of Epictetus a complete fusion 
of Stoicism with Cynism ; and we trace in them pictures not 
only of the Cynic system as a whole, but also of individual 
teachers like Antisthenes and Diogenes, profoundly different 
from and much more human than the representations of them 
familiar through other literature ; they are in fact pictures of 
Cynic teachers passed down or idealized by the members of 
their own sect. By their side stand the pictures of Ulysses the 
sage and Heracles the purger of the world, as they must have 
been described from generation to generation by Cynic orators 
to their hearers amongst the poor and the unhappy. 



135. In the second century A.D. the professed teachers of 
Stoicism must have been very numerous ; with 

Arrian. i , i r t-v • • • i i 

the death of Domitian persecution had passed 
away. The philosophers were everywhere held in high esteem, 
and in turn their whole influence was used in support of the 
existing state of society and the official religion. In the early 
part of the century Flavius Arrianus (circ. 90-175 A.D.) 
is the most eminent of Stoics ; and it was noted that his relation 
to his teacher Epictetus much resembled that of Xenophon to 
Socrates. To him we owe the publication of the ' discourses ' 
{Siarpi^al) which he heard Epictetus deliver. In A.D. 124, 
when lecturing at Athens, he won the favour of the emperor 
Hadrian, and was appointed by him to high public offices, in 
which he shewed himself a wise administrator and a skilful 
general; in A.D. 130 he received the consulship; and later he 
withdrew to his native town of Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he 
filled a local priesthood and devoted himself to the production 
of works on history and military tactics. To Stoic doctrine he 
made no direct contribution. 

After Arrian had given up the teaching of philosophy for 
public life Q. JUNIUS RUSTICUS succeeded to the 

Rusticus. 

position he left vacant. To him, amongst other 
teachers belonging to various philosophical schools, was entrusted 



122 ROMAN STOICISM 

the education of the future emperor M. Aurelius, who gives us 
the following picture of the teaching he received : 

' From Rusticus, I first conceived the need of moral correction and 
amendment ; renounced sophistic ambitions and essays on philosophy, 
discourses provocative to virtue, or fancy portraitures of the sage or the 
philanthropist ; learned to eschew rhetoric and poetry and fine language ; 
not to wear full dress about the house, or other affectations of the kind ; in 
my letters to keep to the simplicity of his own, from Sinuessa, to my mother; 
to be encouraging and conciliatory towards any one who was offended or 
out of temper, at the first offer of advances upon their side. He taught me 
to read accurately, and not to be satisfied with vague general apprehension ; 
and not to give hasty assent to chatterers. He introduced me to the memoirs 
of Epictetus, presenting me .with a copy from his own stores ^^''.' 

In Rusticus we may confidently trace a successor of the school 
of Musonius and Epictetus. 

136. M. Aurelius Antoninus Pius (121-180 a.d.) is 
Marcus commonly spoken of as ' the philosopher upon 

Aurelius. ^]^q throue/ but this description may be misleading. 
Aurelius was in the first instance a Roman prince ; to the 
institutions of Rome and to his own position as their chief 
representative he owed his chief allegiance. He was un- 
doubtedly an apt pupil of the courtly philosophers by whom 
he was surrounded ; he deliberately chose philosophy in pre- 
ference to rhetoric, and of the various schools of philosophy 
his judgment ranked Stoicism highest. He was fairly well 
instructed, but by no means learned, in its doctrines ; he 
adhered with sincerity, but without ardour, to its practical 
precepts. In the leisure hours of a busy life it was his comfort 
and his relaxation to express his musings in the form of 
philosophic reflections. But his attitude towards Stoicism is 
always that of a judge rather than that of an advocate ; and 
much that the school received as convincing reasoning he rejected 
as ingenious pleading. Hence a large part of Stoic doctrine, 
and almost the whole of its detailed instruction, disappears from 
his view ; but we have the advantage that the last of the Stoic 
writers brings out into clearer relief those features of this 
philosophy which could still rivet attention in his own time, 

^^^ M. Aurelius, To himself, i 7 (Randall's translation). 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME 1 23 

and which therefore form part of the last message of the ancient 
world to the coming generations. 

137. It follows at once from the judicial attitude of Marcus 
„. . ,. f . Aurelius that he cannot countenance the Stoic 

rlis beliei in 

the cosmos. claim to Certainty of knowledge. The objection 
of opponents that the wise man, who alone (according to Stoic 
theory) possesses such knowledge, is nowhere to be found, is 
sustained : 

' Things are so wrapped in veils, that to gifted philosophers not a few 
all certitude seems unattainable. Nay to the Stoics themselves such attain- 
ment seems precarious ; and every act of intellectual assent is fallible ; for 
where is the infallible man^^^?' 

Yet Aurelius does not relapse into scepticism. One doctrine 
at least is so convincing that he cannot for a moment doubt it ; 
it does after all shine forth as true by its own light. It is that 
all things are ultimately one, and that man lives not in a chaos, 
but in a cosmos : 

'All things intertwine one with another, in a holy bond; scarce one thing 
is disconnected from another. In due coordination they combine for one 
and the same order. For the world-order is one made out of all things, and 
god is one pervading all, and being is one, and law is one, even the common 
reason of all beings possessed of mind, and truth is one : seeing that truth 
is the one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed with the same 
reason ^^2.' 

From the belief in a cosmos he is led on to a trust in Providence ; 
theoretically, because the doctrine of the chance clashing of 
atoms is out of harmony with the belief in ultimate unity ; 
practically, because in such a conviction only man can find 
a starting-point for his own activity. The choice is to him 
all-important ; either Fortune or Reason is king, and claims 
allegiance from all. 

' Is it the portion assigned to you in the universe, at which you chafe? 
Recall to mind the alternative — either a foreseeing providence, or blind 
atoms — and all the abounding proofs that the world is as it were a city^^^.' 

' The world is either a welter of alternate combination and dispersion, 
or a unity of order and providence. If the former, why crave to linger on 
in such a random medley and confusion ? why take thought for anything 

^^^ To himself, v 10. ^'^^ ib. vii 9. ^^* ib. iv 3. 



124 ROMAN STOICISM 

except the eventual "dust to dust"? why vex myself? do what I will, dis- 
persion will overtake me. But on the other alternative I reverence, I stand 
steadfast, I find heart in the power that disposes alP^V 

138. Aurelius makes full use of the Stoic proofs of the 

existence of the gods, but it soon appears to us 

His piety. . t5 ) ft- 

that his attachment to the established religion was 
not in any way founded upon philosophical arguments. In dis- 
cussing this point he displays a certain heat which we have not 
yet had occasion to notice : 

' If indeed they [the gods] take no thought for anything at all — an 
impious creed — then let us have done with sacrifice and prayer and oaths, 
and all other observances by which we own the presence and the nearness 
of the gods 13°.' 

Finally, he breaks away altogether from philosophy and rests 
his convictions on personal experience : 

' To those who press the question, " Where have you seen the gods, 
whence your conviction of their existence, that you worship them as you 
do?" I reply — first, they are visible even to the bodily eye; secondly, 
neither have I set eyes upon my soul, and yet I do it reverence. So it is 
with the gods ; from my continual experience of their power, I have the 
conviction that they exist, and yield respect i^^.' 

One further argument he held in reserve ; the sword, the 
cross, and the stake for the ' atheists ' who refused to be 
convinced. He was, after all, a king^^''. 

139. In ethics, Aurelius states the main principles of 

Stoicism with clearness ; but he altogether ignores 

Ethics. 1 o • 1 • ir 

the Stoic paradoxes, and does not trouble himself 
with any detailed theory of the virtues and vices. Firmness 
of character is to him the supreme good. 

' Be like the headland, on which the billows dash themselves continually ; 
but it stands fast, till about its base the boiling breakers are lulled to rest. 
Say you, " How unfortunate for me that this should have happened" ? Nay 
rather, " How fortunate, that in spite of this, I own no pang, uncrushed by 
the present, unterrified at the future !" The thing might have happened to 
any one, but not every one could have endured it without a pang^^^.' 

■ i-** M. Aurelius, To himself, vi lo. ^^^ ib. vi 44. 

^•^® See further, §§ 457 and 458. i^'' M. Aurelius, To himself, xii 28. 

'3^ ib. iv 49. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME 1 25 

But in spite of these doctrines, we trace throughout his pages 
a tinge of melancholy. Too apt a pupil of Epictetus, he had 
learnt from him the principles of submission and resignation, 
but he had not acquired the joyous confidence of an older 
period, through which the wise man, even if a slave, felt himself 
a king. Rather, though a king, he felt himself in truth a slave 
and a subject to the universe that was his master. He would 
not go against the universal order, but he hardly felt the delight 
of active cooperation. In this sense he represents to us the 
decadence of Stoicism, or (to put it more correctly) Stoicism 
coloured by the decadence of Rome. 

140. On the question of continued existence after death 
Absorption of Aurelius takcs up and emphasizes the teaching of 
the soul. Epictetus, ignoring the fact that other Stoic teachers, 

from Zeno to Seneca, had taken larger views or at least allowed 
themselves an ampler language. There had been, indeed, a 
change in the point of view. The early Stoics, occupied with 
the question of physics, had insisted upon the indestructibility 
of substance, and the reuniting of the ' spirit ' {irvevixa) with the 
all-pervading spirit from which it came at the beginning. The 
Roman school concerned itself more with the question of in- 
dividuality and personality. Accepting fully the principle that 
that which is born must die, it comes to the definite conclusion 
that that which we trace from the mother's womb through 
infancy and youth, through success and failure in life, through 
marriage and the family ties onwards to weakness and dotage, 
must reach its end in death. The ' I ' cannot survive the body. 
The future existence of the soul, if such there be, is no longer 
(as with Seneca) a matter of joyful expectation, but of complete 
indifference. 

Epictetus had expressed this with sufficient clearness : 

' Death is a change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, 
but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longer exist ? You will not 
exist, but you will be something else, of which the world now has need ; for 
you also came into existence, not when you chose, but when the world had 
need of you^^^.' 

'^^ Epict. Disc, iii 24, 93 and 94. 



126 ROMAN STOICISM 

Aurelius constantly repeats the doctrine in varied forms : 

' You exist but as a part inherent in a greater whole. You will vanish 
into that which gave you being ; or rather, you will be re-transmuted into 
the seminal and universal reason i*".' 

' Death put Alexander of Macedon and his stable boy on a par. Either 
they were received into the seminal principles of the universe, or were alike 
dispersed into atoms ^''^' 

141. The saddened outlook of Marcus Aurelius upon life 
Preparation harmonizcs wcll with the resignation with which 
for death. |-^g contemplates a death, which for himself indi- 
vidually will be the end. Hence it is that his reflections so 
often make the thought of death a guiding principle of ethics ; 
he who has learnt to look forward calmly to his last act has 
learnt thereby to abide patiently all the troubles which postpone 
it. Thus the last message of the princely philosopher, as of his 
predecessor, is that men should ' bear and forbear ' : 

' Contemn not death, but give it welcome ; is not death too a part of 
nature's will ? As youth and age, as growth and prime, as the coming of 
teeth and beard and grey hairs, as begetting and pregnancy and the bearing 
of children, as all other operations of nature, even such is dissolution. 
Therefore the rational man should not treat death with impatience or 
repugnance or disdain, but wait for it as one of nature's operations'*^.' 

' O for the soul ready, when the hour of dissolution comes, for extinction 
or dispersion or survival ! But such readiness must proceed from inward 
conviction"^.' 

' Serenely you await the end, be it extinction or transmutation. While 
the hour yet tarries, what help is there ? what, but to reverence and bless 
the gods, to do good to men, " to endure and to refrain " ? and of all that 
lies outside the bounds of flesh and breath, to remember that it is not yours, 
nor in your power'**.' 

142. Aurelius was no teacher of Stoicism in his time : his 

thoughts are addressed to himself alone "^ But 

His yearnings. » 

the happy accident that has preserved this work, 
which for nine centuries was lost to sight'^**, enables us to obtain 
a view of this philosophy from which otherwise we should have 

'*" M. Aurelius, To himself , iv 14. 

1*' ib. vi 24. 142 j^jj^ ix 3. 

"3 ib. xi 3. 144 ib, V 33. 

14^ Rendall, M. Aurelius, Introd. p. cxii. '46 j/;. cxv. 



THE STOIC SECT IN ROME 12/ 

been shut out. We do not go to Aurelius to learn what Stoic 
doctrine was ; this is taken for granted throughout the book ; 
but we can see here how it affected a man in whom the intel- 
lectual outlook was after all foreshortened by sympathies and 
yearnings which had grown up in his nature. The traditional 
criticism of the school as being harsh, unsympathetic, unfeeling, 
breaks to pieces as we read these ' thoughts ' ; rather we find 
an excess of emotion, a surrender to hum.an weakness. A study 
of Stoicism based on the works of Aurelius alone would indeed 
give us but a one-sided picture ; but a study in which they were 
omitted would certainly lack completeness. He is also our last 
authority. In the centuries which succeeded, other waves of 
philosophic thought washed over Stoicism, and contended in 
turn with more than one religion which pressed in from the 
East. Yet for a long time to come Stoic principles were faith- 
fully inculcated in thousands of Roman homes, and young men 
taught in childhood to model their behaviour upon the example 
of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Epictetus formed the salt of the Roman 
world. If in riper years they joined, in ever increasing numbers, 
the Christian church, they brought with them something which 
the world could not afford to lose. 



CHAPTER VI. 

OF REASON AND SPEECH. 

143. The history of Greek philosophy, even before the time 
Parts of °^ Zeno, leads naturally to its division into the 

philosophy. three parts of logic, physics, and ethics^ The Ionic 
philosophers had chiefly occupied themselves with the nature and 
history of the universe, that is, with the problems of physics. 
The sophists were greatly concerned with questions as to the 
validity of human knowledge, that is, with logic. Socrates 
shared this interest, but attached greater importance to the 
discussion of moral activities, that is, to ethics. It is however 
not clear when a formal division into these three parts was 
first made. Cicero attributes it to the immediate followers of 
Plato in the Academic school ; others assign it definitely to 
Xenocrates^ The Peripatetics and Stoics both adopted the 
division, but whereas the former assigned to Logic an inferior 
position, making it an introduction to philosophy, the Stoics 
insist that it is a part of philosophy itself^ ; and that of the 
three parts it comes first in the order of study, ' as in the mea- 
suring of corn we place first the examination of the measured' 
It must not however be thought that the three parts of philo- 
sophy can be separately treated, for they are intertwined ^ ; so 
that in treating of Logic we shall constantly have need to 
assume a general knowledge of Stoic views both on physics 

^ ' [veteres illi Platonis auditoi-es] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt ; 
quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus ' Cic. Fin. iv 2, 4. 

2 Sext. math, vii 16 (Arnim ii 38). 

^ ol SrwiVot &vTLKpvs /xipos avTrjp d7re(paii'0VTo Philopon, ad Anal, pr. f. 4a ; Stein, 
Psychologie ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49 a. 

* Epict. Disc, i 17, 6. ^ Diog. L. vii 40. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH ' 1 29 

and ethics. Logic is subdivided into ' dialectic,' which deals 
with reasoning, and ' rhetoric,' the art of speech. The relation 
between reason and speech was in ancient times, as now, a 
matter of perplexity ; but it may be taken as a fundamental 
position of Stoicism that the two should always be in agree- 
ment. 

144. Stoicism, as one of the positive and dogmatic schools, 
Knowledge assumes that knowledge is attainable. Since this 
is attainable, jg ^^g very point on which Socrates never reached 

assurance, except on the one particular that he himself knew 
nothing, it was a matter of primary importance to the Stoics 
to make good this position ; more especially since they held 
(this time in agreement with Socrates) that virtue is but an- 
other form of knowledge. Yet the Stoics could not agree with 
the Cynics, that true knowledge can be imparted without a 
study of its method ". Knowledge is, in their view, a high privi- 
lege derived by man from his divine ancestry, and shared by 
him with the deity alone ; and the whole duty of man may 
be summed up by saying that he should keep upright his 
reason '^. They therefore devoted themselves with special zeal 
to this part of philosophy^, and were accordingly nicknamed 
'the dialecticians".' Their aim in this was solely the ascer- 
tainment and imparting of truth ; but the common view that 
their style was in consequence harsh and repellent will be found 
to need considerable qualification^". 

145, The chief argument for the certainty of knowledge is 
Are the ^^^^ ^^ assume as much in the practical affairs of 
senses true? Hfen ; and (as wc have already seen) Aristo found 

it ridiculous that his Academic neighbour should not even 
know who he was^^ Against it is the fact that men frequently 

" dp4crK€L ovv [tois KvvLKols] Tov XoyiKOv TOTTOv Tre pLaLpe'Lv...Kai Trjv aper-qv 8i5aKT7]v 
eli>ai Diog. L. vi 103 and 105. 

'' tLs ovv vXtj tov (piXocrocpov ; fiij Tpi^uv ; ou, dXXd 6 Xdyos ' tL reXos; /j,rj tl 
(popelv rpi^uva ; oil, dWa to opObv 'ix^i-v rbv \byov Epict. Disc, iv 8, 12. 

* 'Stoici...cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi' Aug. Civ. De. viii 7. 

9 Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 66. i*' See below, §§ 164, 165. 

^1 'hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi...totam vitam evertunt funditus ' 
Cic. Ac. ii 10, 31. 

^^ See above, § 93. 

A. Q 



130 ROMAN STOICISM 

disagree even as to what they see, and commonly distinguish 
between what is known to them and what ' seems ' to be this 
or that. Hence Epictetus well defines the function of dia- 
lectic as 

' a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an 
inquiry into the cause of this disagreement ; a condemnation and distrust 
of that which only seems, and some kind of investigation of that which 
seems, as to whether it rightly seems ; and the discovery of some rule 

Of all kinds of knowledge that which comes through the 
senses appears to the ordinary man most worthy of confidence, 
and of the five senses that of sight seems to the philosopher 
the most divine ". In consequence, the whole controversy 
hinges on the question whether the eyes can be trusted. The 
positivist argues that the evidence of sight is so plain and 
unmistakeable that man, if he had the choice, could wish for 
no better informant. The sceptic replies that nevertheless, if 
a straight oar be placed partly in the water, it appears to the 
eyes to be bent ; and that the feathers on a dove's neck, though 
really alike, appear to the eyes as many-coloured ^^ To deal 
with such questions we must examine closely the nature of 
sensation. 

146. The Stoics fancifully derive the word aiadrjcra {' sen- 
Process of sation ') from eladeaa (' storage ') ; it is therefore, 
sensation. strictly Speaking, the process by which the mind is 
stored^®; but it is also, from an opposite point of view, the 
process by which the mind reaches out towards an external 
object^''. From the object (ala-OrjTov) proceed waves which 
strike upon the sense-organ (alo-drjTijpiop); this impact is called 
a ' sensation ' in a narrower sense. At the same time there 
proceeds from the mind (which is the ruling part or 'princi- 
pate ' of the soul), a ' spirit ' or thrill which goes out to meet 

1^ Epict. Disc, ii ii, 13. 

1"* ' Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant ' Chalc. in Tim. 266 
(Arnim ii 863). 

^5 Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19. 1^ Arnim ii 458. 

1^ ' mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem 
vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur ' Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. On the other 
hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and sensation as automatic. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH ' 13I 

this impact ; and this spirit and its operation are also called 
' sensation ^^' As a result of the contact of these two waves, 
and simultaneously with it, there is produced in the soul an 
effect like the imprint of a seal^^ and this imprint is the 
(^avTaala or ' mind-picture.' That the process may be sound, 
it is necessary that the intellect be in a healthy state, and 
further that the organ of sense be healthy, the object really 
there, and the place and the manner in accord^^ But we must 
carefully distinguish between the single sensation and the mind- 
picture. A flash of light, a cry, a touch, a smell, a thrill of plea- 
sure or pain, is always that which the senses declare it to be-^ ; 
here there is no possibility of error ; so understood ' the sensa- 
tions are always true^'^' But if we go in each case a step 
further ; if we say 'that is white,' ' this is sweet,' 'this is musical,' 
'this is fragrant,' 'that is rough,' we are now dealing with mind- 
pictures, not with ' sensations ' in the strict sense^l And as to 
the mind-pictures we agree with the Academics that things are 
not always what they seem ; ' of the mind-pictures some are 
true, some are false^^' 

147. In order then that we may distinguish the true mind- 
_, .^ . picture from the false, we have need of a ' rule ' 

The cntenon " ' 

of clearness. (Kav(i)v) OTC ' Criterion' (KpiTrjpiov). The true mind- 
picture is a stirring of the soul, which reveals both what is taking 

'^ ai'(rd7](ns Se X^yerai Kara Toiis ^tuikovs to tc d(p ifyefiovLKod irvevixa iwl ras 
aladrjaeLS diTJKOv, /cat t) 5i' avTuv KaTakT]^is...Kal i] evepyeiade aia$r](ns /f aXeirat Diog. L. 
vii 52. 

^8 Cleanthes called it ' imprint ' {tOwuj<ti.s) ; Chrysippus, lest the word imprint 
should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ' alteration ' {dWolwcns) Sext. math. 
vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); 'visum obiectum imprimet illud quideni et quasi signabit 
in animo suam speciem ' Cic. de Fato 19, 43. 

^" Sext. math, vii 424 (Arnim ii 68) ; ' ita est maxima in sensibus Veritas, si et sani 
sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt ' Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19. 

'^^ ' idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus 
sui cuiusque generis indicium requirat acrius ' ib. 

^■^ ol ll^rijiiKol rds fiev aiadrjaeis dXrideis Aet. f>/ac. iv 9, 4 ; ' [sensuum] clara 
iudicia et certa sunt ' Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19. 

^ 'sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo 
sensibus, ut haec : "illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc 
asperum." animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus' id. 7, 21. 

^ OL SrwiKot ras fniv aiadifjffeis dXyjdeXs, tQv 5^ (pavracnQiv rds fiev aKrjdeis, rds de 
■ipevbeis Aet. plac. iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78) ; ' Zeno nonnuUa visa esse falsa, non omnia 
fdixit]' Cic. N. D. i 25, 70. 

9-2 



132 ROMAN STOICISM 

place in the soul and the object which has caused this : just as 
light reveals both itself and the objects that lie within its 
range "^ On the other hand the false mind-picture is an empty 
twitching of a soul which is not in a healthy condition^^ ; no 
real object corresponds to it, but to that which appears to be 
an object corresponding to it we give the name 'phantasm^''.' 
When Orestes thinks he sees the Furies leaping upon him, 
though his sister assures him that in real truth he sees nothing, 
the vision of the Furies is a phantasm. The appearances of 
dreams are equally phantasms^^ Now a true mind-picture 
dififers from that of a phantasm by being clearer ; or, in other 
words, the distinctive note of a true mind-picture is its ' clear- 
ness ' {ivdp'yeia, perspicuitasY^. Clearness then is a quality which 
attaches itself to a true vision in a way in which it can never 
attach itself to a work of phantasy^". To this clearness the 
mind cannot but bow^^ ; it is therefore (so far as our study has 
proceeded) the criterion of truth^^. 

148. The mind-picture as such is not within a man's control ; 

but it rests with him to decide whether he will give 

it his ' assent ' (o-uy/cara^ecrt.?, adsensio or adsensus)'^^. 

This assent is therefore an act of the soul, in its capacity 

as will ; and can only be rightly exercised by a soul properly 

25 (pavracria fiev ovv 4(Ttl Trddos iv rrj tj/vxv ytyvd/J-evov, ivbeiKvvfuvov kv ai/rc^ Kal 
TO TreiroiriKos ' ...Kaddvep yap to <pu>s avTO deiKvvai Kal to. &\\a to, iv aiiTf 7repte%6/Aei'a, 
Kal 7] (pavracria deiKwcnv eavTrjv /cat rb TreTroLTjKos avT-qv Aet. plac. iv I2, I (Arnim 
ii 54). The object which causes the (pavraala is technically called the (pavTacTTdv , but 
also inrdpxov Sext. math, vii 426. 

^s Std/cej'os e\Kv(r/j.ds Aetius />lac. iv 12, 4. ^'^ ib, 12, 5. 

^^ (pdvTafffia /u,€v yap eaTi ddKijais diavoias, ol'a yiveTai /card roi/s vttvovs Diog. L. 
vii 50. 

•29 ' yjsis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae propriaro 
quandam haberent declarationeni earum rerum quae viderentur' Cic. Ac. i 11, 41 ; 
cf. § 105. 

•"* On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged ; see above,, 
§ 84. 

>*^ ' necesse est animum perspicuis cedere' Cic. Ac. ii 12, 38. 

^2 ' perspicuitas ilia, quam diximus, satis magnam habet viin ut ipsa per sese ea. 
quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet ' id. 14, 45. 

33 'adsensio nostra erit in potestate ' Cic. J^aL 19, 43; 'adsensio non [potest}, 
fieri nisi commota viso ; tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem ' 
id. 18, 42 ; '[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam. 
et voluntariam ' Cic. Ac. i 11, 40. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH 1 33 

strung, that is, possessed of due tension. Assent wrongly given 
leads to ' opinion ' {86^a, opinio), and all wrong assent is error 
or ' sin ' {aixapTia, peccatum). This error may take place in two 
directions, either by a hasty movement of the will (TrpoTTLTrTeLv), 
giving assent to a picture which is not really clear ; or by feeble- 
ness of will, which leads to assent in a false direction (SiaylreuSe- 
a-Oai)'^. Even haste however is a form of weakness, so that we 
may say that all opining is a weak form of assent^. To ensure 
a right assent due attention should be given to each of its parts; 
it includes (i) the intention of mastering the object {-rrpoOeais:)', 
(ii) careful attention directed to the object, or ' application ' 
{iiTijSoXrj); and (iii) assent in the narrower sense^*^. Apart from 
assent, three courses remain open : these are (i) ' quiescence ' 
{rjcrvxfi^^i'V, guiescere): (ii) 'suspense of judgment' (eVe^efi/, ad- 
sensiini siistinere), which is a settled quiescence ; and (iii) nega- 
tion^''. 

149. Close upon assent follows ' comprehension ' (Kard- 
Comprehen- X77'v/rt?, covipreJieusio) : this is the ratification of the 
^'°"- assent given, the fixing irrevocably in the mind of 

the picture approved. This picture now becomes a ' comprehen- 
sion-picture ' {KaToK-rjiTTtKr} ^avraa-ia), and as such a unit of 
knowledge. We may understand thereby that the mind has 
grasped the external object^*, and this is the plain meaning of 
Zeno's simile; or we may say that the object has gained a hold 
upon the mind, and has left its stamp upon it. Both interpre- 
tations are consistent with Stoic doctrine : but the former view, 
which represents the soul as active and masterful, undoubtedly 
expresses the more adequately the meaning of the schooP'*. 

^* Strrds yap elvai do^as, Tr]v fxev a.KaTa\7}irTi^ avyKaraOeaiv, rrju 8^ virdXrj^LV 
da-devTJ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. Sfo. rep. 47, 10. 

'® ' opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem ' Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 
7, 15 ; ' opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum false incognitoque communis' Cic. Ac. i 
II, 41 ; so Sext. math, vii 151 (Arnim ii 90). 

^^ Epict. Disc, i 21, 2. ^ z^. i 18, i ; Sext. math, vii 416. 

^* 'icxTL de aicr$7](TLS dvTi\7]\l/is tQv alddrjTdv Nem. nat. horn, vii p. 175 M (Stein, 
Psych, ii 135). 

^^ Cicero's point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps the object : 
' [visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno] comprehensionem appellabat, 
similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur ' Cic. Ac. i 11, 41. See further Stein, 
Psych, ii 174, and R. D. Yi\Q!&s,, Stoic and Epiatrean, ^. 71. 



134 ROMAN STOICISM 

From this mutual grasp there follows an important physical 
deduction. Since only like can grasp like, the soul must be 
like the object, and the popular dualism of mind and matter 
is (to this extent) at an end '"'. Still this likeness is not com- 
plete ; and the soul in sensation does not grasp the object from 
every point of view, but only so far as its own nature permits 
in each case''^ For this reason the trained observer and the 
artist grasp far more of the object than the ordinary man^l 

150. The soul, having grasped single mind-pictures, retains 
Fromsensa- '^^ hold upon them by memory^'; the frequent 
tion to reason, exercise of which keeps each picture fresh and 
complete^^. As the air, when an orchestra is performing, receives 
the impression of many sounds at the same time, and yet retains 
the distinctive tone of each''^ so the soul by concurrent altera- 
tions of its texture preserves its hold on the separate pictures 
it has once grasped. Fresh operations of soul now supervene. 
First, from the comparison of many like pictures, comes 'ex- 
perience ' (e/xTreipla, experieittiaY^ ; out of other comparisons, 
' similitude ' (o/iotdr-j;?), as ' Socrates ' from his portrait ; and 
' analogy' {avako<^ia, proportid), as ' the centre of the earth ' from 
that of other spheres ; ' transference ' (/jbeTadeai<;, translatid), as 
'eyes in the heart'; ' composition ' (cruz'^ecri?, compositio), as 'a 
Hippocentaur ' ; ' opposition ' (€vavTLcoai<;, tJ'ansitio), as ' death ' 
from life ; ' deprivation ' {Kara a-Teprjcnv), as ' a cripple*''.' All 

'"' This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato's Timaeus : 
(is rh fi^v (pCos VTTO TTJs (pcoToeidovs o^ews KaTaXafi^dverai, i] 5e (puvi) vwo ttjs depoeidovs 
aKOTJs, oCtws 7] Twv oXuf (pijcris iiirb (rvyyevovs o^eiXei KaraXafM^dvecrdai rod \6jov Sext. 
Emp. viath. vii 93. See also below, § 266. 

*^ ' comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur ; non 
quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in earn 
posset relinqueret ' Cic. Ac. i n, 42. 

^^ Diog. L. vii 5 1 ; ' quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae 
nos non videmus ! ' Cic. Ac. ii 7, 20. 

^'^ HvritiT) 07}(ravpi(Tfj.6t oScra (pavraaiQiv Sext. math, vii 373 (Arnim i 64) ; ' [mens] 
alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur ; alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur ' 
Cic. Ac. ii ro, 30. 

'^ ' quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam subducitur ; 
quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit ' Sen. Ben. iii 2, 3. 

"•^ So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. inath. vii 231. 

■*" ^Ta,v de Ofioeideis iroWal ixvrnxai yivuvrai, rore (j>afj.kv ^x^'^ e/mtreipiav Aet. p/ac, 
iv II, 2. . 47 Diog. L. vii 52. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH 1 35 

these are based on the general principle of likeness and unlike- 
ness, and may be summed up under the general heading of 
' reason's work of comparison ' {collatio rationis)^, or shortly, 
of reason {Xo'^o'^y^. Sensation shews us the present only; but 
reason brings the past and the future within our view, and points 
out to us the workings of cause and effect'*'. 

151. With the mind-pictures {^avraa'iaL, visa) which are 
derived from sensation we may now contrast the 

Perceptions _ .... 

and Con- ' notions ' (evpoiat, notiones or intellegentiae) which 

ceptions. i • i r i i • • r • i 

are derived irom the combmation or sensation and 
reasoning ; the former correspond generally to ' perceptions,' the 
latter to 'conceptions' in the language of modern philosophy^\ 
But each of the Stoic terms is also used in a wider sense which 
includes the other. The sensory pictures are inscribed upon 
the mind as upon a blank sheet from birth upwards ; in this 
sense they may well be called ' entries on the mind ' (evvoia 
from iv vu>y'^ On the other hand the conceptions may be called 
'rational mind-pictures'^^; quite as much as the sensory mind- 
pictures they need the prudent assent of the will before they 
become ' comprehensions,' when they are once more units capa- 
ble of entering into further combinations and becoming part 
of scientific knowledge. If then for the sake of clearness we 
use the modern terms, we may say that perceptions correspond 

■** The details of this list are variously given : e.g. ' cum rerum notiones in animo 
fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione 
rationis ' Cic. Fin. iii lo, 33. 

*^ Diog. L. vii 52. 

^^ ' homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas 
rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines 
comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras ; facile totius vitae 
cursum videt' Cic. Off. '\ ^, 11. 

^^ So Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 79. 

^^ 'orav yevvridrj 6 avdpdjiros, ^X" '''^ riyefioviKov fiipos ttjs ^vxv^ uiffwep %dpr?7J' • ets 
TovTo jxlav eKdffrrjv iQiv ivvoiCov €i'aTroypd(p€Tai Aet. p/ac. iv 11, i. The metaphor 
of the tabtda rasa can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but in this application 
was first used by Cleanthes. Locke presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It 
must not be thought that this metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul ; 
as the Stoics use it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining 
impressions. See Stein, Psych, ii pp. 112 sqq. , note 230. 

*^ rdv 5^ <pa.vTa(nwv...ovK aiffOrjTiKal ai dia ttjs diavoias, Kaddirep al iiri tCov 
daoj/j.dTwv Diog. L. vii 51. 



136 ROMAN STOICISM 

generally to individual objects which have a real existence, 
whilst conceptions correspond to 'classes of things, which (ac- 
cording to the Stoics) have no real existence in themselves, but 
only a sort of existence in our minds. Thus the 'ideas' of Plato 
are all conceptions, subjectively but not objectively existent^^ 
So far as our study has gone, all conceptions are based on per- 
ceptions : therefore all the elements of knowledge either come 
from sense and experience solely, or from sense and experience 
combined with reasoning^^; and the most important reasoning 
process is that comparison of like perceptions which in this 
philosophy takes the place of induction^", 

152. But even if all ' conceptions ' are ultimately derived 
Preconcep- ffom ' perceptions,' it does not follow that in each 
tions. particular case the mind commences de novo to 

collect and shape its material. On the contrary, it is clear that 
not only all practical life, but also all philosophy, takes for 
granted a great many matters which are either allowed by 
general consent, or at least assumed by the thinker; and these 
matters are mostly of the nature of class-conceptions. If it is 
stated that ' the consul entered Rome in a chariot drawn by four 
horses,' we assume that the ideas expressed by 'consul,' 'chariot,' 
' four,' ' horses,' are matters of general consent, and we may go 
on to assume that the person of the consul and the locality called 
' Rome ' are also already known to the speaker and his hearers. 
The general term in the post-Aristotelian writers for such legi- 
timate assumptions is ' preconception ' {irpoKi^^i'^;, anticipatio or 
praesmnptio). The precise meaning of this term (of which the 
invention is ascribed to Epicurus^'') appears not to be always 
the same. Most commonly the 'preconception' is a general 
term or conception, and therefore to the Stoics it is one variety 
of the evvoia ; it is ' a mental shaping, in accordance with 

®* oi dirb Zrjvwvos Srwi'/cot evvorifxaTa Tjfiirepa ras idias <^(f>a<Ta,v Aet. plac. i 10, 5 
(Arnim i 65) ; cf. Diog. L. vii 61. 

^^ iracra yap vdriais aTrb alffdrjcreus yiueTat 7} oii X'^P'^^ aicrdrjaeus, /cat rj aTrb 
irepLTrTdiaeus 17 ovk avev irepLTrrdjaeus Sext, niath. viii 56 (Arnim ii 88) ; cf. Diog. L. 
vii 52 and 53. 

^^ 'cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit' Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. 

57 Cic. N. D. i 17, 44. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH . 1 37 

man's nature, of things general'®^. All such preconceptions are 
foreshadowings of truth, especially in so far as they correspond 
to the common judgment of mankind®'' ; and the art of life con- 
sists in correctly applying these presumptions to the particular 
circumstances with which each individual man has to deal*"*. If 
the preconceptions are rightly applied, they become clearer by 
use, and thus attain the rank of true knowledge by a process 
of development or ' unravelling ' {enodatioy^. 

As to the nature of a preconception, there is a great differ- 
ence between Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus identifies all 
the terms ' preconception,' ' comprehension,' ' right opinion,' ' con- 
ception,' and ' general notion,' and maintains that each of these 
is nothing but memory of a sensation frequently repeated"-; the 
Stoics however hold that preconceptions are established by the 
mind"^, and (so far as they are common to all men) by the uni- 
versal reason. This difference is fundamental. Epicurus, as a 
materialist in the modern sense, explains perception as a bodily 
function, and 'conceptions' of every kind as mere echoes of such 
bodily functions. The Stoics on the other hand recognise at 
each stage the activity of mind, and this in increasing degree 
as we proceed to the higher levels of thought. 

153. We now approach the most critical point in the Stoic 
Notions of theory of knowledge. Is it possible for man to 

inner growth. posscss knowledge which is not derived, either 
directly or indirectly, through the organs of sense ? Such a 

* ^crrt 5 r\ 'rrp6\ri:pL% Ivvoia ^vctlkt] tQip KadoXov Diog. L. vii 54; 'notionem appello 
quani Graeci turn '4vvoiav turn irpoK7j\j/iv ; ea est insita et praecepta cuiusque formae 
cognitio, enodationis indigens ' Cic. Top. 7, 31; ' nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, 
sine quibus nee intellegi quicquam nee quaeri disputarive potest' Ac. ii 7, 21. See also 
Aet. p/ac. iv 11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must 
not be called wpokrj^pis. 

^^ ' There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the 
common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named common 
sense (kolvos vovs) ' Epict. Disc, iii 6, 8. See also below, § 158. 

*'*' ' We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of what 
is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things conformably with nature ' Epict. 
Disc, i 2, 6. 

^^ See Cic. Top. above, note 58. "- Diog. L. x 33. 

"^ ' cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit ; ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae 
rerum, quas Graeci turn ewola^ tum irpo\T)\f/€LS vocant ' Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. As to 
the possibility of distinguishing the two terms see Prof. Reid's note. 



138 ROMAN STOICISM 

question cannot be answered by any appeal to single Stoic 
texts ; it needs an appreciation of the whole philosophic out- 
look, and upon it depend the most vital principles of the system. 
Let us then first consider, on the supposition that such know- 
ledge exists, what its nature is, what its content, and how it is 
attained by individual men. Knowledge cut off from the sense- 
organs is cut off from all human individuality ; it is therefore 
the expression of the common reason (kocvo^ Xoyo'^), and its 
parts are ' common notions ' (Koival ewotai or wpoXij^ei,'^), shared 
by gods and men, but by men only so far as they are partakers 
of the divine nature. The principal content of such knowledge 
is also clear ; it includes the conception of what is morally good, 
and the beliefs that gods exist and that the world is governed 
by their providence®^. Lastly, as of all general conceptions, the 
rudiments or rough outlines only of these beliefs are inborn in 
men, by virtue of their divine ancestry ; whence they are called 
' innate notions ' (eV^f rot evvotai, insitae notionesY^. These 
notions in their full development are not attainable by children 
at all, nor by men till they attain to reason, that is, till they 
become wise men"". 

154. The Stoics are naturally reluctant to admit that doc- 
' Proofs' of in- trines which it is impious to deny are nevertheless 
born notions. unattainable except by perfect wisdom ; but their 
whole system points inevitably to this conclusion. But there 
are intermediate stages between the rough inborn outlines of 
these truths and their ripe completeness. As man grows in 
reason, he becomes increasingly able to appreciate contributory 
truths, derived from the combination of perception and reason- 
ing, that is, by processes such as 'analogy' and 'comparison,' 
which point in the direction of the supreme beliefs. In this 

"■* See notes to the next section. 

"•' ' rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit [qu. incohavit ?], 
quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae ' Cic. Leg. i 9, 26 ; 'quae in animis imprimuntur, 
de quibus ante dixi, incohatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur' ib. i 
10, 30; 'As to good and evil, beautiful and ugly... and what we ought to do and 
what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate 
idea of them?' Epict. Disc, ii 11, 3. 

"" 6 5^ \6yos...€K tC}v ■irpo\y)\}/eo}v avfnrXrjpovadai \eyeTaL KaraTTjv irpuTTjv el35o/j.dda 
Aet. p/ac. iv 11, 4; Trepl de rrjv devripav €^5ojj,dda 'ivvoia yiverai. koXov re Kai KaKoO 
id. v 23, I. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH 1 39 

sense, and (it is here suggested) in this sense only, can there 
be ' proofs ' (aTroSet'let?) of these"''. Only in the crowning moment 
of that probation which is described later on, at the moment of 
conversion, these truths finally flash forth, stirred up indeed by 
secondary evidence, but really rooted in the man's deepest 
nature*^; they then reveal themselves to the soul with an illu- 
minating power which is all their own, but which carries with 
it the most complete conviction. Ordinary men must mean- 
while somehow make shift with reflections or pale copies of this 
knowledge, to which however the name of common or inborn 
notions can also be applied. 

155. The list of ' common notions' is doubtless not limited 
The inward ^° ^^^ high philosophical principles which we have 
touch. mentioned ; for instance it must include such mathe- 

matical principles as ' two and two make four,' ' a straight line is 
the shortest distance between two points,' ' a three-sided figure 
has three angles,' and so forth. With these however we have 
little direct concern. Of more interest to us is another kind of 
perception"^ recognised by the Stoics as well as by other schools 
of philosophy, that called the ' inward touch ' (ez/ro? dcfjijy^. By 
this the soul becomes aware of its own workings, most obviously 
of its pleasure and pain. The doctrine of the ' inward touch ' is 
of great philosophical importance, for it breaks down the dualism 

"'' 7] 5e KaTa\r;\pLS yiv€Tat....\6yij} tQv 5t' dTroSei'fews crvv ay ofxiviov, unnrep to 0eovs 
etvai /cat Trpovoelv toiitovs Diog. L. vii 52 ; ' collatione rationis boni notio facta 
est; cum eniin ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione 
rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit' C\c. Fin. iii 10, 33 ; 'nobis videtur observatio 
collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se coUatio : per analogian nostri intellectum 
et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem ; ex hac cogitavimus 
esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires ; ex his collegimus esse et animi 
robur' Sen. Ep. 120, 4; ' de bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat ; quid utile sit, 
quid inutile, ignorat. non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus 
est ; ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum ' ib. 66, 35. 

^® (pvaiKCos 5i voeirai 5iKai.6v ti koI dyaddv Diog. L. vii 53. 

"" For the classification as a sensation see above, § 146. 

''" oi Srwi'/cot TTjvde (sc. Aristotelis) t7]v koivtjv aiaOrjaiv 'ivrbs a(f>y]v^ irpoaayo- 
pevovffi, Kad' ■^v Kal rjixdv airCiv avTiXafi^avo/xeda Aet. J>lac. iv 8, 7 ; 'quid de tactu, 
et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut dolorls aut voluptatis?' Cic. 
Ac. ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken for the perception of an external object, is an 
' empty twitching ' : ^avraaia tQv kv rjfuv iradSiv ■ b dj] Kvpidbrepov diaKevos eXKvapids 
Trap' avToTs KoXetrai Sext. »iatA. vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, S/oic and 
Epictirean, p. no. 



I40 ROMAN STOICISM 

of subject and object, the barrier between the knowing and the 
known. Since these are the same in the specific cases named, 
the door is open to the conclusion that everywhere there is a 
kinship between the two, and that without this knowledge would 
be without firm foundation. By this kinship we may also ex- 
plain the fact that direct communications are made by the deity 
to man, as by dreams, oracles and augury''^ 

156. Thus it appears that the elements of knowledge, ac- 
cording to the Stoics, are sensations, perceptions, 

Knowledge; . . ^ i i ' 

the parts and conccptions or uotious, and general or inborn 
notions. As in the other parts of the Stoic 
philosophy, we shall regard this fourfold division as indicating 
generally the ground covered, and not as setting up definite 
lines of demarcation. The same material may be analyzed from 
other points of view, as for instance in the study of words, in 
which we shall find a division into objects, statements, condi- 
tional statements, and syllogisms. The elements may also be 
combined in various ways. A combination or ' system ' (avarijfjLa) 
which is directed towards a useful or pleasurable object, such as 
music or grammar, is called an 'art' (rexvVy arsy^: and arts are 
attainable by ordinary men. The wise man, on the other hand, 
is not necessarily acquainted with the several arts; his practice 
is to ' keep quiet ' when matters are discussed which require such 
special knowledge. The combination of all knowledge in one 
all-embracing system is ' science' {iiriaTrj fir), scientia); the only 
science in the full sense is philosophy ^^; and in this system no 
part can be at variance with any other parf^ The elements of 
knowledge also acquire the character of science, when they are 
found to be parts of this compacted system, and therefore in- 
capable of coming into conflict with any other part^^; and in 

''^ ' visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur, quaeque oraculis 
auspiciis extis declarentur ' Cic. Ac, ii 15, 47. 

''^ Arnim ii 93 and 95 ; ' ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut 
duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?' Cic. Ac. ii 7, 22; 'ex quibus 
[perceptis] collatis inter se et compaiatis artes quoque efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, 
partim ad oblectationem necessariis ' N. D. ii 59, 148. 

''^ Arnim ii 95. '''* irpoX-q^pis Trpo\r)\p€i ov /xdxerat Epict. Disc, i 22, i. 

''^ elvai 5e rrjv iTncrTTjfiriv KaTdXrjxpLV dacpaXi] /cat dfJ,eTa,WT(i3Tov virb \6yov ' eripav Sk 
€TricrTrj/jL7)v <Tv<TTT]/xa ef iiriaTTjfxQiv tolo>jtwv Stob. ii 7, 5 1 (see also Wachsmuth's crit. 
note). 



OF REASON AND SPEECH - I4I 

particular we find the term 'science' predicated of comprehen- 
sions which are firmly established and cannot be refuted by any 
argumenf*^. In the language of Zeno's simile, over the closed 
fist that grasps the object is placed the other hand, keeping it 
with firmness and assurance in its place^; or, to use a comparison 
first suggested in ridicule of Stoicism, but which by the progress 
of architectural skill has since then been made less damaging, 
science is like a firm and immoveable building constructed upon 
a shifting foundational Finally ordinary men can reach compre- 
hension, but only the wise man can attain to science''". 

157. We revert to the difficult problem of the criterion of 
The criterion truth, that is, the discovcry of a rule by which the 
reviewed. ^^ue Can be separated from the false. Our autho- 

rities differ greatly as to what the Stoic criterion is; and this 
vacillation must have placed the Stoics at a great disadvantage 
in their controversy with the Academics, who maintain that there 
is no criterion. The most usual statement is that the ' compre- 
hensive mind-picture ' {KaraXrjirrtKt} ^avTaala) is the criterion ; 
this view is expressly attributed to Chrysippus, Antipater, and 
Apollodorus*". As we have seen, the meaning of this is that 
a true mind-picture can be distinguished from one that is false 
by the note of clearness, and this general doctrine can be traced 
back to Zeno^\ It appears at first sight to provide a criterion 
which can be applied by the percipient at the moment when it 
is needed, and it was doubtless intended to be a practical tool 
in this sense; but under the pressure of criticism the Stoics were 
frequently compelled to modify it. They could not but admit 
that in the case of dreams and drunken visions it is only at 

''^ ' scientiam...quam nos non comprehensionem modo reriim, sed earu stabilem 
quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus ' Cic. Ac. ii 8, 23; 'quod erat sensu 
comprehensum...si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam 
[Zeno] nominabat' id. i 11, 41 ; ' quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], 
earn sic animo comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus ' id. ii 37, 119. 

" See above, § 77. 

'"' Plut. co7tim. not. 47, 4. 

''" Sext. math, vii 151 (Arnim ii 90) ; ' scientiam, cuius compotem nisi sapientem 
esse nemmem' Cic. Ac. 1147, 145. 

8" Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below. 

^^ See especially Pearson, Zeno fr. 11; and above, § 84. 



142 ROMAN STOICISM 

a later moment that the lack of clearness can be appreciated*^; 
whereas on the other hand a picture may be perfectly clear, and 
yet the percipient, because of some prepossession, may not realize 
this. Such was the case when Hercules brought Alcestis from 
the world below; her husband Admetus received a true mind- 
picture of her, but put no confidence in it, because he knew her 
to be dead. It follows that no mind-picture can be implicitly 
trusted for itself; for our sense organs may be clouded, or our 
previous experience in conflict with it. If the Academics 
urged that the sure note of clearness is not to be found in the 
senses*-^, the Stoics admitted as much when they now said that 
a true comprehensive picture must come from a real object^, 
when they added the words that 'no objection must arise*^'; 
thus really admitting that it must be not only persuasive, but 
also such as no reasoning process can shake, and such as has 
been examined from all sides*®. Thus they shifted the centre 
of certainty from the single comprehension to the general field 
of science; they still held to it in theory, but no longer main- 
tained its practical application. For this too they had the 
authority of the older masters. For we learn on the authority 
of Posidonius that 'some of the older Stoics' held the true 
criterion to be ' right reason ' (6p66<; XoyosiY^, and this is equi- 
valent to saying that only the deity and the wise man possess 
the secret**. In a loose sense any important part of the Stoic 

*^ ' omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive ilia cogitatione in- 
formantur, ...sive in quiete, sive per vinum, sive per insaniam. nam ab omnibus 
eiusmodi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus.... 
itaque, simul ut exper recti sumus [ex somnoj, visa ilia contemnimus neque ita 
habemus, ut ea quae in foro gessimus ' Cic. Ac. ii 17, 51. 

*^ ' [ab Academia disputatum est], non inesse [in sensibus] propriam, quae 
nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam ' zd. ii 32, 103; 'dicunt [Academici] hoc 
se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem mode falsum etiam 
possit videri' id. 11, 33. 

^'^ KpLTTjpLOP 5e TTJs dXTjdeias (paai ttjv KaTa\7]TrriK7]v ^avraaiav, TovriarL ttjv airb 
.virdpxovTos, Kadd (p'qo'L X.pv<nTnros Kal ' AvTiirarpos koI AiroWodcopos Diog. L. vii 54. 
This view is attributed to Zeno himself: 'visum [Zeno ita definiit] ex eo, quod 
asset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum ' Cic. Ac. ii 24, 77. 

*^ ol de vedirepoL irpofferidea-av Kal to fX7)d^v 'ixov(^a.v ^v<TT7j/j.a Sext. math, vii 253. 

'^^ (pavracria TTLdavrj /cat dire pier waaros koL irepiudevij^i'r] Sext. math, vii 181. Such 
was the definition of Carneades (Schmekel, p. 344). 

^'^ Diog. L. vii 54 (see § 80, note 68). 

** 'posse eum [sapientem] falsa a veris distinguere ' Cic. Ac. ii 21, 67. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH I43 

theory of reason may be said to be a criterion ; thus Chrysippus 
again said that ' the criteria are sensation and preconception,' and 
Boethus set up many criteria, as mind, sense, science, and (in 
practical matters) appetite^**. 

158. Seeing that the full assurance of truth is not at every 
General con- niomcnt attainable, it is necessary to be contented 
sent. from time to time with something less complete. 

Amongst such tests the 'general consent of mankind' plays 
an important part, especially in connexion with the dogma 
* that gods exist' We may indeed well believe that this cri- 
terion was not originally suggested by revolutionary philosophers, 
but rather by conservative advocates of an established religion ; 
and therefore we are not surprised to see it emphasized first by 
Posidonius and afterwards by Seneca^". General consent is 
however by itself no proof of truth, but at most an indication 
of the presence of a ' common notion ' in its rough shape. If 
however we see that the ' common notion ' grows stronger 
and more clear every day, and if it is the more firmly held as 
men approach the standard of wisdom, it becomes a strong 
support ^\ 

159. From a very early period, as we have already indi- 

cated, Stoic teachers accepted probability as the 
the guide guide of life in its details, being perhaps aided by 

the happy ambiguity of the expression ' reasonable- 
ness ' (to evXojov), which suggests formally the pursuit of reason, 
but in practice is a justification of every course of which a 
plausible defence can be brought forward. Ptolemy Philopator, 
we are told, jestingly put wax fruit before Sphaerus at his table, 
and when Sphaerus tried to eat it cried out that he was giving 
his assent to a false miind-picture. Sphaerus replied that he had 
not assented to the picture ' this is fruit,' but only to the picture 
■' this is probably fruit^l' Antipater of Tarsus, when he explained 

'^^ Diog. L. vii 54. See on this point Hicks, S^o?'c and Epicurean^ p. 70. 

'*'* ' multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apiid nos veritatis 
:argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri; tanquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, 
quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est...neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapien- 
itiam bonum et sapere bonum ' Sen. Ep. 117, 6. 

^^ ' opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat ' Cic. N. D. ii 2, 5. 

'^^ Diog. L. vii 177. 



144 ROMAN STOICISM 

that the very essence of virtue lay in the choice of natural 
ends upon probable grounds'*^, was felt to be giving way to 
Carneades*^. Panaetius justified the maintaining of that which 
is plausible by the advocate, and Cicero, whose own conscience 
was not at ease in the matter, was glad enough to quote so 
respectable an authority on his own behalP^ In the Roman 
imperial period a growing spirit of humility and pessimism led 
to a general disparagement of human knowledge, centring in 
attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses. So Seneca speaks 
of the ' usual weakness ' of the sense of sight^**, and Marcus 
Aurelius feels that ' the organs of sense are dim and easily 
imposed upon^^' The older Stoics had admitted the frequent 
errors of the senses"®, but they had been confident they could 
surmount this difficulty. Their latest disciples had lost the 
courage to do this, and in consequence the practice of ' suspen- 
sion of judgment,' which before had been the exception"", became 
with them the rule. Nevertheless Epictetus, who alone amongst 
these later Stoics was an ardent student of dialectics, held fast to 
the main principle that certainty is attainable. ' How indeed ' he 
said ' perception is effected, whether through the whole body or 
any part, perhaps I cannot explain, for both opinions perplex 
me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect 
certainty"".' 

160. Having now dealt with the theory of knowledge, we 
may consider briefly the subordinate sciences (or 
rather ' arts ') of Grammar, Logic (in the narrower 
sense), and Style. Here we may leave the technical divisions 
and sub-divisions of the Stoics ; for these matters are substan- 
tially independent of the main lines upon which the ancient 

^^ oxxTiav rdyadov TidevTon Trjv evKdyLarov iKKoyriv tG>v Kara (pvaiv Plut. comin. not. 

27> 9- ^ ^ 

^■* eKeivou [top 'AvTiiraTpof] vtto Kappeddov Tne^bfxevov, eh raiJTas KaradveadaL rds 

eiipecriKoyias ib. 27, 15. 

"5 'iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam verisimile, 
etiam si minus sit verum, defendere ; quod scribere...non auderem, nisi idem placeret 
gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio ' Cic. Off. ii 14, 51. 

"^ ' visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus' Sen. N. Q. i 2, 3. 

^'' To himself , v 33. "'^ See above, §§ 146, 147. 

"" 'sapientem aliquando sustinere adsensionem ' Cic. Ac. ii 17, 53. 

i"" Epict. Disc, i 27, 17. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH I45 

philosophies parted company, and have for us only a secondary 
and historical interest. The Stoics distinguish five parts of 
speech: 'name' {ovofxa, nomen), as 'Diogenes'; 'class-name' 
{Trpo(jrj<yopia, appellatio), as ' man, horse '^"^; 'verb ' {prjjxa, verbimi) ; 
' conjunction ' (crvvSecr/jio^, coniunctio) ; and ' article ' {dp6pov, ar- 
tiaihis). The last they define naively as a little word which is 
all ending, and serves to distinguish the cases and numbers ^°l 
To the list of the parts of speech Antipater added the ' mixed 
part ' or participle (/j,ea6T7]<i). The noun has four cases (7rTc6c7et?), 
the 'upright case' (Trrwcri? evOela, casus rectus \ this is of course 
a contradiction in terms) ; and the ' oblique ' cases {irXd'yiai), 
that is the ' class ' case (jeviK?]), the ' dative ' (Sotlkt]), and the 
' effect ' case (alrcariKr]). The prj/j,a or verb is identical with 
the icaTTq'yoprjp.a or ' predicate,' and may take the ' active ' form 
(opda), the ' passive ' {vima), or the * neuter ' (ovSerepa) ; some 
verbs also express action and reaction, and are called ' reflexive * 
(avrtTreTTovdoTo). The Stoics also distinguished the tenses. 
Time (■)(^p6vo<;) being of three kinds, past {irap(p')(rj p,evo^\ pre- 
sent {ive(TTm), and future (/xeWcov), we have the following tenses 
which are ' definite ' {oopLcrixevoi) : the ' present imperfect ' (eyeo-ra)? 
areXrjs:), the ' past imperfect ' (7rap(pxv/^^T^o'i areXris:), the ' present 
perfect' (ivea-roDq TeX€io<;), and the 'past perfect' (wapw'x^ijfievoii 
Te\eto9); in addition to these we have the 'indefinite' tenses, the 
future (neXXwv), and the past indefinite, called simply indefinite 
{dopicrro'iy'^. 

161. So far we find in the Stoic system the general frame- 
Theoriesof work of the grammar of the period, much of it 
speech. adapted with modifications from Aristotle. In 

some other details points of real grammatical or philosophical 
interest are raised. Such is the controversy between ' anomaly/ 
the recognition of the individuality of each word in its flexion, 
and ' analogy,' in which the validity of the rules of declension 
and conjugation is insisted upon. Two Stoic masters, Chrysippus 

^°^ The distinction between ' name ' and ' class-name ' was due to Chrysippus : 
see Sandys, Classical Scholarship, i p. 144. 

102 Diog. L. vii 58. 

103 Yox these and further particulars see Sandys, Classical Scholarship, i cb. ix ; 
R. Schmidt, Stoicorum Grammatica, pp. 18 sqq. 

A. 10 



146 ROMAN STOICISM 

and Crates of Mallos, took up the cause of ' anomaly^"^' Further 
the Stoics held that all correct language exists by nature ((fivaei), 
and not by convention (Oecrei), as Aristotle had maintained ; 
the elements of language being imitations of natural sounds^''^ 
Further, they held that the natural relation between ' things ' 
{arjixaivoixeva, significatd) and the words that express them 
{(jriijbalvovra, significantid) can frequently be determined by 
etymology; for instance ^wvr) 'voice' is ^w? vov 'the mind's 
lamp,' aloiv 'age' is ael ov 'enduring for ever"".' Like Hera- 
clitus and Aristotle, the Stoics distinguished between ' thought ' 
(Xojo'i 6v8idO€To<i, ratio) and ' speech ' (X,o709 7rpo(f>opLK6<;, oralio), 
which the Greek word X0709 tends to confuse"''; thought is im- 
material, but speech, as consisting of air in motion, is body"^ 
Young children and animals do not possess real speech, but only 
' a sort of speech"".' 

162. Words in combination form statements, questions, 

wishes, syllogisms, and so forth"" ; there is there- 

and^syiio°"^ forc no clear line drawn between what we call 

gisms. syntax and logic respectively. Whenever we have 

a complete combination of words expressing that which must 

either be false or true, as ' Hannibal was a Carthaginian,' ' Scipio 

destroyed Numantia,' we call it a ' statement ' or ' proposition ' 

(a^twyLta) "^ ; for phrases of all kinds we have the more general 

term 'phrase' (XeKTov, id quod dicitury^'^. Of special interest is 

"* ' Crates, nobilis grammaticus, fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo, qui reliquit 
irepL dvw/J.a\las III libros, contra analogiam atque Aristarchum est nixus ' Varro Z. Z. 
ix I (Arnim ii 151). 

105 Orig. con/. Celsiini i 24 (Arnim ii 146). 

los Varr. Z. Z. vi 11 (Arnim ii 163). 

"^ See Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 73, n. 2 ; Aristotle's distinction is between rov iv 
TTJ \{/vxv ^oyov and rbv ^|w \6yov. 

108 'vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt eamque esse dicunt ictum aera ' 
A. Gellius, N. A. v 15, 6. 

"^ ' hunc [qui primo dicitur iam fari] Chrysippus negat loqui, sed ut loqui;... 
sic in corvis, cornicibus, pueris primitus incipientibus fari, verba non esse verba' 
Varro Z. Z. vi 56 (Arnim ii 143). 

1" Diog. L. vii 6^ to 78. 

m Varro translates this by 'proloquium' (Cell. N. A. xvi 8, 8), Cicero pro- 
visionally by ' pronuntiatum ' {Tiisc. disp. i 7, 14). 

"2 A statement or proposition is therefore a phrase ' complete in itself (XeKTov 
avToreXh) A. Gellius A/'. A. xvi 8, 4. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH - I47 

the conditional sentence (a-vvTjfi/uievov), which has two parts, the 
conditional clause (rjyov/j,evov) and the contingent clause (Xijjov). 
The conditional or leading clause always contains a sign 
(arjfj,6lov), by means of which we reach proof: thus in saying 
'if it is day, it is light' we mean that 'day' is a sign of light. 
Proof is ' speech on every subject gathering what is less clear 
from that which is more clear"^' Its most important form is 
the syllogism, of which Chrysippus recognises five forms : 

(i) if A, then B; but A, therefore B, 
(ii) if A, then B ; but not B, therefore not A. 
(iii) not A and B together; but A, therefore not B. 
(iv) either A or B ; but A, therefore not B. 

(v) either A or B; but not A, therefore B"^ 

All these matters admit of endless qualifications, subdivisions, 
and developments, and were therefore serviceable to those Stoics 
who were before all things makers of books"^ Examples of Stoic 
syllogisms have been given above"''. 

163. Closely connected with the theory of the syllogism is 
the enticing subject of the ' resolution of fallacies ' 
{ao(f)ia/jLdT(ov \v(tc<;), which the Megarians had 
brought within the range of philosophy. To this subject the 
Stoics gave much attention"''. The most famous fallacy is that 
of the ' heap ' (acoplTT)^, acervus) ; ' if two are few, so are three ; if 
three, then four; and so forth.' In this Chrysippus took a special 
interest"*; his reply was to keep still"". Another is the 'liar' 
(i|reySo/ievo9, nientiens) ; ' when a man says " 1 lie," does he lie 
or not .'' if he lies, he speaks the truth ; if he speaks the truth, 
he lies'^".' On this subject Chrysippus wrote a treatise, which 

"3 Diog. L. vii 45. "* ib. 80 and 81. 

^1® ' ex iis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur ' Cic. Top. 14, 57. 

"« § 83. 

^^^ 'i\ve hi [Ziji'wi'] (Tocpicr fiara, Kod ttjv diaXeKTiKriv, us tovto iroielv dvva/j.iv7]v, 
^/cAeue irapaXafj.^di'eLi' rovs fiadTjrds Plut. Sio. rep. 8, 2. 

118 ' inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi ' Pers. Sat. vi 80. 

•^•'^ 'placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, tria pauca sint anne multa, 
aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere ' Cic. Ac. ii 29, 93. Cf. Sext. 
math, vii 416. 

^^^ 'si te mentiri dicis idque varum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis?' Cic. Ac. ii 
29. 95. 

10 — 2 



148 ROMAN STOICISM 

Epictetus thought not worth reading^^^ Seneca gives us exam- 
ples of other fallacies, which also are verbal quibbles^^. Of an 
altogether different kind are those problems in which the question 
of determinism as opposed to moral choice is involved. Such is 
the ' reaper,' which maintains ' either you will reap or you will 
not reap; it is not correct to say "perhaps you will reap."' 
Such again is the 'master-argument' of Diodorus the Megarian, 
directly aimed against every moral philosophy^^^ These diffi- 
culties we shall discuss later as touching the supreme problems 
which are presented to the human reason ^^*. 

164. The scientific study of syllogisms and fallacies promises 

at first sight to be a guide to truth and a way of 

Definition. r 1. j. • 1 •j_ 

escape Irom error, but experience shews it never- 
theless to be barren. It has however an advantage in securing 
a careful statement of teaching, and for this purpose was much 
used by Zeno and Chrysippus, The later members of the school 
realized that this advantage could be more simply gained by 
the practice of careful definition {6po<i, definitid). Antipater thus 
defined definition itself: 'definition is an expression which ela- 
borates in detail without falling short or going too far^^^' He 
and all other Stoics of his time gave numerous definitions of the 
most important terms used in the system, such as God, fate, pro- 
vidence, the supreme good, virtue, and so forth ; and these are of 
great value in giving precision to their doctrine. 

165. In considering Style we first notice the distinction 

between dialectic in the narrower sense, in which 
^^" statements are made in the shortest and most pre- 

cise form, and rhetoric, in which they are expanded at length ^^^ 
Zeno compared one to the closed fist, the other to the open 
palm^^^ Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote upon rhetoric, 

^^^ Epict. Disc, ii 17, 34. 

12^ 'mus syllaba est. mus autem caseum rodit : syllaba ergo caseum rodit...o 
pueriles ineptias ! ' Sen. Ep. 48, 6 and 7 ; ' quod non perdidisti, habes ; cornua autem 
non perdidisti ; cornua ergo habes ' ib. 49, 8. 

"^ Epict. Disc, ii 19, i sqq. ^'-^^ See below, §§ 220, 221. 

^^s Diog. L. vii 60. 

1^" ' omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; 
hanc 5taXe/{Ti/C7jj', illam prjTopiKriJ' placuit vocari ' Sen. £p. 89, 17. 

^^^ Cic. Orator 32, 113. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH ' 149 

and it appears to have become a tradition to ridicule their 
teaching, chiefly on the ground of the novel terms which the 
Stoics introduced, as 7rpor]jfjb€va, Koa/xoTToXa^'^^. But it is exactly 
in these new-fangled words that we observe one of the chief aims 
of the Stoic theory of style, namely the use of words which 
precisely and exclusively correspond to the objects described 
(KvpioXoyla, proprietas verborum), and which therefore lead up 
to transparent clearness of speech ((Ta(f)7]veia, pelhicida oratioy-'^. 
To this clearness the study of grammar is contributory; 'bar- 
barisms ' (faults in spelling and pronunciation) must be avoided, 
with proper help from the doctrines of ' anomaly ' and ' analogy' ; 
for the Stoics learnt in time that neither of these is exclusively 
true. Equally important is the avoidance of ' solecisms,' or faults 
in syntax. In this way a pure use of language (KXX7]vt<7/j,6<;, 
Latinitas) is attained ; this is largely based upon the example 
of older writers, such as Homer in Greek, and Cato the elder in 
Latin^^", but not to such an extent as to employ words not com- 
monly intelligible. But little more is needed; the Stoic will say 
what he has to say with ' brevity ' (cruyro/xta, brevitas) ; the graces 
of style will be represented by ' becomingness ' {irpeirov, decorum) 
and ' neatness ' {KaracrKevrj), the latter including euphony. These 
virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well, which is neither 
more nor less than speaking truthfully ^^i; for the Stoic needs 
only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to 
amuse him or to excite his emotions ^^l Style has three varieties, 
according as it is employed in the council, in the law-courts, or 
in praise of goodness and good men'^^; in the last there was no 

'^^ ' scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes. Chrysippus etiam ; sed sic, ut si quis 
obmutescere cupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides quo modo loquantur ; 
nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata' Cic. Fin. iv 3, 7. 

^^ Diog. L. vii 59. 

130 1 yjjj ]y[_ Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi ' Front, et Aur. Ep. 
ii 13. 

^^^ ol SrwiVot 5^ rb ev Xiyeiv iXeyov to aXrjdrj Xeyeiv Anon, ad Herm. Rhet. Gr. 
vii 8. Hence speech was a virtue ; ' [Stoicis] hanc habeo gratiam, quod soli ex 
omnibus eloquentiam virtutem ac sapientiam esse dixerunt ' Cic. de Or. iii 18, 65. 

132 ' fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium 
docere; namque et effectus duplici ratione exciudendos putabant, primum quia vitium 
esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate pelli misericordia gratia 
similibusque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium peterc.vix etiam viro dignum 
arbitrabantur ' Quint. Inst. or. v Prooem. ^'^'^ Diog- L. vii 42. 



I50 ROMAN STOICISM 

doubt greater room allowed for that expansiveness of speech 
which the Stoics specially designated as ' rhetoric' 

166. The 'Stoic style' was a severe intellectual and moral 
Th Stoic discipline. The speaker was called upon under all 
orator. circumstances to speak the truth, the whole truth, 

and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing from 
his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their 
religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of de- 
cency ; he could add no word which would touch their sympathies 
or kindle their indignation in the direction he himself might 
wish. He had always before his eyes the example of Socrates' 
defence before the Athenian jury and its result. The Stoic 
appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and rather rugged 
speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the circum- 
stances demanded ^H Even the Stoics of the transition period, 
in spite of their Academic leanings and their literary acquire- 
ments, made this impression at Rome. Diogenes, who had 
himself done much to elaborate the theory of style, was noted 
as a quiet and self-restrained speaker^^*'^. The influence of 
Panaetius may be traced in his friend Lucilius, who in his 
book on style is never tired of ridiculing the artifices of rhetori- 
cians. Then followed a succession of these reserved speakers^ 
which we shall trace in another chapter, leading up to Cato of 
Utica, by far the best-known and the most ridiculed of them 
allies. 

It is not easy to form a fair judgment of the merits of the 
Stoic style. It must be admitted that the works of Chrysippus 
are not readable; but on the other hand Antipater, Panaetius, 
Posidonius, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus were all writers or 
speakers of great attractiveness^^l 

167. In connexion with style we may call attention to the 
important function of paradoxes {irapdho^a, in- 

Paradox. , • , \ , i , • 

opmata), that is, propositions contrary to common 

^^ ' orationis genus habent [Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum ; sed, ut in 
oratore, exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum, 
attamen eiusmodi quo uti ad vulgus nullo modo possit ' Cic. de Or. iii 18, (>6. 

^^^ ' dicebat modesta Diogenes et sobria ' A. Gellius, N. A. vi 14, 10. 

136 See below, chap. xvi. ^■^'' See Smiley, Latinitas and 'EWrjvur/xds. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH - 15I 

opinion. Since all philosophies conflict with common opinion, 
they must necessarily include many paradoxes 1^®. The chief 
Stoic paradoxes are those which were borrowed directly from 
the Cynic school, and indirectly from the teaching of Socrates^^^ : 
and Cicero devotes a special work to their defence. He includes 
the following : (i) that only what is honourable is good ; (ii) that 
virtue is sufficient for happiness ; (iii) that right actions and 
offences are equal ; (iv) that all foolish men are mad ; (v) that 
the wise man alone is free and every foolish man a slave ; (vi) 
that the wise man alone is rich. These of course include the 
very pith and marrow of Stoic ethics ; and the form is calculated 
to arrest the attention of the crowd and to challenge defiantly its 
cherished opinions. The Stoics of literary taste and social posi- 
tion usually shew some distaste for paradoxes, and prefer to state 
their teaching in ways more obviously reasonable. But it should 
hardly be necessary to explain that no paradox is complete in 
itself, but each needs to be interpreted according to the principles 
of the school which propounds it. In proportion as the doctrines 
of any school win general recognition, its paradoxes tend to find 
ready acceptance, and may ultimately become truisms"". 

The treatment of myths as allegories'^^ may also be considered 
as the use of a kind of paradox ; this we shall find it most conve- 
nient to discuss in connexion with Stoic views upon the nature 
of the gods. 

168. The study of logic is at first sight dismal and repill- 

Dangers of ^^^^ ' when progress has been made in it, it seems 

^°^''^- illuminating; in the end it becomes so alluring, 

that the would-be philosopher may easily be lost for ever in its 

mazes"^. The early Stoics had pressed this discipline upon 

338 ' Philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion, as Cleanthes 
also said, but not words contrary to reason' Epict. Disc, iv i, 173 ; ' where is the 
wonder if in philosophy many things which are true appear paradoxical to the in- 
experienced ?' ii>. i 25, 33. 

^■^^ ' ista Trapddo^a quae appellant, maxime videntur esse Socratica ' Cic. Farad. 
Prooem. 4. 

i-*" ' nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile ' Cic. Parad. 
Prooem. 3 ; ' Stoica paradoxa, quorum nullum esse falsum nee tam mirabile quam 
prima facie videtur, adprobabo ' Sen. Ep. 87, i. 

"' Zeller, Stoics etc., pp. 354-370. 

"2 A. Gellius, N. A. xvi 8, 16 and 17. 



152 ROMAN STOICISM 

their pupils ; those of the Roman period, themselves (with the 
exception of Epictetus) weak dialecticians, never cease to warn 
their hearers against its fascinations. So Seneca tells us that 
many logical inquiries have nothing to do with real life"* ; and 
that the older Stoics had wasted much time over them'**; 
Epictetus complains that his hearers never get beyond the 
resolving of syllogisms"^ and M. Aurelius thanks the gods that 
he never wasted his time in this way"*', 

169. It was a favourite contention of Cicero, adopted from 
c+^.v o„^ A^ his teacher Antiochus, that the Stoic dialectic was 

btoic and Aca- ' 

demic logic. j^q original system, but only a modification of the 
views of the old Academy"''. Such a conclusion seems partly due 
to the fact that the Stoics of his own time had largely borrowed 
from the Academic system in detail ; and partly to the overlook- 
ing by Antiochus of an essential difference of spirit between the 
two schools, Plato is speculative, Zeno positive ; Plato plays with 
a dozen theories, Zeno consistently adheres to one. Plato ranks 
the mind high, Zeno the will ; Plato bases his system on the 
general concept, Zeno on the individual person or object. It 
would seem that no contrast could be more complete. Nor 
does Zeno's theory agree with that of Epicurus. Both indeed 
are positive teachers, and hold that the senses are messengers 
of truth. But here Epicurus stops, whilst Zeno goes on. We 
have to understand rightly the functions and limitations of the 
senses, or we shall quickly glide into error; we have also to 
learn that the senses are but servants, and that the mind rules 
them as a monarch by divine right, coordinating the messages 

"* 'quaedam exercendi tantum ingenii causa quaeruntur, et semper extra vitam 
iacent' Sen. Bett. vi i, i. 

^** ' multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosae disputationes, 
quae acumen inritum exercent' Ep. 45, 5. 

145 < \Ye terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able to expound 
it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and in handling the hypothetical syllogism' 
Epict. Disc, iv 4, 14. 

146 1 Thanks [to the gods] too that, in spite of my ardour for philosophy, I did not 
fall into the hands of any sophist, or sit poring over essays or syllogisms, or become 
engrossed in scientific speculation ' M. Aurelius To himself i 17. 

^*^ * verum esse arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem 
veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam [Stoicorum 
rationem] ' Cic. Ac. i 12, 43. 



OF REASON AND SPEECH - 153 

they bring, shaping them according to its own creative capacity, 
even adding to them from the material it has derived from its 
source. The Stoic theory is in fact a bold survey of the results 
of the reflection of the human mind upon its own operations ; 
it has, as we might expect, many gaps, a good deal of over- 
lapping description, and some inconsistencies. To sceptical 
objections it is of course unable to give answers which are 
logically satisfactory; but its general position proved accept- 
able to men who sought in philosophy a guide to practical life. 

170. In the approximation between Stoicism and the 
Questions of Acadcmy which characterizes the first century 
temperament. -q q ^ j-^g Stoic logic obtained in the end the upper 
hand ; and the logic of the so-called ' old Academy ' founded by 
Antiochus is in all essentials that of the Stoics. Nevertheless 
the objections urged against it by Cicero represent not only 
his reason but also his sentiments. The positive system appears 
at its best in the education of children ; and even at the present 
day the theory of knowledge which is tacitly adopted in schools 
is substantially that of the Stoics. It leads to careful observa- 
tion, earnest inquiry, and resolute choice; and thus lays the 
foundation of solidity of character. But it must be admitted 
that it also works in the direction of a certain roughness and 
harshness of disposition. Not only is the Stoically-minded 
man lacking in sympathy for beliefs different from his own, 
which he is bound to regard as both foolish and wicked ; but 
he is also blind to that whole side of the universe which cannot 
be reduced to syllogistic shape. Thus we may account for the 
indifference or hostility with which most Stoics regarded both 
literature and art^^. The Academic, on the other hand, even 
if he lacked moral firmness and saw too clearly both sides of 
every question, was saved by his critical powers from extreme 

^'^ ' tunc intellegere nobis licebit, quam contemnenda miremur, simillimi pueris, 
quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est. quid ergo inter nos et illos interest, ut Ariston 
ait, nisi quod nos circa tabulas et statuas insanimus, carius inepti ? illos reperti in 
litore calculi leves delectant, nos ingentium maculae columnarum ' Sen. £/>. 115, 8. 
This tone is clearly derived from Cynism, as the reference to Aristo indicates. A 
modern Cynic is still more sweeping in his condemnation : 'all the nastiness and 
stupidity which you call science and art' (Count Leo Tolstoy in the Westminsier 
Gazette, Sept. 3, 1910). 



154 ROMAN STOICISM 

assertions and harsh personal judgments, and had a delicate 
appreciation of the finer shadings of life. Thus behind the 
formal differences of the two schools there lies a difference of 
character. We have long since learnt that the fundamental 
questions between the two schools are incapable of solution 
by the human mind, and we can therefore appreciate the one 
without condemning the other. In practical life each theory- 
has its appropriate sphere ; but the Romans were hardly in 
the wrong when in matters of doubt they leaned towards the 
Stoic side. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS. 

171. Under the general heading of Physics the ancients 
included a number of subjects which in modern 

Physics. - , ., 

times form independent branches of philosophy. 
Cleanthes subdivided the subject into Physics proper and 
Theology^ Here it will be convenient to make a larger 
number of subdivisions, so as to treat separately of (i) the 
Foundations of Physics, generally called (after Aristotle's 
treatise) ' Metaphysics ' ; (ii) Physics proper, that is, the account 
of the Universe and its history ; (iii) the final problems involved 
in the history of the Universe, such as its government by Divine 
Providence, the Existence of Evil, Free-will, and Chance ; 
(iv) the problems of Religion, such as the existence of gods, 
their number, character, and claims on mankind ; and (v) the 
nature of Man, including the modern subjects of Psychology 
and Physiology, and to some extent of Anthropology also, 
treated by the Stoics as a Kingdom governed by the Soul. 
According to Stoic principles these subjects cannot be separated 
one from the other, or from the other parts of philosophy ; and 
therefore in treating each one we shall, as before, assume a 
general knowledge of all the others. The Stoics laid great 
stress upon the study of Physics, as the only sound basis for 
a scientific rule of human conduct ; and some of them (beginning 
with Chrysippus), having especial regard to the elevated dignity 
of the study of Theology, were disposed to rank this branch of 
philosophy as the highest and last of its three principal divisions". 
We shall however, in accordance with a view more generally 
held, reserve the last place for Ethics^ 

^ Diog. L. vii 41. 2 Arnim ii 42 and 44. ^ Diog. L. vii 40. 



156 ROMAN STOICISM 

172. To the earlier Greek philosophers, as we have already 
Fundamental Seen, it appeared that a single bold intuition was 

onceptions. enough, or almost enough, to discover a sufficient 
foundation upon which to construct a reasoned account of all 
things. Thus the Ionic philosophers took up as such a founda- 
tion one or more of the elements of air, fire, and water. But 
as soon as these three, together with earth, were recognized as 
' elements ' existing side by side, it became necessary to dig 
deeper, so as to secure a foundation for these as well. Thus 
Democritus resolved all four into 'atoms' and 'void'; his theory 
was taken over by Epicurus, and remains to this day not only 
the most popular solution of the problem, but also that which 
(till quite recently) was tacitly assumed as the basis of all 
scientific investigation. Anaxagoras, working on different lines, 
began his account of the universe with ' mind ' on the one hand 
and a primal conglomerate ' matter ' on the other ; a doctrine 
evidently based upon the popular dualism of soul and body, 
and still the basis of all transcendental philosophy and established 
religious conceptions. This Aristotle varied by assuming rather 
an ' active ' and a ' passive ' principle, force which works and 
matter upon which it works. Resides these conceptions many 
others need to be considered, which if not absolutely funda- 
mental, are nevertheless matters of discussion in all philosophical 
schools, as those of motion, space, time, soul, body, God, the 
universe, cause, effect, will and necessity. In this way the 
original inquiry into the foundation of the universe developes 
into a general study of fundamental conceptions ; and it is at 
this stage that it is taken over and dealt with by Stoicism, 
which adds to the list certain conceptions on which it lays 
a special stress and to which it gives a characteristic colour ; 
such are those of ' body,' ' spirit,' and ' tone.' 

173. The fact that the Stoics use from time to time the 
The stoic language of other schools or of popular speculation 
monism. docs uot uecessarily imply that this language is 

an adequate statement of their doctrine ; and we frequently^ 
find that the discussion of particular problems seems to be 

* Perhaps necessarily: on the definition of monism, see above, § 35, note 22. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 1 57 

based on dualisms, though these are in the end subordinated 
to monistic statements. Thus in logic we have already noticed 
the sharp contrast between the perceiving mind and the external 
object of perception (alcrdijTov, vTrdp-)(^ov) ; nevertheless mind and 
object are ultimately declared to be akin^ So in particular the 
popular dualism of 'soul' and 'body' is often accepted by the 
Stoics, and yet as steadily superseded by the paradox that ' soul 
is body.' The reason given for this is that ' body is that which 
acts and is acted upon*^'; and this statement in the end over- 
rides the Aristotelian distinction of force and matter, active 
principle and passive principle. ' Body,' as conceived by the 
Stoics, is the one ultimate element, the foundation and beginning 
of the universe ; it contains within itself the capacity of action, 
and nothing but ' body ' has this capacity. Body, and nothing 
but body, exists in the true sense ; that certain other things have 
a quasi-existence (as we shall see later in this chapter) is an 
embarrassment which only brings into clearer relief this dis- 
tinctive feature of the system. The Stoic ' body,' though it 
is also called ' matter ' {v\r], materia), must not be confused 
with the ' matter ' of modern philosophy, which has derived 
from Aristotle the implication of passivity^ ; much more closely 
it corresponds with the 'stuff' by which modern monistic philo- 
sophers denote the substratum of mind and body alike. To call 
the Stoics ' materialists ' will generally prove misleading ; it is 
the Epicurean system, to which the Stoics were sharply opposed, 
which (as we have seen)^ corresponds to modern materialism. 

174. The conception of ' body ' therefore replaces in the 
The nature Stoic systcm the various elements which the Ionic 
of body.' philosophers assumed as the basis of the universe, 
and combines both parts of such dualistic elements as were 
assumed by Democritus, Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Since it 
is the foundation of all things it must be capable of taking very 
various shapes. In logic we have met with it under the name 

^ See above, §§ 149, 153. 

® ' [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea [natura], quae 
expers esset corporis... nee vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur, posse 
esse non corpus' Cic. Ac. i 11, 39; ' cui tanta vis est, ut inpellat et cogat et retineat 
et iubeat, corpus est ' Sen. Ep. 106, 9. 

^ See above, § 67. * § 43. 



158 ROMAN STOICISM 

of the ' substratum ' (to virapxov, id quod esty, but it none the 
less includes the 'subject' or feeling and reasoning mind. In 
the universe as a whole it is ' essence ' {ovaia, essentia) ; in its 
parts it is 'matter' {vXr}, silvay^; but it also appears, possessed 
of intelligence, as the deity", and again is identified with 'breath' 
or ' spirit^'V and through this with the human souP^ Even in 
ethics it has its place ; for all causes are bodily, and not least 
' the good ' and the respective virtues, all of which are bodies, 
for they act upon body^* ; similarly the emotions such as anger 
and melancholy, are of the nature of body^^ 

175. The Stoic 'body' in all its transformations is active 
,, ^. and alert. It contains in itself the principle or 

Motion, space r^ r 

and time. powcr of movement ; for though we observe that 

one body is set in motion by another, yet this could not be the 
case unless in the beginning there had been a body which had 
movement of itself ^*^. As to the nature of the primal movement, 
the Stoics agree with Anaximenes that it may be described as 
alternate rarefaction and condensation. Rarefaction is a wave 
or 'spirit' spreading from the centre to the extremities; con- 
densation is a contrary movement from the extremities to the 
centre". The extension of body is ' space,' which therefore does 

" See above, § 157, note 84. 

1" TCLVTbv au>fx.a Kal ovaiau bpi^ojjievoi Clem. Alex. Stro?n. ii p. 436 (Arnim ii 359) ; 
Si,86a(n de Kai trcD/xa avry [rrj vXy] Plot. Eftti. ii 4, i (Arnim ii 320). ovaia in this 
sense is also called -n-pihT-q vXtj, see § 182, note 52. 

11 rbp 6ebv...au)/J.a voepbv ...iroiovvres Plut. comm. not. 48, 2. 

1^ ' vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior 
est ' Sen. Ep. 50, 6. 

13 ' et hoc [animus] corpus est ' ib. 106, 4. 

^^ ol Srwl'/cot iravTa ra a'LTia ffUfiaTLKd' wvev/jiaTa yap Aet. plac. i 11, 5 ; 'placet 
nostris quod bonum est, corpus esse ' Sen. £p. 117, 2 ; ' quaeris, bonum an corpus sit. 
bonum facit, prodest enim. quod facit, corpus est ' id. 106, 4. 

1^ ' non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint, tanquam ira, amor, tristitia. 
si dubitas, vide an voltum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciem diffundant, 
an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem. quid ergo ? tarn manifestas notas corpori 
credis imprimi nisi a corpore?' id. 106, 5. 

1'' 'dicimus non posse quicquam ab alio moveri, nisi aliquid fuerit mobile ex semet' 
Sen. A'^. ^. ii 8 ; 'is ardor, qui est mundi, non agitatus ab alio, neque externo pulsu, 
sed per se ipse ac sua sponte [movetur]' Cic. JV. D. ii 11, 31. 

1^ 01 5^ 2iTwl'Kol...Klvr](Tiv T^v fxavuTiKrjv Kal wkv(>}ti,k7jv TLdevTai,Ti)v fiev (sc. irvKvia- 
TiKTjv) iiri TO. Iffw, T7]v be eirl ra ^fw Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 74 ; 'tenorem, qui rarescente 
materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur 
ad medium ' Censorinus de die nat. p. 75 (Zeller, p. 128). 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 1 59 

not exist of itself, but only as a function of body'^. Where there 
is no body (and body is limited), there is no space, but only the 
'boundless void' beyond the universe^''; of this we cannot say 
that it ' exists ' ; rather it ' not exists.' Time also does not exist 
of itself, but only in the movement of body-". Neither space 
nor time existed before the universe, but have been all along 
bound up with it^\ 

176. In almost every particular we find a sharp contrast 
between the Stoic conception of ' body ' and the 

Body com- 
prises life Epicurean ' atom.' The atom is extremely small 

and entirely unchangeable ; ' body ' is immensely 
large and in a high degree plastic. Atoms alternate with void ; 
but ' body ' spreads continuously throughout the entire universe ; 
it can never be torn apart or show a gap^l Atoms move down- 
wards in parallel straight lines; 'body' moves from the centre to 
the circumference, and thence returns to the centre. Two atoms 
can never occupy the same space ; but ' body ' everywhere moves 
through body, penetrating it and combining with it throughout 
its whole extent^^. The atom is a convenient hypothesis within 
the range of modern physical and chemical science ; the con- 
ception of ' body ' gains force as we enter the region of biology. 
For life also is a movement which proceeds from a warm centre 
(and warmth is body rarefied), and extends towards a circum- 



1^ rdirov 5' elvai 6 'Kptjcrnnros aire<paiveTO to Karexo/xecoc 5t' 6\ov vtro oVros Ar. Did. 
fr. 25 Diels (Arnim ii 503). 

^^ Kevbv nev elvai (pacn to olbv re virb ovtos KaTexf<Tf)aL, /j.t] KaTexofxevov 5e Sext. 
math. X. 3 (Arnim ii 505); t6 iilv ovv k^vov aTreipov elvai Xeyecrdai.' to yap e/cros toO 
Kdfffiov TOLOVT etvai, top Se tottov ireTrepacr/j.ei'oi' dio, to firidef crdfia aweipov ehat Ar. Did. 
(as note 18). 

^^ Xpvannros didaTrj/Ma [tov xp^vov elire] ttjs tou KocTfjLov Kivyjaecos Simpl. Ai'ist. cat. 
p. 88 1 (Arnim ii 510); 01 irXeiovs tCov HitwCkQv [xpbvov ovaLavl avTijv ty/v Kivrjcnv Aet. 
plac. i 22, 7. 

^^ Xpbvos yap ovk tjv irpb nda/xov dXX' rj avv aiiTW yiyovev ij fier' avT6v Philo de 
mundi op. § 26 (Arnim ii 511). 

^^ The question is thus stated by Seneca : ' [quaeramus] continua sit omnis et 
plena materia. ..an diducta, et solidis inane permixtum sit' Sen. Dial, viii 4, 2; 
and answered as follows 'nihil usquam inane est' N. Q. iii 16, 5. Cf. Arnim i 95 
and ii 425. 

^'^ aw/xara de irdvTa viveOevTo /cat crw/^a Sia (Tixi/j,aTOS xw/oe?^ Hipp. /%e7. 21 
(Arnim ii 469). 



l60 ROMAN STOICISM 

ference which is in comparison gross and cold-*. Going 
further, we find that ' body ' and its functions are so interpreted 
as to provide a key to the activities of the human reason 
and will. 

177. To the central conception of body are attached in the 
Tone or Stoic system various supplementary conceptions, 

tension. which serve to bring into clearer view its nature 

and powers. Of these the most characteristic is that of ' tone ' 
or ' strain ' (roi^o?, intentid). This term a^^pears originally to 
have expressed muscular activity^'', and was next used by the 
Cynics to denote that active condition of the soul which is the 
true end of life ; ' no labour,' said Diogenes, ' is noble, unless its 
end is tone of soul-®.' Although we cannot trace the term ' tone' 
directly to Zeno, we find that he explains sleep as a relaxation 
of the soul, substantially agreeing with later writers who call it 
a 'relaxation of the sensory tone around the souP''.' With 
Cleanthes the word becomes fairly common, first in the ethical 
application, in which ' tone ' is ' a shock of fire, which if it be 
strong enough to stir the soul to fulfil its duties is called strength 
and force^V a-nd then in physics to explain the unceasing activity 
of the universe^^, personified by Hercules in Stoic allegorical 
theology^". In later writers tone becomes constantly associated 
with the ' spirit ' or ' thrill ' which explains both the unity and the 
movement of all things^\ so that 'tone of spirit' or 'thrill-tone' 

^* ' animus ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio ' 
Cic. Tusc. disp. i i8, 42. The principle is however not carried out in the Stoic 
universe, in which the heat resides in the periphery, and the central earth is 
cold. 

^^ vki>iv Ti dpdv /jL€v evToviorepai x^pes Eur. fr. 291 quoted by Corn. 31 (Arnim i 514) ; 
Ofiolcos uffirep iax^^ tov <Tii)fji.aTos rovos icTTiv Inavos ev vevpols, ovtoj Kal 17 ttjs ^vxvs 
tVxi^r tSvos earl Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4. 

2® Epict. Fr. 57. 

'^^ See below, § 290. 

^'^ 6 8^ KXedvdrjs . . .ei-jTuiv on ir\7]yrj irvpos 6 t6vos ecrri, kSLv Uavos ev ry ^pvxv yivriTaL 
irpbs TO eTTtTeXeti' to. etri^dWoi'Ta icrxijs KaXeirai /cat Kparos Plut. Sio. rep. 7, 4. 

^^ KXedc^T/s 5e oiiro; ttuis <f)7}(XL...T0v iv rrj twp oKuv ovfflq. rbvov fiij waijea-dat 
Stob. i 17, 3. 

*" "HpaKXijs 5' €(ttIv 6 iv roh oXois rSvos, Kad' dv 7} <f>{i(n,% itxxvpa /cat Kparaid eari 
Cornutus 31. 

^^ 'quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam 
spiritus ? ' Sen. A''. Q. ii 8. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS l6l 

{irvevfjuariKo^ rovo'^, intentio spirittis) explains to us the operations 
of body and mind alike'l 

178. Body however is not only active but creative ; there is 
The seed inherent in it a power, which is that of the ' seed ' 

power. {airepfxa, semeji), and which is most conspicuously 

illustrated in the seed of animals and plants. It is the charac- 
teristic of seed that from a small beginning it developes a great 
plan, and that this plan never changes^l This plan or purpose 
is named by the Stoics its ' reason ' or ' word ' (X0709), and at 
this point Stoicism incorporates the doctrine of the ' Word ' 
or universal reason with which it became acquainted through 
Heraclitus. The 'Word' or 'seed-power' (X0709 airepixariKO';) 
of the universe is one ; it is the primal fire in its work of creation ; 
it is Zeus the Creator who moulds gross matter into the things 
that are to be^^; it is wisdom which plies matter as it will^^ But 
there are also in individual objects, animate and inanimate, in- 
destructible seed-powers, countless in number, displayed alike 
in growth, procreation, and purpose^® ; these seed-powers are, 
as it were, spirits or deities, spread throughout the universe, 
everywhere shaping, peopling, designing, multiplying ; they are 
activities of fiery spirit working through tension^'' in its highest 
development. But the seed-power of the universe comprehends 
in itself all the individual seed-powers ; they are begotten of it, 

?^ ' quid est illi [animo] motus nisi intentio ? ' ib. ii 6, 6 ; ' quid cursus et motus 
omnis, nonne intenti spiritus operae sunt ? hie facit vim nervis, velocitatem cur- 
rentibus' ib. ii 6, 4. 

^^ Kara^XTjdev rb cnr^pfxa avairXtjpo'l Tois oiKeiovs \6yovs Kal iTricTTrdTai ttjv wapaKei- 
fiivqv ii\-qv Kal dia/j,op(poi Simpl. Ar. cat. 7 ;3. 

^* o^TW Kal TovTov [jov Ata] airepiJ.aTi.Kov \6yov 6vTa tov K6(rfji,ov...evepybv avri^ 
iroiovvra Trjv vXijv 'wpbs rrjv tQiv e^Tjs yeveaiv Diog. L. vii 136; to 5e iroiovp tov ev 
aiiry Xoyov tov debv ib. 134. 

^^ 'ratio materiam format et quocunque vult versat ' Sen. Ep. 65, 2. Cf. Tert. 
Apol. 21. 

^^ d(pddpTovs [to^s (nrep/xaTLKOvs \6yovs] iiroiriaav, ihs ot dirb ttjs StoSs Proclus 
in Farm, iv 135. See further Stein, Psychologie der Stoa, i p. 49; Heinze, Lehre 
vom Logos, pp. 107-127. 

"*'' ' The original impulse of providence gave the origin and first momentum to 
the cosmic ordering of things, by selecting certain germs of future existences, and 
assigning to them productive capacities of realisation, change, and phenomenal 
succession.' M. Aurelius, To himself ix i. 

A. II 



l62 ROMAN STOICISM 

and shall in the end return to it. Thus in the whole work of 
creation and re-absorption^^ we see the work of one Zeus, one 
divine Word, one all-pervading spirit^l 

179. Closely akin to the theory of ' seed-powers ' and the 
Word is that of ' cause ' (alria, causa). Aristotle 

Cause. . . ' ^ . , 

had already explained this term in connexion with 
cosmogony, laying down that, in order that a universe may come 
into being, three 'causes' are required; matter, without which 
nothing can be made ; a workman, to make things ; and the form 
or shape, which is imposed on every work as on a statue. To 
these may be added a fourth cause, the purpose of the work. 
Thus to produce a statue we need the bronze, the artist, the 
design, and the fee. Grammatically these causes may be 
expressed by the help of prepositions, as the ex quo, a quo, 
in quo and propter quod'^^. To this theory of multiple causes 
the Stoics oppose the doctrine of a single ' first cause,' the maker 
of the universe. This first cause can be none other than the 
primal creative fire in a new aspect ; equally it is the creative 
Word. 

It seems well to translate here in full the argument of Seneca 
on this point, for it stands almost alone as an example of his 
powers in continuous exposition : 

The Stoic dogma is that there is one cause only, the maker. Aristotle 
holds that cause is threefold. ' The first cause,' he says, ' is the material 
itself, for without it nothing can be made. The second cause is the maker. 
The third is the design, which is impressed on every single work as on a 
statue ;' this Aristotle calls the etSos. I will now explain what he means. 

The bronze is the first cause of a statue ; for it could never have been 
made, had there not been stuff to be cast or wrought into shape. The 
second cause is the sculptor ; for the bronze could never have been brought 
into the shape of a statue without the artist's touch. The third cause is the 

^8 ' ad initia deinde rerum redit [sapientia] aeternamque rationem [sc. tov \br^ov\ 
toti inditam, et vim omnium seminum [sc. twv a-wepixaTiKQiv \67wi'] singula propria 
figurantem' Sen. Ep. 90, 29. See also the interpretation of the picture of Samos, 
§ 254, note 83. 

^^ 6 /xef Qeh% TTup rexviKOV 65(p jSddi^ov iirl yeviaeis koct/jlov eytiTreptetXrj^os airavras 
Tovs cnrepfiaTLKovs \6yovs, to 8^ TrpeO/j-a aiiTov St'qKeL di' S\ov tov Kda/xov Athen. 
Stipp. 6, 7 B (Pearson Z. 45). 

*" See above, § 67. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 163 

design ; for the statue would not be called the 'javelin-man' or the 'crowned 
king ' had not such a design been impressed upon it. 

There is besides a fourth cause, the purpose. What is purpose ? It is 
that which induced the sculptor to undertake the work, the aim that he had 
in view. It may have been money, if he intended to sell it ; or glory, if he 
wished to make himself a name ; or religious feeling, if he proposed to 
present it to a temple. That for the sake of which a thing is done is there- 
fore also a cause ; for you cannot think it right in making up a list of causes 
to omit something, apart from which the thing would never have been made. 

Thus Aristotle postulates a multiplicity of causes ; but we maintain that 
the list is either too long or too short. 

If we hold that everything, apart from which the thing would never have 
been made, is a cause of its making, then the list is too short. We ought to 
reckon time as a cause, for nothing can be made without time. We ought 
to reckon space as a cause ; for if there is no room for a thing to be made, 
it will certainly not be made. Movement too should be placed in the list ; 
for without movement nothing can be produced or destroyed ; without 
movement there can be neither art nor change. 

We Stoics look for a first and general cause. Such a cause must be 
single, for the stuff of the universe is single. We ask what that cause is, 
and reply that it is the creative reason, the deity. The various causes in 
the list that has been made are not a series of independent causes, but are 
all variations of a single cause, namely 'the maker *^.' 

180. Although the ' first cause ' and the ' Word ' are thus 
Causation and formally identified, their associations in connexion 
free-will. with cosmogouy are very different. For whereas 

the ' Word ' suggests reason and purpose, and leads up to the 
dogma that the universe is governed by divine providence, the 
term ' cause ' suggests the linking of cause and effect by an 
unending chain, the inevitable sequence of events which leaves 
no room for effort or hope. These terms therefore point to the 
supreme problems of Fate and divine Purpose, Determinism and 
Free-will, and as such will be discussed in a later chapter''^ 
Here it is sufficient to note that the Stoics not only accept, 
but insist upon the use of terms suggesting both points of view, 
and look therefore beyond their immediate opposition to an 
ultimate reconciliation ; and that the importance attached to 
the doctrine of a 'single and general cause' by no means 
excludes a multiplicity of individual causes depending upon 

^ Sen. jEp. 65, 4 to 6, 11 and 12. 
*- See below, ch. ix. 



l64 ROMAN STOICISM 

it, and capable of classification according to their relative im- 
portance ^^ 

181. Thus the conception of 'body,' so simple to the plain 
The cate- Hian, bccomcs to the philosopher manifold and 
gories. intricate. Its interpretation is to some extent 

brought into harmony with common speech through the doc- 
trine of the ' categories ' based upon Aristotle's teaching^*. But 
whereas Aristotle endeavoured in his categories to classify the 
various but independent classes of existences, the Stoics consi- 
dered the different aspects in which the one primary body might 
be studied. The first two categories, those of ' substance ' (vtto- 
Keijjbevov) and of ' quality ' {ttolov), agree with those of Aristotle^, 
and clearly correspond to the grammatical categories of noun 
and adjective. The third category is that of ' disposition ' (tto)? 
e'x,ov), as ' lying down ' or ' standing^®.' The fourth is that of 
' relative position ' {irpo^ ri 7rco<i e^ov), as ' right ' and ' left,' ' son' 
and ' father'*''.' Some of the categories are further subdivided*^; 
but enough is here stated to shew the object of the analysis, 
which in practice may have been useful in securing some 
completeness in the discussion of particular conceptions. Of 
' substances ' the Stoics, like others, say that they ' exist,' and 
are 'bodies'; of qualities they boldly say the same*^. But 
they do not consistently apply the same terms to disposition 
and relative position ; in this direction they are at last led, 
like other philosophers, to speak of things which ' do not exist.' 
They could not take the modern view that all such discussions 
are verbal entanglements, of which no solution is possible, be- 
cause they believed that there was a natural harmony between 
words and things. We on the other hand shall be little inclined 
to follow their analysis into its manifold details^". 

^^ ' causarum enim,' inquit [Chrysippus], ' aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae 
adiuvantes et proximae' Cic. de Fato i8, 41. 

** See above, § 66. 

45 ol Si ye ^TCocKol...TroiovvTai ttjv to/xtjv els recraapa' eh vwoKeifieva /cat Trota Kal 
TTCtis ^xoj'ra /cat Trpos tI ttuis ^x°^'''^ Simpl. Arist. cat. f 16 A (Arnim ii 369). 

4® Plotinus Ennead. vi i, 30 (Arnim ii 400). 

4^ Simpl. Arist. cat. f 42 E (Arnim ii 403). 

4^ For a fuller statement see Zeller, pp. 97-100. ■** See § 183. 

*" For the position of ' things not existent ' in the Stoic system see further below, 
§ 187- 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 165 

182. The analysis of the first two categories, those of 
Substance and Quality, leads us at once to the 
s ance. profoundest problems of Metaphysics ; and even 
if we allow that the difficulty is primarily grammatical, and 
resolves itself into a discussion of the functions of Substantive 
and Adjective, it is none the less inextricably interwoven with 
all our habits of thought. It would be unreasonable to expect 
from the Stoics perfectly clear and consistent language on this 
point; they absorb into their system much from popular philo- 
sophy, and much from the teaching of Aristotle in particular. 
The view which is distinctively Stoic is that Substance and 
Quality are both body", but in two different aspects. The 
terms ' body ' and ' substance ' refer to the same reality, but 
do not describe it with the same fulness. Yet because the 
very word ' substance ' {ova-la) suggests existence, the Stoics 
are drawn also to speak of ' substance without quality ' (d7roio<i 
ovaia), and seem to identify it with a dead ' matter ' (vXv), or 
' substratum ' (vTroKel/xevov), as though life must be introduced 
into it from without^l This is practically the view of Aristotle, 
embodied in the phrase ' matter without quality is potentially 
body'®^; but just so far as terms of this kind imply a dualistic 
explanation of the universe, they are not really reconcileable 
with the fundamental principles of Stoicism, and they must 
therefore be understood with reservations. It may often seem 
that the three terms ' body,' ' substance,' ' matter,' are practically 
interchangeable, but they are of different rank. For body exists 
eternally of itself; whereas substance and matter, except when 
loosely used as equivalents of body, do not exist of themselves, 
but substance always in association with quality^"*, and matter 
always in association with force. Further we may distinguish 
between 'substance' in general, or 'first matter,' which is a 

^1 aQfia di icm /car' ai;roi>s 17 ov(ria Diog. L. vii 150 ; ^(pT]<Te 5^ 6 HocreiSwvios rrjv 
tQv dXiiJv ovaiav Kai vXrjv diroiov koI dnop<pov elfai Stob. i 11, 5 c. 

^2 ovcriav de <pa(n tQv ovtcjv airdvTwv tijv TrpdiTTjv vXtjv uXtj 84 iariv ef ■^y OTidrjTroTOvv 
yiverai Diog. L. vii 150; vXtjp, ffu/ia aJs (pacni' ouaav Plot. Enti. ii p. 114 (Arnim 

" 375)- 

^^ T] diroios HXt], ^v dwd/xei aQ/ia ' ApuxroT^Xris (p-qal Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 23, 25 
(Arnim ii 374). 

^* See Plutarch, comm. not. 50, 6. 



l66 ROMAN STOICISM 

'substratum' {v-rroKeiixevov) to the universe, and the 'matter' of 
particular things^^ The former never grows greater or less, 
the latter may alter in either direction '^®. 

183. Quality (770^0x779, ro ttolov, qiialitas) constitutes the 
second category. It is defined by the Stoics as a 
ua 1 y. difference in a substance which cannot be detached 

from that substance, but makes it ' such and such/ as for instance 
'sweet,' 'round,' 'red,' 'hot^'.' Qualities, say the Stoics, are 
bodies^l This paradoxical statement may be understood in 
two ways ; first, in that qualities do not exist independently, 
but are aspects of 'body' which possesses quality; secondly, 
in that qualities are bodies in a secondary sense. We may 
consider it evidence of the second point of view that language 
describes the qualities by nouns, as ' sweetness,' ' rotundity,' 
' redness,' ' heat ' ; and indeed it is not so long since our own 
chemists described heat as a 'substance' under the name of 
' caloric' This point of view is carried to an extreme when 
the Stoics say ' qualities are substances,' thus throwing the 
first two categories into one^". Much stronger is the tendency 
towards Aristotle's views, so that as substance becomes iden- 
tified with dead matter, quality is explained as the movement, 
tension, or current which endows it with life. Hence the Stoics 
say 'the movement of rarefaction is the cause of quality^"'; 
'matter is a dull substratum, qualities are spirits and air-like 
tensions"^'; ' quality is a spirit in a certain disposition *''^' ; 'the 
air-current which keeps each thing together is the cause of its 

^^ (xttXcDs yU.ei' ■ydp VTroKelfievov iraaiv ij Trpihrr) iiXr], TLai Se VTroKelfievov yi,yvofiivois 67r' 
avTOv /cat KaTrjyopovfxevoii 6 xaX/cos /cat 6 T^UKpaTrjs Dexippus Ai'ist. cat. p. 23, 25 
(Arnira ii 374). 

^^ Diog. L. vii 150. 

^■^ Simplic. Arisi. cat. p. 57 E (Arnim ii 378). 

^8 6 7re/)t TtDj' -iroiOTTiTOov \6yos /cat tQv (rv/j.^£J37]K6Twv aTravrcov, a (pacnv etvai. 
Srwi/cwf TrarSes ffibfjiaTa Galen ^ua/. incorp. i xix, p. 463 K (Arnim ii 377). 

^^ ras 5e TroLorrjTas av iroKiv ovcrias /cat ffdfiara TrotoCcrt Plut. comin. not. 50, i. 

^^ 01 8e 2Twt/coi KLV7](nv [rrji' fiavwTLK-qv see above, note 17] rod iroiov elvai vo/j.i^ov<rw 
alriav Simpl. Arist. cat. p. 68 E (Arnim ii 452). 

^^ rrjv v\r]v apybv ef eavrrjs /cat aKiv7)Tov viroKeladaL rats 7roi6T7)tTLV d'7ro<palvovcn, ras 
5^ TTOLOTTjTas TTvev/jiaTa oiiffas koI rdvous depwdeis eldowoieXv e/cacrra Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 4. 

^^ dpaipoiTo a," to rriv woioTTiTa eTvai TTPeufid irws ^x°^ Alex. Aph. Arist. Top. iv 
p. 181 (Arnim ii 379). 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 167 

quality*^.' All these expressions must however be interpreted 
in the light of the Stoic theory as a whole. Finally we notice 
that, corresponding to the two kinds of substance, general and 
particular, there are two kinds of quality, as shewn in the 
'generically qualified' {kolvm<; iroiov) and the 'individually 
qualified ' {l^iay^ ttolov) ; for instance, heat in the universe and 
heat in particular objects''^ 

184. The third category is that of ' disposition ' (tto)? 
eT^oi'Ta, res qiiodaimnodo se habens). It differs 
from quality in its variableness ; for a brave man 
is always brave, and fire is always hot ; but a man is some- 
times standing, sometimes lying ; fire is sometimes lambent, 
sometimes still. Qualities therefore appear to correspond 
generally to the av^i^e^riKora {coniiinctd) of Epicurus, in that 
they can never be separated from a body^^ ; and dispositions 
rather with the avixTTroifjiaTa {eventd), which come and go*^". 
The third category appears to be used by the Stoics in a very 
wide sense, and to correspond to several of the categories of 
Aristotle®^. Disposition is attached to quality as quality is 
attached to substance^^; and though dispositions are not ex- 
pressly termed bodies, yet we must consider them to be, as 
the terms in the Greek and Latin sufficiently indicate, bodies 
in particular aspects. 

In the further applications of Stoic theory disposition as 
defined above appears to be replaced in Greek by the term 
6^t9. But this term is used in two different senses. In the 
first place it is the movement of rarefaction and condensation, 
by which a spirit or thrill passes from the centre of an object 
to the extremities, and returns from the extremities to the 

63 ToO TTOLOV eKaffTov etvai aiVtos 6 crvvex'^v ar)p eari Plut. Sio. rep. 43, 2. 

^^ Zeller, pp. 103-107. 

"^ ' pondus uti saxi, calor ignis, liquor aquai, | tactus corporibus cunctis' Lucr. 
R. N. i 454, 455- 

'"' ' servitium contra, paiipertas, divitiaeque, | ...cetera quorum | adventu manet 
incolumis natura abituque, | haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare' ib. 456-9. 

^^ et 5e Tts eis to :rcbs 'iyov (rvvTarroi ras TrXeLaras KaTTjyopias, (bairep ol ^tu'lkoL 
Dexipp. Arist. cat. p. 34, 19 (Arnim ii 399). 

^ ra i-i-ev woia irepl ttjv v\r]v ttojs 'ixovra, to. Idlcos de Trcbs &x°^'^'^ irepl to. ttolo, Plot. 
Enn. vi i, 30 (Arnim ii 400). 



l68 ROMAN STOICISM 

centre"" ; in this sense it is translated in Latin by unitas, 
and takes bodily form as an air-current^". This force, when 
it requires a further motive power in the direction of deve- 
lopment, becomes the principle of growth ((f)vcri<;, natiird), 
and is displayed not only in the vegetable world, but also in 
animals, as in particular in the hair and nails''^ Growth when 
it takes to itself the further powers of sensation and impulse 
becomes soul (-^vxv, aniina), and is the distinctive mark of 
the animal world'l 

In a rather different sense e^t? or temporary condition is 
contrasted with Sidd€<Ti<; or ' permanent disposition.' In this 
sense the virtues are permanent dispositions of the soul, because 
virtue is unchanging ; the arts are temporary conditions. The 
virtues belong to the wise man only, the arts to the ordinary 
man. This distinction however does not hold its ground in 
the Roman period, the word habitus (representing e^t?), our 
'habit,' being used in both senses ''I The virtues are bodies, 
being dispositions of the soul which is bodily''^ 

185. The fourth category, that of ' relative position ' (7rpo9 
Relative posi- '^'^ '"'^'^ ^'x^t'), appears to be of less importance 
tion- than the others''^ Its characteristic is that it 

may disappear without altering that to which it belongs. Thus 
that which is on the right hand may cease to be so by the dis- 
appearance of that which was on its left ; a father may cease to 
be such on the death of his son''*'. It seems difficult to describe 

^^ 7] 5k [^f'5] ^(^tI TTi/evfj-a dvacrrpecpov i(p' iavrd Philo quod deiis, § 35 (Arnim ii 458). 

^^ ov5ev dWo Tots e^eis TrXrjv depas elvai [Xpi/ctTTTros] <pr)<nv ' vtto roijrcoy yap ffwix^'^o-'- 
TOL crto/xara Plut. Sto. rep. 43, 2 ; ' esse autem unitatem in aere vel ex hoc intellegi 
potest, quod corpora nostra inter se cohaerent. quid est enim aliud quod teneret 
ilia, quam spiritus?' Sen. N. Q. ii 6, 6. 

^^ 7} bk (pijcns StaretVet Kal iirl to, (pvrd. Kal ev ijfjuv 54 icrriv ioiKora (pvTots, ovvx^S 
re Kal rpixes ' iffri 5k jj (pijais ?|is rfdrj Kiuovfj-ivrj Philo Leg: Alleg. ii § 11 (Arnim ii 458). 

^2 ^j/vx'ri 5€ icxTi cpiaii irpocreLXricpvia (pavracrlav Kal dpfj-rjv. avrr} Koivrj Kal tQv 
aXdyuy ecrrlv ib. 

''* ' voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit ; habitus porro animi 
non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit ' Sen. Ep. 95, 57. 

''* 'virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens' ib. 113, 1. 

''' ' Relative position ' must be distinguished from 'correlation' {irpbs rt). Such 
terms as 'sweet' and 'bitter,' 'living' and 'dead' are said to be correlated. Simpl. 
Arist. cat. p. 42 e (Arnim ii 403). 

^® Simpl. as in last note. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 1 69 

the fourth category as one consisting of ' body,' but at least it is 
a function of body. Also it does not appear that ' relative posi- 
tion' can be predicated of the universe as a whole; it is peculiar 
to individual objects, but works towards their combination in a 
larger whole. The fourth category has an important application 
in practical ethics in the doctrine of daily duties, for these are 
largely determined by the relative positions (crn^eo-6t9) of the 
parties concerned : such are the duties of a king to his people, 
a father to his son, a slave to his master". 

186. Having fully considered bodies and their relationships, 
we proceed to consider their combination. In 

Combination. ,. . • 1 1 i • 1 r 

ordmary experience we meet with three kinds 01 
combination ; juxtaposition {irapdOeai^i), as in a mixture of 
various kinds of grain ; mixture (/^t^t?), when solid bodies are 
interfused, as fire and heat, or fusion (/cpacrt?), when fluids are 
interfused, as wine poured into the sea; chemical mixture 
(avy')^vai<i), when each of the two bodies fused disappears''^ Of 
these the second in its most completed form {KpaaL<i hi oXcov, 
universa fusio) is of high importance. For in this way we find 
that soul is fused with body''", quality with substance®", light with 
air*\ God with the universe^l Aristotle admits that there is this 
mixture between substance and qualities ; but as both of these 
are to the Stoics bodies, and so too are the members of the other 
pairs quoted, the Stoic doctrine must be summed up in the 
paradox ' body moves through body®^.' This also follows from 
the Stoic doctrine that there is no void in the universe. Corre- 
spondingly the sum total of body in its various aspects and 

'''' See below, § 337. 

''^ So Ar. Did. fr. 28, and, more exactly, Alex. Aph. de ?nixt. p. 216, 14 Br. 
(Arnim ii 473). Another division is as follows: 'quaedam continua esse corpora, 
ut hominem ; quaedam esse composita, ut navem ; quaedam ex distantibus, tanquam 
exercitus, populus, senatus ' Sen. Ep. 102, 6. 

'''* ol 8i awb TTJs 2Toas...5ta Travros opQvres rod cw/xaros Kal ttjv ^vXV" X'^P^^'^'^^ 
KOLi ras TTOiOTiyras, ev rais Kpacreci (TVvex<Jipow ffCifia 5id ad/xaros x'^P^^" Simpl. Arist. 
phys. p. 530, 9 (Arnim ii 467). 

^^ Arnim ii 411 and 467. 

^^ rh ^ws 5e tQ d^pi 6 'Kpiai.inros Kipvacrdai X^yei Alex. Aph. de mixt. p. 216, 14 
(Arnim ii 473). 

^^ 'Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per 
favos ' Tertull. adv. Her?nog. 44 ; and see below, § 207. 

^^ Note 2 above. 



I/O ROMAN STOICISM 

mixtures completes the whole (oXov), which is identical with 
the 'world-order' or 'universe' (Koafio^Y'^. It seems likely that 
this important conception had been reached in very early times 
by the Chaldaean astronomers; it was definitely propounded 
by Pythagoras*^, had been taken up by Socrates*'' and the 
Sophists^'', and was in Stoic times generally accepted both in 
popular philosophy and in scientific investigation. 

187. Up to this point the Stoic system has been guided 
by a determined monism. Body is; that which is 

Quiddities. 11- -it-.i i,r-../-» 

not body is not. Yet m the end the Stoics feel 
compelled to speak of certain things which are not body 
{aaoifjbara, incorporalia). In the first instance there is the void 
beyond the universe**. It is possible to dispute as to whether 
void may more correctly be said to exist or not to exist ; but 
at least it is a part of nature*®, and we need some term like 
' the all ' {to irav) to include both the universe and the void 
beyond °°. Next we have to deal with statements (Xe/cra), and 
mental conceptions of every kind, which stand as a class in 
contrast with the real objects to which they may or may not 
respectively correspond ®\ Lastly, the Stoics included space 
and time, which they had previously explained as functions of 
body, in the list of things not bodily''^. Having thus reached 
the two main classes of 'bodies,' and 'things not bodily,' the 
monistic principle can only be saved by creating a supreme 
class to include both. Let this then be called the existent 
{to 6v, quod estY', or, if it be objected that things incorporeal 

** oXov fxev yap Xeyouai tov Koa/xov Achill. Is. 5, p. 129 (Arnim ii 523). 

*^ See Rendall, M. Aurelitts Introd. p. xxix. 

^^ 6 TOV oKov Kbff^ov (TvvTaTT(i}v T€ Kol avvexwv Xen. Mem. iv 3, 13. 

*'' ib. i I, II. ** See below, § 193. 

*^ 'in rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt; et haec autem, 
quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur ' Sen. Ep. 58, 15. 

^^ oKov }iAv yap Xeyovcri tov KSa/xoV irdv 8e /xera tov Kevov Achill. Isag. 5, p. 129 
(Arnim ii 523). 

^^ Sen. as above. 

^^ tQ)v 8e dcrufiCLTCOv Tecrcxapa e'idri KaTapid/xovvTaL, ws Xe/CToj' Kal Kevbv /cat tSttov Kai 
Xpbvov Sext. math, x 218 (Arnim ii 331). 

^^ ' etiam nunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. dicimus enim quaedam 
corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia. quid ergo erit ex quo haec deducantur? 
illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium imposuimus, "quod est'" Sen. Ep. 58, 11. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS I/I 

do not exist®^ we may use the name 'quiddities' {tlvo,, quidy^. 
In this way the monistic theory, though a Httle damaged in 
vitahty, is again set on its feet so far as the ingenious use 
of words can help. 

188. The language of the Stoics with regard to the pheno- 
mena of speech and thought is not always easy to 

Statements. r n 11 11 • i--\ 

follow, and perhaps not altogether consistent. (Jn 
the one hand, attaching high importance to the reasoning power, 
they desire to include its operations in that which is real and 
bodily. Thus the 'mind-pictures' and indeed all mental con- 
ceptions are bodily and even 'animal,' in the sense that they are 
operations of body ^''; and truthfulness, ignorance, science and art 
are all bodies in the sense that they are dispositions of the soul, 
which is bodily^^ But ' phrases ' {Xeicrci) are definitely incor- 
poreal, and with them appear to be ranked all mental conceptions 
and general ideas; about these there is a question, not merely 
whether they exist or not, but whether they may even be classed 
in the most general class of all as ' quiddities-'l' Nor can we call 
general conceptions true or false^^ ; though of some of them, as 
of Centaurs, giants, and the like, we may say that they are formed 
by false mental processes^"''. Finally statements are either true 
or false, but are not to be called existent. The whole discussion 

^^ ol Srwl'/cot, (is ol wepl tov HacnXeidrjv, ols edo^e fx-qSev eluai dadj/xcLTOv Sext. math. 
viii 258. 

^^ ^Kclvoi [oi Srwt/cot] vo/jLodeTrjaai/Tes avroTs to of Kara, crw/xdrwf ij.6v(i)v X^yeffdai... 
TO tI yevLKdiTepov aiiTov (paaiv elvai, KaTriyopovfievov oi KaTo, crw/jidToiv fxovov, aXKd, koL 
/cara dcrwfiaTup Alex. Aphr. Arist. Top. iv p. 155 (Arnim ii 329) ; ' primum genus 
Stoicis quibusdam videtur "quid " ' Sen. Ep. 58, 15. 

"^ ' animalia sunt omnia, quae cogitamus quaeque mente complectimur ; sequitur 
ut multa milia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli niulta simus 
animalia. non sunt, inquit, multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra 
sunt ' Sen. Ep. 113,3 ^'^'i 9 (Seneca himself does not agree with this way of speaking). 

"^ 7) de dXrjdeLa (rS>/j,d iaTiv vap Saov eirL<XTr}iJ.7) irdvTOiv dXrjdujv dwocpavTiKij SoKei 
Tvyxdveiv ' Tracra Se €in<TTrifxr} irios ^x"" eaTiv r)yefiovLK6v...Tb Se rjye/j.ovLKbv crCofxa KaTO. 
ToiTovs virijpxe Sext. math, vii 38 (Zeller, p. 129). 

^^ rd ivforifj.aTd ^aai tx7]Te TLvd elvac ^rjTe iroid, ihaavel de tlvo. Kal diffapel iroid 
(pavTd(T/j.aTa \J/vxv^ Ar. Did. fr. 40 (Diels). 

^^ oifre dXrideis oCre i/'eu5ets elcriv at yevLKal [(pavTaa-iai] Sext. math, vii 246. 

i*"* 'haec.quae animo succurrunt, tanquam Centauri, gigantes, et quicquid aliud 
falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat 
substantiam' Sen. Ep. 58, 15. 



1/2 ROMAN STOICISM 

therefore ends with the broad distinction between the object, 
which may be real or ' existent,' and the predication which may 
be ' true ' ; and the attempt to unite these two conceptions is not 
persisted in^"\ 

189. Although the Stoics aim consistently at the monistic 
Force and Standard, they make frequent use of dualistic state- 
matter, ments, some of which we have already noticed. 
The Latin writers often contrast soul and body from the stand- 
point of ethics ^"2; and we meet in all the Stoic writers, and often 
in unguarded language, the favourite Aristotelian dualism of force 
and matter, or (what comes to the same thing) the active and 
passive principles. ' Zeno ' (we are told) ' laid down that there 
are two principles in the universe, the active and the passive. 
The passive is matter, or essence without quality; the active is 
the Logos or deity within it^^l' So also Cleanthes and Chrysippus 
taught ^"^; and in the Roman period Seneca regarded this as a 
well-understood dogma of the whole school "^ But even if direct 
evidence were lacking, the whole bearing of the philosophy would 
shew that this dualism is also surmounted by an ultimate monism. 
God and matter are alike body; they cannot exist the one apart 
from the other^*"*. Of this Cicero, speaking for the Stoics, gives 
a proof; matter could never have held together, without some 



i**i ovdev oiV ^Ti Set \eyeLV tov xpovov, to KaT'qyopyj/.i.a, to d^iwfia, to avvqjj.ixevov, to 
<Tvfj,ireir\eyiJ,evov ' oh xpw^rat /xev /idXtcrra tQi' (pL\oa6(po}v, ovtu 8^ ov Xiyovatv elvai 
Plut. comm. not. 30, 12. 

102 See below, § 287. 

^"^ 5o/cet 5e aurois a,pyb,% elvai tCov 6\wv bio, to ttolovv koX to wdcrxov, k.t.\. Diog. 
L. vii 134. 

^"^ lb.; 01 ttTTO TTjs SroSs hvo XeyovTes dpxds, Oebv koL dTroioy vXtiv Sext. mat/i. ix 11 
(Arnim ii 301). 

105 ' dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, 
causam et materiam. materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo 
moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat' 
Sen. £p. 65, 2 ; ' universa ex materia et ex deo constant, deus ista temperat, 
quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur. potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, 
quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei' id. 23. 

^'"' &\\<>}v de Kal TTOirjTiKTjv fiev airiav diroXeLirbvTdiv , dxij^pi-OTOv 8e Ta^Tyjv ttjs vKrqs, 
KaOdwep ol HiTuI'koL Syrianus Arist. met. (Arnim ii 308). ' Stoici naturam in duas 
partes dividunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae se ad faciendum tractabilem 
praebeat. in ilia prima esse vim sentiendi, in hac materiam ; nee alterum sine altero 
[esse] posse ' Lact. Div. inst. vii 3. 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS 1/3 

force to bind it ; nor force without matter"^ We must not 
therefore be led by the term ' principles ' {dp'^ai, principia) to 
think of force and matter in any other way than as two aspects 
of primary body, separable as mental conceptions, inseparable 
as physical realities. The interpretation is essentially the same, 
whether the Stoics speak of God and the universe, matter and 
cause, body and tension, or substance and quality, and has 
been already discussed with some fulness under these separate 
headings. 

190. The position of the four ' elements ' {uToi^Gla, elementd) 

is similar ; these are in the Stoic philosophy sub- 

The dciTiditiSt 

divisions of the two principles just discussed. For 
fire and air are of the nature of cause and movement; water and 
earth of receptivity and passivity"**. Body is therefore made up 
of the four elements mixed"", or perhaps rather of the elementary 
qualities of heat and cold, dry and wet, which they represent"". 
The doctrine of primary or elemental qualities had been taught 
before, first by Anaximenes, then by Hippocrates the physician, 
and by Aristotle"^ ; the list of the four elements is traced back 
to Empedocles. For Aristotle's ' fifth element ' Zeno found no 
use "I 

191. Such are the fundamental conceptions or postulates 

with which the Stoics approach the problems of 

Conclusion. , . ,. . - 

physics. It IS not necessary tor our purpose to 
compare their merit with those of Aristotle, or to set a value 
on the debt that Zeno and his successors owed to the founder 
of the Peripatetic school. Still less do we suggest that the 

^^"^ ' neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur, neque 
vim sine ulla materia' Cic. Ac. i 6, 24. 

108 Arnim ii 418; 'e quibus [elementis] aer et ignis movendi vim habent et 
efficiendi ; reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram * 
Cic. Ac. i 7, 26. 

^'^'^ Kara toi)s Iitwiko'lis, e/c ttjs tQv reaadpcov (XTOLxeiuv Kpdaeujs yivofx^vov toO 
ffufjiaros Justin de res. 6 (Arnim ii 414). 

^^^ oaa Toivvv crd)fj.aTa irpwrov rds roLavras ^xet woLdrriTas, eKeiva orotxeta tQv 
aWcov aTrdvTwv ecrrl /cat t-^s aapKds ' icrri 51 ravra yfj /cat vdup /cat di]p /cat irvp Galen 
const, art. vied, i p. 251 K (Arnim ii 405). 

^'•^ Galen meth. med. i 2, X p. 15 K (Arnim ii 411). 

^^^ See below, § 196. 



174 ROMAN STOICISM 

Stoics have perfectly analyzed the contents of the universe, or 
have even produced an orderly and rounded scheme. But at 
least it seems clear that their work shews intellectual power, 
and that speculation is not necessarily less profound because 
it is pursued with a practical aim"^ The founders of, the 
Stoic philosophy had a wide reach ; they took all knowledge 
to be their province ; and they worked persistently towards 
the harmonization of all its parts. 

^^^ Cf. Mahaffy's Greek Life and Thought; 'it is quite wrong to suppose that 
these thinkers [Zeno and Epicurus], busy as they were with practical Kfe, despised 
or avoided speculation. Their philosophical theories demand hard reading and hard 
thinking' p. 137. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE UNIVERSE. 

192. In including in their system the study of the physical 
Study of the uuivcrse the Stoics broke daringly with Socrates 
heavens. ^,^(5 j^jg faithful followers the Cynics. These had 

joined with the ignorant and the prejudiced* in ridiculing those 
whose eyes were always turned up towards the sky, whilst they 
saw nothing of things that were nearer at hand and concerned 
them more closely. But it was not for nothing that the most 
highly civilised nations of antiquity, Egyptians, Chaldaeans, and 
Babylonians, had studied the starry heavens, mapped out the 
constellations, measured the paths of the wandering stars, pre- 
dicted eclipses, reckoned with the tides, the seasons, and the 
winds ; with the result that their successors defied the common 
opinion by declaring the earth to be a sphere, and to hold 
inhabitants whom they called Antipodes, because they walk 
with their feet turned up towards ours-. All this body of 
knowledge, called generically the knowledge of the sky (though 
it included the whole physical geography of the earth), had 
impressed and fascinated the Eastern world. It seemed that 
as the eyes were raised to the sky, so the mind of man was 
elevated and made ampler and nobler^, leaving behind it the 
petty contentions and rivalries of common life ; and further 
that true knowledge had surely been reached, when the posi- 
tions of the heavenly bodies and the eclipses of sun and moon 

^ As, for instance, Aristophanes in the Clottds. 

^ ' vos etiam dicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis 
vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos Antipodas vocatis' Cic. Ac. ii 39, 123. 

^ ' cum tu, inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri, | nil parvum sapias et adhuc 
sublimia cures ; | quae mare compescant causae ; quid temperet annum ; | stellae 
sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent ' Hor. Ep. i 12, 14 — 17. 



1/6 ROMAN STOICISM 

could be predicted so long before with unfailing accuracy. 
These feelings are now commonplaces of literature, and were 
fully shared by the Stoics. ' Is not the sun,' says Seneca, 
' worthy of our gaze, the moon of our regard ? When the sky 
displays its fires at night, and countless stars flash forth, who 
is- not absorbed in contemplation of them .-' They glide past 
in their company, concealing swift motion under the outward 
appearance of immobility. We comprehend the movements of 
a few of them, but the greater number are beyond our ken. 
Their dignity fills all our thoughts'*.' In the golden age which 
preceded our iron civilisation ' men lay at nights in the open 
fields, and watched the glorious spectacle of the heavens. It 
was their delight to note the stars that sank in one quarter 
and rose in another. The universe swept round them, per- 
forming its magnificent task in silenced' 'Their order never 
changes, spring and autumn, winter and summer succeed 
according to fixed laws^.' And in the same tone writes the 
Stoic poet : ' unshaken the lights of heaven ever move onwards 
in their proper orbif.' The emotion roused in the Stoic by 
the contemplation of the sky was thus identical with that 
expressed in Judaic poetry by the ' Song of the Three Holy 
Children*, and in more modern times by Addison's famous 
hymn^ 

193. The phenomena of earth and heaven combined, in 

The world- ^^^ general opinion of intelligent men, to show 

order. -^he existcncc of a ' world-order ' or ' universe^".' 

The Stoics accepted this conception in their physics from 

* Sen. Ben. iv 23, i to 4. 

* ' in aperto iacentes sidera superlabebantur et insigne spectaculum noctium. 
mundus in praeceps agebatur silentio tantum opus ducens...libebat intueri signa 
ex media caeli parte vergentia, rursus ex occulto alia surgentia ' Ep. 90, 42. 

^ ' [vides] oidinem rerum et naturam per constituta procedere. hiems nunquam 
aberravit. aestas suo tempore incaluit. autumni verisque, ut solet, facta mutatio est. 
tam solstitium quam aequinoctium suos dies rettulit ' N. Q. iii 16, 3. 

'' ' caelestia semper | inconcussa suo volvuntur sidera lapsu ' Lucan Phars. ii 267, 8. 

8 ' O all ye Works of the Loi'd, bless ye the Lord ; praise and exalt him above all 
for ever' Daniel iii 57 to 82. 

^ ' The spacious firmament on high, | with all the blue ethereal sky, | and spangled 
heavens, a shining frame, | their great Original proclaim,' etc. J. Addison (1728). 

10 See above, § 186. 



THE UNIVERSE I// 

Heraclitus, who had declared that ' neither god nor man created 
this world-order,' as in their ethics from Diogenes, the ' citizen 
of the universe".' They therefore needed only to adjust an 
established notion to their own physical postulates. We observe 
at once that the very conception of an ordered whole differen- 
tiates that whole from the absolute totality of all things. The 
universe is indeed on the one hand identified with the substance 
of all things (ovala tmv oXrnv), but only as a thing made indivi- 
dual by the possession of quality (tStw? iroiovy^, and necessarily 
one^l It is self-created ; and it may therefore be identified with 
its creator, the deity ^■*; it also includes all that is bodily^®; but 
outside there remains the boundless void^^. It is therefore 
defined by Chrysippus as ' the combination of heaven and 
earth and all natures that are in them,' or alternatively as ' the 
combination of gods and men and all that is created for their 
sakei^.' 

194. The Stoic conception of the universe is therefore that 
of a continuous body, having a definite outline, and 

Its position. . i • , i n . i t-i i 

stationed m the boundless void. Ihat the universe 
has shape the Stoics deduce from its having ' nature ' {(f)ucri<;), 
that is, the principle of growth, displayed in the symmetry of its 
parts^^; and its shape is the perfect shape of a sphere^". Within 
this sphere all things tend towards the middle^"; and we use the 
terms ' down ' meaning ' towards the middle,' and ' up ' meaning 

^^ See below, § 303. 

^^ Kal ^crri Kdfffios 6 t'St'ws ttoios rrji tuv SXuu ovarlas Diog. L. vii 138. 

^^ OTL 6' eh ecTTiv [6 /c6(T/xos] Ti-qvojv t4 (p7)aiv iv ry irepl rod 3Xov Kal ^p6ennros 
id. 143. 

•'^ \eyeTat de ir^pus Kocr/ioi 6 deSs Stob. i 21, 5. 

^^ oi dwo r?js SroSs eva Kdcfiov a.we(pr)vavTO, Sv drj rh irav ^(paaav eXvat Kal to 
ffu/MariKov Aet. p/ac. 15, i. 

1® See § 187, note 90; Seneca however thinks there may be more outside the 
universe than void ; ' iUud scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda 
vastiias sit an et hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur; qualis sit habitus exclusis' DiaL 
viii 5, 6. 

1'' Ar. Did. fr. 31. is Arnim ii 534, 

^^ Arnim ii 547. 

^^ fi^py; 54 earw avrov 7^, i/5wp, drjp, irvp, a wdvTa veun iirl ro fieffov Achilles /sa^. 9 
(Arnim ii 554). But according to another view only earth and water, being naturally 
heavy, tend towards the middle ; whereas air and fire, being naturally light, tend from 
it; id. 4 (Arnim ii 555). See § 196. 

A. T2 



178 ROMAN STOICISM 

thereby from the middle^^ The Peripatetics are therefore need- 
lessly alarmed, when they tell us that our universe will fall down, 
if it stands in the void ; for, first, there is no ' up' or ' down' out- 
side the universe ; and, secondly, the universe possesses ' unity' 
(e^t?)'-'^ which keeps it together^l And here we see the folly of 
Epicurus, who says that the atoms move downwards from 
eternity in the boundless void ; for there is no such thing as 
'downwards' in that which is unlimited 2"^. Further, the universe, 
is divided into two parts, the earth (with the water and the air 
surrounding- it) which is stable in the middle, and the sky or 
aether which revolves around it"l 

195. Thus early in their theory the Stoics were led to 
The heiiocen- make two assertions on questions of scientific fact, 
trie theory. j^ which they opposed the best scientific opinion 
of their own time. For many authorities held that the earth 
revolved on its axis, and that the revolution of the sky was 
only apparent. Such were HiCETAS of Syracuse-", a Pytha- 
gorean philosopher, whose views were quoted with approval by 
Theophrastus, and later ECPHANTUS the Pythagorean, and 
HeraclideS of Pontus^^. From the point of view of astrono- 
mical science this view seemed well worthy of consideration, as 
Seneca in particular emphasizes'^^ Other astronomers had gone 

2^ Arnim ii 557. ■•^- See above, § 184. 

^^ Arnim ii 540. The universe, being 'body,' possesses 'up' and 'down,' 'front' 
and 'back,' and all the other relations, according to the fourth category. 

2" Plut. Sto. rep. 44, I. 

^® Ar. Did. fr. 31, quoting from Chrysippus. So Cornutus i ; 6 ovpo.vo'i irepL^x^'- 
kvkXixI ttjj' yrjv. 

'^^ ' Hicetas Syracosius caelum solem lunam Stellas supera denique omnia stare 
censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum circum axem se 
summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae si stante terra 
caelum moveretur' Cic. Ac. ii 39, 123, on which see Prof. Reid's note. 

^^ Plut. p/ac. phil. iii 13, 3. The question of priority in the statement of this 
theory has been much discussed in recent years; and it is contended that Hicetas and 
Ecphantus never existed except as characters in dialogues composed by Heraclides of 
Pontus, the true discoverer. See H. Steigmliller, Archiv der Geschichte der Pkilo- 
sophte,'Bex\\n 1892; OXX.oNo%%, de Heraclidis Pontici vita et scriptis, Rostock, 1896; 
Tannery, Pseudonymes antiques (Revue des etudes grecques, 1897). 

•28 I pertinebit hoc excussisse, ut sciamus utrum mundus terra stante circumeat an 
mundo stante terra vertatur. fuerunt enim qui dicerent nos esse, quos rerum natura 
nescientes ferat ' Sen. N. Q. vii 2, 3. Seneca however appears for himself to reject 
the doctrine : ' scimus praeter terram nihil stare, cetera continua velocitate decurrere ' 
£p. 93, 9. 



THE UNIVERSE ' I79 

further, declaring that the sun lay in the centre, and that the 
earth and other planets revolved round it. Theophrastus stated 
that Plato himself in his old age had felt regret that he had 
wrongly placed the earth in the centre of the universe ; and the 
heliocentric view was put forward tentatively by Aristarchus 
of Samos, and positively by the astronomer Seleucus, in 
connexion with the theory of the earth's rotation -I For this 
Cleanthes had said that the Greeks should have put Aristarchus 
on trial for impiety, as one who proposed to disturb ' the hearth 
of the universe^".' This outburst of persecuting zeal, anticipating 
so remarkably the persecution of Galileo, was effective in pre- 
venting the spread of the novel doctrine. Posidonius was a great 
astronomer, and recognised the heliocentric doctrine as theoreti- 
cally possible^^ ; indeed, as one who had himself constructed an 
orrery, shewing the motion of all the planets^^, he must have 
been aware of its superior simplicity. Nevertheless he opposed 
it vigorously on theological grounds, and perhaps more than any 
other man was responsible for its being pushed aside for some 
1500 years^'l The precise ground of the objection is not made 
very clear to us, and probably it was instinctive rather than 
reasoned. It could hardly be deemed impious to place the sun, 
whom the Stoics acknowledged as a deity, in the centre of the 
universe ; but that the earth should be reckoned merely as one 
of his attendant planets was humiliating to human self-esteem, 
and jeopardised the doctrine of Providence, in accordance with 
which the universe was created for the happiness of gods and 
men only, 

196. Having determined that the earth is the centre of the 

^j^g universe, and the sun above it, the way is clear to 

elements. incorporate in the system the doctrine of the four 

elements (a-roi^eia, naturaey^^^ which probably had its origin in 

^^ Plut. qu. Plat, viii i, 2 and 3 ; K&t. plac. ii 24, 8 and iii 17, 9. 

^'^ Plut. /ffc. hin. 6, 3. ^^ Simplic. Arist. phys. p. 64. 

■^^ ' si in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc, quam nuper 
familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole 
et in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et 
noctibus' Cic. N. D. ii 34, 88. 

^^ Schmekel, p. 465. 

^ 'in rerum natura elementa sunt quattuor' Sen. iV. Q. iii 12, 3. 

12 — 2 



l8o ROMAN STOICISM 

a cruder form of physical speculation than the doctrine of the 
heavenly bodies. As we have seen above^^, the elements are 
not first principles of the Stoic physics, but hold an intermediate 
position between the two principles of the active and the passive 
on the one hand, and the organic and inorganic world on the 
other. Earth is the lowest of the elements, and also the 
grossest ; above it is placed water, then air, then fire ; and 
these are in constant interchange, earth turning to water, this 
into air, and this into aether, and so again in return. By this 
interchange the unity of the universe is maintained^*'. The 
transition from one element to the next is not abrupt, but 
gradual ; the lowest part of the aether is akin to air^'' ; it is 
therefore of no great importance whether we speak with Hera- 
clitus of three elements, or with Empedocles of four. The two 
grosser elements, earth and water, tend by nature downwards 
and are passive ; air and fire tend upwards and are active^**. 
Zeno did not think it necessary to postulate a fifth element as 
the substance of soul, for he held that fire was its substance^^ 

197. Fire, heat, and motion are ultimately identical, and are 

Fire and ^^^ sourcc of all life^°. Thus the elemental and 

breath. primary fire stands in contrast with the fire of 

domestic use ; the one creates and nourishes, the other destroys^\ 

^^ See above, § 190. 

^® * ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether ; deinde retrorsum vicissim ex 
aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia 
constant, sursum deorsum ultro citro commeantibus, mundi partium coniunctio 
continetur ' Cic. N. D. ii 32, 84. 

^^ * necesse est ut et imus aether habeat aliquid aeri simile, et summus aer non sit 
dissimilis imo aetheri, quia non fit statim in diversum ex diverse transitus; paulatim 
ista in confinio vim suam miscent, ut dubitare possis an aer an hie iam aether sit ' 
Sen. N. Q. ii 14, 2 ; cf. iv 10. 

^•^ Arnim ii 555. But see above, § 194, note 20. 

^^ ' de naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam 
hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensum et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet: 
statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque 
sensus.' Cic. Ac. i 11, 39; cf. J^in. iv 5, 12. 

*•> ' sic enim se res habet, ut omnia quae alantur et crescant, contineant in se vim 
caloris : sine qua neque all possent neque crescere.' JV. D. ii 9, 23 and 24; ' caloris 
[natura] vim [habet] in se vitalem, per omnem mundum pertinentem ' ib. 

^1 ' hie noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium ; 
contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat aht auget sustinet sensuque 
afficit' ib. ii 15, 41. Cicero is quoting from Cleanthes (fr. 30 P); the teaching of Zeno 
was the same (fr. 71 B). 



THE UNIVERSE l8l 

It follows that fire, though it is one of the four elements,, has 
from its divine nature a primacy amongst the elements^^, which 
corresponds to its lofty position in the universe^^; and the other 
elements in turn all contain some proportion of fire. Thus 
although air has cold and darkness as primary and essential 
qualities^*, nevertheless it cannot exist without some share of 
warmth'*^ Hence air also may be associated with life, and it 
is possible to retain the popular term ' spirit ' {irvev^a, sphdtics) 
for the principle of life. In the development of the Stoic 
philosophy we seldom hear again of air in connexion with 
coldness ; and between the ' warm breath ' {aninia inflamniatd) 
and the primary fire there is hardly a distinction ; we may even 
say that 'spirit' has the highest possible tension'"'. 

198. Air on its downward path changes to water. This 
God in change is described as due to loss of heat^", and 

the stone. yg^- water too has some heat and vitality*^ Even 
earth, the lowest and grossest of the elements, contains a share 
of the divine heat ; otherwise it could not feed living plants and 
animals, much less send up exhalations with which to feed the 
sun and stars^". Thus we may say even of a stone that it has 
a part of the divinity in it^". Here then we see the reverse side 
of the so-called Stoic materialism. If it is true that God is body, 

*^ TO S^ [""Op Kal] Kar e^oxV" (Ttoix^iov \iye<xdai. Slo, to i^ avTou irpuiTov to, Xoltto, 
(TwicTTacrdat. /card. fj.eTa^oXrjf Ar. Did. fr. 21 ; ' Stoici ignem,...unum ex his quattuor 
dementis, et viventem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem..., eumque omnino 
ignem deum esse putaverunt ' Aug. Civ. De. viii 5. 

^^ '[ignem] natura sursum vocat ; in illo igne purissimo nihil est quod deprimatur' 
Sen. N. Q. ii 13, i and 2. 

■** ol fiev Srwi'/cot t(^ dipt to Trpwrws xf/vxpov dwodiSovTes Plut. pri77i. frig. 9, i ; 'aer 
frigidus per se et obscurus' Sen. N. Q. ii 10. 

^^ ' ipse vero aer, qui natura est maxime frigidus, minime est expers caloris ' Cic. 
N. D. ii 10, 26 ; 'aer nunquam sine igne est. detrahe iUi calorem ; rigescet, stabit, 
durabitur ' Sen. N. Q. iii ro, 4. 

*^ ' quid autem est, quod magis credatur ex se ipso habere intentionem quam 
spiritus?' Sen. N. Q. ii 8. Aristotle held that air was warm (Arnim ii 431). 

^^ 'detrahe [aeri] calorem ; transiet in humorem ' Sen. N. Q. iii 10, 4. 

^ ' est aliquid in aqua vitale ' ib. v 5, 2. 

■*^ 'non esse terram sine spiritu palam est... illo dico vitali et vegeto et alente 
omnia, hunc nisi haberet, quomodo tot arbustis spiritum infunderet non aliunde 
viventibus, et tot satis ?...totum hoc caelum,... omnes hae stellae..., hie tarn prope 
a nobis agens cursum sol...alimentum ex terra trahunt' ib. vi 16, i and 2. 

^^ Philod. de ira p. 77 Gomp. 



1 82 ROMAN STOICISM 

and that the soul is body, it is equally true that even water, the 
damp and cold element, and earth, the dry and cold element, 
are both penetrated by the divinity, by the creative fire without 
the operation of which both would fall in an instant into nothing- 
ness". 

199. We return to the consideration of the heavenly bodies. 
The heavenly Thesc are set in spheres of various diameter, all 
''°'^^^^- alike revolving around the earth. The succession 

we find described in Plato's Timaeus^'^ ; the moon is nearest to 
the earth, then comes the sun, then in order Venus, Mercury, 
Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. This theory was taken up by 
Aristotle and after him by Eudoxus, from whom it passed to 
Aratus and Chrysippus^^. A tradition derived from Chaldaean 
sources gave a different order, setting Venus and Mercury 
nearer to the earth than the sun ; and this order was accepted 
by the middle Stoics, that is to say by Panaetius and Posidonius, 
the latter placing Venus nearer to the earth, and therefore 
further from the sun, than Mercury'^^ The moon, like the 
earth, obtains her light from the sun, being crescent-shaped 
when nearest to him, full-orbed when furthest away. Her 
distance from the earth is two million stadia (250,000 miles) ; 
when she lies between the earth and the sun she eclipses his 
light, but when she is on the side of the earth directly away 
from the sun she is herself eclipsed ^^ Her phases are explained 
by her position relative to the sun^". The sun is 60 millions of 
miles from the earth •'^'' ; his diameter is 37^ times as large as that 
of the earth^^; he appears larger when on the horizon because 
his rays are refracted through the thick atmosphere^^. The 

*^ ' ex quo concluditur, calidum illud atque igneum in omni fusum esse natura ' 
Cic. N. D. ii 10, 28. 

®- cap. xi, p. 38 D. 5^ Schmekel, pp. 463, 4. ^^ ib. p. 464. 

*^ Diog. L. vii 145 and I46; Posidonius is his general authority, but the theory 
of the solar eclipse he refers to Zeno. 

^® ' [lunae] tenuissimum lumen facit proximus accessus ad solem, digressus autem 
longissimus quisque plenissimum ' Cic. N. D. ii 19, 50. 

*^ Pliny, Nat. hist, ii 2 1 . 

^^ Such was the calculation of Posidonius; see Mayor's note on Cic. N. D. ii 36, 92t 
The sun's diameter is in fact three times as large as Posidonius thought. 

^ This explanation has so plausible a sound that it may not be superfluous to 
remark that it is scientifically valueless. 



THE UNIVERSE ' 183 

planets, whether they revolve round the earth or the sun, are 
falsely called * wandering stars/ since their orbits have been 
fixed from all eternity ''''. The fixed stars revolve round the 
earth at such a distance that the earth, when compared with 
it, is merely the central point*\ All the heavenly bodies are, 
like the earth, of spherical form"^. Finally Seneca, in advance 
of the school, declared the comets to be a regular part of the 
celestial world ''^^ 

200. Whilst the Stoics generally were in sympathy with 
Cruder the best astronomical teaching of their time, they 

theories. combined with it many views based on much 

cruder forms of observation. Even Seneca thinks it bold to 
suggest that the sun is not a little larger than the whole earth*^; 
and it is commonly held that not only the sun and moon, but 
also the heavenly bodies generally, feed upon moist exhalations 
from the Ocean "^ Cleanthes in particular seems to have viewed 
the astronomers with suspicion. He alone regarded the moon 
not as a sphere, but as a hemisphere with the flat side turned 
towards us^^; the stars he considered to be conical*'*'. These 
views, very probably derived from Heraclitus, seem to point 
to the conception of the sky or aether as a single fixed fiery 
sphere, in which the heavenly bodies only differ from the sur- 
rounding element by containing more closely packed masses of 
fiery matter*'''; a conception which harmonizes far more closely 
with the Stoic theory of the elements than the doctrines which 

60 Cic. N. D. ii 20, 51. 

^1 ' persuadent enim mathematici terram in medio mundo sitam ad universi caeli 
complexum quasi puncti instar obtinere, quod Kevrpou illi vocant.' Tusc. disp. i 17, 40. 

6^ Diog. L. vii 144 and 145. 

••^^ ' ego nostris non adsentior ; non enim existimo cometen subitaneum ignem sed 
inter aeterna opera naturae ' yV. Q.v\\zi, i. 

"* ' omni terrarum ambitu non semel maior' Sen. N. Q. vi 16, 2. 

6^ "Hpd/cXetros xat ot IiTwikoI rpecpeadai roiis affrepas e/c ttjs eTTiyeiov dvadv/Mciaews 
K^y. plac. ii 17, 4; ' [sidera] marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis 
[aluntur]' Cic. N. D. ii 16, 43; 'totum hoc caelum ..halitu terrarum [sustinetur] ' 
Sen. N. Q. vi 16, 2. 

^ Ar. Did. fr. 34; for the text and interpretation see Hirzel, pp. 121, 122. 

66 Aet. plac. ii 14, I and 2. 

67 ' solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur 
in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur' Cic. N. D. ii 15, 41. 



184 ROMAN STOICISM 

are astronomically more correct. Cleanthes also explained that 
the sun could not venture to travel beyond his solstitial positions, 
lest he should be out of reach of his terrestrial food*^^ And 
Cleanthes and Posidonius agree that the sun keeps within the 
' torrid zone ' of the sky, because beneath it flows the Ocean, 
from which the sun sucks up his nutrimenf^ 

201. From the relation of the heavenly bodies to the 
Deity of element of fire the Stoics draw the conclusion 
the stars. |.|^^^ they are animated, reasoning, self-determined, 

and divine ; in short, that they are gods^°. This godhead per- 
tains particularly to the sun''^ Of this doctrine Cleanthes is 
especially the upholder^^, deeming that the sun is the ruling 
power in the universe, as reason in man''^ It is not clear 
whether the Stoics derived their theory of the divinity of the 
heavenly bodies from logical deduction, or whether they were 
here incorporating some Eastern worship. In favour of the 
latter point of view is the consideration that at this time the 
association of Mithra with the sun was probably making 
some progress in the Persian religion, and that the popular 
names of the seven days of the week, following the names 
of the sun, moon, and five planets, must have been already 
current. 

202. But in the Stoic system this doctrine is overshadowed 
Deity of the ^y the paradox that the universe itself is a rational 
universe. animal, possessed of free-will and divine. This is 

the teaching of all the masters of the school, beginning with 
Zeno himself. It appeared to him to follow logically from two 
principles, the first that the universe possesses a unity, the 
second that the whole is greater than its parts. * There cannot 

^ Cic. N. D. iii 14, 37. 

^^ 'ideo enim, sicut et Posidonius et Cleanthes adfirmant, solis meatus a plaga, 
quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus' Macrob. Sat. i 23, 2. 

'" ' hac mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas, quae 
ex mobilissima purissimaque aetheris parte gignuntur ;...totaque sunt calida atque 
perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime animantia esse et sentire atque intellegere dicantur' 
Cic. N. D. ii 15, 39. 

^^ Sen. Ben. vii 31, 3. 

''^ ' Cleanthes... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat' Cic. Ac. ii 41, 126. 

''* Diog. L. vii 139. 



THE UNIVERSE - 1 85 

be a sentient part of a non-sentient whole. But the parts of the 
universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentienf^' 'The 
rational is better than the non-rational. But nothing is better 
than the universe; therefore the universe is rationaF'.' 'The 
universe is one''*^'; we must not therefore think of it as of an 
army or a family, which comes into a kind of existence merely 
through the juxtaposition of its members. By the same reason- 
ing the universe possesses divinity''''. Upon this favourite Stoic 
text is based the frequent assertion of modern commentators 
that the philosophy is pantheistic'^; but the more central position 
of Stoicism is that the deity bears the same relation to the 
universe as a man's soul to his body''*', and the universe is there- 
fore no more all divine than a man is all soul. This view is 
expressed with great clearness by Varro, who says : ' As a man 
is called wise, being wise in mind, though he consists of mind 
and body ; so the world is called God from its soul, though it 
consists of soul and body^".' The Stoics are however in strong 
conflict with the Epicureans and all philosophers who hold that 
the world is fundamentally all matter, and that soul and mind 
are developments from matter. ' Nothing that is without mind 
can generate that which possesses mind,' says Cicero's Stoic*\ 

''■* 'idemque [Zeno] hoc modo : " nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse 
sentiens. mundi autem partes sentientes sunt : non igitur caret sensu mundus " ' 
Cic. N. D. ii 8, 22. 

''^ ' quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur. nihil 
autem mundo melius: ratione igitur mundus utitur' ib. 8, 21 ; see also § 83. 

™ Diog. L. vii 143 ; 'haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus 
profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur' Cic. N. D. 
ii 7, 19. This unity of the universe is technically termed (rvixTrddeia tQv 6\wv, 'con- 
sentiens c'onspirans continuata cognatio rerum ' (Cic. as above). It w^as denied by 
Panaetius (Schmekel, pp. 191, 192). 

" 'est ergo in eo virtus : sapiens est igitur et propterea deus' Cic. iV. D. ii 14, 39; 
' quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui dei pars est ? 
totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus ; et socii sumus eius et membra ' 
Sen. £p. 92, 30. 

''^ ' From what has been said it follows that the Stoics admitted no essential 
difference between God and the world. Their system was therefore strictly pan- 
theistic' Zeller, p. 156. 

™ uKTirep 5i 7]fj.e?s airo ^vxrjs SioiKorj/xeOa, ovtw kuI 6 k6(t/xos ^vxv" ^X^' '''V" <^vvi- 
Xovaav aiirdv, /cat avrr] KaXeirai Zeiyj Cornutus 2. 

*'•' Varro Fr. i 27 b (Aug. Civ. De. vii 6). 

^^ ' nihil quod animi quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest 
animantem compotemque rationis ' Cic. N. D. ii 8, 22. 



1 86 ROMAN STOICISM 

in full opposition to modern popular theories of evolution. 
Further, just as it may be questioned in the case of man 
whether the soul is situated in the head or in the heart, so in 
the case of the universe we may doubt whether its soul, or 
rather its ' principate,' is in the sun, as Cleanthes held^^ or in 
the sky generally, as Chrysippus and Posidonius maintain^^, or 
in the aether, as Antipater of Tyre taught®*. 

203. In the study of the universe we are not called upon 
The earth's merely to consider the earth as a member of the 
inhabitants. celestial Company ; we have to contemplate it as 
the home of beings of various ranks, which also display to us 
the principle of orderly arrangement. Preeminent amongst the 
inhabitants of the earth stands man, who is distinguished by 
being the sole possessor of the faculty of reason, and in addition 
owns all those capacities which are shewn in beings of lower 
rank. The nature of man constitutes so large a part of philo- 
sophy that we must reserve its full consideration for a special 
chapter®^ ; and must restrict ourselves here to treating of lower 
beings, which fall into the three orders of animals, plants, and 
inanimate beings. But since each of the higher orders possesses 
all the properties of every order that stands lower, the study of 
the orders inferior to man is also the study of a large part of 
human nature. The number and classification of these orders 
are not to be treated mechanically. From one point of view 
gods and men form one class, the rational, as opposed to every 
kind of non-rational being. On the other hand, from the stand- 
point with which we are rather concerned at this moment, gods, 
men, and animals are subdivisions of the order of animate beings, 
below which stand the plants, and lower still things without life. 
Animals, as the name indicates, possess life or soul ; the two 
lower orders possess something corresponding to soul, but lower 
in degree. The general term which includes soul in the animal 
and that which corresponds to it in the plants and in lifeless 
bodies is 'spirit' (Trvev/jua) ; soul therefore is the highest type 
of 'spirit' 

^- See above, § loi. ®^ Diog. L. vii 139. ^* ib, 

'^^ See below, chap. xi. 



THE UNIVERSE ' 187 

204. To the dumb animals the Stoics consistently deny the 

faculty of reason ; and this position must have 

The animals •' ' . , . 

have not Seemed to them self-evident, since the same word 

reason _ • 1 /^ 1 1 1 1 

Logos expresses m the (jreek both reason and 
speech. In the Latin the point was no longer so clear ; still 
the words 'ratio' and ' oratio,' if not identical, appeared to be 
connected by a natural association. Since the animals then are 
necessarily unreasoning, those acts of animals which appear to 
show reason must be explained in some other way. A dog 
pursues a wild animal by its scent; it must therefore be admitted 
that in a way the dog recognises that ' this scent is the sign of 
the wild animal^"'; still he is incapable of expressing this belief 
in the form of a correct syllogism. The industry of the ant is 
disposed of in a more summary way ; this animal shows a ' rest- 
less helplessness,' climbing up and down straws in meaningless 
industry ; many men however are no wiser^^. For their young 
the animals have a certain feeling, yet their grief at losing them 
is comparatively shortlived^^ In spite, however, of these limita- 
tions the animal world is one part of the wonders of nature, and 
is deserving of our admiration ; all animals have strong affection 
for their young so long as these need their protection^", and the 
dog deserves special recognition both for his keen intelligence 
and for his loyalty towards his master"**. 

205. To define more accurately the nature of animals we 
but a sort must to somc cxteut anticipate the discussion of 

reason. human naturc in a later chapter, which follows the 
same general lines : for in every point the animals are like men, 
but inferior. They possess soul, but without reason"^; by soul 
we here mean the twin powers of observation and of independent 

^8 Sext. 7nath. viii 270 (Arnim ii 727). 

^^ ' inconsultus illis vanusque cursus est, qualis formicis per arbusta repentibus, 
quae in summum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur. his pleiique similem 
vitam agunt, quorum non immerito quis " inquietam inertiam " dixerit ' Sen. Dial. 
ix 12, 3. 

^^ ib. vi 7, 2. 

8" 'quid dicam, quantus amor bestiarum sit in educandis custodiendisque eis, quae 
procreaverunt, usque ad eum fineni,dumpossint seipsadefendere?' Cic.iV^. Z?. ii 51, 129. 

"" ' canum vero tarn fida custodia, quid significat?' ib. 6},., 158. 

"^ lr\\ov oTi TO. fiev ?^ei dioiKelrai to. S^ (p^/ffei, to, de dXdyo} ^vxv Plut. viri. 
nior. 12. ■ ' 



1 88 ROMAN STOICISM 

movement ''I In a rough way the animals also possess a ruling 
part"^ Their power of observation enables them to distinguish 
what is healthful to them from that which is injurious ; their 
power of movement shapes itself into pursuit of the healthful 
and avoidance of the injurious*^*. They possess also properties 
which resemble the human feelings, such as anger, confidence, 
hope, fear ; but they do not in a strict sense possess the same 
feelings as men^'l As they cannot attain to virtue, neither can 
they fall into vice"^. 

206. From the animals we pass to the plants. These seem 
to have soul, because they live and die^''; yet they 

Plant life. . ^ ^ J J 

have not soul in any strict sense of the word. It 
will therefore be better not to use this word, but to speak of the 
'growth-power' (^i/o-i?)^*. The governing part is situated in the 
roof'l The growth of plants both in size and in strength is very 
remarkable, inasmuch as little seeds, which at first find them- 
selves place in crevices, attain such power that they split huge 
rocks and destroy noble monuments, thus illustrating what is 
meant by tone or tension ; for it is a spirit which starts from the 
governing part (the root) and spreads to the trunk and branches, 

92 7-^;, 7.^5 aladrjcreus re Kal e'f iavTTjs Kivrjcreus [alriav opofj-d^o/xev] \pvxw Galen 
adv. ltd. V (Arnim ii 718). 

'** ' omnem naturam necesse est... habere aliquem in se principatum, ut in homine 
mentem, in belua quiddam simile mentis' Cic. N. D. ii 11, 29; ' ipsum principale 
parum subtile, parum exactum. capit ergo visus speciesque rerum quibus ad impetus 
evocetur, sed turbidas et confusas ' Sen. Dial, iii 3, 7 and 8. 

"^ ' bestiis [natura] et sensum et motum dedit, et cum quodam appetitu accessum 
ad res salutares, a pestiferis recessum ' Cic. N. D. ii 12, 34 ; and so again, ib. 47, 122. 

"' ' irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere ; muta animalia humanis 
adfectibus carent, habent autem similes illis quosdam impetus ' Sen. Dial, iii 3, 
5 and 6. 

^^ ' [ira], cum sit inimica rationi, nusquam nascitur, nisi ubi rationi locus est ' 
ib. 3, 4. 

"' ' sunt quaedam quae animam habent nee sunt animalia. placet enim satis et 
arbustis animam inesse; itaque et vivere ilia et mori dicimus ' Sen. Ep. 58, 10; 
cf. N. Q. vi 16, I. 

^8 oi 8i SrwlVoi ovdi ^vxh" 6'\ws ovo/xd^ovcn tt]v to, (pvra SioLKodcrav, aXKa (picnv 
Galen de Hipp, et Plut. vi. 561 K (Arnim ii 710). Aristotle had used the term 
dpeTTTiKT] ^vxn in the same sense. So too Cicero : ' iis quae [gignuntur] e terra 
natura nihil tribuit amplius quam ut ea alendo atque augendo tueretur' JV. D. 
ii 12, 33. 

'" ib. ii II, 29. 



THE UNIVERSE 189 

conveying a force equally strong to construct and to destroj^^"". 
From another point of view we may say that the seed contains 
the Logos or law of the fully developed plant, for under no 
possible circumstances can any other plant grow from that seed 
except the plant of its kind'"^ 

207. Lowest in the scale come inanimate objects, such as 
stones^l Yet even these have a property which 
corresponds to soul, and which keeps them together 
in a particular outward form or shape ; this property we call 
'cohesion' (e^i?, zmitasy^^; like soul itself, it is a spirit pervading 
the whole"^ and again it is the Logos of the whole. An external 
force cannot impart this unity : so that the water contained in 
a glass is not an 'inanimate object' in this sense^"^ In this 
lowest grade of 'spirit' we read in Stoicism the antithesis of 
the materialism of Epicurus, who postulates for his 'atoms' the 
fundamental property of indivisibility, and can only account for 
the coherence of the bodies formed from them by supplying them 
with an elaborate system of ' hooks and eyes,' which was a 
frequent subject of derision to his critics. Epicurus makes the 
indivisibility of the smallest thing his starting-point, and from 
it constructs by degrees a compacted universe by arithmetical 
combination ; the Stoics start from the indivisibility of the great 
whole, and working downwards explain its parts by a gradual 
shedding of primitive force. God is in fact in the stone by 
virtue of his power of universal penetration (Kpdat<; 8c' o\r,)vy 



V106 



100 < parvula admodum semina...in tantum convalescunt ut ingentia saxa disturbent 
et moniimenta dissolvant. hoc quid est aliud quam intentio spiritus ? ' Sen. JV. Q. 
ii 6, 5 ; and again ' quid aliud producit fruges et segetem imbecillam ac viientes 
exigit umbras ac distendit in ramos quam spiritus intentio et unitas?' id. ii 6, 6. 
See also Cic. JV. D. ii 32, 8r. 

■'*'^ Arnim ii 713. 

■'"^ ' quaedam anima carent, ut saxa ; itaque erit aliquid animantibus antiquius, 
corpus scilicet ' Sen. Ep. 58, 10. 

^'^^ This use of 'i^i% must be kept distinct from that which is contrasted with Std^eo-ts, 
as habitus from dispositio : see above, § 184. 

■'''■* iKTiKbv ixiv ovv i(TTi irvev/xa to avvexov tovs Xidovs Galen inlrod. s. med. xiv 
p. 726 K (Arnim ii 716). 

^"^ ' [unitas corporum] ad naturam corporis [refert], nulla ope externa, sed unitate 
sua cchaerentis ' Sen. Af. Q. ii 2, 4. 

^"^ Alex, de mixt. p. 226, 24-30 Bruns (Arnim ii 1048) j Lucian Hermot. 81. See 
above. § 186. 



igo ROMAN STOICISM 

208. No existing thing can possess one of the higher grades 
Gradations of Spirit without also possessing all the lower, 
of spirit. Stones therefore have cohesion, plants growth 

and cohesion, animals soul growth and cohesion ; for these are 
not different qualities which can be combined by addition, but 
appearances of the same fundamental quality in varying intensity. 
Man clearly possesses cohesion, for he has an outward shape ; 
there does not however seem to be any part of him which has 
merely cohesion. But in the bones, the nails, and the hair are 
found growth and cohesion only, and these parts grow as the 
plants do. In the eyes, ears and nose, are sensation, as well as 
growth and cohesion ; that is, there is soul in the sense in which 
the animals possess soul. It is the intelligence only which in 
man possesses soul in the highest grade ^°^ 

209. This universe, in spite of its majesty, beauty and 
The con- adaptation, in spite of its apparent equipoise and 
flagration. j|.g ggsential divinity, is destined to perish. ' Where 

the parts are perishable, so is the whole ; but the parts of the 
universe are perishable, for they change one into another ; there- 
fore the universe is perishable"^.' Possibly this syllogism would 
not have appeared so cogent to the Stoics, had they not long 
before adopted from Heraclitus the impressive belief in the final 
conflagration, familiar to us from its description in the ' second 
epistle of Peter^l' According to this theory, the interchange 
of the elements already described"" is not evenly balanced, but 
the upward movement is slightly in excess. In the course of 
long ages, therefore, all the water will have been converted into 

:07 This gradation of soul-power is most clearly explained by Varro ; ' idem Varro 
tres esse adfirmat animae gradus in omni universaque natura ; unum qui omnes partes 
corporis, quae vivunt, transit et non habet sensum sed tantum ad vivendum valetudi- 
nem ; hanc vim in nostro corpore permanare dicit in ossa ungues capillos, sicut in 
mundo arbores sine sensu...crescunt et modo quodam suo vivunt; secundum gradum 
animae, in quo sensus est ; hanc vim pervenire in oculos aures nares os tactum ; tertium 
gradum esse animae summura, quod vocatur animus, in quo intellegentia praeminet ; 
hoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales' Aug. Cw. De. vii 23. 

^°^ Diog. L. vii 141. 

109 ' Yi^g heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be 
dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be 
burned up.' 2 Peter iii 10. 

"" See above, § 196. 



THE UNIVERSE 19I 

air and fire, and the universe will become hot with flame"^ 
Then the earth and all upon it will become exhausted for want 
of moisture, and the heavenly bodies themselves will lose their 
vitality for want of the exhalations on which they feed. Rivers 
will cease to flow, the earth will quake, great cities will be 
swallowed up, star will collide with star. All living things will 
die, and even the souls of the blest and the gods themselves 
will once more be absorbed in the fire, which will thus regain 
its primitive and essential unity"l Yet we may not say that 
the universe dies, for it does not suffer the separation of soul 
from body "I 

210. In connexion with the doctrine of the conflagration 

the Stoics were called upon to take sides upon the 

universe favouritc philosophic problem whether the universe 

is perishable, as Democritus and Epicurus hold, or 

imperishable, as the Peripatetics say"'*. In replying to this 

question, as in the theory as a whole, they relied on the 

authority o£ Heraclitus*^^ The word universe is used in two 

senses : there is an eternal universe (namely that already 

described as the universal substance made individual by the 

possession of quality"*^), which persists throughout an unending 

^^^ The theory of the conflagration appears to have been attached to the Stoic 
system from without, and the logical contention is obviously weak. For if the 
upward movement is in excess, the earth should disappear before the water. It 
should also always be remembered that the fire that finally remains is not the 
destructive, but a constructive element. 

^^^ ' ex quo eventurum nostri putant id,...ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret, 
cum humore consumpto neque terra ali posset neque remearet aer ; cuius ortus, aqua 
omni exhausta, esse non posset : ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursum 
animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque idem ornatus oriretur' Cic. N. D. 
ii 46, 118. 'cum tempus advenerit, quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus 
ista se suis caedent et sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrante materia uno igne 
quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. nos quoque felices animae atque aeterna 
sortitae, parva ruinae ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur' Sen. Dial. 
vi 26, 6. 

^^^ 01; pr}Tiov airodvfidKeiv tov Kdafiov Plut. S(o. rep. 39, 1. 

^^■' ' [quaeramus] imraortalis sit mundus, an inter caduca et ad tempus nata 
numerandus ' Sen. Dial, viii 4, 31. 

^1^ ' Heraclitus after all his speculations on the conflagration of the universe ' 
To himself (Kendall's transl.), iii 3. Aristotle interpreted Heraclitus in the same 
way; thus he paraphrases fr. 26 (B), 66 (D); iravTa. to irvp iTreKdbv Kpiviei Kai KaraXri- 
yperai as follows: "H/)d/c\etT6s (prjaiv airavra yiyveada'i Trore irvp Met. xi 10. 

^■® See above, § 193. 



192 ROMAN STOICISM 

series of creations and conflagrations"^ In another sense the 
universe, considered in relation to its present ordering, is perish- 
able"l Just in the same way the word 'city' is used in two 
senses ; and that which is a community of citizens may endure, 
even though the collection of temples and houses also called the 
' city ' is destroyed by fire"^ 

211. The doctrine of the conflagration was not maintained 
Dissentient ^Y ^^ Stoic teachers with equal conviction. Zeno 
stoics. treated it with fulness in his book ' on the uni- 

verses^"'; and Cleanthes and Chrysippus both assert that the 
whole universe is destined to change into fire, returning to that 
from which, as from a seed, it has sprung ^'^^ In the transition 
period, owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle, 
and the critical acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics 
abandoned the theory^^l Posidonius however, though a pupil 
of Panaetius (the most conspicuous of the doubters s^^), was quite 
orthodox on this subject ; though he pays to his master the 
tribute of asserting that the universe is the most permanent 
being imaginable^-'*, and that its existence will continue through 
an immense and almost unlimited period of time^-^ In the 
Roman period the conflagration is not only an accepted dogma, 
but one that makes a strong appeal to the feelings. For with 
the conflagration there comes to an end the struggle of the evil 
against the good ; and the Deity may at last claim for himself 
a period of rest, during which he will contemplate with calmness 

^'^ Clem. Al. Strom, v 14 (Arnim ii 590) relying on fr. 20(B), 30(D). Philo 
mc. mund. p. 222, 2 (Arnim ii 620). 

^1® Clem. Al. as before, relying on fr. 21 (B), 31a (D) ; (fydaprbs fiev [6 KScrfios] 
6 /caret ttjv diaKdafirjaLv, Philo as above. 

i'9 Ar. Did. fr. 29. 

^^^ Diog. L. vii 142. 

^2' Zijcwj/t /cat K\edv6ei /cat XpucrtTTTrtj; apiffKei rrjv oixriav fjL€Taj3d\\eLV olov els 
airipfjia to irvp Ar. Did. fr. 36. 

^'^ See above, § 109. 

^^•' See above, § 115. For a full discussion of the motives of this change see 
Schmekel, pp. 304-318. 

i^** ' ita stabilis mundus est atque ita cohaeret ad permanendum, ut nihil ne 
excogitari quidem possit aptius ' Cic. JV. D. ii 45, 115. 

^23 ' [mundi partium coniunctio] certe perdiuturna [est,] permanens ad longinquum 
at immensum paene tempus' ib. 33, 85. 



THE UNIVERSE I93 

the history of the universe that has passed away^"®, and plan for 
himself a better one to follow^-''. 

212. Upon the conflagration will follow the reconstruction 
The re- ^f the world {iraXijjeveo-La, re^tovatid), which will 
construction, jgg^^ again to a conflagration ; the period between 

one conflagration and the next being termed a 'great year' 
(7reptoSo9, magnus annus). The conception of the 'great year' 
was borrowed by the Stoics from the Pythagoreans^^, and leads 
us back ultimately to astronomical calculations ; for a great year 
is the period at the end of which sun, moon and planets all 
return to their original stations^^^ The phenomena of the sky 
recur in each new period in the same way as before; and hence 
we readily infer that all the phenomena of the universe, including 
the lives of individuals, will recur and take their course again. 
Although this doctrine appears only slightly connected with the 
general Stoic system, it was an accepted part of it : and Seneca 
expresses an instinctive and probably universal feeling when he 
says that few would willingly repeat their past histories, if they 
knew they were so doing ^^^ 

213. We have put off till the end of this chapter the dis- 

cussion of the Stoic theory of Creation, because 
it is in fact one of the least defined parts of the 
system. According to the theory of the great year creation is 
not a single work, but a recurring event ; and therefore in one 
sense the history of the universe has neither beginning nor end. 
It would however be a mistake to suppose that this point of 
view was always present to the minds of Stoic teachers. The 
question of the beginning of things is of primary importance to 

^^® '[luppiter,] resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis paulisper cessante natura 
adquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus ' Sen. Ep. 9, 16. On the relation of Zeys 
to the eKTTijpioais see Alex, de viixt. p. 226, 16 B; Philo inc. mund. c. 14, 15. 

^^^ ' [conflagratio] fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, Vetera finiri ' N. Q. iii 28, 7. 

1^ Zeller, p. 166. ^^^ Cic. N. D. ii 20, 51 : see also Schmekel, p. 241. 

130 < veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponat dies ; quern multi recusarent, nisi 
oblitos reduceret ' Sen. Ep. 36, 10. Socrates and Plato will live again, their friends 
and fellow citizens will be the same, and they will be again treated as before ; Nemes. 
nat. hom. p. 277 (Arnim ii 625). This theory is plainly not reconcileable with 
Seneca's hope of better things (see note 127). See also Hicks, Stoic a7td Epicureatt, 
pp. 33 sqq. 

A. 13 



194 ROMAN STOICISM 

every philosophy, and the Stoics approached it from many points 
of view, popular, scientific, mythological and theological, and 
gave a number of answers accordingly. To the orthodox Stoic 
all these answers are ultimately one, though the language in 
which they are expressed differs greatly ; whilst the critic of 
Stoicism would assert that they are derived from different 
sources and are fundamentally irreconcileable. Seneca suggests 
four answers to the question ' Who made the universe ? ' It may 
be an omnipotent deity ; or the impersonal Logos ; or the divine 
Spirit working in all things by tension; or (lastly) destiny, that, 
is, the unalterable succession of cause and result ^^^ These 
answers we may examine in order. 

214. The view that ' God made the world ' is that of the 
The golden theology which was now everywhere becoming 
^se. popular ; and it is usually associated, even when 

expounded by Stoic teachers, with dualistic views. Before the 
creation there existed a chaos, matter without shape, dark and 
damp^^^; the Deity formed a plan, and brought life order and 
light into the mass : from ' chaos ' it became ' cosmos '^^'\ This 
deity is the same that is commonly named Zeu?"^ or Jove, and 
is called the ' father of gods and men.' The universe so created 
was at first happy and innocent, as is expressed in the tradition 
of the Golden Age. Men lived together in societies, willingly 
obeying the wisest and strongest of their number^"^ ; none were 
tempted to wrong their neighbours. They dwelt in natural 
grottos or in the stems of trees, and obtained nourishment 
from tame animals and wild fruits. Little by little they made 
progress in the arts, and learnt to build, to bake, and to m.ake 

^^^ ' quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium, sive incor- 
poralis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima et 
minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causai-um inter se 
cohaerentium series' Sen. I}ia/. xii 8, 3. 

^^^ This chaos the Stoics identified vi^ith the watery stage which preceded the 
creation of earth in the history of the elements: see Pearson on Zeno fr. ri2, 113. 

^^'^ Seneca's writings are penetrated with this conception: 'hoc universum.-.dies 
aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenebrasque demerget ' Dial, xi i, 2 ; 
cf. £p. 65, 19. 

^'^^ Aia d' avrov KoKovfJiev, 6tl 5t' airov yiverai Kai (rdo^erai to, iravra Cornutus 2. 

135 «jiio ergo saeculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum 
Posidonius iudicat ' Sen. Ep. 90, 5. 



THE UNIVERSE ipS 

use of metals. These views were especially developed by 
Posidonius, who believed that in the Mysians of his day, who 
lived on milk and honey, and abstained from flesh-meat, he 
could still trace the manners of this happy epoch^^l It seems 
probable that it was from Posidonius, rather than from the 
Pythagoreans, that Varro derived his picture of the Golden Age, 
which has become familiar to us in turn through the version 
given by Ovid in his Metamorphoses'^^'' . 

215. These conceptions however are only familiar in the 
Older stoic later forms of Stoicism. The teaching of the 
theory. founders of Stoicism is on this matter monistic, 

and is based upon the teaching of Heraclitus that the world 
was in the beginning a creative fire, which was alike the creator 
and the material of creation. The process of creation (Sta- 
Koa-jji'qaif;) may be regarded as identical with that of the mutation 
of the elements on the downward path^=^; with the special note 
that when the stage of water is reached ^''^ the deity assumes the 
shape of the seed Logos {airepixarLKO'; Xoyo?)^**, and begets in 
the first instance the four elements"^ ; then, from a combination 
of these, trees and animals and all other things after their kind "2. 
Yet even this statement is simplified if we regard the original 
fire as itself containing the seed Logoi of all things that are to 
be created"^ To this is to be added that all this is well ordered, 
as in a duly constituted state ^H From this point of view the 

^^^ Strabo vii 296. See generally Schmekel, pp. 288-290. 

137 Ov. Met. XV 96-142 ; Schmekel p. 288. 

^^^ ko.t'' d,pxo.s fi€V ovv Kad^ avrov ovtcl \tov debvl Tpeweiv rijv iracrav ovcriav 81 d^pos 
els iidwp Diog. L, vii 136. 

139 xhis stage, at which the whole universe is water, even though the four elements 
have not yet been created, reflects the popular tradition as to Chaos as in the last 
section : see Pearson p. 102. For the process of creation as described by Cleanthes 
see Pearson p. 252. 

"« See above, § 178- 

^*^ Kol wcnrep ev rrj yovfj to cir^p/xa irepiix^T^'-^ ovtco /cat tovtov, airepixaTLKOv \6yov 
6vTa Tov Koafiov aTroyewav Trpurov ra Tecaapa ffroixeia, Diog. L. vii 136. 

^'^'^ elra Kara /lu^lv eK tovtwv cpvTo, re Kal fijja Kal ra dXKa y^vrj ib. i\i. 

^^^ TO fxevTOi irpQiTov wup eXvai. Kadawepei tl airepfia, tQiv airdvTUiv ^%oj' Toiis \byovs 
Arist. apud 'Ewseh. praep. ev. xv (Arnim i 98). 

^*^ Ta\jTr] 5e TravTO. SLOLKeladai to. /cara tov nbafiov invipev,\ Kaddwep ev evvopLuiTCLTrj 
Tivi TToXiTeig. ib. 

13—2 



196 ROMAN STOICISM 

Cosmos is a CosmopoHs, and we reach the border of the investi- 
gations which deal with the moral government of the universe, 
and the political organization of mankind. 

216. We may sum up the history of the universe according 
to the Stoics somewhat in the following way. 

Summary. ° ■^ 

Body is neither a burden on the soul nor its 
instrument, but all body is of itself instinct with motion, warmth, 
and life, which are essentially the same. This motion is not 
entirely that of contraction, or immobility would result ; nor 
entirely that of expansion, else the universe would be scattered 
into the far distance"^. One of these motions constantly succeeds 
the other, as Heraclitus says ' becoming extinguished by measure, 
and catching light by measure"^'; as when a swimmer with all 
his strength can just hold his own against the force of the stream, 
or a bird straining its pinions appears to rest suspended in the 
air"''. At the beginning of each world-period expansion or 
tension is supreme, and only the world-soul exists. Next the 
fiery breath begins to cool, the opposing principle of contraction 
asserts itself, the universe settles down and shrinks ; the aether 
passes into air, and air in its turn to water. All this while 
tension is slackening, first in the centre, lastly even in the 
circumference ; yet the vital force is not entirely quenched ; 
beneath the covering of the waters lurks the promise of a new 
world. The fire still unextinguished within works upon the 
watery mass or chaos until it evolves from it the four elements 
as we know them. On its outer edge where it meets the ex- 
pansive aether, the water rarefies until the belt of air is formed. 
All the while the outward and inward movements persist ; 
particles of fire still pass into air, and thence into water and 
earth. Earth still in turn yields to water, water to air, and 
air to fire (0S09 avw Kdrco). Thus by the interaction of con- 
flicting tendencies an equilibrium (Icrovo/jULa) is established, and 
the result is the apparent permanence of the phenomenal world ^^. 

^^5 Galen de trem. 6 vii, p. 616K (Arnim ii 446). 

1*^ airrbixevov [xirpa /cat aTroa-^evvifji.evov fiirpa Heracl. Fr. 20 (B), 30 (D). 

1*^ Galen de 7uusc. i 7 and 8 (Arnim ii 450). 

^*^ iKw^pw(7iv /xiv Kara ttjv toO deov dvpacrrelav tQv aWuv iTriKparTjcraPTOS, dia- 



THE UNIVERSE I97 

Finally the upward movement becomes slightly preponderant, 
water becomes absorbed in air and air transformed into fire, 
once more the conflagration results and all the world passes 
into the fiery breath from which it came^*^ 

KbafJiTjcriv 8e Kara Trjv twv reTTapwv aroi-x^iuv iaovofiiav yjv avTidi.d6a<Ti.v (zWtjXois 
Philo an. sac. Ii 242 M (Arnim ii 616). 

^■*'* This concluding section is based upon a note, which was prepared by 
Mr A. C. Pearson for an edition of Chiysippus now abandoned, and which has 
been kindly placed by him at my disposal. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SUPREME PROBLEMS. 

217. In the preceding chapter we have discussed the uni- 
The verse from the scientific standpoint. ' Such/ say 

mauvais pas. ^j^^ Stoics, ' wc find that the universe is ; such and 
such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the end.' 
Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification, and 
analysis ; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that 
there is also employed that power of scientific imagination which 
the ancients call ' divination.' Still on the whole the investi- 
gation has been that of the student, and the method that of 
speculation or contemplation dissociated from any consideration 
of the usefulness of the results attained. In the study we now 
undertake all this is changed. Our philosophy proceeds to 
assert that the universe is good, that it is directed by wise 
purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience of 
mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with 
moral approval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such 
conclusions cannot be reached by purely discursive reason ; but 
they are such as are everywhere sought by practical men. They 
appeal to a side of human nature different from that which 
passes judgment on the conclusions previously reached. From 
the first position ' the universe is ' to the second ' the universe is 
good ' the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of 
philosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers 
find their way they know not how, and can hardly hold out a 
hand to help those who are in distress. The Stoic teachers did 
not perhaps always follow the same track, and now and again 
they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often proved a weak 
support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the 
refuges on which their eyes were all along set. 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 199 

218. To the problem of the meaning and government of the 

universe three answers were current in the epoch 

Fate, provi- 
dence, and with which we are deahng. Either all things take 

place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine 
providence; or else fortune is supreme^ These three terms are 
not always mutually exclusive : Virgil speaks commonly of the 
'fates of the gods-'; and 'fortune' is frequently personified, not 
only in common speech, as when the Romans spoke of the 
'fortune of the city,' but even by a philosopher like Lucretius, 
who speaks of ' Fortune the pilotV with a half-humorous 
abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of 
not only recognising fully these three powers, but also of using 
the terms with relative consistency. By fate then we mean an 
abstract necessity, an impersonal tendency, according to which 
events flow; by providence a personal will; by fortune the ab- 
sence of both tendency and purpose, which results in a constant 
shifting to and fro, as when a man stands upon a ball, and 
is carried this way and that*. All explanations, both of general 
tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve 
themselves into one or other of these three ; every constructive 
system must necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately 
coincide, and that philosophy is the guardian and guide of man- 
kind in the understanding of their relations one to another^ 

219. The Stoics hold that ' all things happen by fate*^.' 

To this conclusion they are brought by the same 
reasoning that moved the Chaldaeans. The visible 
universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies move in- 
cessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or without 

1 The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca ; ' dicet aliquis — quid 
mihi prod est philosophia, si fatum est ? quid prodest, si deus rector est ? quid prodest, si 
casus imperat?...quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt, philosophandum 
est ; sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta dis- 
ponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet' 
Sen. Ep. 16, 4 and 5. 

^ e.g. Aen. vi 376. 

■^ 'quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans ' R. N. y 108. 

■* ' vaga volubilisque Fortuna' Cic. Milo 26, 69; ' fortuna... arnica varietati con- 
stantiam respuit ' N. D. ii 16, 43. 

^ Seneca as in note i. 

'° Diog. L. vii 149 ; '[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt ' Cic. de Falo 15, 33. 



200 ROMAN STOICISM 

them that can turn them aside a hair's breadth, or make their 
pace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no preiogatives of 
gods can make them change''. Without cause there is no effect ; 
and each effect is in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed 
an endless chain, in which all things living and inanimate are 
alike bound. If a man knew all the causes that exist, he could 
trace out all the consequences. What will be, will be ; what will 
not be, cannot be. This first Stoic interpretation of the universe 
is that of Determinism ; it reiterates and drives home the prin- 
ciple that is here our starting-point, ' the universe is.' ' Chrysippus, 
Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place according to 
fate ; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or the 
system by which the universe is conducted**.' This 'fate' is only 
another name for 'necessity^'; fates cannot be changed". 

220. The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the 

belief in human free will, and to lead up to the 
The _ , ^ . 

'fallacies' of practical doctrine of laziness (dpjb<i X0709, ignava 

determinism. • ^ r^ n • i i ^ i -ii i 

ratio). Once we allow it to be true that what will be, 
will be,' it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the present 
time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says 
to the sick person, ' if it is your fate to recover, then you will 
recover whether you call in the physician or not; and if it is 
your fate not to recover, then you will not recover in either case. 
But it is your fate either to recover or not to recover ; there- 
fore it will be useless to call in the physician.' To which another 
will reply: 'you may as well argue that if it is your fate to beget 
a son, you will beget one equally whether you consort with your 
wife or not ; therefore it will be useless to consort with your 

'' ' et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel constituta nee 
a numinibus posse mutari ' Comment, in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim ii 924). 

* So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable clearness the 
conception of fate: ' fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. fatum autem id appello, quod 
Graeci €lfx,apii.ivt\v, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex 
se gignat ' Cic. Div. i 55, i^s ; 'quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem 
rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat ' Sen. .A''. Q. ii 36 ; cf. Ep. 19, 6 
and N. Q. ii 35, 2. 

^ X/5iy(7i7r7ro5 yJi\ diaipipeiv [elTre] roO eifiap/x^vov t6 KaT7]vayKa<r/j,ivov Aet. p/ac. 127,2. 

^^ ' Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata mutari ' Serv. 
ad Verg. Aen. i 257 (Arnim ii 923). 



I 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 201 

wife".' With such verbal disputes Chrysippus dehghted to 
deal ; his reply to the ' lazy argument ' was that certain things 
go together by fate {iuncta fato^ confataliaY^. Thus in the above 
cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call 
in a physician and recover, both consort with your wife and 
beget a son. 

So once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his 
ships : 

Keep watch, my lads : let sleep seize no man's eyes, 
Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize i^. 

Some one then replies, ' No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it 
is predestined that the dock be not seized.' To such an objection 
any one can give the right answer : ' all these things are equally 
predestined, and go together by fate. There is no such thing 
as a watch kept by sleepers, a victory won by runaways, or a 
harvest reaped except after sowing good clean soiP^.' 

221. The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some 
Logic of of the commonest forms of speech. For if it is 

possi 1 ity. correct to say ' Either this will happen, or it will 
not happen,' it seems incorrect to say ' it may happen ' ; and still 
more of the past, since we must admit of any event that ' it has 
happened ' or ' it has not happened,' there seems no room for the 
statement ' it might have happened.' Chrysippus however main- 
tains that the words ' may ' and ' might ' are correctly used, or 
(in other words) that we may assert that it is or was ' possible ' 
for things to happen, whether or not they will happen or have 
happened. For example, the pearl here is breakable, and may 
be broken, though fate has ordained that it never will be broken. 
Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth, though the 
oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time that 
he would be^^ This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus 
the Megarian ; and the controversy was summed up in the 
* master argument.' This is stated as follows : there are three 
propositions in conflict with one another in the sense that if any 

^^ Orig. cont. Cels. ii 20 (Arnim ii 957). 

^^ Cic. de Fato 12, 28 to 13, 30. ^^ Horn. //. xi 192 and 193. 

" Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25). i^ Cic. de Fato 7, 13. 



202 ROMAN STOICISM 

two of them are true, the third is false. They are these: (i) every 
past event is necessary ; (ii) the impossible cannot follow on the 
possible; (iii) there are things possible that neither are nor will 
be true. Diodorus accepted the first two ; he therefore drew the 
conclusion that there is nothing possible except that which is 
or will be true ; or in other words he denied the existence of any 
category of ' things possible ' distinct from that of facts past or 
future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and third 
propositions : Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied 
the second^*^; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the 
breaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate 
had decided to the contrary. The choice intimates much ; it 
shows that the Stoics, however strongly they assert the rule 
of fate or necessity, intend so to interpret these terms as to 
reconcile them with the common use of words, that is, with the 
inherited belief in divine and human will, breaking through the 
chain of unending cause and effect^^. 

222. The next step is professedly taken by way of definition 
Definitions of the word ' fate ' {elfxapixevr], fatimi). Exactly as 
° **^' the stuff of the universe, fire, has been explained 

to be no mere passive or destructive element, but one possessed 
of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to be no blind 
or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power 
which regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name 
for the Logos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers 
are in the main agreed. ' Fate,' said Zeno, ' is a power which 
stirs matter by the same laws and in the same way ; it may 
equally well be called providence or nature^^' Chrysippus 
gives us several alternative definitions : ' the essence of fate is 
a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe"'; it is 'the Logos 
of the universe^^,' or ' the law of events providentially ordered 

1® Epict. Disc, ii 19, i sqq. 

1'' Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention : ' irepl dwardv me scito 
/cara AtiSwpoj/ Kplveiv ; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse esse te venire : sin autem 
non es, twv ddwdruv est te venire, nunc vide, utra te Kpicns magis delectet, XpvcnTr- 
ireiane, an haec, quam noster Diodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, 
otiosi cum erimus, loquemur ; hoc etiam /card Xpija-Lwirov dwarov est ' ad Favi. ix 4. 

18 Aei. plac. i 27, 5. " ib. i 28, 3. 

2" elfiap/jLivr] iarlv 6 rod k6(T/xov \6yos id. 



^ THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 203 

in the universe^^ ' ; or, * the law by which things that have been 
have been, that are are, that will be will be-.' But an important 
difference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. 
They are agreed that all that happens by providence also happens 
by fate. But Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared 
to do, that all things that happen by fate happen providentially-^ 
With Cleanthes the conception of fate is wider than that of 
providence, just as in Virgil the fates are more powerful than 
Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious of the evil existing 
in the universe, refused to hold providence responsible for it, 
Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the deity-^ 

223. Providence {irpovoia, providentid) differs from fate, if 
„ .^ at all, by including an element of personality. It 

Providence. 5 y & r j 

is a principal dogma of the Stoics that ' the universe 
is ruled by providence.' Cicero indeed assures us that the word 
' providence ' is merely an abbreviation for ' the providence of 
the gods,' and that the dogma really asserts that ' the universe 
is ruled by the gods with foresight'; and Balbus, the Stoic 
advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for having 
travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as ' a 
fortune-telling hag,' as though she were some kind of goddess 
governing the world ^^ But the travesty is at least as instructive 
as the exposition. If ' providence ' is on the one hand interpreted 
as God's providence^", it is on the other hand equivalent to 
Nature^'', and again to the Mind of the universe ; it is the Logos, 

^^ ■f), Xoyos Tujv ev ry Kdafiip irpovoia dLOLKOVfxeviov iKet. plac. i 28, 3. 

^^ 7/ X670S Kad' ov TO. jxhv yeyovSra yeyove, to. de yivofxeva yiverai, to, Be yevyjao/xeva 
yevTiaerai ib. 

^^ ' ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint, eodemque 
modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. alii vero, quae 
quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nee tamen quae 
fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes' Chalc. in Timaeum 144 (Arnim ii 933). 

^ ' Chrysippus... deum dicit esse...fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum ' 
Cic. N.D. i 15, 39. 

^^ ' a te dictum est anum fatidicam irp6voiav a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam. 
quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam 
singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat. plene autem et perfecte sic 
dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum administrari ' ib. ii 29, 73 and 74. 

^^ X/)i5(Tt7r7ros Kal Ti-qvujv v'iredei'T0...dia ttolvtuv dc'^Keiv Tijv Trpbvoiav avTov Hippolyt. 
Philos. 21, I (Arnim i 153). 

^ TJvTiva [tt]v elfjLapixevTqvl /^V SLa<pipeLv Trpbvoiav Kal (pijcnv KoKelv A'et. J>/ac. i 27, 5. 



204 ROMAN STOICISM 

the universal Law, the creative force-®; not merely an attribute, 
but a manifestation and bodily presentment of deity. After the 
final conflagration three joining in one will be left, Zeus, pro- 
vidence, and the creative fire-l Lastly, if we consider the process 
of logical demonstration, it is from the reality of providence that 
the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods ; only from the 
standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed. 

224. The work and functions of Providence are open to our 
Beauty of view, for it has an aim and pathway of its own^°. 

the universe, j^^ g^.^^ ^^^ j^ ^^ Create a universe capable of 

enduring ; next, it makes that universe complete ; thirdly, it 
endows it with every beauty and excellences^ The beauty 
of the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators 
discourse at length ; this is, in their view, the best world that 
could possibly have been created ^l This sense of beauty 
appears to be derived from two sources, the admiration and 
awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun moon and stars 
moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep caves^^; 
and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile field, 
the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds, which 
all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we 
pass to usefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world 
has been created and is maintained for the use of man^*. In 
strict language, however, we must say that the universe is made 
for the use of rational beings, that is, for gods and men^^, that 

2* ' talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel provi- 
dentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim irpovoia dicitur)...' Cic. N. D. ii 22, 58. The 
term 'nature' is used in the same sense by Epicurus also, though it does not harmonize 
very well with his theory ; ' natura gubernans '' R. N. v 78. 

^^ ora,v ovv eKw{ipuj(7is yipr/rat,, fibvov a(p6apTov ovra rov Aia rdv OeQv avaxwpetv eirl 
T7]v wpdvoiav, elra ofxou yevofx.ivovs iiri ytitas r^s rod aidipo^ oiiaias diareXelv afKporipovs 
Plut. coi7i7n. not. 36, 5. 

^^ ' habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur ' Cic. N. D. ii 22, 57. 

^^ ib. 22, 58. 

*^ ' [mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi possit ; ex iis 
enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit, effectum est ' ib. 34, 86. 

■^3 ib. 39, 98. 

^* ' omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata ' ib. ii 61, 154. 

^* ' deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum ' ib. 53, 133. 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 205 

it is a home or city in which gods and men alike have a share^®. 
From the protection of providence the animals, according to the 
Stoic view, are in principle entirely excluded. Yet it did not 
escape notice that nature has often provided for their comfort 
in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them to maintain 
life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions of their 
existence^''. And Seneca especially found that man was apt to 
swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of 
which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and 
where day and night, summer and winter would continue of 
themselves, even if no man observed them^. On the other 
hand zealots like Chrysippus worked out the detailed applica- 
tion of this theory in a way that provoked the amusement of 
their critics^", 

225, Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore 
Particular for the parts of mankind, the various continents, 
providence. nations, and cities. The Stoics are also inclined to 
hold that it cares for the individual*". The difficulty of this belief 
is great. Busy cities are overthrown by the earthquake ; the 
crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the hailstorm ; Socrates 
is condemned to death by the Athenians ; Pythagoras, Zeno and 
Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that 
in any of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by 
the gods; it is rather an inevitable necessity that has worked 
their ruin. The gods who have great things in their charge, 
must sometimes overlook small matters ; they must save the 

^^ ' est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs 
utrorumque ' Cic. M. D. ii 62, 154; ' intraturus es urbem dis hominibusque com- 
munem ' Sen. Dial, vi 18, i. 

^'' Cic. N. D. ii 47, 122. 

^8 ' neque enim omnia deus homini fecit, quota pars operis tanti nobis commit- 
titur?' Sen. N. Q. vii 30, 3; 'nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur propter 
quos tanta moveantur ' Dial, iv 27, 2. 

^^ Thus ' horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting : lions and leopards provide 
a discipline in courage : the sow is convenient for sacrifices to the gods, who have 
given her a soul to serve as salt, and keep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is 
created for his tail, and the peahen accompanies him for symmetry's sake. The flea 
is useful to wake us -out of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless 
in leaving the cheese about.' All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus 
(Arnim ii 1152, 1163). 

■*" ' etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet ' Cic. N. D. ii 65, 164. 



206 ROMAN STOICISM 

community by sacrificing the individuals^ The storm may rage 
in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain heights^^. The 
philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great whole 
cannot even see the flaws in its details. ' If the gods care for 
all men,' says Cicero's authority, ' it follows logically that they 
care for each single man ''I' 'Nothing occurs on earth, nor in 
the heaven above, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,' sings 
Cleanthes**. 'It is impossible,' says Cbrysippus, 'that even the 
least of particulars can fall out otherwise than in accordance 
with the will of God, with his Word, with law, with justice, and 
with providence^^' 

226. The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme. 
Existence Icads to the denial of the existence of evil. But 
the Stoics did not draw this conclusion ; had they 
done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have become 
futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language 
that they employ. If we meet with the paradox that 'this is 
the best of all possible worlds,' we must remember that all 
paradoxes need for their interpretation some sense of humour, 
and that the ' best possible ' is not the same as the ' best imagin- 
able.' Somewhere or other there is, in a sense, a limitation to 
the sphere of providence. If again in poetical passages we learn 
that ' nothing occurs without God,' we must not forget the 
doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end into 
harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of 
Stoic doctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is 
not the equal of the good either in intensity or in duration ; it 
is an incident, not a first principle of the universe^^ From this 

^^ 'nee vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, ,..eum, cui quid 
horum accident, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo [iudicabimus]. magna di curant, 
parva neglegunt ' Cic. N. D. ii 66, 167 ; ' [universorum] maior dis cura quam 
singulorum est' Sen. Dial, i 3, i. See also note 64. 

^■^ ' lege deum minimas rerum discordia turbat, | pacem magna tenent ' Lucan 
Phars. ii 273. 

** ' licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores, 
postremo deducere ad singulos' Cic. N. D. ii 65, 164. 

^ Hymn, vv. 15, 16. *^ Plut. comm. not. 34, 5 ;' Sto. rep. 34, 10. 

■^^ This appears to be the correct interpretation of the saying of Epictetus — ' as 
a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature 
of evil exist in the world ' Manual 27 (Long's transl. ii p. 269, where see his note). 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 207 

point of view it becomes possible to 'plead the cause of the gods,' 
to defend providence from the heavy accusations men bring 
forward against it^''. Thus the Stoics set about to prove that, 
in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is ruled by the 
foresight of a beneficent deity. 

227. The first argument for the defence is logical, and is 
Lo icai pressed by Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, 
solutions. (.yii ' There could be no justice, unless there were 

also injustice; no courage, unless there were cowardice; no truth, 
unless there were falsehood^®.' Just in the same way we find 
coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself, and yet 
somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole^''. 
The second argument is based upon the doctrine of ' necessary 
consequence ' {TrapaKoXovOrjo-i^;). The general design of the 
human head required that it should be compacted of small and 
delicate bones, accompanying which is the inevitable disadvan- 
tage that the head may easily be injured by blows-'". War is an 
evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of superfluous 
populations^ 

In many other cases there may be explanations that are 
beyond our present knowledge, just as there are many kinds 
of animals of which we do not yet know the use^l 

228. More important are those arguments which introduce 
Moral moral considerations. In the first place the generous 
solutions. intentions of providence are often thwarted by the 

perverseness of wicked men^^, just as many a son uses his in- 
heritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it to him did him 
a service^^. The Deity treats good men as a Roman father his 
children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow in 



^'^ ' faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam' Sen. Dial, i i, i. 

''^ Cell. N. A. vii i, 4 and 5 ; ' nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus potest esse ' Sen. 
Ep. 124, 19. 

''^ Pint. comm. not. 14, i ; M. Ant. vi 42. s" A. Gellius, N.A. vii i, 9 to 11. 

®^ Plut. Sto. rep. 32, 2. ^^ Lactantius de ira 13 (Arnim ii 1172). 

^^ ■w\riv owoffa pi^ovcn KaKol <T<f)eTipri(nv dvoiacs Cleanthes Hymn 18. 

54 Cic. N. D. iii 28, 70. 



208 ROMAN STOICISM 

virtue^^ ; those that he loves, he hardens^®. Earthquakes and 
conflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar cata- 
strophes in the sky, because the world needs to be purified from 
the wickedness that abounds^''. The punishment of the wicked, 
for instance by pestilence and famine, stands for an example to 
other men, that they may learn to avoid a like disaster ^^ Often, 
if the wicked have gone unpunished, the penalty descends on 
their children, their grandchildren, and their descendants^^ 

229. The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses 
betrays the weakness of the case, and the Stoics are 
power in the last resort driven to admit that the Deity is 

limited. neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that the 

sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. 
Thus Chrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that 
' the Deity cannot know everything®",' and though he ascribes to 
the Deity all power, yet when hard pressed he admits that he 
cannot do everything, and that ' there is a good deal of necessity 
in the matter®^' In this way he is forced back to the position 
which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken from the first^l After 
we have taken away from fate all that has life or meaning, 
there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to 
some ' natural necessity''^' This point once granted, we realize 
that it includes many of the detailed explanations previously 
given. Thus it is by 'natural necessity' that good cannot exist 
without evil ; that the past cannot be altered ; that the one 
must suffer for the many'^''; that the good cannot always be 

5^ ' patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter amat ; operibus, 
inquit, doloribus, damnis exagitentur, ut verum colligant robur' Sen. Dial, i 2, 6. 

^^ ' deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet ' ib. 4, 7 ; ' when a 
difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched 
you with rough young men ' Epict. Disc, i 24, i. 

5^ This view of Origen is conjecturally assigned to a Stoic source (Ai-nim ii 11 74). 
See also Philo ap. Euseb. praep. ev. viii 13. 

58 Plut. Sto. rep. 15, 2. 59 Cic. N. D. iii 38, 90 ; Sen. Beti. iv 32, i. 

^^ Arnim ii 1183. 

61 0ijcri 5^ -KoKh koX to ttjs avdyKt]^ /jLefuxOoLt Plut. Sto. rep. 37, 2. 

•"^ See above, § 222. 

^•* Seneca uses the term ' law of mortality ' : ' minime dis [irascamur] : non enim 
illorum, sed lege mortalitatis patimur quicquid incommodi accidit' Dial, iv 28, 4. 

** ' sciat ilia ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, et 
ex lis esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant ' Ep. 74, 20. 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 209 

separated from the bad*^'; that character grows by the defiance 
of pain ; that the individual is everywhere exposed to disaster 
from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake. 

230. The recognition of the limitations of divine power 
^ _, _, creates a new tie between gods and men. Men 

God and *=> 

men allied. are no longer the mere instruments of providence, 
they are its fellow-workers ; we may even go further, and boldly 
call them its fellow-sufferers®*'. God has given man what he 
could, not what he wouW^ ; he could not change the stuff on 
which he had to work*'^ ; if anything has not been granted to 
us, it could not have been granted ''''. Under such circumstances 
a sensible man will not find fault with the gods, who have done 
their best'^"; nor will he make appeals 'to them to which they 
cannot respond''^ Even less will he quarrel with a destiny that 
is both blind and deaf^, 

231. In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays 

•no part; it has no existence in the absolute sense 

^ ""^' of the term'^^ But in practical life, and from the 

limited point of view of the individuals concerned, fortune is 

everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have 

"^ ' di multa ingratis tribuunt. sed ilia bonis paraverunt : contingunt etiam 
malis, quia separari non possunt. excerpere singulos non potuerunt ' Ben. iv 28, i. 

"^ ' quicquid est quod nos sic vivere sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate et decs 
adligat ' Dial, i 5, 8. 

®'' ' [God] has given me the things which are in the power of the will. How 
was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance ? [He could not], and 
accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole possessions, household 
things, house, children, wife' Epict. Disc, iv i, 100. ' What says Zeus? since I was 
not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us' 
ib. i I, 10-12. 

"^ 'non potest artifex mutare materiam' Sen. Dial, i 5, 9 ; see also Plut. comm. 
not. 34, and Mayor on Cic. N. D. ii 34, 86. In technical language, the gods cannot 
control the i-K(XKoKovB7]n.a.ra. and awairTd/xeva, 

^^ ' quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit ' Sen. Beit, ii 29, 3. 

''" ' dementes itaque et ignari veritatis illis imputant saevitiam maris, immodicos 
imbres, pertinaciam hiemis' Dial, iv 27, 2. 

5"^ ' frustra vota ac studia sunt ; habebit quisque quantum illi dies primus adscripsit ' 
id. vi 21, 6. 

''2 • accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus : stant dura et inexorabilia ' 
id. xi 4, I. 

''^ See above, § 226, note 46. Fortune only has ultimate existence if identified 
with fate or providence ; ' sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam ; omnia eiusdem 
dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate ' Ben. iv 8, 3. 

A. 14 



210 ROMAN STOICISM 

just seen to be ascribed to ' natural necessity ' ; storms, ship- 
wrecks, plagues, wars, and tyranny^"*. Fortune therefore by no 
means excludes causality, but includes all events which are 
without meaning from the point of view of the individual''^; 
all advantages or disadvantages which he has not personally 
merited, and which are not designed for his individual discipline. 
So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first that she 
is mistress of human life ; and we may picture her as a tyrant, 
mocking and merciless, without principle and without policy^**. 
The further consideration of Fortune belongs to the department 
of Ethics. 

232. The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation 

to gods and men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, 
or man Centre in the question of free will. If we grant that 

free will ? ^^^q diviue power is to some extent less in range than 
the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute 
to it within that range some real choice between. alternatives, 
something of that individual power which common opinion 
attributes to kings ? or must we on the other hand regard the 
divinity as a mere symbol of an unchanging law, girt with the 
trappings of a royalty from which all real share in government 
has been withdrawn ? Is man again a mere puppet under the 
control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in 
creating the destiny to which he must submit .'' Supposing him 
to have this power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of 
reason, or do the animals also possess it ? 

233. To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct 
The stoics answer 'Yes ' or ' No,' The critics who wish to tie 
incline them down to one or other of the opposing views 

towards '^ '^ ° 

free will. complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and 

^^ ' fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas, tempestates, 
naufragia, ruinas, incendia ; deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus, impetus, etc' Cic. OJ^. ii 
6, 19; 'saepe...optimorum virorum segetem grando percussit. fert sortem suam 
quisque ' Sen. Ben. ii 28, 3. 

''^ So Fortune is technically defined as ' a cause not discerned by human reason ' ; 
oi 'ZtwikoI [ttip tvxv] cLlrLav ddTjXop dvOpwirli'iii XoyicfM^ Aet. plac. i 29, 7. 

''^ ' in regnum Fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius 
arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri ' Sen. £>ia/. vi ro, 6 ; ' hanc imaginem animo 
tuo propone, ludos facere fortunam ' £p. 74, 7. 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 211 

excited about their answer''''. They accept apparently both 
views as dogmas, asserting that 'all things take place by destiny' 
and that 'something rests with us''^' To the first dogma the 
whole of their treatment of physics points ; but the second is 
required as a postulate for any science of ethics''®^ The Stoics 
were in no way disposed to cut the knot by sacrificing one or 
the other of the principal parts of their philosophy. They go 
back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, 
and endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition 
to do away with the obvious contradiction. In this work they 
were observed to have a bias in favour of free will'^*'. The first 
sign of this bias we have already noticed in the vindication of 
the word 'possible^".' If our eyes are fixed merely on the move- 
ment of the heavenly bodies, we shall hardly need a term which 
prints on future events a character which it denies to those that 
are past. The astronomer can describe to us with equal precision 
an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the battle of 
Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word 'possible' 
opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense 
of right and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future 
events. However delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the 
main issue is determined when we say of gods and men that 
they ' can®\' 



^^ ' Chrysippus aestuans laboransque quonam pacto explicet et fato omnia fieri et 
essealiquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo ' Gellius N. A. vii 2, 15. 

"^^ €K€lvo yap 5rj to KarayeXaardTaTOV dircivTcov, rd ixlyiia, Koi i] cr^vodos rod Kal iirl 
rots dvdpwiroLS tl elcat, /cat elpfiov (seriem causarum) ovSkv tjttov elvai Oenom. apud 
Euseb./r. ev. vi p. 258 (Arnim ii 978); 'manente fato aliquid est in hominis arbitrio' 
Sen. N. Q. ii 38, 3. 

78a < y^j igitur virtus, si niiiil situm est in nobis ipsis?' Cic. Ac. ii 12, 39. 

^8 ' mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, 
una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret... 
altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, 
Chrysippus tanquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adpKcat se ad 
cos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberates volunt ' Cic. de Fato i^j, 39. 

^^ See above, § 221. 

^^ It seems clear thftt so faj; as ^ human thought goes 'possibility' is only an 
abstraction from that which 'a man can dS^' reached by widening the subject 'man' 
so as to include both superhuman powers and half-personified unseen forces. In 
other words dvvarbv is derived from ^vvarai., possibilitas from potest. Such a com- 
bination as fortuna potest, though quite common, is really a contradiction in terms. 

14 — 2 



212 ROMAN STOICISM 

234. In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and 

possibility, we must first distinscuish between outer 

Proximate . . 

and principal and inner compulsion, between 'proximate' and 

causes. . . , , _ _ , i • i 

principal causes. If a boy starts a cylinder 
rolling down hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it 
could not have rolled ; this is the proximate cause {irpoKa- 
rapKTLKi], proxijna). But the cylinder would not continue rolling 
except by an inner compulsion, a law within itself, by which it 
is the nature of cylinders to roll downwards^-. This is the leading 
or principal cause {irporjyov/jievr], antecedens or principalis). So 
neither in thought nor in action can a man form a judgment, 
unless there be a picture {^avraaia, visum) presented to his 
mind. The picture is a proximate cause ^^. But assent to the 
picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason, 
his will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma 
which is the foundation of ethics : ' assent is in our power.' 
Upon this rests the right of the philosopher to praise or blame, 
the right of the lawgiver to reward and punish. 

235. We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, 

the principal cause. With regard to the gods 

The divine . . . . , , , . -r^' 

nature their own disposition IS a law to them, their char- 

immutabie. acter holds them to their purpose, their majesty 
makes their decrees immutable^^. This is the final answer of 
philosophy, even though men cannot content themselves with it. 
Even amongst those most disposed to accept Stoic principles, 
there is a wish that the gods should be allowed a little play, 
a choice at any rate in small matters not hampered by conside- 
rations of destiny and morality^^ ; and upon this issue the poet 

8^ ' qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non 
dedit' Cic. de Fato 19, 43. 

^' ' quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen id visum 
proximam causam [habet], non principalem ' ib. 18, 42. 

^ ' non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas est. statuerunt 
quae non mutarent,...nec unquam primi consilii deos paenitet. vis sua illos in pro- 
posito tenet' Sen. Ben. vi 23, i and 2; '[deus] scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. 
semper paret, semel iussit ' Dial, i 5, 8. So Lucan : ' qua cuncta coercet se quoque 
lege tenens ' Phajs. ii 9, 10. 

^^ ' disco... liceat illi [sc. deo] hodieque decernere et ex lege fatorum aliquid 
derogare, an maiestatis diminutio sit et confessio erroris mutanda fecisse?' Sen. 
N. Q. i Prol. 3. 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 213 

may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the philosopher^". 
Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of the 
gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer^''. 

236. In the case of men free will comes accompanied by 

Man's ^ heavy burden of responsibility; for by its exer- 

wickedness. (.jgg ^ig^ have defied the gods and brought evil 

into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny, when 

their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer 

bears witness : 

' Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods ! For of us 
they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness 
of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained ^^.' 

'Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished, fools^^.' 

Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties 
prescribed by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has 
drawn them^". Of their wrong-doing the 'principal cause' lies 
in their own natures ; if these are from the first wholesome, the 
blows of fate are deadened ; if they are boorish and undisciplined, 
they rush of themselves into sin and error ^^ Into the further 
question, whether a man is responsible for his own nature, our 
authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in ethics a way 
will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent to 
undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into har- 
mony with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they 
act upon impulse, but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess 
will, nor are they proper subjects for praise and blame. 

^ 'illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur, | pro Latio obtestor ' Verg. Aen. xii 
819, 820. 

^'^ ' nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi ac potestate fatorum ' Sen. 
A'^. Q. ii 37, 2; ' deos quorum notitiam nulla res effugit, rogamus ; et illos vota non 
exorant, sed admonent ' Ben. v 25, 4. 

^^ Horn. Od. i 32-34 (Butcher and Lang's translation). ^^ il>. 7. 

^^ ' propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia 
non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur' A. Gellius JV. A. vii 2, 5. 

^1 ' contra ea Chrysippus argute disserit : ingenia, inquit, ipsa proinde sunt fato 
obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. nam si sunt per naturam primitus 
salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius 
tractabiliusque transmittunt. sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia...sua scaevitate 
et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt' A. Gellius N. A, \ii 2, 
6 to 8. 



214 ROMAN STOICISM 

237. Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent 

to the negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified 

No result • i i i • i r \ • ■ \ 

without With the highest type of cause. Action without 

^^^^^- cause (to avairiov), effect which is self-caused (to 

avTOfiuTov), are totally denied ^l Even if a man be given the 
choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, 
as when he must begin walking either with the right or with 
the left foot, there is always a cause which determines between 
them, though (as in all cases of ' chance ') it is not discernible by 
human reasoning^^. In this way destiny, cause, will are all 
brought into harmony; the dualism (which after all cannot be 
entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ' All things take place 
according to destiny, but not all things according to necessity*^'; 
thus is saved the principle of free choice (to i(f rifxlv). In other 
words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living, willing 
powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind non- 
moral unbending ' necessity ' of things, even whilst he admits that 
such necessity is there. 

238. Now that the various steps have been decided upon, 

by which our philosophy progresses from physics 
to ethics, it remains to connect them by a pathway 
in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that the 
steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show 
of reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical 
form is a convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction 
on the memory, and if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in 
the subject-matter, it at least so distributes them that they may 
be overlooked by the zealous and defied by the adventurous. 
Thus then the argument runs : — 

' If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the universe 
must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there must be an ordered 
universe ; and if so, there must be gods. Now if there are gods, the gods 
are good ; and if they are good, goodness exists ; and if goodness exists, so 

^^ Trpbs TOVTovs 6 XpOcriinros avTiXiyuv . . .lelire^ t6 dvalnov 6\us avvirapKTov etvai /cat 
TO avrbfiaTov Plut. Sto. rep. 23, 1 and 3. 

"^ -tI yap aWo ttoiouctlv oi tt)v tvxV'' '<■'*' '''° o-iiTbixaTov opi^dfievoi. alrlav ddrjXoP 
avdp<jnrlv(fi \oyL(r/x(^ ; Alex. Aph. de fato 8 (Arnim ii 970). 

"■' ib. 10 (Arnim ii 960). 



THE SUPREME PROBLEMS 21 5 

also does wisdom. And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and 
for men''^ If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and 
to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right actions are 
praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy deserve reward, 
and things blameable deserve punishment. 

Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be rewards 
and punishments^'^.' 

All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is 
already a Stoic ; to his opponent it seems to display its weak- 
ness at every joint. 

'® 6 eK TTjs ttoikLXtjs xopo'i ol (paffKovres elvai Trjv avTrjv dperrip Kal aKr]deiav dfdpbs 
/cat Oeov Them. Or. ii p. 27 c (Arnim iii 251). 
"** Alex. Aphrod. de fato 37 (Arnim ii 1005). 



CHAPTER X. 

RELIGION. 

239, We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy 
Philosophy ^° ^^^ formulation of religious belief and practice, 
crystallized. ^ Complete chauge comes over the spirit of our 
study. Until now we have been reaching out to observe, to 
define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every object, 
every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind 
can rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to 
learn from the East and from the West, from the idealist and the 
materialist, from the poet and from the critic. At last we have 
reached our highest point in the dogmas of the providential 
ordering of the universe and the moral obligation of the indi- 
vidual man ; dogmas which, as we have seen, are expounded in 
logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither estab- 
lish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain 
air of supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of 
common life, and to find the due application of its theories in the 
ordering of practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated 
as the first stage in this downward path ; it is the adaptation of 
philosophy to the language of social life and individual aspira- 
tion. By ' religion ' we mean here the theory of the existence 
and character of the gods ; the practice of ceremonies in their 
honour and of prayers for their favour ; and further, the theory 
and practice of divination. Upon all these questions philosophy 
sits as the supreme judge : external authority, embodied in the 
traditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim con- 
sideration, but not submission, from the intellect. 



RELIGION 217 

240. In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can 
easily distinguish certain historical changes. Zeno 

Historical ^ ^ ^ 

changes represents in the main the critical temper ; his tone 

is revolutionary and atheistic ; he contemplates the 
entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room 
for a purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, 
but find expression in a more cheerful spirit ; he has no bitter- 
ness as to the present, and much confidence in the future. With 
Chrysippus there sets in a tide of reconciliation ; the ingenuities 
of etymology and allegorical interpretation are set to work to 
prove that the old religion contains, at least in germ, the sub- 
stance of the new. The practical dangers of this method are 
obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics of Stoicism. 
It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by allowing 
him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning ; it 
is not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal con- 
version, by which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents 
men who give it no real submission, and increases its numbers 
at the cost of its sincerity. Posidonius stands out as the type 
of this weakness ; with him begins the subordination of philo- 
sophic principle to religious sentiment. In the first period of 
Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute ; many of the Stoics 
had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their fellow- 
countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn 
the Stoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in 
order that they might hold the honoured and lucrative posi- 
tions of defenders of the national religion \ show a lack both of 
sympathy and of critical discernment. All through the Roman 
period the Stoics held in theory a definite and consistent position, 
which will be expounded in this chapter ; in the application of 
their principles to practical problems they showed that variation 
of standard and temperament which history has always to record 
even of societies of honourable and intelligent men. But it must 
be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their devo- 
tion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in 
Marcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the 
man in whom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected 
to the play of old associations and prejudices. 

1 e.g. Theodor Mommsen, Roman History iii 432 (Dickson's translation). 



2l8 ROMAN STOICISM 

241. The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology 
^ , follows a very definite programme. Four dogmas 

Dogmas of J v i> fc> 

natural need to be established : (i) that gods exist; (ii) that 

religion. , ,. . , 

they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that 
they govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of 
men. To each of these dogmas is attached a series of ' proofs,' 
such as are still in vogue as ' evidences of natural religion^' 
The whole of this body of teaching may be treated by us as an 
exposition in popular language of the central dogma that ' the 
universe is ordered by providence.' We have therefore first to 
consider whether the language used is really appropriate to the 
philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much to accepted 
beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the ' proofs ' 
employed really correspond to the monistic point of view as 
understood by the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in 
principle are regaining their old position in connexion with prac- 
tical problems. Now the third and fourth dogmas, so far as 
they add to the first two, import nothing more than the general 
doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas, taken together, 
substitute for the abstract term ' providence ' the more concrete, 
and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a 
' god ' or ' gods.' The supreme question of the Stoic religion is 
therefore whether these terms are rightly used ; and it falls into 
two parts, the use of the singular ' god,' carrying with it associa- 
tions derived from Persism and Judaism ; and the use of the 
plural 'gods,' which carries with it a qualified approval of the 
polytheism of the Greek and Roman pantheons. In accordance 
with the general principles of our philosophy, the wider question 
must be first determined. 

242. The ' gods,' according to the Stoics, form a ' natura,' a 
The 'nature' department of the universe, a category including 
of gods. Qr,g Qj. niore individuals. Hence the title of Cicero's 

work, 'de natura deorum ' ; that is, 'of the class of beings called 
gods.' Each department of philosophy, according to the Stoic 
interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world 
of deities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, 

2 'omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem in partes 
quattuor. primum docent esse deos ; deinde quales sint ; turn, mundum ab iis 
administrari ; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis ' Cic. A^. D. ii i, 3. 



RELIGION 219 

the Logos or Word, whose divine being permeates the universe*. 
Metaphysics points us to Body in its purest form"*; to Spirit 
which reaches from end to end of the universe*^; to a first Cause, 
a Cause of causes, the initial Hnk in the unending chain of 
events**. If we look to the elements in their unceasing inter- 
change, we find deity in all things that shift and suffer meta- 
morphosis, in water, in earth, and in air" ; how much more then 
in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements, and in 
another is the creative rational substance from which the whole 
universe issues^? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in 
it, though not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused 
throughout all things^ Look towards this earth, which lies at 
the centre of the world-order; even in its most repulsive con- 
tents, in its grossest matter, there is deity^". Lift up your eyes 
to the heavens ; God is the all-encircling sea of fire called 
Aether" ; he is sun^^ and stars ^^ Consider the universe in its 
history; God is its creator^^ its ruler, its upholder ^^ Analyze 

^ ' \6yov, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat ' Lact. ver. sap. 9 (Arnim i 160) ; ' rationem 
deum vocat Zeno' Min. Felix 19, 10 {ii>.); '[Zeno] rationem quandam, per omnem 
naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam putat' Cic. JV. D. i 14, 36. 

* dpxw ^£0'' T^f TfdvTwv, aQfia ovra to Kadapwrarov, inridevTO 6 re Xpvcrnnros /cat 
Zt^j'wi/ Hippol. Z";^//. 21 (Arnim ii 1029). 

^ t6 81' o\ov K€xw/D77/c6s TTvev/xa debv doyfj-ari^ovaiv Theoph. Atitol. i 4 (Arnim ii 

1033)- 

® ' ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent ' Sen. Be7i. iv 7, 2 ; 'hie est 
causa causarum' N. Q. ii 45, 2. 

^ ' [Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse], ut aquam et 
terram et aera' Cic N. D. i 15, 39. 

^ ' [Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse ' ib. ; ' et deum ipsum ignem 
putavit [Zeno]' August, adv. Ac. iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157) ; rhv debv irvp voepbv elTrovres 
Euseb./r. ev. 15 (Arnim ii 1050). 

^ oixjiav 8e deoS Ti-qviiiv ixiv (prjai rov oXov Kdcr/xov Kal rbv ovpavbv Diog. L. vii 148 ; 
' Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse' Cic. IV. D. i 14, 37 ; ' vis iUum vocare 
mundum? non falleris ' Sen. N. Q. ii 45, 3; 'quid est deus? quod vides totum et 
quod non vides totum; solus est omnia' ii>. i Prol. 13 ; ' luppiter est quodcunque 
vides quocunque moveris ' Lucan Phars. ix 580. 

1" Arnim ii 1037 and 1039. 

" ' Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus ' Cic. Ac. ii 41, 126. 

^^ ' Cleanthes... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat ' ib. 

1^ '[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit ' N. D. i 14, 36; '[Cleanthes] 
divinitatem omnem tribuit astris ' ib. 14, 37. 

^^ 'tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare' Sen. Ben. iv 7, 1. 

^^ ' rectorem custodemque univergi ' N. Q. ii 45, i ; ' stant beneficio eius omnia ' 
Ben. iv 7, r. 



220 ROMAN STOICISM 

it; he is its soul^", its mind^''. Strain your sight to perceive the 
meaning of all things: he is fate^* ; he is nature^^; he is provi- 
dence; he is necessity^". And if we look forward to the problems 
of politics and ethics, we must say that God is the Universal Law 
that calls for the reverence of gods and men as a community^', 
and equally demands, under the name of conscience, the unhesi- 
tating obedience of the individuaP^ Lastly, in the history of 
mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic 
masters recognised the element of divinity^l In the language 
of to-day, God is the pole in which all the parallels of human 
inquiry merge, the x of the problem of the universe, the unknown 
that is known in his works. 

243. That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take 
Unity of over from the Cynics^* (who therein follow Socrates), 

^°^- and from the general opinion; without making this 

a formal dogma, they constantly assume it tacitly by using the 
term ' God ' (o ^eo?, dens). With equal readiness they accept in 
use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception, as di itn- 
mortales, vis divina. The interpretation of this apparent conflict 
of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic 
monism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the 
creative fire in its changing shapes : just as the virtues are 
many, and yet there is but one Virtue appearing under different 
circumstances : so there is but one Deity, appearing under many 

1^ Arnim i 532. 

^'' ' [Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae animo atque 
mente ' Cic. N. D. i 15, 39; 'quid est deus? mens universi ' Sen. N. Q. i Prol. 13; 
cf. Arnim i 157. 

^^ Arnim iii Ant. 35; 'hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris ' Sen. 
Ben. iv 7, 2. 

^^ 'quid aliud est natura quam deus?' ib. i. 

^" ' [Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum ' Cic. N. D.i i^, 
39 ; cf. Arnim ii 1076. 

^^ oi^re ^poTols yipas dWo ti fj-et^ov \ ovre deols, r) kolvov ad vd/iov ev SIktj v/xvelv 
Cleanthes Hymn 38, 39 ; ' naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam esse censet ' Cic. N. D. i 

u. 36- 

^^ ' [Clirysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae atque 
magistra officiorum sit, lovem dicit esse' ib. 15, 40. 

^ ' [Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti [deos 
dicit esse]' ib. 15, 39; ' Persaeus...inventa ipsa divina dicit' ib. 15, 38. 

^* ' Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]' ib. i 13, 32. 
e 



RELIGION 221 

names^^ This view the assailants of Stoicism reduce to the 
absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and mortal, whilst 
others are uncreated 2"; and again that Zeus is worse than a 
Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those 
seemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is 
nothing so foul that he does not in turn become-''. No one how- 
ever who is familiar with the many points of view from which 
Greek philosophers approach the problem of ' the one and the 
many' will be readily disturbed by this rather superficial 
criticism. 

244. In its practical application the belief in the one-ness 
of God assimilated itself to the worship of the 
Greek Zeu? and the Latin Jove or Juppiter. It 
would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace the 
growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in 
connexion with the names of these two deities, which in the 
mythologies are members of societies. We have already sug- 
gested that the most direct impulse came from Persism : but in 
connexion with Roman history it is important to notice that a 
similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion-^ The 
nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated 
by the Hymn of Cleanthes^^ ; the intimate sense of companion- 
ship between Zeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps 
with a tinge of Cynic sentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. 
A special emphasis is laid on the fatherhood of Zeus. This 
attribute could be traced back to the poems of Homer, and is 
prominent throughout Virgil's Aeneid^". It can be explained 

"^ Kvdiar aOavdruv, woKvihw fie... Tied Cleanthes Hymn i and 2; ' Stoici dicunt 
non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae pro ratione officiorum 
variis nominibus appellatur' Servius ad Verg. Georg. i 5 (Arnim ii 1070). 

'^'^ 01 fxev yevriTol ehat /cat (pdaprol {Xeyovrai.], oi 5' dyii'TjToi Plut. Sto. rep. 38, 5 
(quoting from Chrysippus). 

^■^ Galen qual. inc. 6 (Arnim ii 1056). 

^^ 'ne hoc quidem [illi altissimii viri] crediderunt, lovem, qualem in Capitolio et 
in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed eundem quem nos lovem 
intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius 
dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit...idem Etruscis visum est ' Sen. 
A/'. Q. ii 45, I and 3. 

^^ See above, § 97. 

^* ' hominum sator atque deorum ' Aen. i 254, and so passim. 



222 ROMAN STOICISM 

in connexion with the growth of all living substances^^ but has 
a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods 
the inheritance of reason ^^. But the Homeric association of 
Zeus with mount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in 
favour of the Persian conception of a god dwelling in heaven ^^ 
Further the Stoics agree with the Persians that this god must 
not be thought of as having the form of any animal or man** ; 
he is without form^^ but capable of assuming all forms^*"'. 

r 245. In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one 
Definition ^^^^ suprcme much exceeds in importance the con- 

of 'god.' ception of a multiplicity of gods. We may therefore 

reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of the Stoic 
theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of the 
word ' god.' As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs 
thus : ' a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing 
to what it wills and made like to all things^V This definition 
corresponds satisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics ; but 
even so we must notice that the statement ' God is necessity^® ' 
is an exaggeration, since ' necessity ' is entirely devoid of the 
qualities of reasonableness and plasticity. We find a different 
definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which is emphasized by the 
Stoics of the transition period generally: — 'God is a living being, 

^1 ' turn pater oninipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in greniium laetae 
descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus ' Virgil Georg. ii 

325-327- 

^^ This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text of 
Cleanthes Hymn 4 ; Pearson well compares KOLvwvlav 5' inrapxeiv irpos d\\-q\ovs 
(scil. 6eou Kul avdpihiTiiiv) dia rh Xdyov /xer^xetz' Euseb. praep. ev. xv 15. See 
above, § 97. 

^•* ovpavbs d^ eariv -q eaxo-Ti] TvepKpipeia, €v ^ irav idpvrai to deiov Diog. L. vii 138 ; 
, fTrei eKel icrri to KvpiwTaTov /x^pos Trjs tou k6(Thov xjyvxv^ Corn. JV. D. 8. 

3* [Xpi;(Ti7r7r6s <^7y(rt] iraiSapiwSws \iyeadaL Kal ypdcpeadai /cat irXaTTecrdai deo^s 
dvdpuiroeideis, 8v rpoirov Kal TroXets Kal iroTafio'is Philod. de piet. 11 (Arnim ii 1076) ; 
' est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nee cor nee caput habet ' Sen. Apoc. 8, i. 

3-^ ' Stoici negant habere ullam forniam deum' Lact. de ira 18 (Arnim ii 1057). 

^^ In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may say (but 
only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form ; lUav ^x^' iJ.op<l>y]v to 
a^aipo€td4s Frag. Here. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060) ; ' quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo 
deo?' Cic. N. D. i 10, 24. 

^'' irvevixa voepov Kal irvpudes, ovk 'ix^v /^ev fj.op(pi]v, pLera^dWov 5' els 6 ^ov\eTai 
Kal awe^oixowifxevov irdatv Aet. plac. i 6, r. 

38 See above, § 242, note 20. 



RELIGION 223 

blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind ^l' This defini- _ 
tion points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion. The 
difference between the two definitions marks then the step that 
has here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property 
of personality; we pass from a 'rational spirit' to a 'living being.' 
There is the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic 
substance to a beneficent will. The existence of deity in the 
first sense has been displayed to us by our whole analysis of the 
universe; it is with regard to the existenceof deity in the second 
sense that we need the constant support of the dogma of provi- 
dence, expounded in the technical proofs which we now proceed 
to examine. 

246. The first Stoic dogma is ' that gods exist ' ; and of this 
the first and most familiar 'proof is that which 

Gods exist : 

the proof dcpeuds upon common consent. Amongst all men 

rom consen . ^^^ .^_^ ^j^ nations there is a fixed conviction that 
gods exist ; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven 
on the minds of all men^". To this proof the Stoics attach the 
highest possible importance ; but its justification, as we have 
seen, presents great difficulties^^ Cleanthes, the most religiously 
minded of the early Stoics, had not troubled to conceal his con- 
tempt for the opinions of the crowd^- ; and the ridiculous belief 
in Tartarus'*^ is as widespread as that in the gods. Here then 
we must distinguish; it is not sufficient that a conception should 
be universal, if it appeals most to foolish folk, and even so is de- 
caying^. We must not however at this moment inquire into the 

^^ debv voovfj.ev ^i2ov /xa/edptoc Kal dcpdapTov kclI evTroirjTiKbv avOpiLiruiv Plut. Sto. rep. 
38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii 147 as indicating the view of the 
Stoics generally. 

•*" ' inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat ; omnibus enim innatum est et 
in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos ' Cic. iV. Z). ii 4, 12 ; ' nee ulla gens usquam est 
adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat ' Sen. Ep. 117, 6. 

^ See above, § 158. 

■^^ o\j yap ttXtjOos ^x^' cwerriv Kplaiv oOre diKaiav | o^re Ka\r]u Cleanthes apud 
Clem. Al. Strom, v 3 (Arnim i 559). 

^^ See below, § 294. 

■" ' videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse...quae 
[enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae ilia quae quondam credebantur apud 
inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum enim commenta delet dies' Cic. A'^ D. 
ii 2, 5. 



224 ROMAN STOICISM 

causes of this belieP ; for this is to pass from the question at 
issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that the 
value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine 
of * inborn conceptions,' which we have already discussed"*®. 
Without going over the whole ground again, the substance of 
the argument as applied to the present question may be thus 
stated. The mind of each individual man is by descent akin 
to the universal reason (Koivo<i A0709, imiversa ratioy. There- 
fore all men carry with them from their birth predispositions in 
favour of certain pre-conceptions ; and the fact that these pre- 
conceptions are common to all is evidence of their divine origin. 
These predispositions by the growth and training of the indi- 
vidual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on 
the other hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. 
Now all men are born with a predisposition to explain what is 
beyond their own reasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living 
and reasoning agent. The belief in gods is therefore a ' precon- 
ception ' ; and if it is confirmed by growth and experience, it 
must be of divine origin and therefore self-proving. In the 
language of our own times, the belief in deity cannot be dis- 
pensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames human 
reason. 

247. The second proof ' that gods exist ' is particularly 
associated with the name of Chrysippus ; it may 

The proof of • i i 

the 'higher be summcd up by saymg 'there must be a Being 
^'"^' higher than man.' We begin by assuming that 

reason is the highest power in the universe*® ; an axiom which 
is always subject to limitation on account of the existence of 
' natural necessity.' According to the Stoics, reason is common 
to gods and men ; if, for the sake of argument, this is denied, 
then reason is possessed by men alone, for we can certainly find 
no better name than 'god' for higher reasoning beings*". If 

45 As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) N. Z). ii 5, [3. 

^6 See above, § 158. 

*'' 7) Tuv o\(av cp6(ns inrb ffvyyevovs o^e^Xet KaToXafi^dveadaL tov \6yov Sext. math. 
ix 93, see § 149. 

48 See the next note. 

^ ' si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius ? in eo enim 
solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius ' Cic. A/'. D. ii 6, 16. 



RELIGION 225 

then there exists something greater than human reason can 
produce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater 
than man, that is, it must be the work of the gods. But the 
heavenly constellations are such a work ; therefore they are the 
work of the gods, and therefore gods exist'". To this argument 
two others are supplementary. First, human reason itself must 
be derived from some source,- and what other can we name 
but the deity^^? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be 
the supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation ^l 
The same arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno'* ; nay, 
so cogent are they that they are in part accepted even by 
Epicurus'^ 

248. There follow two proofs connected with gradations 
The proofs ^" ^^^ scalc of being. Earth and water are the 
from the |-^o lower and grosser elements ; and since tempera- 

elements and *=" '■ 

the universe. mcnt depends greatly upon climate, we find that 
men and the animals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air 
and fire are the higher and more refined elements ; how then 
can we think otherwise than that they are the home of more 
lofty beings'-' ? Then again the universe is either a simple or a 
composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the 
harmony {au/xTrddeia, concentiLs) of its parts ; it is therefore 
simple. A simple body must be held together by spirit in some 

'" 'si enim ' inquit [Chrysippus] ' est aliquid in rerum natura, quod potestas humana 
efficere non possit ; est certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius, atqui res caelestes 
ab homine confici non possunt. est igitur id, quo ilia conficiuntur, homine melius, id 
autem quid potius dixeris quam deum ? ' ib. 

°^ ' et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et earn 
quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo arripuit ? ut 
ait apud Xenophontem Socrates' ib. 18. 

^2 'esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, 
insipientis arrogantiae est ' ib. 16. ■• 

^^ See above, § 83. 

^ ' placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse 
aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius' Cic. N. D. ii 17, 46. See however Mayor's 
note. 

^' ' tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum 
caelestium...si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere 
videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem 
esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?' etc. Cic. N. D. ii 6, 17. For the 
original argument of Chrysippus see Sext. math, ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014). 

A. 15 



226 ROMAN STOICISM 

one of its grades, either as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held 
together merely by unity, like stones or logs, admit of very 
simple changes only ; but the universe admits of every kind of 
change and development, and yet keeps together ; it must there- 
fore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that is by 
soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its 
parts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater 
than man, and possessing soul and reason, is god^l 

249. The proof from the good gifts of providence has been 

already given in substance ; we may however notice 
from the sharp reply given to Epicurus, who maintains 

providence. . r ^ /^ r 

that the wondrous contrivances oi the Creator tor 
the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles. 
' As well contend,' replies the Stoic, ' that words and verses come 
from the chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, 
and that the poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking 
together a sufficient quantity of these in a box, and then pouring 
them out on the ground ! Chance would hardly produce a 
single verse •'^^.' The terrors of the universe, its storms, earth- 
quakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which seem to militate 
against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth prooP^ 
A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the 
movements of the heavenly bodies^^, we have sufficiently con- 
sidered in connexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian 
thought. 

250. There remain two proofs, which at first sight may 

appear singular, but are nevertheless very strongly 

The proof , , r r 1 ■ , ;. . . ^ 

from urged, the proofs irom worship and divination ; 

wors ip. which according to the Stoics are practices 

that must be justified, but cannot be justified without the 

^^ 'haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non 
possent, nisi ea iino divino et continuato spiritu continerentur ' Cic. iV. D. ii 7, ig. 
Here of. Sext. mat/i. ix 78 to 85 (Arnim ii 1013). 

S7 Cic. JV. D. ii 37, 93. 

^^ The third in the exposition of Cleanthes : ' tertiam [causam dixit Cleanthes 
esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus...pestilentia terrae motibus' 
ib. 5, 14. 

^3 'quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli ' ib. 5, 15. 



RELIGION 227 

postulate of the existence of gods. The proof from worship is 
best known in the paradoxical form, ' if there are altars, there 
are gods,' which is attributed to Chrysippus®". This proof is fused 
by Seneca with the proof from general consent®^ ; but its true 
character seems to be different. ' Without gods there can be no 
piety, for piety is the right worship of the gods. Without gods 
there can be no holiness, for holiness is a right attitude towards 
the gods. Without gods there can be no wisdom, for wisdom is 
the knowledge of things human and divine"^. But without piety, 
holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be con- 
structed. Therefore gods exist.' The argument in its simplest 
form is attributed to Zeno himself. ' It is reasonable to honour 
the gods. But it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent. 
Therefore gods exisfl' 

251. The final argument is that from divination ; which is 
remarkable in view of the close association between 

The proof 

from divination and astrology, and the derivation of the 

divination. , ^ ..^ ,.,^, , 

latter irom a scientmc system which nnds no place 
for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the fore- 
casting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, 
upon the hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of 
coming events. In accepting the truth of divination the Stoics 
were following the Socratic tradition**-*. This belief was accepted 
by all the great Stoic masters, and was a ' citadel ' of their 
philosophy"'. It is true that on this point Panaetius exercised 
the privilege of a suspense of judgment**" ; but all the more did 
his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon the subject, on 
which he composed five books"", of which the spirit is preserved 
to us in Cicero's books de Divinatione^. To Roman writers their 

"" Arnim ii 1019. 

"' ' [non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda numina 
et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia' Sen. Ben. iv 4, 2. 

"^ Sext. math, ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017). 

** i^- '33 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as a 'transparent 
sophistry ' ; but at the present time there is a widespread tendency towards its 
revival ; see Hoffding, Philosophy of Religion, ch. iii. 

"■• Xen. Mem. i i, 2. "^ Cic. Div. i 5, 9 and 6, 10. 

"" ib. 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149. 

"^ Divination is based upon the cm/xTra^eta TtDv o\wv (continuatio coniiinctioque 
naturae), Cic. Div. ii 69, 142. See also Epict. Disc, i 14, and above, § 248. 

15—2 



228 ROMAN STOICISM 

inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate though 
half- forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining this 
belief ^^ ; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi 
maintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned 
with even greater reluctance"". Nevertheless the whole group of 
beliefs was quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of 
the empire, if we may judge from the words of Epictetus — ' what 
need have I to consult the viscera of victims and the flight of 
birds, and why do I submit when he (th4 diviner) says " it is 
for your interest?" Have I not within me a diviner'"? ' 

252. Our next enquiry is 'of what kind are the gods?' 
_. . ' what are their qualities ? ' Here the Stoics break 

Divine ^ 

qualities. more decidcclly with tradition. Antipater of Tarsus, 

as we have seen, defined the deity as 'a living being, happy, 
immortal and benevolent towards men''^' It is clear that this 
description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme 
deity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general 
conflagration''^. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and 
of reason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; 
but we have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against 
those that hold that the world is governed by blind destiny and 
chance. In stating that the gods are happy the Stoics agree 
with Epicurus ; but according to them this happiness consists 
not in rest, but in activity. In this distinction the whole 
difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals of happiness, 
that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight. The Stoics 
affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters of the 
greatest concern : and that any other conception is unworthy 
of them''^. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the 

''^ ' [Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia ' Sen. JV. Q, ii 32, 2. 

^^ ' non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica sedes | quod 
siluit' Liican Phars. v 111-113 ; cf. 86-96. 

^^ Epict. Disc, ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very severely 
criticized by Zeller : ' these vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests prepondera- 
ting over science' Stoics, etc. p. 280. But the belief in fiavriKTj is traced back to 
Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly ' practical ' men in the sense in which Zeller 
seems to use the word. 

"^ See above, § 245. ''^ See above, § 209. 

73 Cic. A". Z). ii 30, 77. 



RELIGION 229 

happiness of men is plainly the doctrine of providence ; and in 
making benevolence an attribute of deity''"' the Stoics turn their 
backs for ever upon the belief in gods that are greedy, jealous, 
mischievous, and haughty ; that is, not merely on such deities as 
were still a part of the creed of the rustic^', but also such as had 
provided the problems of the whole of Greek tragedy, and given 
the opportunity for the stinging attacks of Epicurus on religion'®. 
In examining these attributes of the gods we have anticipated 
the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth categories ; 
namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods. 
Incidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the 
logical importance of definition and the four categories. Defini- 
tion implies in advance what is contained in each of the categories, 
and each category contains implicitly what is contained in the 
other three ; but the logical mechanism enables us so to express 
the doctrine that it is for ever fixed on the memory. Nor can 
we easily imagine that the world will ever forget this conception 
of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being; in his 
attributes immortal, immutable", active and benevolent ; in his 
disposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great 
work the universe, and in his relation to his creatures constantly 
concerned for their comfort and happiness. 

253. It must by this time be plain that the whole atmo- 
sphere of Stoic religion was alien to that in which 

Stoicism and i o 

the old the gods of the Greek and Roman mythology had 

taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods 
in the Stoic system has therefore no theoretical importance ; it 
was a work of political adaptation. The Stoics themselves 
doubtless believed that they were restoring the original meaning 
of the pantheon, and freeing it from corruptions for which the 

^"^ '[di immortales] nee volunt obesse nee possunt. natura enim illis mitis et 
placida est' Sen. Dial, iv 27, i ; ' di aequali tenore bona sua per gentes populosque 
distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse ' Ben. vii 31, 4. 

''^ ' Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura | lenis 
ineedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis ' Hor. C. iii 18, r— 4. 

''•' 'tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum' Luer. R. N. i 102. 

'^ ' Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow ? No, his look is fixed as becomes 
him who is ready to say — Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail ' Epict. Disc, ii 
8, 26 (quoting from Hom. //. i 526). ' . ' 



230 ROMAN STOICISM 

poets were responsible. The original meaning was also, in their 
judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion was already in 
revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and on moral 
grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible 
and revolting''* ; the worship of them too often an attempt to 
silence the voice of conscience''^ The Stoics proposed to make 
the myths S3^mbols of scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive 
to honest living. Their interpretation was in the main physical; 
the gods represent respectively the heavenly bodies, the elements, 
the plants ; the amours of the gods represent the continuous 
work of the great creative forces of nature. To a lesser extent 
explanations are found in society and in history. These inter- 
pretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the 
doctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole 
process may seem to the modern critic puerile, because the 
practical occasion for it has passed away ; but there are still to 
be found thinkers who hold that by such processes alone it is 
possible for human thought to progress without civil society 
being disrupted. 

254. According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery 
^, „ . heaven, the chief of the elements, the source of all 

The Stoic ' ■ ^ ' 

metamor- life*"; Juno is the softer air, into which the fire 

enters to become the germinating seed*\ Thus 
she is called sister as a fellow-element*^ and wife as an instrument 
in the creative process. From a slightly different point of view 
Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter ; and 
their union as the commencement of the Creation, when God 

'* ' sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum luppiter ineptias poetarum, 
quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua ; alius adulterutn ilium induxit et 
abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in homines, alius parricidam et 
regni alieni paternique expugnatorem ' Sen. Dia/. vii 26, 6. 

'^ This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of Hannibal ; 'hoc 
scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | lovem se placare posse donis, hostiis ; | et 
operam et sumptum perdunt ' Plant. Hud, 22 to 24. 

*" ' [Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quern homines lovem appellarent ' 
Cic. JV. D. i 15, 40. 

*^ ' aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, lunonis nomine consecratur...effeminarunt 
autem eum lunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo moUius ' ib. ii 26, 66. 

"^ 'quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana' Serv, 
ad Verg. Aen. i 47 (Arnim ii 1066). 



RELIGION 231 

spread throughout matter the seed Logoi^^ So again Hephaestus 
(Vulcan) represents fire ; Poseidon (Neptune) is the sea ; Dis 
(Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the earth^'*. Demeter (Ceres) 
again is the corn-land ^^ and Persephone (Proserpine) the growing 
crop ; as such she is lost to her mother and lamented by her for 
six months in every year^^ Apollo is the sun, Luna or Diana 
the moon^''; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos 
{Xp6vo<i) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because 
all that is begotten of time is in turn consumed by time*^. 
Athene or Minerva is the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has 
given birth without a partner, because she is the divine Reason 
by which he made the universe'*^ Chrysippus wrote at length 
on the allegorical interpretation of the three Graces^"; and the 
work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of this system. 
Other gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications 
of actions or feelings ; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and 
Pothos (regret) of feelings ; Hope ('EXtti'?, Spes), Justice {AiKrjy 
IiLstitid), and Wise Law i^vvoybla) of actions^^ So in particular 
Ares (Mars) stands for war, or the setting of array against 
array. 

255. We have already noticed that the gods that are bor- 
Minor rowed from the popular mythology do not possess 

deities. ^|-^g divine attribute of immortality; and in some of 

^^ Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers later, concurred 
in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this principle of interpretation to a ' dis- 
graceful ' representation found in Argos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine 
seed in her mouth ; yet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of 
the conception of the Virgin 'Mary through the ear ('quae per aurem concepisti ' 
in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated the absurdity of 
criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of social decency, and by so 
doing relieved the pious souls of his own day from a real source of distress. See 
Arnim ii 1071-1074. - 

** Cic. N. D. ii 26, ^(). 85 ib. i 15, 40 and ii 26, dd. . , 

®^ ' Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre 
fingunt' ib. ^'^ ib. 27, 68. 

^ /cat 6 xP^''os Se roiovrbv t'l icrn ' darravaTaL yap vw' avTov to, yivdfieva ev avri^ 
Cornutus N. D. 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus is thus explained by the 
Stoics : ' caelestem naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare 
voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum " Cic. 
N. D. ii 24, 64. 

^ Justin Apol. i 64 (Arnim ii 1096). ^^ Sen. Ben. i 3, 9. 

^^ A&t. plac. i 6, 13. 



232 ROMAN STOICISM 

them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent. There was 
thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature 
of lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already con- 
stituted by the popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the 
whole universe is full of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others 
mischievous. Highest in the former class stand the divine 
messengers, who everywhere throughout the universe keep watch 
over the affairs of men and bring report thereof to God**-. This 
was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the principles of 
Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda^^ and in the poems 
of Hesiod^*. These watchmen are however not the spies of a 
cruel tyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find 
them early in Roman literature identified with the stars"^, and 
this may account for the special recognition of the twins Castor 
and Pollux, as kindly daemons that protect sailors from ship- 
wreck^*^. There are also spirits which are careless, idle, or 
mischievous"^ ; these the deity may employ as his executioners^^ 
A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil or mis- 
chievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan 
of Judaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. 
Amongst daemons are also to be recognised the souls of men 
parted from their bodies, some good and some evil'"'. All 
beliefs of this kind are specially characteristic of the type of 
Stoicism introduced by Posidonius"°. We may specially note 
the belief in the Genius which accompanies each man from his 

^'^ (paal 8^ elvai Kal rivas dai/Movas av9piiiwo}v crvfiirddeiap ^x'"''''"'^^ iiroTTTas tuv 
avOpwireiuv TrpayfidTuv Diog. L. vii 151. 

8^ ' asya [varunasya] spaso na ni misanti bhurnayah' Rigv. ix 73, 4. 

^* rpis yap fivploi elalv iivi x^o»'t TrovXv^oTeipri | dddvaroL Zr]vds (pijXaKes dvrjTuv 
dvdpunriov Hes. Oj>. et Di. 252, 253 ; see also § 33. 

^5 'et alia signa de caelo ad terrain accidunt; | qui'st imperator divum atque 
hominum luppiter, | is nos per gentis hie alium alia disparat, | hominum qui facta 
mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus ' Plaut. Rud. 8-12. 

"® KoX To^Tij} <TVfi<p(i}V€L TO Tovs ALocTKoOpovs dyadoijs Tivas elvai daifiovas "(TWTTJpas 
evo-A/xwf veu)v" Sext. mai^. ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); ' clarum Tyndaridae sidus ab 
infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates' Hor. C. iv 8, 31 and 32. 

"^ (pa^Xovs Salfxovas dir^XiTre 'KpvaLTnros Plut. de/. orac. 17. 

"^^ KCLddirep ol irepl X-pvcrnnrov otovrai <piX6(T0(f)0i (pavXa 5ai/x6vLa wepivoareiif, ols oi 
deol dr]/jiiois xpcDcTat KoXacrrals iwl roi)s dvocriovs Kal ddiKOvs dvdpibirovs qu. Rom. 51. 

8^ Arnim ii r loi. 

100 < Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit immortalium 
animorum ' Cic. Div. i 30, 64. 



RELIGION 233 

birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the guardian 
angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in 
the Roman world "\ 

256. The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities 

with the recognition of men raised to the sky for 

Deified men. . . 1 • r 11 01 

their services to their fellow-men. buch were 
Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters ; Castor and Pollux ; 
Aesculapius the inventor of medicine ; Liber the first cultivator 
of the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder 
of the city. These are deities established by the laws of each 
city^^'l The Stoics do not raise their own leaders to this 
position, but (as we shall see in dealing with the question of 
the ' wise man ') they assign to them almost equal honours. 
This part of their theory appears to open the door to great 
practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of 
the sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their 
lifetime, and those of the Roman emperors that their predeces- 
sors should be worshipped as such after their death. But it does 
not seem that such an abuse actually occurred ; and this part of 
the theory of gods always seems to have been regarded by the 
Stoics rather as an explanation of historical facts than as a prin- 
ciple of civic submission. 

257. Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly 

to the department of politics, so far as public wor- 
'^' ship is concerned, and of ethics, so far as individuals 

are concerned. It may however be convenient to anticipate the 
discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate the Stoic 
views of religion apart from their practical application. We 
must therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accor- 
dance with its Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in 

^"^ ' Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae, mortalis 
in unum | quodque caput' Hor. Ep. ii 2, 187-189; ' sepone in praesentia, quae 
quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari deum, ex eorum numero 
quos Ovidius ait " de plebe deos" ' Sen. Ep. no, r ; ' Zeus has placed by eveiy man 
a guardian, every man's daemon, to whom he has committed the care of the man ; a 
guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived' Epict. Disc, i 14, 1-2. M. Aurelius 
identifies this daemon with the principate (To himself v 27). 

1"^ A'Qt. plac. i 6, 9 and 15 ; Cic. N. D. ii 24, 62. 



234 ROMAN STOICISM 

the popular language atheistic. -Not only did it follow the 
principles of Persism in condemning altogether the worship of 
images, but it also poured scorn upon the building of temples 
and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book on ' the 
State ' forbids the making of temples and images, because they 
are unworthy of the deity"*; an idea which the Romans recog- 
nised as not altogether strange to their own history, seeing that 
for a hundred and seventy years (presumably during the Etrus- 
can supremacy) no images had been known at Rome"^. The 
Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly expressed by silence, 
but it finds words in Seneca^'"^. Although they thus denounced 
in principle the whole existing system of public worship, the 
Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it 
as a seemly and ancient custom"**; and the Roman Stoics took 
a special pride in the reputation of the city for attention to 
' religion,' that is to say, to the ritual observances due to the 
gods"'. 

258. Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own 
Stoic ideal of worship, namely the rendering of praise 

hymnoiogy. ^^^ honour to the gods by means of hymns. ' It 
is reasonable,' said Zeno, ' to honour the gods"®.' The hymn 
of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find 
expression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual 
conviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnoiogy "I The 
value of music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of 

103 Ainim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan : ' estne dei sedes, nisi terra 
et pontus et aer, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid quaerimus ultra?' Phars. ix 

578-9- 

^"^ ' Varro dicit antiques Romanes plus annos centum et septuaginta deos sine 
simulacro coluisse : "quod si adhuc mansisset, castius di observarentur " ' August. 
Civ. De. iv 31. 

"^ 'ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor ' Sen. Ben. i 6, 3. 

106 ( To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the 
custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a 
thing which belongs to all to do ' Epict. Manual 31,5. 

"■^ ' si conferre volumus noitra cum externis ; ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam 
inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum superiores ' Cic. N. D. 
ii 3. 8. 

"® See above, § 250. 

^"'' 80/)' av Tiii-qdhTes dfiei^d/jLeada tre rifirj, \ v/jLvovvres to, cd, Ipya diTjpeKes, us 
iwioiKe Hymn 36, 37. . ^ 



RELIGION 235 

Babylon"". Posidonius laid it down that the best and most pious 
worship of the gods is to honour them with pure mind and 
voice"\ Epictetus speaks continually in this spirit, and gives 
us examples of prose hymnology : ' great is God, who has given 
us implements with which we shall cultivate the earth ^^- ' ; ' I 
give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this 
thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to compre- 
hend this thy administration "^' Thus ought we 'to sing hymns 
to the deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits"^' 

259. Prayer to the gods may be taken as more character- 
istic of private and individual worship, though the 

Prayer, 

paradox is worthy of attention that men should 
ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly"^ The 
whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon 
Stoic lines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can 
be added to his exposition but the evidence that his teaching 
is in fact Stoic. Let us then enter the temples and listen to 
men's prayers. First they beg the doorkeeper for admission, 
though the deity is equally near to them outside ; then they 
raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths close to the 
ear of an image"**. To the unlistening deity they pour out 
wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share 
their secret"^. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, 
and make themselves out younger than they are"^ Another 
prays for riches"^, or for some other thing that will do him 
harm^^". Undertakers pray for a busy season ^'^^ Parents and 
nurses (and these are the nearest to innocence) pray for the 
success of their children in life^^^ They may be excused, but 

"" irepl Toivvv ttjs 5ia t(cDi' fjLov)(nKQv {t)ou deiov T€i{/j,Tis ei/)ij)rai /xev avrdpKws Kai 
irp&repov Philod. mus. iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64). 

"^ ' cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus 
plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura Integra incorrupta et mente et voce vene- 
remur' Cic. N. D. ii 28, 71. 

"2 Epict. Disc, i 16, 17. "^ ib. iii 5, 10. 

^^^ ib.'x 16, 15. "^ See above, § 121. 

^^® 'non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nee exorandus aedituus, ut nos ad 
auretn simulacri admittat ; prope est a te deus' Sen. Ep. 41, i. 

"^ 'turpissimavota dis insusurrant ; siquis admoverit aurem, conticescent' ib. 10, 5. 

118 Sen. Dial, x 11, i. "» ib. xi 4, 2. 

120 Ben. ii 14, 5. . 121 ib. vi 38, i. 122 ^^. 3,, 4. 



236 ROMAN STOICISM 

the thoughtful man should know that the advantages for which 
friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man's de- 
struction ^2*. He should examine his own heart, and recognise 
that his prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish^^*. 
Since the gods wish us well, let us leave it to them to choose 
what is best for us'-^ 'Look up to God, and say: — deal with 
me for the future as thou wilt : I am of the same mind as thou 
art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases thee^-*^.' ' Seek 
not that the things which happen should happen as you wish ; 
but wish the things that happen to be as they are : and you will 
have a tranquil flow of life^-''.' 

260. Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of 
Self- resignation, in which a man ceases to battle against 

examination. ^ dcstiuy that is too strong for him ; it is a daily 
examination of his soul, to know whether it is in tune with the 
purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious 
exercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both 
by Seneca and Epictetus. ' How beautiful' says Seneca, 'is this 
custom of reviewing the whole day ! how quiet a sleep follows 
on self-examination! The mind takes its place on the judgment- 
seat, investigates its own actions, and awards praise or blame 
according as they are deserved ^^l' And Epictetus adopts the 
verses ascribed to Pythagoras : 

' Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes 
Before each daily action thou hast scanned ; 
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone ; 
From first to last examine all, and then 
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice ^^''.' 

^'^* ' etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut mater? o 
quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum ! ' Sen. Ep. 60, i. 

•'^^ 'se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et inspiciat, quid tacitus 
optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi fateri pudet ! quam pauca, quae 
facere coram teste possimus ! ' Ben. vi 38, 5. 

^^^ This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus : ' stulti hau scimus 
frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis : quasi quid in rem sit 
possimus noscere ' Plautus Pseud. 683-5. 

126 Epict. Disc, ii 16, 42. i^'' Manual 8. 

1-® Sen. Dial, v 36, 2. He describes his practice with naive detail : ' cum 
sublatum e conspectu lumen est et conticuit uxor moris mei iam conscia, totum 
diem meum scrutor ' ib. 3. 

1^^ Epict. Disc, iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long's transl.). 



RELIGION 237 

261. We are now in a position to sum up in technical 
Religious language^^" the obHgations of reHgion freed from 
^^^^' superstition ^^\ Our duty towards the gods is 

rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness and 
benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the 
universe"^ We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath- 
days, nor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the 
morning ; we may not offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror^'^^ 
Our service to them is to make ourselves like to them ; he who 
would win their favour, must be a good man^^^ Wheresoever 
they call us, we must follow with gladness, for they are wiser 
than we^^^ Without God we must attempt nothing, but we 
must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the 
divine will"**. We came here when it pleased God, and we must 
depart when he shall please'^''. 'So live,' says the Stoic teacher, 
'with your fellow-men, as believing that God sees you : so hold 
converse with God, as to be willing that all men should hear 
you"^.' 

^^° ' quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi ' Sen. £/>. 95, 47. 

131 ' non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostii superstitionem a 
religione separaverunt ' Cic. JV. D. ii 28, 71. 

132 ' primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, 
reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire illos esse, qui praesident mundo' 
Sen. £p. 95, 50. 

133 id. 95, 47. 

13* ' vis deos propitiare ? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est 
z&. 95, 50. 

135 < You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey them, and 
to yield to them in everything vi^hich happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being 
accomplished by the wisest intelligence ' Epict. Manual 31, i. 

138 Disc, iii 22, 53 (compare Long's transl. ii p. 83). 

13^ ib. iii 26, 30. 

138 ' sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat ; sic loquere cum deo, tanquani 
homines audiant ' Sen. Ep. 10, 5. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL. 

262. From the contemplation of the universe as a whole, 

^ both from the purely scientific standpoint in the 

part of the study of physics, and from the more imaginative 

universe. . r • • i i /- i • • 

pomt oi View ni the dogmas or religion, we now 
pass on to the more intimate study of the individual man, 
consisting of body and soul. In its main outlines the Stoic 
theory has already been sketched. Thus it follows from the 
monistic standpoint that man is not ultimately an ' individual ' , 
or unit of the universe ; for the universe itself is the only true 
unit, and a man is a part of it which cannot even for a moment 
break itself off completely from the whole. It is therefore only 
in a secondary and subordinate sense, and with special reference 
to the inculcation of ethics, that we can treat Zeno or Lucllius 
as separate and independent beings. Again, when we say that 
man 'consists of body and soul,' we are merely adopting popular 
language ; for body and soul are ultimately one, and differ only 
in the gradation of spirit or tone which informs them. Then 
we have already learnt in dialectics that the highest power of 
man is that of ' assent ' or free choice, which is displayed in 
every exercise of reason ; and the same power, though in a 
different aspect, is at work in every moral act. The doctrine 
of the universe is based upon the postulate that it is a living 
rational being on the largest scale ; and it follows that each 
man is a 'microcosm,' and contains in himself a complete repre- 
sentation of the universe in miniature. Lastly, we see that man 
takes his place in the universe, a little lower than gods and 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 239 

daemons, and as greatly higher than animals as these in their 
turn surpass plants and inanimate objects ; and that his nature, 
considered as composite, includes all the varying gradations of 
spirit to which these orders correspond within the universe. In 
all his parts alike the divine element is immanent and it binds 
them together in a coherent unity (avfjUTrddeta rwv jxepoov). It 
remains for us to put together from these and like points of 
departure a complete picture of human nature. 

263. To indicate the general trend of Stoic thought on 
The soul's this subject we propose the title ' the kingdom of 
kingdom. ^j^g soul.' Starting with the popular, distinction 

between body and soul, we find that the biologist and the 
physician alike are preoccupied with the study of the body, 
that is, of physiology. Only as an afterthought and supple- 
ment to their work are the functions of soul considered ; and 
they are treated as far as possible by the methods suggested by 
the study of the body. All this is reversed in the Stoic 
philosophy. The study of the soul stands in the front, and is 
treated by methods directly suggested by observation of the 
soul's functions. The body is not entirely ignored, but is 
considered of comparatively small importance. Further, the 
soul itself is manifold, and is likened to a State, in which all 
is well if the governing part have wisdom and benevolence 
proportionate to its power, and if the lower parts are content 
to fulfil their respective duties ; but if the balance of the State 
is upset, all becomes disorder and misery^ Lastly, this kingdom 
is itself a part of a greater whole, namely of the Cosmopolis or 
universal State. By the comparison with a kingdom we are 
also directed towards right moral principle. For as the citizen 
of Corinth or Sparta ought not to repine because his city is of 
less grandeur than Athens, so no man should be anxious because 
Jiis external opportunities are limited. He has a kingdom in 
his own mind and soul and heart. Let him be content to find 
his happiness in rightly administering it. 

^ ' rex noster est animus : hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio, parent, ob- 
temperant ; cum ille pauUum vacillavit, simul dubitant. ubi vero impotens, cupidus, 
delicatus est, fit tyrannus; tunc eum excipiunt adfectus impotentes' Sen. Ep. 114, 24. 



240 ROMAN STOICISM 

264. The doctrine that man is a representation or reflection 
of the universe is of unknown antiquity. It seems 

Man a ^ •' 

picture of to be clearly implied by the teaching of Heraclitus, 

the univcrsG 

in so far as he lays it down that both the universe 
and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos^. The 
technical terms ' macrocosm ' (/xeja^ Koafiosi) and ' microcosm ' 
{jjuLKpo'i KocTfio^), are, as we have seen, employed by Aristotle ^ 
But even if we suppose that this conception is a commonplace 
of Greek philosophy, it is in Stoicism alone that it is of funda- 
mental importance, and knit up with the whole framework of 
the system. And accordingly we find that all the Stoic masters 
laid stress upon this principle. The words of Zeno suggest to 
Cicero that ' the universe displays all impulses of will and all 
corresponding actions just like ourselves when we are stirred 
through the mind and the senses*.' Cleanthes used the dogma 
of the soul of the universe to explain the existence of the 
human soul as a part of it^ Chrysippus found a foundation 
for ethics in the doctrine that man should study and imitate 
the universe^ Diogenes of Babylon says boldly that God 
penetrates the universe, as soul the man''; and Seneca that the 
relation of God to matter is the same as that of the soul to 
the body^ It is little wonder therefore if by Philo's time the 
analogy had become a commonplace, and philosophers of more 
than one school were accustomed to say that ' man is a little 
universe, and the universe a big manV i God is therefore the 
soul of the universe"; on the other hand the soul is God within 
the human body", a self-moving force encased in relatively inert 

^ See L. Stein Psych, i p. 206. ^ See above, § 68. 

* ' natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas 
op/ids Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmetipsi, qui animis 
movemur et sensibus' Cic. N. D. ii 22, 58. 

^ T-r]v he i/'i'xV 5t' okov rov kSg/jlov SiJjKeLv, ijs jxipos /xerixovTas ijfids efixj/yxovaOai 
Hermias irris.ge7tt.phil. 7 (Arnim i 495). 

^ ' ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum ' Cic, 
N. D. ii 14, 37. 

^ Tov Kbcixov TrepUxei-v tov Ala Kaddirep dvdpuiwov ipyxw Philod.^/V/. 15 (Arnim iii 

^i'^^- 33)- 

** ' quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic 
materia, id in nobis corpus est ' Sen. £p. 65, 24. 

^ Philo rer. div. i 494 M (Stein Psych, i 207). ^° See above, § 242. 

" See below, § 274. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 24I 

matter, providence at work within the Hmitations of natural 
necessity. 

265. The dualism of body and soul appears in a sharply 
Soul and defined shape in Persism, and upon it depends the 
^°^^" popular dogma of the immortality of the soul, 

which (as we have already noticed) reached the Greco-Roman 
world from a Persian source^^. It appears to be rooted in the 
more primitive ways of thinking termed ' Animism ' and ' Spirit- 
ism,' in which men felt the presence both in natural objects and 
within themselves of forces which they conceived as distinct 
beings. According to this system a man's soul often assumes 
bodily shape, and quits his body even during life, either in sleep 
or during a swoon ; sometimes indeed it may be seen to run 
away and return in the shape of a mouse or a hare. At death 
it is seen to leave the man as a breath of air, and to enter the 
atmosphere. But besides his soul a man possesses a shadow, 
a likeness, a double, a ghost, a name ; and all these in varying 
degrees contribute to form what we should call his personality. 
In the animistic system the soul survives the man, and why not? 
But this survival is vaguely conceived, and only credited so far 
as the evidence of the senses supports it. Its formulation in the 
doctrine of immortality belongs to a more advanced stage of 
human thought^^ 

266. This dualistic conception could be and was incor- 

porated in the Stoic system to the same extent as 
body are the dualism of God and matter, but no further. 

Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and 
body are one ; or, in the language of paradox, 'soul is body^V 
This follows not only from the general principles of our philo- 
sophy, but also specifically from observation of the facts of 
human life. ' The incorporeal,' argued Cleanthes, ' cannot be 
affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by the incorporeal, 
but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul is affected 

^* See above, § 11. 

^^ On the whole subject see Tylor, Anthropology, ch. xvi ; Primitive Culture, 
chs. xi-xvii ; Jevons, Introd. to the history of Religion, ch. v, 
■•* See above, § 174. 
A. 16 



242 ROMAN STOICISM 

by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by the 
soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore 
the soul is body^l' And similarly Chrysippus argues: 'death 
is the separation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal 
neither joins with nor is separated from body, but the soul 
does both. The soul therefore is body^**.' This doctrine is 
commonly adduced as evidence of the ' materialism ' of the 
Stoics : yet the Stoics do not say that ' soul is matter,' and (as 
we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles quite 
different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential 
unity of body and soul follows also from the way in which we 
acquire knowledge of them. For we perceive body by the 
touch ; and we learn the workings of the soul by a kind of touch, 
called the inward touch (ivT6<; a(f)7]y'^. 

267. Having realised that the division of man into soul 
Mind, soul and body is not ultimate, we may more easily 
and body. prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A 
division into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life {'y^v'x/i, aninid), 
and (iii) mind (1/01)9, animus), was widely accepted in Stoic 
times, and in particular by the school of Epicurus ; the mind 
being that which man has, and the animals have not^^. The 
Stoics develope this division by the principle of the microcosm. 
Mind is that which man has in common with the deity ; life 
that which he has in common with the animals ; growth ((j)vcri<;, 
.natura), that which he has in common with the plants, as for 
instance is shown in the hair and nails ^". Man also possesses 

^^ Nemes. nat. horn, ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518). 

"^ ib. 99 (Arnim ii 790). 

^'' Here we come into close touch witli modern ways of thinking. The soul is 
the self as known subjectively and from within, as appealed to in the argument of 
Descartes ' cogito, ergo sum.' The body is the self as known objectively and from 
without, first in our neighbours who obstruct our efforts ('ofificium quod corporis 
exstat, I officere atque obstare' Lucr. R. JV. i 337, 8), and then by analogy in 
ourselves. The Stoic theory then asserts that subjective and objective knowledge 
are ultimately the same, both being activities of the same Logos. See above, § 149. 

^8 The distinction is most clearly made by Juvenal : ' sensum a caelesti demissum 
traximus arce, | cuius egent prona et terram spectantia. mundi | principio indulsit 
communis conditor illis | tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos | ad- 
fectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet ' Sat. xv 146-150. 

^^ See above, § 206. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 243 

cohesion (efi?, unitas) but never apart from higher powers. 
Further these four, mind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not 
different in kind, but all are spirits {irvevixara) which by their 
varying degrees of tension {jovo'i, intentid) are, to a less or 
greater extent, removed from the divine being, the primal stuff. 
In this sense man is not one, nor two, but multiple, as the deity 
is multiple^". 

268. The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with 
the creative fire which is the primal stuff of the 

The soul ^ 

is fire and univcrse-^ But the popular conception, according 
to which the soul is air or breath, and is seen to 
leave the body at death, is also not without truth^^. There is a 
very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, 
or is hot air^^. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul 
was a compound of two different elements, but that it was a 
variety of fire in the first stage of the downward path, beginning 
to form air by relaxation of its tension : but even so this form 
of the doctrine was steadily subordinated to the older doctrine 
of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with the divine fire. 
Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself, as a 'fiery 
intelligent spirit ^^'; and in this definition it would seem that we 
have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word 
'spirit' (7n/ej}//.a) and its original meaning 'breath,' since the word 
has in our philosophy many other associations. It is further a 
Stoic paradox that 'the soul is an animal,' just as God is an 
animal. But the soul and the man are not on that account two 

^'^ See above, § 203. 

2^ ' Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur ' Cic. Tusc. disp. i 10, 19. 

'^ ' spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus ; quo recedente a corpore 
moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu recedente moritur animal; 
naturalis igitur spiritus anima est' Chalc. in Tim. 220 (Arnim i 138). 

^^ ' probabilius enim videtur, tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex igni atque anima 
temperatum ' Cic. N. D. iii 14, 36; cf. Arnim ii 786. This view was accepted 
by Panaetius : 'is animus. ..ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video 
Panaetio ' Ttisc. disp. i 18, 42. The 'fire' and 'air' here referred to are not the 
ordinary elements : oh yap vav irvp ov8^ wav irvevjj.a Taijryjv ^;\;et t7]v Swafxiv. fierd 
TLVos ovv 'icTTM el'Sous ISiov /cat X67011 /cat 8vvdfieu}s Kai, ihs avTol Xiyovaiv, t6vov Alex. 
Aphr. de anima p. 115, 6 (Arnim ii 785). See further Stein Psychologic i pp. loi to 
103. 

^ ol Srajt/cot Tri/eO/xa voephv depixov [ti]v '<pvxw'\ Aet. plac. iv 3, 3. 

16—2 



244 ROMAN STOICISM 

animals ; all that is meant is that men and the brutes, by reason 
of their being endowed with soul, become animals^^ 

269. According to another theory, which is probably not 
The tempera- Specifically Stoic, but derived from the Greek 
'"^"*^" physicians, the soul is compounded of all four 
elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul 
(subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason^®) 
is determined by the proportion or ' temperament ' (/cpacri<?, 
teinperatiira) of the four elements. There are accordingly four 
temperaments, the fervid, the frigid, the dry, and the moist, 
according to the preponderance of fire, air, earth, and water 
respectively-'^. Dull and sleepy natures are those in which there 
is an excess of the gross elements of earth and water^**; whilst 
an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an excess of 
fire makes him passionate^". These characters are impressed 
upon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within 
the limits indicated above are unalterable^". The 'temperaments' 
have always been a favourite subject of discussion in popular 
philosophy^\ 

270. The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is 
The sours self-moved {avTOKiv^rovY"-. Although in this point 
parts. ^j^g Stoics agree with Plato, they do not go on to 

^^ ' animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia ; et cum ab 
illo animalia hoc nomen traxerint ' Sen. Ep. 113, 2 ; 'et animus mens animal est et 
ego animal sum ; duo tamen non sumus. quare ? quia animus mei pars est ' ib. 5. 

'•'^ TertuUian deals with this point as against Valentinian heretics ; de an. 21. 

^^ ' cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates pares his sunt, 
fervida frigida arida atque umida ; eadem animalium hominumque discrimina sunt' 
Sen. Dial, iv 19, i and 2; 'cuius [in homine] elementi portio praevalebit, inde mores 
erunt ' ib. 2. 

^^ ' languida ingenia et in somnum itura inertibus nectuntur elementis ' ib. i 5, 9. 

2^ 'iracundos fervida animi natura faciet ; frigidi mixtura timidos facit' ib. iv 19, 2. 

^^ ' quaecunque adtribuit condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura, haerebunt ' 
Ep. II, 6. 

^1 For a treatment of the subject on modern lines see Ribot, The emotions, 
chs. xii and xiii ; and the works of Fouillee, Paulhan, and other French writers. For 
the earlier history see Summers on Sen. Ep. 11, 3, and Stein Psych, i p. 175. 

^* '^vx'] ^o'Ti- Kara rois SrwiVous crQfjLa XewTO/jLepes i^ eavrov KLvovfievov Kara cnrepixa- 
riKovs Xoyovs Galen def. med. 29 (Arnim ii 780) ; ' nosmetipsi qui animis movemur ' 
Cic. JV. D. ii 22, 58; 'humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus ' Sen. Dial. 
ix 2, II. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 245 

name life as another attribute, for they do not agree with the 
argument of the Phaedo that the soul, having life as an in- 
separable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on to 
the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its 'parts' in 
other philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But 
the soul has not in the strict sense parts^'; what are so called 
are its activities''*, which are usually reckoned as eight in 
number, though the precise reckoning is of no importances^ 
The eight parts of the soul are the ruling part or 'principate^'V 
the five senses, and the powers of speech and generation. The 
seven parts or powers other than the principate are subject to it 
and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as we have called it, a 
kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated each with a 
separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected 
with the principate. They may therefore be identified with 
' spirits which extend from the principate to the organs, like the 
arms of an octopus-'V where by a 'spirit' we mean a pulsation 
or thrill, implying incessant motion and tension. The principate 
itself, that is the mind, is also a spirit possessed of a still higher 
tension ; and the general agreement of the Stoics places its 
throne conveniently at the heart and in the centre of the body^l 

s* ilia. 7) T^s i^vxvs dvpafjLis, wJ t7]I' avrrju irws ^xoucrai' wori /xev SiavoeJadai, irore de 
opyi^eadaL [qu. opeyeaOai ?] irori 8' iinOv/xeip Trapa, fi^pos Alex. Aph. de anima p. it8 
(Arnim ii 823). 

^* ' huiusmodi autem non tarn partes animae habebuntur quam vires et efficaciae 
et operae' Tert. de ati. 14. They may also be called the soul's qualities : oi diro 
XpvfftTTTTOi; Kai Titjvuvos <pi\6(jo<poi TCLS fJ.ev dvvd/ji.ei.s clis iv ry viroKeiixivi^ iroidTTjras 
ffVfj,^tpd^ovaL, TTjv di ^i^xV '^^ ovaiav TrpovTroKeifxevrjv rats 8vpdfiecn riOeaaL Stob. i 

49. 33- 

^^ See above, § 79; for other divisions Tert. de aji. 14 (Arnim i 144), Cic. OJ^. i 
28, loi, and generally Stein, Psych, i p. 123. 

^'° On this translation see § loi, note 8r. 

^"^ [(XTTO Toxj Tj-yefj-oviKov] Tavra iravra iTnTeTarai did tQv oineiwy opydvuiv irpo<T(j>ep!hs 
TOLS rov TToKijTrodos -rrXeKTavais Aet. plac. iv 4, 4. 

s^ Arnim ii 838. Since many philosophers think the mind seated in the head, 
Chrysippus collects many arguments to the contrary ; for instance that women say, 
when they don't agree with a statement, ' it won't go down,' pointing all the while to 
the heart, Galen p/ac. Hipp, et Plat, iii 5, p. 323 K (Arnim ii 892). Further that 
KapSia is derived from Kpdr-qais, the heart being the seat of government tl>. (Arnim ii 
896). He could support his view by thousands of quotations from the poets. On 
the other hand we find the suggestion that the principate resides in our spherical 
heads, as in a universe (Aet. ptac. iv 21, 4). This latter view may be due to 
Academic influence (Schmekel, p. 259). 



246 ROMAN STOICISM 

Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul's parts as 'powers of 
one substance seated at the heart^".' 

271. If we now fix our attention on the principate itself, 

we find it no more simple than the universe, the 

Aspects '■ 

ofthe deity, the man, or the soul. In particular it 

resembles the deity in that, although essentially 
one, it is called by many names. It is the soul in its reasoning 
aspect, the reason, the intellect (Xoyi/crj yjrvx^, vov^, Stdvoiay^ ; 
it is also the 'ego,' that is, the will, the energy, the capacity for 
action''^ It is in one aspect the divinity in us, world-wide, 
universal ; in another the individual man with his special bent 
and character ; so that we may even be said to have two souls 
in us, the world-soul and each man's particular soul*l The 
principate becomes also in turn each of the other functions or 
parts of the soul, for each of them is an aspect of the principate 
(rjjefioviKov tto)? exov)*^. In addition the principate has many 
titles of honour, as when Marcus Aurelius terms it the Pilot", 
the King and Lawgiver^^, the Controller and Governor^*^, the 
God within'"'. 

272. Although for the purpose of discussion we may dis- 

tinguish between reason and will, they are in fact 
The ^ _ ' -^ _ _ 

principate everywhere intermingled. Thus the principate as 

as reason. , . _ , 1 • 1 1 1 

the reasonmg part oi the soul mcludes the powers 
of perception, assent, comprehension, and of reason in the 
narrower sense, that is, the power of combining the various 
conceptions of the mind, so as ultimately to form a consistent 

39 5vvdfj.eLS /JLids ovalas iK rrjs Kapdias bpfnofxivrjs GsX&li plac. Hipp, et Plat. p. 51 K. 

""* t6 \oyt.(STiKov fxbpiov TTJs '^vxv^, S /cat Idlws riyefxovLKOv KoXeirai. Alex. Aphr. de an. 
p. 98, 24 (Arnim ii 839). In this direction Epictetus defines the rational faculty as 
'that which contemplates both itself and all other things ' Disc, i i, 4. 

^^ t6 eyoj Xiyofj-ev Kara, rovTo [to r}y€/ji,oviKbvJ beiKvvvres Galen plac. Hipp, et Plat. 
ii 2 p. 215 K. 

^^ ' intellegenduni est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis, 
quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis ; altera autem, 
quae proprie singulis est tributa' Cic. Off. i 30, 107. 

^3 Arnim ii 823. 44 7-^ hi?nself\n 64. 

^ ib. iv 12. •^s il>. V 27. 

*^ ib. iii 5, V 10, xii i ; so too Epictetus ' God is within, and your daemon is 
within' Disc, i 14, 14. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 24^ 

system^^ But amongst these powers assent is equally an act 
of the will ; and on the other hand the judgments formed by 
the reasoning mind are not purely speculative, but lead up to 
action ; so that it is the reasoning power which must be kept 
pure, in order that it may duly control the soul's inclinations 
and aversions, its aims and shrinkings, its plans, interests and 
assents'*^ If in the Stoic theory the greater emphasis always 
appears to be laid on the reason, it is the more necessary in 
interpreting it to bear in mind that we are speaking of the 
reason of an active and social being, 

273. The maintenance of the principate as will in a right 
„^ condition is the problem of ethics ; and it is 

The 

principate important to understand what this right condition 
is. The answer is to be found in a series of 
analogies, drawn from all departments of philosophy. Thus 
from the standpoint of physics the right condition is a proper 
strain or tension, as opposed to slackness or unsteadiness^". In 
theology it is the agreement of the particular will with the 
divine or universal will^\ From the point of view of the will 
itself it is the strength and force {lo-)(y<i koL KpaTo<;) of the will, 
the attitude that makes a man say ' I can^l' Again it is that 
state of the soul which corresponds to health in the body®-''; 
and in a quiet mood the Stoic may describe it as a restful and 
calm condition". Finally, if the soul as a whole is compared 
to a State, the principate in its function as the will may at 
its best be compared to a just and kind sovereign ; but ,if this 

^^ See above, §§ 146-156. 

■*** 'ipya 8k ipvxrjs op/j.dv, acjiopixav, opiyeffdai, iKKK'iveLV, 7rapa<rKevd^e<T0ai, iirL^dWeffOai, 
crvyKaTaTideadaL. ri ttot ovv iarL to iv roirois tois '4pyois pvirapav irap^ov airriv koX 
aKadapTov ; oiidev dWo 7) to. /jloxOvRo- Kplfiara avTTjS Epict. Disc, iv 11, 6 and 7. 

^'^ 17 T^S V'l'X^S IcTX^^ TOVOS iCFTLV LKaVOS iv Tip Kplv€LV KOl irpiTTSlV Tj fJLT) Stob. \\ 

7 5b 4 ; ' quaerimus quomodo animus semper secundo cursu eat' Sen. Dial, ix 1, 4; 
'quidam se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris ac extendunt ; vitium est haec diversitas et 
signum vacillantis animi ac nondum habentis tenorem suum ' Ep. 20, 3. 

®^ See above, § 96. 

^^ 'satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur ; nolle in causa est, non 
posse praetenditur' Sen. Ep. 116, 8. 

^* ' animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro arbitrio ibunt, 
non suo ferentur' Dial, iv 35, 2. 

" 'banc stabilem animi sedem Graeci evdv/iuav vocant, ego tranquillitatem voco ' 
i6. ix 2, 3. 



248 ROMAN STOICISM 

aim is missed, it may turn into a greedy and ungovernable 
tyrant ^^ 

274. The principate, as it is of divine origin^", and destined, 

as we shall see, to be reabsorbed in the deity, may 
principate, rightly be Called god : it is a god making its 
divine and settlement and home in a human body'^'^: it keeps 

human. •' '^ 

watch within over the moral principle^^. In the 
language of paradox we may say to each man, ' You are a 
god®^.' Of this principle we see the proof in that man interests 
hiniself in things divine*"*, and in it we find the first incentive 
to a lofty morality*'^ As however the deity is not conceived 
in human form, and is not subject to human weaknesses, there 
comes a point at which, in the study of the human principate, 
we part company with the divine ; and this point we reach both 
when we consider the principate with regard to its seven 
distinctly human manifestations, and when we consider its 
possible degradation from the standard of health and virtue. 
We now turn to the seven parts or powers of the human soul 
which are subordinate to the reasoning faculty. 

275. The first five powers of the principate are those which 

are recognised in popular philosophy as the 'five 
ofthe senses.' To materialistic philosophers nothing is 

plainer than that these are functions of the body ; 



principate. 



^^ Ep. 114, 24 (see above, § 263, note i). 

^® ' non est [mens] ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore, ex illo caelesti spiritu 
descendit ' Dial, xii 7, 7 ; 'ratio nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars 
divini spiritus mersa' ^/. 6(>, 12. 

®^ 'animus, sed hie rectus bonus magnus...quid aUud voces hunc quam deum in 
corpore hum an o hospitantem ? ' ib. 31, 11. 

' ^^ ' sacer inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator [et] 
'custos' ib. 41, 2. 

®'* 'deum te igitur scito esse: si quidemdeus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit' 
Cic. Rep. vi (Sonin. Scip.) 24, 26. 

^^ Physics, and in particular astronomy, is meant: '[animus] hoc habet argumentum 
divinitatis suae, quod ilium divina delectant ; nee ut alienis sed ut suis interest ' 
Sen. .A''. Q. i Prol. 12 ; ef. Horace Ep. i 12, 14-19. 

®^ 'When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when 
you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you 
'are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know 
it not.' Epiet. Disc, ii 8, 12. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 249 

is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears®^ ? This 
the Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees 
through the eye as through an open door. The ear does not 
hear, but the soul hears through the ear. Sensation therefore is 
an activity of the principate, acting in the manner already 
described in the chapter on ' Reason and Speech''^' The soul 
is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers as water from a 
fountain ; the sense-organs are passively affected by the objects 
perceived**". Subject to this general principle, sensation (atadTjcri^, 
sensus) may be variously defined. It is 'a spirit which pene- 
trates from the principate to the sensory processes"; it includes 
alike the mind-picture (^apTaa-ta, visujn), that is, the first rough 
sketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense- 
organ ; the assent {avyKaTadeeri'^^ adsenst/s), which the mind 
gives or refuses to this sketch ; and the final act of compre- 
hension (/caToXrj-'.p-L'i, comprehensid) by which this assent is sealed 
or ratified*^'. Of these the middle stage is the most important, 
so that we may say paradoxically ' sense is assent*"*.' Only in 
a secondary and popular way can we use the word sensation 
to denote the physical apparatus of the sensory organs 
(aladTjrrjpLa), as when we say of a blind man ' he has lost the 
sense of sight**".' 

276. The nature of sensation is more particularly described 

The five in the case of sight and hearing. In the first case 

senses. there proceed from the eyes rays, which cause 

tension in the air, reaching towards the object seen***; this 

®^ ' dicere porro, oculos nullam rem cernere posse, | sed per eos animum ut foribus 
spectare reclusis, | difficile est ' Lucr. A''. D. iii 360-362 ; cf. Arnim ii 862. See also 
Cic. JV. D. iii 4, 9, and Mayor's valuable note. Modern psychologists side with the Stoics. 

^^ See above, § 146, note 18. 

^^ TO, fiev irdOr] ev to?s weirovdoaL tottols, ras 5e altTdricreis iv t(^ rjyejJLovLKi^ A.'tt. plac. 
iv 23, I. 

85 See above, § 146, note 18. 

88 alcrdrjTiKrj yap (pavTacrLq, avyKaTadecrls ecmv ij aicr97](TLS Porph. de anima (Arnim 
ii 74) ; ' dicunt Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse ' Cic. Ac. ii 33, 108. 

87 a'iadyjais 8e '\€yeTa,L...Kal 17 Trepl to, alcrOriTripta KaraaKevrj, Kad' tjv rives wripol 
yipovrai Diog. L. vii 52. 

88 1 Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae videri queunt, 
emissionem aerisque simul intentionem ' Cell. JV. A. v 16, 2 ; 'Stoici videndi causam 
in nativi spiritus intentione constituunt, cuius effigiem coni similem volunt ' Chalc. 
Tim. 237 (Arnim ii 863). 



250 ROMAN STOICISM 

tension is cone-shaped, and as the distance from the pupil of 
the eye increases, the base of the cone is increased in size, 
whilst the vigour of the sight diminishes. This human activity 
effects vision of itself in one case ; for we say ' darkness is 
visible,' when the eye shoots forth light at it, and correctly 
recognises that it is darkness^^. But in complete vision there is 
an opposing wave-motion coming from the object, and the two 
waves become mutually absorbed : hence Posidonius called 
sight 'absorption' {avfju^voi^y^. Similarly, in the case of 
hearing, the pulsation (which, as we have seen, comes in the 
first instance from the principate) spreads from the ear to the 
speaker, and (as is now more distinctly specified) from the 
speaker to the hearer ; this reverse pulsation being circular in 
shape, like the waves excited on the surface of a lake by 
throwing a stone into the water''^ Of the sensations of smell, 
taste and touch we only hear that they are respectively (i) a 
spirit extending from the principate to the nostrils, (ii) a spirit 
extending from the principate to the tongue, and (iii) a spirit 
extending to the surface of the body and resulting in the easily- 
appreciated touch of an object^-. 

277. The Stoic account of the functions of the soul dis- 
other played in the ordinary activities of life is either 

activities. defective or mutilated ; for even a slight outline of 
the subject should surely include at least breathing, eating (with 
drinking), speech, walking, and lifting. We need not however 
doubt that these, equally with the five senses, are all * spirits 
stretching from the principate ' to the bodily organs. This is 
expressly stated of walking''^ Of all such activities we must 
consider voice to be typical, when it is described as the sixth 
function of the soul. Voice is described as ' pulsating air''^' set 
in motion by the tongue''®; but we can trace it back through the 

•^^ Arnim ii 869. 

'*' Yioffu^wvLos yovv avT7]v (sc. ttjv oij/lv) avfKpvaiv ovofid^ei AJit. plac. iv 13, 3. 

''^ Diog. L. vii 158. ''"■^ Arnitn ii 836. 

''■* 'Cleanthes [ambulationem] ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes per- 
missum' Sen. Ep. 113, 23. 

''* ' vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt, eamque esse dicunt ictum aera ' Gellius 
N. A.v ic^, 6. 

^* ' quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata percussu ? ' 
Sen. N. Q. ii 6, 3. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 251 

throat to some source below, which we can without difificulty 
identify with the heart, the seat of the principate"*'. The 
voice is indeed in a special relationship to the principate, 
since the spoken word is but another aspect of the thought 
which is expressed by if''. 

278. The seventh and last of the subordinate powers of the 

soul, according to the Stoics, is that of procreation. 

Procreation. . . 

This part of their system is of great importance, 
not only for the study of human nature, but even in a higher 
degree for its indirect bearing upon the question of the 
development of the universe through ' procreative principles ' 
(aTrepfiaTiKol Xoyoi), or, as we have termed them above, ' seed 
powers''^' That all things grow after their kind is of course 
matter of common knowledge ; no combination of circumstances, 
no scientific arrangement of sustenance can make of an acorn 
anything but an oak, or of a hen's egg anything but a chicken. 
But in the common view this is, at least primarily, a corporeal 
or material process; whereas the Stoics assert that it is not only 
a property of the soul, but one so primary and fundamental that 
it must be also assumed as a first principle of physical science. 
Before approaching the subject from the Stoic standpoint, it 
may be well to see how far materialistic theories, ancient and 
modern, can carry us. 

279. Lucretius finds this a very simple matter : 

' Children often resemble not only their parents, but also their grand- 
parents and more remote ancestors. The explanation is that 
the parents contain in their bodies a large number of atoms, 
which they have received from their ancestors and pass on to their descendants. 
In the chance clashing of atoms in procreation Venus produces all kinds of 
effects, bringing about resemblances between children and their forebears, not 
only in the face and person, but also in the look, the voice, and the hair'^^.' 

This account has a generally plausible sound until we bear 
in mind that it is the fundamental property of atoms that, 

6 \6-yos €KeWev eKTr^/xireTaL, odev Kal t) <pwvr). 7} 5e <poovT] oiiK e/c tQu Kara rT)v 
Ke<pa\r]P rbiruiv eKTrefiweTai, dXXd (pavepus e/c Karudev fidWov Galen, p/ac. Hipp, et 
Plat, ii 5 p. 205 Mliller. 

^'' See above, § 161. 

^^ See above, § 178. ''^ Lucr. R. N. iv 12 14-1220. 



252 ROMAN STOICISM 

though their own variety is limited, they can form things in 
infinite variety by changes in their combination and arrange- 
ment. They are Hke the letters out of which words, sentences, 
and poems are made up ; and we can hardly expect to re- 
produce the voice or the spirit of an Aeschylus by a fresh 
shuffling of the letters contained in the Agamemnon. On the 
contrary, seeing that the atoms contained in the bodies of 
parents have largely been drawn from plants and animals, we 
could confidently reckon upon finding the complete fauna and 
flora of the neighbourhood amongst their offspring. Lucretius 
in effect postulates in his theory that particular atoms have a 
representative and creative character, passing from father to 
child in inseparable association with the marks of the human 
race, and endowed with a special capacity of combining with 
other like atoms to form the substratum of specifically human 
features. In giving his atoms these properties he is insensibly 
approximating to the Stoic standpoint. 

280. Modern biologists deal with this subject with the 
Modern minutcncss of detail of which the microscope is the 

theories. instrument, and with the wealth of illustration 
which results from the incessant accumulation of ascertained 
facts. But they are perhaps open to the criticism that where 
they reach the borders of their own science, they are apt to 
introduce references to the sciences of chemistry and physics as 
explaining all difficulties, even in regions to which these sciences 
do not apply. The following account is taken from one of the 
most eminent of them : 

' Hertwig discovered that the one essential occurrence in impregnation 
is the coalescence of the two sexual cells and their nuclei. Of the millions 
of male spermatozoa which swarm round a female egg-cell, only one forces 
its way into its plasmic substance. The nuclei of the two cells are drawn 
together by a mysterious force which we conceive as a chonical sense-activity 
akin to smelly approach each other and melt into one. So there arises through 
the sensitiveness of the two sexual nuclei, as a result of erotic chemotropisfn, 
a new cell which unites the inherited capacities of both parents ; the sperma- 
tozoon contributes the paternal, the egg-cell the maternal characteristics to 
the primary-cell, from which the child is developed*''.' 

** E. Haeckel, Weltrdthsel (Volksausg.) p. 30. The italics are those of the 
author of this book. ■ • 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 253 

In another passage the same author sums up his results 
in bold language from which all qualifications and admissions 
of imperfect knowledge have disappeared : 

'Physiology has proved that all the phenomena of life may be reduced to 
chemical and physical processes. The cell-theory has shown us that all the 
complicated phenomena of the life of the higher plants and animals may be 
deduced from the simple physico-chemical processes in the elementary 
organism of the microscopic cells, and the material basis of them is the 
plasma of the cell-body*^' 

281. These utterances may be considered typical of modern 
Their materialistic philosophy in its extreme form. We 

inadequacy, ^lay nevertheless infer from the references to a 
' mysterious force,' ' chemical sense-activity akin to smell,' and 
' erotic chemotropism/ that the analogies to biological facts 
which the writer finds in chemical science stand in need of further 
elucidation. We may notice further that the 'atom' has entirely 
disappeared from the discussion, and that the 'material basis' 
of the facts is a 'plasma' or 'plasmic substance,' something in 
fact which stands related to a 'protoplasm' of which the chemical 
and physical sciences know nothing, but which distinctly re- 
sembles the ' fiery creative body ' which is the foundation of the 
Stoic physics. Further we must notice that the old problem of 
' the one and the many ' reappears in this modern description ; 
for the cell and its nucleus are neither exactly one nor exactly 
two, but something which passes from two to one and from one 
to two ; further the nuclei of the two cells, being drawn 
together, coalesce, and from their union is developed a 'new cell' 
which unites the capacities of its ' parents.' Modern science, 
therefore, although it has apparently simplified the history of 
generation by reducing it to the combination of two units out 
of many millions that are incessantly being produced by parent 
organisms, has left the philosophical problem of the manner of 
their combination entirely unchanged. In these microscopic 
cells is latent the whole physical and spiritual inheritance of the 
parents, whether men, animals or plants, from which they are 
derived ; just as the atoms of Epicurus possess the germ of free 

^1 ib. Anmerkungen, p. 158. 



254 ROMAN STOICISM 

will*-, SO the cells of Haeckel smell and love, struggle for 
marriage union, melt away in each other's embrace, and lose 
their own individuality at the moment that a new being enters 
the universe. 

282. If then the phenomena of reproduction are essentially 
the same, whether we consider the relations of two 

Creation 

and pro- human beings or those of infinitesimal elements 

which seem to belong to another order of being, 
we are already prepared for the Stoic principle that the creation 
of the universe is repeated in miniature in the bringing into life 
of each individual amongst the millions of millions of organic 
beings which people it. From this standpoint we gain fresh 
light upon the Stoic theory of creation, and particularly of the 
relation of the eternal Logos to the infinite multitude of pro- 
creative principles or 'seed-powers.' Again, it is with the 
general theory of creation in our minds that we must revert to 
the Stoic explanation of ordinary generation. This is to him 
no humble or unclean function of the members of the body ; it 
is the whole man, in his divine and human nature, that is 
concerned *l The ' procreative principle' in each man is a part 
of his soul^; 'the seed is a spirit' (or pulsation) 'extending from 
the principate to the parts of generational' It is an emanation 
from the individual in which one becomes two, and two become 
one. Just as the human soul is a 'fragment' of the divine, so is 
the seed a fragment torn away, as it were, from the souls of 
parents and ancestors***. 

*- Though Lucretius laughs at the idea of attributing laughter and tears to the 
elements (' hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum : | fiet, uti risu tremulo concussa 
cachinnent, | et lacrumis salsis umectent ora genasque' R. N. i 917-919)) yet he 
attributes to them the essential power of free-will: 'si. ..nee declinando faciunt 
primordia motus | principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, | unde est haec, 
inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas?' R. N. ii 253-257. 

8'^ 01 Srwl'sot d7r6 tov aihjj.o.TO's oXov /cat ttjs ^vxv^ ^ipecrdai to, airep/xara Aet. plac. 
V. II, 3 ; 'When you consort with your wife. ..you are carrying about a god with you' 
Epict. Disc, ii 8, 12. 

^■' fJi^pi) 5k ^vxv^ 'K^yovcTLv . . .Tovs iv tjijuv ffTrepfxaTiKovsXSyovs Diog. L. vii 157. 

85 tQv 8e XoiTTwv [fxepwy ttjs '/''^X'?^] ''"^ M^'' Xiyerai crwipfia, Srrep /cat avrb irvevfj-a 
icTTi diareivov dwo tov 7)-y€fxovLKov M^xpt tQv wapa.aTa.rSiv K€\.. plac. iv 21, 4; cf. 
Diog. L. vii 159. 

*^ TO de cnrepfia (pTjcrlv 6 Tirjvuv elvai. ypvxv^ p.4pos Kal air Ixriraoi fj.a /cat tov arrepfiaTos 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 255 

283. In the seed is contained the whole build of the man 

that is to be^\ It is therefore important to know 

Motherhood. . . 

whether the procreative prmciple m the embryo 
is derived from one or both parents, and if the latter, whether 
in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have kept 
entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the 
law of paternal descent, according to which the male element 
is alone active in the development of the organism; and so they 
allege that the female seed is lacking in tone and generative 
power^*. On the other hand observation appeared to them to 
show that children inherit the psychical and bodily qualities of 
both parents, and the general tendency of their philosophy was 
towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the latter 
considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of 
modern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are 
inherited from the seed of both parents^''; wherein the possibility 
remains open, that in particular cases the debt to one parent 
may be greater than to the other^". 

284. The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles 

wholly distinct from that of Plato ; which does not 

Impulses, 

at all prevent its exponents, and least of all those 
like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of Plato, from 
making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato 
divided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional 
(and volitional) part, and the appetitive "\ Both the two latter 
parts need the control of the reason, but the emotional part 

Tov Twv irpoyovwv Kepaa/ia koL ij.iy/j,a tuv ttjs ''pvxv^ fiep^v crvveXriXvdds Euseb. pr. ev. 
XV 20, I (Arnim i 128). That the separation or 'tearing away' [dTrocnracrfxa) is not 
complete or absolute seems to follow from the general principles of Stoic physics : see 
above § 262. 

^^ 'in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est' Sen. JV. Q. iii 29, 3. 

*^ ' utrum ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, iit...Stoici scripserunt ' 
Censor, di. nat. 5 ; cf. Diog. L. vii 159, Aei. plac. v 5, 2. 

^9 The evidence for this is mainly indirect. [6 5^ 'KXeavO-qs] ov [xbvov, cp-qalv, 6/j.oloc 
Tols yovevcri yLvofxeda Kara rd auifj-a dWa Kara tt)v ^vxvv Nemes. naL honi. ii 85 
and 86 (Arnim 1518); ' quod declaret eorum similitude, qui procreentur ; quae etiam 
in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus appareat ' Cic. Tusc. disp. i 32, 79. 

^^ wpoteadai. 5^ Kal ttjv yvvaiKa cnrepfxa • k&v fxev iTri.KpaTrj'nr; to ttjs yvvaLKOi, o/Moioy 
£tvai TO yevvdi/j-evov Ty fJ-ijTpi, eav de to tou dvdpos, ry iraTpi Aet. J>lac. v 11, 4. 

^^ See above, § 63. 



256 ROMAN STOICISM 

inclines to virtue, the appetitive to- vice'-'l The rational part, 
as with the Stoics, is peculiar to man ; the other two are also 
possessed by the animals, and the appetitive soul even by plants. 
The Stoics do not however seriously allow any kinship between 
virtue and the emotions, and they deal with this part of the 
subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living- things 
certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An 
impulse towards an object is called ' appetite ' {opfxr], appetitus or 
impetus) \ an impulse to avoid an object is called 'aversion' 
{d(f)op/jby, alieiiatioY^. In man appetite should be governed by 
reason; if this is so, it becomes 'reasonable desire' (ope^t<; 
ev\o<yo<i, recta appetitioY^\ if otherwise, it becomes 'unreasonable 
desire ' (ope^a d7r€tdrj<i Xoyo)) or ' concupiscence ' {iTrcdvfila, 
libido). To living things lower in the scale than man terms that 
are related to reason can of course not apply. 

285. Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly 
Will and analogous to intellectual decision. Just as the 

responsibility, powers of sensation never deceive us^^, so also the 
impulses are never in themselves irrational^®. An impulse is 
an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be pursued ■"■; 
to this the will gives or refuses its assent ^^. It is the will, and 
the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want of 
proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in 
a false judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse ; and 
this is what we call in ethics a perturbation"''. A healthy assent 

^^ ' inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam ambitiosam 
impotentem positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem languidam voluptatibus 
deditam' Sen. Ep. 92, 8. 

^^ ' appetitio (earn enim esse volumus opfiriv), qua ad agendum impellimur, et id 
appetimus quod est visum ' Cic. Ac. ii 8, 24. 

^^ This is termed by Panaetius ope^is simply; the term ewi^oK-f] is also used : see 
§ 272, note 49. "^ See above, § 146. 

^ Zeller {Stoics, p. 243) states that man has irrational as well as rational impulses. 
This seems to be incorrectly expressed. 

^^ (pavraaia 6p/ji,7jtlkt] toG KadrjKoi'Tos Stob. ii 7, 9. 

^8 ' omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, 
deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum. quid sit adsensio 
dicam. oportet me ambulare : tunc demum ambulo, cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi 
hanc opinionem meam ' Sen. £/>. 113, 18. 

^^ doKei 5' avTois tcl irddrj Kpiffeis etvai., Kadd (prjffi Hpiicrnnros Diog. L. vii 1 1 r ; 
' omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione' Cic. Tz{sc. disp. iv 7, 14; 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 257 

leads up to a right action : a false assent to a blunder or sin. 
Hence we hold to the Socratic paradox that ' no one sins 
willingly ' (ovSeU ckcov a[xaprdvei) ; for the true and natural will 
cannot sin ; it must first be warped to a false judgment and 
weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the paradox 
that 'every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,' or 
(in few words) that 'virtue is wisdom' (cfypovrjai'i r/ nperrj). In 
such views we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems 
of ethics, including those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, 
its application to daily duties, and its failure through ignorance 
or weakness of soul. 

286. We pass on to consider the body, but at no great 
length ; partly because many functions often con- 

The body. fc. ' r ./ J 

sidered as bodily are by the Stoics treated as 
belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly 
because the study of the body is rather the task of the physician 
than of the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately 
(i) the bones, sinews, and joints, constituting the framework on 
which the whole is built up ; (ii) the surface, including beauty 
of outline and features, and (iii) the complexion, which suffuses 
a glow over the surface and most attracts the attention"". No 
absolute distinction can be made between body and soul. 
Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of the two 
grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen) 
rests on the two higher elements of air and fire^°^; of the grada- 
tions of spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) 
that of coherence (e|^t?), whilst it shares with the soul the principle 
of growth ((^va-t9)"l Yet these contrasts are after all only 
secondary. As surely as soul is body so body is soul, and 

aaOevrj hk Xiyovai avfKaTddeaiv, orav jx-qbiiro) TreireiKdres iZfiev ij/xas avroijs Galen de 
peccatis ii r p. 59 K (Arnim iii 172) ; Ioti 5' avrh to Trddos Kara Zrjvajva. . .op/j-i] TrXeopd- 
foucra Diog. L. vii no. 

100 ' jjj corpore nostro ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta totius et vitalia, 
minime speciosa visu, prius ordinantur ; deinde haec, ex quibus omnis in faciem 
adspectumque decor est. post haec omnia qui maxime oculos rapit, color, ultimus 
perfecto iam corpore adfunditur ' Sen. DiaL iv i, 2. 

i»i See above, § 268. 

102 ^ \l/vxv 'Jrvevfj.d ecm av/jLtpvTov tj/xTv Galen plac. Hipp, et Plat, iii 1 p. 251 M, 
quoting Chrysippus (Arnim ii 885). 

A. 17 



258 ROMAN STOICISM 

divinity penetrates into its humblest parts. In its practical 
applications Stoicism dwells so little on the body that the wise 
man seems hardly conscious of its existence. 

287. Side by side with the strictly Stoic view of the body 
we find in all the Roman literature another con- 

' The flesh." 

ception which is strongly dualistic, and which we 
cannot but think to be drawn from some non-Stoic source"^ 
According to this view the body, often called the ' flesh,' is 
essentially eviP"*; it is the prison-house of the souP"*^, the source 
of corruption of the wilP*"^, the hindrance to a clear insight of 
the intelligence. In the language picturesquely adopted in the 
Pilgrims Progress (after St Paul), it is a burden which the 
enlightened man longs to shake off ^''''. For the body so under- 
stood we find abusive names ; it is the husk in which the grain 
is concealed "^ the ass from which the owner should be ready 
to part at any moment^'"'. This language tends to be exagge- 
rated and morbid, and leads in practice to asceticism"". It 
appealed in ancient as in modern times to a widespread senti- 
ment, but is not reconcileable with the main teaching of the 
Stoic philosophy. 

^^'^ Schmekel traces the introduction of this doctrine to Posidonius, and finds in it 
the starting-point of the later mysticism, Philos. d. viittl. Stoa, pp. 400 sqq. See also 
L. Stein, Psych, i 194. 

1"* ' nos corpus tam putre sortiti' Sen. Ep. 120, 17; ' inutilis caro et fluida, 
receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius ' ib. 92, 10. 

^"^ ' haec quae vides ossa circumiecta nobis, nervos et obductam cutem, voltumque 
et ministras manus, et cetera quibus involuti sumus, vincula animorum tenebraeque 
sunt, obruitur his animus, effocatur, inficitur, arcetur a veris et suis in falsa coniectus. 
omne illi cum hac carne grave certamen est' Sen. Dial, vi 24, 5 ; ' corpusculum hoc, 
custodia et vinculum animi ' ib. xii 11, 7. 

106 I What am I ? a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh. Through 
this kinship with the flesh, some of us become like wolves ' Epict. Disc, i 3, 5 and 7. 

^"^ ' corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est' Sen. Ep. 65, 16; 'quantum per moras 
membrorum et hanc circumfusam gravem sarcinam licet ' Dial, xii 1 1 , 6 ; ' corporis 
velut oneris necessarii non amator sed procurator est ' Ep. 92, 33. 

108 < Epicurus placed the good in the husk ' Epict. Disc, i 23, i. 

109 'You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded. When the body 
is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, 
fodder' ib. iv i, 79 and 80. 

^^^ In particular to the practice of self-mutilation, with which Seneca is disgusted : 
' cottidie comminiscimur, per quae virilitati fiat iniuria... alius genitalia e'xcidit ' Sen. 
N. Q. vii 31, 3. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 259 

288. According to the true Stoic view, the body is a 

dwelling'-place or temple inhabited for a time by 

Dignity ^ ^ ^ ^ 

of the the principate, its divinity "\ Therefore the body 

as such is deserving of respect, even of veneration "I 
In particular the erect form of the human body is a mark of 
divine favour, by which it is hinted that man is fitted to con- 
template the operations of the heavens"^. The whole framework 
of the body, from the organs of sensation to those by which we 
breathe, swallow, and digest, is a masterpiece of divine skill, 
and an evidence of the care of providence for man"'*. And even 
as an architect provides that those parts of the house which are 
offensive to sight and smell should be out of sight, so has 
nature hidden away those parts of the body which are neces- 
sarily offensive, at a distance from the organs of sense "I The 
Stoic conception of the dignity of the body is symbolized in 
practical ethics by the culture of the beard, in which is latent 
the broad principle of attention to the cleanliness and healthy 
development of every part of the body. 

It is a mark of the Oriental associations of Stoicism that this 
respect for the body is never associated with the Hellenic cult 
of the body as displayed in art and gymnastics. 

289. Having now studied man in all his parts, it is time 

to consider how those parts are compacted together, 

Junction of r- r fc> > 

soul and how man grows and decays, and what varieties of 

mankind exist. First then the principate is com- 
bined with the lower functions of the soul, and every part of 
the soul, by the process of interpenetration (o-tw/xa hia awfxaTo^ 

^^^ ' nee domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium at quidem breve hospitium ' Sen. 
Ep. 120, 14; 'hoc [corpus] natura ut quandam vestem animo circumdedit' ib. 92, 13. 

^^^ 'inter me teque conveniet corpus in honorem animi coli ' ih. 92, i. In the 
same spirit Seneca writes in condemnation of the gladiatorial conflicts ' homo sacra 
res homini' ib. 95, 33. 

113 '[natura] voltus nostros erexit ad caelum' ib. 94, 56 ; ' [natura]... ut ab ortu 
sidera in occasum labentia prosequi posset, sublime fecit [homini] caput et collo 
fiexili imposuit ' Dial, viii 5, 4. See also Mayor on Juv. Sat. xv 147. 

"■* Cic. N. D. ii 54 to 58. 

^^® ' quae partes corporis, ad naturae necessitatem datae, adspectum essent 
deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas [natura] contexit atque abdidit ' Off. i 
35> 127. 

17 — 2 



26o ROMAN STOICISM 

^^fwpet)""; or (from a slightly different point of view) upon body 
which has cohesion (e^t?) is overlaid growth, on growth soul, 
and on soul reason ; so that the higher tension presupposes the 
lower, but not vice versa. In the act of generation the soul 
loses its higher tensions ; and consequently the embryo 
possesses neither human nor animal soul, but only the 
principles of cohesion and growth. It is in fact a vegetable"'', 
but necessarily differs from other vegetables in having the 
potentiality of rising to a higher grade of spirit"^ At the 
moment of birth its growth-power {<^v<ji<i) is brought into 
contact with the cold air, and through this chill it rises to the 
grade of animal life, and becomes soul (•>/^i^%^ from 1/^1)^19)"^ 
This etymological theory provokes the ridicule of opponents, 
who do not fail to point out that soul, standing nearer to the 
divine fire than growth, ought to be produced by warmth 
rather than by coolness ; but the Stoics probably had in mind 
that contact with either of the two higher elements must raise 
the gradation of spirit. The infant, according to this theory, 
is an animal, but not yet a man ; it has not the gift of reason ^2". 
To attain this higher stage there is need both of growth from 
within, and of association with reasonable beings without ; in 
these ways reason may be developed in or about the seventh 
year^^\ In the whole of its growth the soul needs continually 
to be refreshed by the inbreathing of air, and to be sustained 
by exhalations from the blood ^^l Here we touch upon one 

^^^ In the Epicurean system atoms of soul are dispersed amongst atoms of body, 
there being a mixture of the two, which however does not go beyond juxtaposition; in 
the Stoic system soul permeates body. The Stoic explanation is frequently referred 
to by opponents as a redtictio ad ahsurduni : t^ \eyovTi tiju ^vxv'' o^^P-a. eirerai to 
(Twfxa dca (Td)fJi.aTos xw/5eri/ Alex. Aphr. A7-ist. Top. ii 93 (Arnim ii 798). The relation 
of the principate to the man as a whole is also called a-varaais (cottslitiitid) ; ' consti- 
tutio est principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus' Sen. Ep. 121, 10. 

^^^ ol 2Twt'/col fiipos avTO [to ^fi^pvov^ TTJs yaffTpds, ov ^(fov Aet. plac. v 14, 2 ; to 
^p4(pos if Trj yaaTpl (pvaet Tpicpeadai [Xpi/crtTTTros] vo/jLl^ei Kaddirep (pvrov Plut. Sto. rep. 
41, I. 

^^^ Stein, Psych, i p. 115. 

1^^ oTav 5^ Tex^Vy ''pvxovfievov virb tov dipos to irvevfia /neTa^dWeiv /cat yiveaOai 
^i^ov Plut. as above. 

^2** ' infans nondum rationalis [est]' Sen. £p. 121, 14; ' tu me expertem rationis 
genuisti, onus alienum' Ben. iii 31, 2. 

1"^^ See above, § 153, note 66. 

^^ diaacp^eadai Xiyovaiv avTr]v [sc. ttjv ^vxw] ^'^ ^^ tv^ dvadvfiidaeus tov al/^aros 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 261 

of those fundamental doctrines of the system, derived by Zeno 
from Herachtus^--', which bind together the great and the Httle 
world. Just as the heavenly bodies are maintained by exhala- 
tions from the Ocean^-*, so the soul is dependent upon the body 
for its daily food. Hence follows the important consequence 
that weakness and disease of the body react upon the soul ; 
the philosopher must keep his body in health for the soul's good, 
if for no other reason''^^ If the Stoics in discussing problems 
of ethics constantly maintain that the health of the soul is 
independent of that of the body, such statements are paradoxical 
and need qualification ^^''. 

290. The mutual action of body and soul is most readily 
Sleep and illustrated by sleep. The Stoics do not hold, as 
death. ^j^^ Auimists do, that the soul quits the body in 

sleep ; nor do they agree with another popular view, that the 
soul then quits the extremities of the body and concentrates 
itself at the heart^^''. Sleep is due to a relaxation, contraction, 
or weakening of the spirit ^2^; a lowering of its grade, which 
nevertheless is clearly no sign of ill health. In old age there is 
often an imperfection of the reason, and this is also seen in 
the sick, the tired, and the anaemic^^l In death there is a 

Koi Tov Kara t7}v elcnrvorjv i\KOfj.evov [depos] Galen conun. Hipp. 6 (Arnim ii 782) ; 
Tpi(p€cr9ai. e| ai/xaros t-^v '^vxh^, ovaiav d' avTTJs inrdpxetv to irvev/xa plac. Hipp, et Plat. 
ii 8 (Arnim i 140); 'poor soul itself mere exhalation of the blood' M. Aurel. To 
himself v 33. 

''^ TiT\vij3v rrfl) ^j/vxh" ^^761 alcrdrjTiKrjv avadvfXLaffLv, KaOdirep 'UpaKKeiros'...' Kal 
■ipvxoX Si dwo ruv vypQv dvaOvfiLwurat.' dvaOvfiiaaiv fiiv odv ofioiiiis t<2 '}lpaK\eiT(p 
a.iro(f>aiv€i Ti-{]vicv Ar. Did. fr. 39, 2 and 3 (Diels) ; the reference to Heraclitus is not 
necessarily an exact quotation by Zeno, see Bywater's critical note on fr. 42 ; on the 
other side Diels' note on fr. 12. L. Stein is of opinion that the Stoics missed the 
meaning of Heraclitus whilst accepting his terminology ; see Psych, i, note 182. 

■'"'' See above, § 200. ^-' See § 316, note 100. 

■^-^ Kol T-r\v \pvxV'' [ot Srwt'/cot] ^(pacrav /xjjdev virb tov ffcb/uiaTos 7) ihtpeXetadai t] 
^XaTrreadai Theod. Gr. aff. cur. 1 1 ; see generally the discussion by Stein, Psych, i 
pp. 139, 140. 

127 Plut. fr. {de an.) 6, 3. 

128 qI 2TwiVoi TOV /xev inrvov ylveadai dviaei tov alcrOriTiKOv rrvevfiaTos Aet. plac. 
V 23, 4, cf. Plut. Qze. conv. IV ii 4, 6 ; ' contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi 
putat atque concidere, et id ipsum esse dormire' Cic. Div. ii 58, 119. See also 
above, § 177. 

128 ' senes difficiles et queruli sunt, ut aegri et convalescentes, et quorum aut 
lassitudine aut detractione sanguinis exhaustus est calor ' Sen. Dial, iv 19, 4. 



262 ROMAN STOICISM 

complete relaxation of tone in the breath that we can feel, that 
is, in such spirit as belongs to the body"" ; there follows the 
separation of soul from body. 

291. We are thus brought to the critically important ques- 
tion of the existence of the soul after death. On 

The beyond. 

this point we shall not expect to find that all Stoic 
teachers agree in their language. In Zeno himself we shall be 
sure to find that variety of suggestion which is accounted for by 
his eagerness to learn from all sources ; and later writers will 
also differ according to their respective inclinations either to 
draw strictly logical conclusions from the Stoic physics, or to 
respect the common opinion of mankind and to draw from it 
conclusions which may be a support to morality"^ These 
variations need not discourage us from the attempt to trace in 
general outline the common teaching of the school. We have 
already seen that the various parts of the Stoic system are 
not bound together by strictly logical processes ; where two 
conclusions appear contradictory, and yet both recommend 
themselves to the judgment, the Stoics are not prepared to 
sacrifice either the one or the other, but always seek to lessen, 
if they cannot altogether remove, the difficulties which stand in 
the way of accepting both. On the other hand, we need not 
too readily admit the charge of insincerity, whether it is found 
in the candid admission of its temptations by Stoic teachers^^^ 
or in the less sympathetic criticisms of ancient or modern 
exponents of the system ^^^ 

^^'* orav de TravreXris y^vr]Tai i] dveais rod aicrdrjTiKOu wveij/xaTOS, Tore ylyveadai 
ddvarov Aet. p/ac. v 23, 4. 

^''^ ' cum animarum aeternitatem disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet 
consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium ' Sen. £p. 117, 6. 

^■^^ ' iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo niehercules credere, crede- 
bam enim me facile opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium 
magis quam probantium ' Sen. £p. 102, 2; cf. Cic. Tzisc. disp. in, 24. 

^^'^ So especially L. Stein : ' um nun ihre Philosophic popular und mundgerecht zu 
machen, liessen sich die Stoiker zuweilen zu Ausserungen herbei, die dazu angethan 
waren, ihr ganzes philosophisches System umzustossen ' Psych, i 149. Further their 
Scottish critic : ' thus did the later Stoicism try to meet the claims of the human heart, 
which the earlier Stoicism had to a large extent ignored ' W. L. Davidson, The Stoic 
creed, p. 98 ; again ' die Lehre von der Fortdauer der Seelc.war nur flir die grosse 
Menge berechnet ' H. A. Winckler, Stoicismus, p. 50. Zeller is much more judicial, 
Stoics, pp. 217-222. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 263, 

292. On certain points all Stoic teachers seem to be agreed; 
The Stoic fi^st that the soul is, as regards its substance,- 
standpoint. imperishable ; secondly, that the individual soul 

cannot survive the general conflagration^''*; lastly, that it does 
not of necessity perish with the body^^^ The first two dogmas 
follow immediately from the fundamental principles of the Stoic 
physics, and point out that every soul will find its last home by 
being absorbed in the divine being. The third dogma leaves 
play for ethical principles ; subject to the monistic principle of 
an ultimate reconciliation, there is room for some sharp dis- 
tinction between the destiny of good and bad souls, such as 
stands out in the Persian doctrine of rewards and punishments 
after death. And so we find it generally held that the souls 
of the good survive till the conflagration, whilst those of the 
wicked have but a short separate existence, and those of the 
lower and non-rational animals perish with their bodies^^*'. If 
this difference in duration will satisfy the moral sense, the nature 
of the further existence of the soul may be determined on 
physical principles. 

293. In the living man the soul, as we have already seen 
The released rcason to supposc, derives its cohesion (e^t9) and 
^°"'' shape from its association with the body. Separated 

from the body, it must assume a new shape, and what should 
that be but the perfect shape of a sphere^^'? Again, the soul 
being compounded of the elements of air and fire must by its 
own nature, when freed from the body, pierce through this 
murky atmosphere, and rise to a brighter region above, let us 
say to that sphere which is just below the moon^^^ Here then 

^^■* evioi de ttjv /xev rod 6\ov ['/'I'X'?''] a'tStov, ras de XotTrds crvfi/xiyvvadai eiri TeKevTig 
els sKeLv-qv Ar. Did. fr. 39, 5. 

335 j^j, g^ \pvxw yevT^T-qv re /cat (pdapTrjv Xeyovcriv ovk evdvs S^ rod aw/xaros diraX- 
Xayelaav ^deipeadai, dX\' iirifxeveLv Tivas xp^^^^^ /ca^' eavrrjv ib. 6; ' Stoici...diu 
mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant ' Cic. Tusc. disp. i 31, 77. 

136 ^^y ^^j, ^Qy airovSaiuv [tpvxvv dia/j.iveiv'l fJ.^XP'' '''V^ ^^^ '"'^P o-vaXucrews ruv 
TravTuv, TTjv 8e tQv dcppuvuv wpos irocroijs rivas X/!)6vous'...Tcts Se tQv d.<f>p6vwv Kal 
dXoyiov ^i^iov ipvxds crvvairdXXvadai rots (rdifiaffi Ar. Did. fr. 39, 6 and 7. 

^^'' Arnim ii 815. 

138 ^Q^i ipy^al] XeiTTOfxepe'LS ovaaL Kal ovx y^TTov irvpiIideLi rj Trv€v/J.aTuidet.s els roijs Avu 
f/.aXXov TOTTovs Kov<pO(popov<n...Tov vTTo aeXrjVTjv olKovac tottov Sext. math, ix 71 to 73 
(Arnim ii 812) ; Ar. Did. fr. 39, 4 ; ' si [animae] permanent et conservant habitum 



264 ROMAN STOICISM 

souls dwell like the stars, finding like them their food in exhala- 
tions from the earth ^'^^ Here they take rank as daemons or 
heroes (of such the air is full), and as such are joined in the 
fulfilment of the purposes of divine providence"". Yet it must 
be admitted that this bright destiny, if substantiated by the laws 
of physics, is also subject to physical difficulties. Suppose for 
instance that a man is crushed by the fall of a heavy rock ; his 
soul will not be able to escape in any direction, but will be at 
once squeezed out of existence"'. To fancies of this kind, 
whether attractive or grotesque, we shall not be inclined to 
pay serious attention. 

294. In this general theory hope is perhaps held out before 
the eyes of good souls, but there is little to terrify 

Tartarus. ... 

the wicked, even if it be supposed that their souls 
neither survive so long, nor soar so high, as those of the good"l 
As against it we are told by a Church Father that Zeno 
accepted the Persian doctrine of future rewards and punish- 
ments, and with it the primitive belief in an Inferno in its 
crudest form^'l We must agree with the first English editor 
of the fragments of Zeno that ' it is hardly credible that Zeno 
can have attached any philosophical importance to a theory stated 
in these terms^^'; they can at the best only have occurred in 

suum,...necesse estferantur ad caelum et ab his perrumpatur et dividatur crassus hie et 
eoncretus aer ; calidior enim est vel potius ardentior animus, quam est hie aer ' 
Cic. Tusc. disp. i 18, 42; ' itaque sublimantur animae sapientes...apud Stoicos sub 
lunam' Tert. de an. 54 (Arnim ii 814). 

^"^^ rpocprj T€ xptDj/rai OLKeia rfj diro yfjs dvadv/xidaeL (hs Kal rd \onrd darpa Sext. 
math, ix 73 ; ' fortium animas existimant in modum siderum vagari in aere ' Comm. 
in Lucan. ix 6 (Arnim ii 817). 

"" el ovv dia/j.^vovaiv ai xpvxch Saifioaii/ ai ai/rai yiyvovrai Sext. as in note 138 ; 
<pacrl SI eTvai Kal Tiva% dai/xovas Kal ijpwas, rets vTroXeXetfifj-dvas twv awovdaiwv \f'vx^s 
Diog. L. vii 151; 'plenus [est] aer immortalium animorum' Cic. Z>w. i 30, 64, 
quoting from Posidonius. 

1^^ ' [Stoici] existimant animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non 
posse et statim spargi ' Sen. £p. 57, 7 ; Seneca himself rejects this opinion. 

^*" KXedvdTjs /mev ovv wdaas [rds rj/vxas] i-mSiafjAveiv fJ-^XP'- '''V^ iKirvpihaews, XpHannros 
5^ ras tQv crocpQp fiovov Diog. L. vii 157. 

"^ ' esse inferos Zenon docuit et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas ; et illos 
quidem quietas ac delectahiles incolere regiones, hos vero lucre poenas in tenebrosis 
locis atque in caeni voraginibus horrendis' Lactant. Div.inst. vii 7, 13 (Arnim i 147); 
' reliquas animas ad inferos deiciunt ' Tert. de an. 54. Cf. Cic. fr. 240, 6. 

^^^ Pearson, Fragments, p. 146. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 265 

some narration in the style of the Platonic myths, intended to 
illustrate a principle but not to convey a literal truth"^ For 
just as the whole Hellenistic world, including the Stoics, stood 
aloof from the Persian doctrine of a spirit of evil, so it firmly 
rejected the dogma of a hell. Lucretius makes it a principal 
argument in favour of the philosophy of Epicurus that it drives 
out of men's hearts the fear of Tartarus"^; but writers partly or 
wholly Stoic are not less emphatic. 'Ignorance of philosophy/ 
says Cicero, 'has produced the belief in hell and its terrors^*''.' 
In the mouth of the representative of Stoicism he places the 
words ' Where can we find any old woman so silly as to 
believe the old stories of the horrors of the world below ?^^' 
' Those tales ' says Seneca ' which make the world below 
terrible to us, are poetic fictions. There is no black darkness 
awaiting the dead, no prison-house, no lake of fire or river 
of forgetfulness, no judgment-seat, no renewal of the rule of 
tyrants "^' 

295. Of far more importance to us is the theory of 
Purgatory purgatory, familiar through the description in 
of Virgil. Virgil's Acneid: 

'In the beginning the earth and the sky, and the spaces of night. 

Also the shining moon, and the sun Titanic and bright 

Feed on an inward hfe, and, with all things mingled, a mind 

Moves universal matter, with Nature's frame is combined. 

Thence man's race, and the beast, and the feathered creature that flies, 5 

All wild shapes that are hidden the gleaming waters beneath. 

Each elemental seed has a fiery force from the skies, 

Each its heavenly being, that no dull clay can disguise, 

Bodies of earth ne'er deaden, nor limbs long destined to death. 

Hence their fears and desires, their sorrows and joys ; for their sight, 10 

Blind with the gloom of a prison, discerns not the heavenly light. 

i'*^ So Hirzel, Untersiichimgeii ii p. 29 note. 

^■^^ ' et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, | funditus humanam qui 
vitam turbat ab imo, | omnia suffuscans mortis nigrore, neque ullam | esse voluptatem 
liquidam puramque relinquit ' R. N. iii 37-40. 

"7 Cic. Tusc. disp. i i6, 36. "s ]\^_ ^. jj 2, 5. 

149 1 cogita ilia, quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulam esse; nullas imminere 
mortuis tenebras nee carcerem nee flumina igne flagrantia nee oblivionis amnem nee 
tribunalia...[nec] ullos iterum tyrannos. luserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere 
terroribus ' Sen. Dial, vi 19, 4. Here we have the opposite extreme to the statement 
in note 131. 



266 ROMAN STOICISM 

Nor, when life at last leaves them, do all sad ills, that belong 

Unto the sinful body, depart; still many survive 

Lingering within them, alas ! for it needs must be that the long 

Growth should in wondrous fashion at full completion arrive. 15 

So due vengeance racks them, for deeds of an earlier day 

Suffering penance ; and some to the winds hang viewless and thin. 

Searched by the breezes ; from others the deep infection of sin 

Swirling water washes, or bright fire puiges, away. 

Each in his own sad ghost we endure ; then, chastened aright, 20 

Into Elysium pass. Few reach to the fields of delight 

Till great time, when the cycles have run their courses on high. 

Takes the inbred pollution, and leaves to us only the bright 

Sense of the heaven's own ether, and fire from the springs of the sky^^".' 

Although we cannot accept Virgil as a scientific exponent 
of Stoic teaching, yet there is much reason to suppose that he 
is here setting forth a belief which met with very general 
acceptance in our school, and of which the principle is that the 
sufferings of the disembodied are not a punishment for past 
offences, but the necessary means for the purification of the 
soul from a taint due to its long contact with the body. 

296. The language in which Virgil first describes the 
Probable creatiou and life of the universe closely resembles 

stoic origin. ^|^^^ ^f Stoicism ; the phrases ' elemental seed,' 
'fiery force,' 'heavenly being' might be used by any Stoic 
teacher. The conception of the body as a 'prison-house,' even 
though it does not express the most scientific aspect of Stoic 
physics, was nevertheless, as we have seen, familiar to Stoics 
of the later centuries. The ethical conception, again, of the 
doctrine of purgatory is exactly that of which the Stoics felt a 
need in order to reconcile the dualism of good and evil souls 
with the ultimate prevalence of the divine will. Again, we can 
have no difficulty in supposing that Virgil drew his material 
from Stoic sources, seeing that he was characteristically a learned 
poet, and reflects Stoic sentiment in many other passages of his 
works^^\ We have also more direct evidence. The Church 

150 Virgil Aen. vi 724-747 (transl. by Lord Bowen). For the corresponding 
description of Paradise, see ib. 638 — 644. The substance of this discussion is 
drawn from Hirzel's full note in his Untersuchungen ii pp. 25-31. 

^^1 For instance Geoi'g. iv 221 sqq. See also below, §§ 434, 435. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 267 

Father whom we have already quoted not only ascribes to the 
Stoics in another passage the doctrine of purgatory, but 
expressly quotes this passage from Virgil as an exposition of 
Stoic teaching. And here he is supported to some extent by 
Tertullian, who says that the Stoics held that the souls of the 
foolish after death receive instruction from the souls of the 
good^^l Finally, we have the doctrine definitely accepted by 
Seneca^'^^ 

297. We may now consider more particularly the views 
Views of and feelings of individual Stoic teachers. It appears 

Greek Stoics. ^^ ^g accordingly that Zeno left his followers room 
for considerable diversity of opinion, and quoted the Persian 
doctrine because of its suggestiveness rather than for its literal 
truth. Of Cleanthes we are told that he held that all souls 
survived till the conflagration, whilst Chrysippus believed 
this only of the souls of the wise^'^^ Panaetius, although a 
great admirer of Plato, is nevertheless so strongly impressed 
by the scientific principle that ' all which is born must die,' 
that he is here again inclined to break away from Stoicism, 
and to suspend his judgment altogether as to the future 
existence of the soul^^^; the belief in a limited future existence 
was meaningless to a philosopher who disbelieved in the con- 
flagration. Of the views of Posidonius we have the definite 
hint, that he taught that the 'air is full of immortal souls^-^*^'; 

^^^ ' impias vero [animas Stoici dicunt]... habere aliquid imbecillitatis ex con- 
tagione carnis, cuius desideriis ac libidinibus addictae ineluibilem quendam fucum 
trahant labemque terrenam, quae cum temporis diuturnitate penitus inhaeserit, eius 
naturae reddi animas, ut...cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quae peccatis inusta 
sensum doloris attribuit. quam sententiam poeta sic explicavit — " quin ct supremo 
etc."' Lact. Div. inst. vii 20, 9 and 10 (Arnimii8i3); '[Stoicos] miror, quod timpru- 
dentes animas circa terram prosternant, cum illas a sapientibus multo superioribus 
erudiri adfirment' Tert. de an. 54 (Arnim i 147, reading 'prudentes ' on his own con- 
jecture). On the other hand Augustine {Civ. De. xxi 13) ascribes the doctrine to 
' Platonici quidam' and Comm. Luc. ix 9 (p. 291 Us.) to Pythagoras. See Schmekel, 
p. 105. 

^^"^ ' facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione dimissis. 
facilius quicquid est illud obsoleti inlitique eluunt ' Sen. Dial, vi 23,1; ' [filius tuus] 
paulum supra nos commoratus, dum expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem 
mortalis aevi excutit' ib. 25, i. 

^^^ Diog. L. vii 157. 1-'^ Cic. Tusc. disp. i 32, 79. 

•'^'' See above, §§ 254, 293; for the teaching of Posidonius as to the pre-existence 
of the soul, see Schmekel, p. 250. 



268 ROMAN STOICISM 

and this is in such harmony with the devout temper of this 
teacher that we may readily believe that he enriched the 
somewhat bare speculations of his predecessors by the help 
of an Oriental imagination, and that he introduced into Stoicism 
not only the doctrine of daemons but also that of purgatory, 
holding that souls were both pre-existent and post-existent. 

298. In the period of the Roman principate the question 
View of of the future existence of the soul acquires special 

Seneca. prominence. Seneca is criticized on the ground that 

he affects at times a belief which he does not sincerely entertain, 
partly in order to make his teaching more popular, partly to 
console his friends in times of mourning. The facts stand 
otherwise. At no time does Seneca exceed the limits of the 
accepted Stoic creed ; he bids his friends look forward to the 
period of purgation ^=^, the life of pure souls in the regions of the 
aether, and the final union with the divine being. It is after 
purgation that the soul by the refinement of the elements of 
which it is built forces its way to higher regions^®®; it finds a 
quiet and peaceful home in the clear bright aether ^^''; it has cast 
off the burden of the flesh^'^'*; it is parted by no mountains or 
seas from other happy souls ^''^; it daily enjoys free converse 
with the great ones of the past^*^^; it gazes on the human world 
below, and on the sublime company of the stars in its own 
neighbourhood ^^^. At a later epoch all blessed souls will be 
re-absorbed in the primal elements'*^, suffering change but not 

^" See above, § 296. 

^°^ 'animus benehcio subtilitatis suae erumpit' Sen. jEp. 57, 8. 

159 ' {jjj ilium aeterna requies manet e confusis crassisque pura et liquida visentem ' 
DtaL vi 24, 5. 

160 « emissis [animis] meliora restant onere detracto' jEp. 24, 18. So in the 
Burial Service ' the souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden of 
the flesh, are in joy and felicity.' 

1^' 'non illos interfusa maria discludunt nee altitudo montium ; traniites omnium 
plani ' DiaL vi 25, 3. 

16; t ^j excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas, Scipiones Catonesque, interque 
contemptores vitae et mortis beneficio liberos ' z6. i . 

163 < rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur et humana omnia ex superiore loco despicit, 
divina vero propius intuetur ' id. xi 9, 3. 

^** 'nos quoque, felices animae atque aeterna sortitae, parva ruinae ingentis 
accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur ' i7?. vi 26, 7. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 269 

forfeiting their immortal nature^''^ The somewhat exuberant 
language of Seneca has frequently been adopted by Christian 
writers, to express a belief which is not necessarily identical ^^*'; 
but for the associations thus created Seneca must not be held 
responsible. 

299. With the decay of interest in the Stoic physics there 
begins a tendency to overlook the intermediate 

Personality " •' 

cannot Stage of the soul's life, and to dwell solely on its 

survive. . , ... 

nnal absorption ; whilst at the same time it is 
urged from the ethical standpoint that no possible opinion as to 
the soul's future should disturb the calm of the virtuous mind. 
On one further, but important, point the Stoic teaching becomes 
clearer. In no case is the soul that survives .death to be 
identified with the man that once lived. Cut off from all human 
relations, from the body and its organs, and from its own sub- 
ordinate powers ^*^", it is no longer 'you,' but is something else 
that takes your place in the due order of the universe. In all 
this the Stoic doctrine remains formally unchanged ; but its 
expression is now so chastened that it seems only to give a 
negative reply to the inherited hope, and the chief comfort it 
offers is that 'death is the end of all troubles.' This change of 
tone begins in Seneca himself; it is he who says to the mourner 
' your loved one has entered upon a great and never-ending 
rest^®^'; 'death is release from all pain and its end^*'^'; 'death is 
not to be. I know all its meaning. As things were before 
I was born, so they will be after I am gone^™.' 'If we perish 
in death, nothing remains^".' In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 
this new tone rings out much more clearly ; if we like so to 
speak, more unrelentingly. To the characteristic passages from 

^^•^ ' [animus], si superstes est corpori, nuUo genere [perire potest], quoniam nulla 
immortalitas cum exceptione est ' Ep. 57,9. 

■'^^ See Winckler, Der Stoicis??ius eine IVnrzel des Christentkufns, p. 52. 

^^ ' haec sunt ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de mente dici, 
non de partibus iis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque versentur ' Cic. Tusc. 
disp. i 33, 80. 

168 ( excepit ilium magna et aeterna pax ' Sen. Dial, vi 19, 6. 

169 I niors dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis ' ib. 19, 5. 

1''" ' mors est non esse, id quale sit, iam scio. hoc erit post me, quod ante me 
fuit ' Ep. 54, 4. 

^''^ 'mors nos aut consumit aut exuit;...consumptis nihil restat' ib. 24, 18. 



270 ROMAN STOICISM 

these writers which are quoted above"' may be added the 
following, perhaps the most precise of all : 

'If souls survive death, how can the air hold them from all eternity? 
How, we reply, does earth hold the bodies of generation after generation 
committed to the grave? Just as on earth, after a certain term of survival, 
change and dissolution of substance makes room for other dead bodies, so 
too the souls transmuted into air, after a period of survival, change by 
processes of diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal 
principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others to take 
up their habitation in their stead. Such is the natural answer, assuming the 
survival of souls "'l' 

Such are the last words of Stoicism, not wholly satisfying 
either to knowledge or to aspiration, but assuredly based on a 
wide outlook and a keen discrimination. 

300. The whole nature of man, as discussed up to this 
Men and poiut, is common to every individual born into the 
women. world, with some exceptions dependent on age or 

temperament which have been explained incidentally. It 
remains to discuss shortly the important differences which result 
from sex, nationality, and location. There seems every reason 
to believe that the equality of men and women, though at the 
time seemingly paradoxical, was generally accepted by the 
earlier Stoics, and adopted as a practical principle in Stoic 
homes. The whole treatment of human nature by the Stoics 
applies equally to man and woman, and points to the conclusion 
that as moral agents they have the same capacities and the 
same responsibilities"^. Seneca in writing to a great lady of 
philosophical sympathies states this as his firm conviction"^ and 
the lives of many Stoic wives and daughters (to whom we shall 
refer in a later chapter)"^ showed it to have a firm basis in fact. 
We need attach no great importance to those more distinctively 
masculine views which Seneca occasionally expresses, to the 

'''^ See above, §§ 140 and 141. i''-' M. Aurel. To himself iv 21. 

"* See below, § 306. Cleanthes wrote a book to show that 'virtue is the same in 
men and women '; see Diog. L. vii 103. 

1'^ ' quis dixit naturam maligne cum muliebribus ingeniis egisse, et virtutem 
illarum in artum retraxisse ? par illis, mihi crede, vigor, par ad honesta, libeat, 
facultas est ; dolorem laboremque ex aequo, si consuevere, patiuntur ' Sen. Dial, vi 
16, I. 

i^« See below, §§431, 439, 444, 446. 



THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL 27 1 

effect that woman is hot-tempered, thoughtless, and lacking in 
self-controP'''', or to the Peripatetic doctrine that man is born 
to rule, women to obey^''*; for these sentiments, however 
welcome to his individual correspondents, were not rooted in 
Stoic theory nor exemplified in the Roman society of his 
own days. 

301. It follows with equal certainty from the early history 
Class and ^f Stoicism, and in particular from the doctrine of 
^^'^^- the Cosmopolis, that differences of class and race 

were hardly perceived by its founders. For this there was 
further historical cause in the spread of Hellenistic civilisation, 
which was of an entirely catholic spirit and welcomed disciples 
from all nationalities^'"'^. The doctrine of Aristotle, that some 
nations are by nature fitted only for slavery, finds no echo in 
the Stoic world 1^". There we look in vain for any trace of that 
instinctive feeling of national difference, that sensitiveness to race 
and colour, which can easily be recognised in the early history 
of Greece and Rome, and which has become so acute in the 
development of modern world-politics. The Roman Stoics, as 
we shall see later, might individually be proud of advantages of 
birth, but they never associated this feeling with their philosophy. 
Here and there, however, we find signs of a scientific interest 
in the question of differences of national character, which are 
generally ascribed to the influences of climate. Seneca, for 
instance, remarks that the inhabitants of northern climates have 
characters as rude as their sky; hence they make good fighters, 
but poor rulers^*^ Yet when he contemplates the northern 
barbarians, his mind is mainly occupied by admiration ; and, 
like other pro-Germans of the period, he foresees with prophetic 

^'''' ' muliebre est furere in ira ' Sen. C/em. i 5, 5 ; ' [mulier] aeque imprudens 
[atque] animal est, et nisi scientia accessit et multa eruditio, ferum, cupiditatum 
incontinens ' Dial, ii 1 4, i . 

"** ' utraque turba [i.e. sexus] ad vitae societatem tantundem [confert], sad altera 
pars ad obsequendum, altera imperio nata [est] ' zd. 1, r. 

^''^ See below, § 305. ^*° See below, § 309. 

^^1 ' fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos, qui mitiore caelo utuntur. in 
frigora septentrionemque vergenlibus immansueta ingenia sunt' Sen. Dial, iv 15, 5. 
So too Lucan : ' omnis in Arctois populus quicunque pruinis | nascitur, indomitus 
bellis «t mortis amator ' Phars. viii 363-6. 



272 ROMAN STOICISM 

clearness a danger threatening the Roman empire. ' Should the 
Germans once lay aside their fierce domestic quarrels, and add 
to their courage reason and discipline, Rome will indeed have 
cause to resume the virtues of its early history^^l' The roots 
of true greatness of soul, then, lie deeper than in literary culture 
or philosophic insight. It is a part of the irony of history that 
Stoicism, which aimed above all things at being practical, should 
diagnose so correctly the growing weakness of the Roman world, 
and yet fail to suggest any remedy other than a reversion to an 
epoch in which philosophy was unknown. 

^^^ ' agedum illis corporibus illis animis luxum opes ignorantibus da rationem, da 
disciplinam : ut nihil amplius dicam, necesse erit certe nobis mores Romanos repetere' 
Sen. Dial, iii 11, 4. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE LAW FOR HUMANITY. 

302. The department of Ethics contains two divisions : 
The Right cthics (in the stricter sense) which is concerned 
L^^- with the action of the individual ; and poHtics, 

which has to do with the order of the State. It has been main- 
tained that in Stoicism the latter is altogether subordinated, and 
that the central aim of this philosophy is to erect a shelter for 
the individuals The truth of this view is more than doubtful. 
jStoic ethics are not based on the needs of the individual, but on 
jthe demands of the supreme Law. ' If there is a universe, then 
{there is a universal law, bidding us do this and refrain from that.' 7 
' If there are gods, there is virtue-.' We have already noticed^ 
that Zeno's earliest work was ' on the Stated' and that it is an 
attempt to show how a state can be ordered by wise laws. The 
whole theory of the Logos leads up to the same point. The 
same eternal Wisdom through which the primal stuff took shape 
is, in another function, the Right Rule {6pdo<; Xojo^;, vera ratio) 
which commands and forbids^ Right Rule and Common Law I 
{Koivb<i v6/jio<;, lex coinimmis) are terms of identical meaning, by 
which a standard of supreme authority is set up^; State law and 

^ e.g. Zeller, Stoics etc. pp. i6, 17 ; Stein Psych, ii p. 141. 

^ See A^lex. Aph. defato, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 ^iid 1005). 

^ See above, § 75- 

* X670S opdos wpocrraKTiKOS /x^v up iron^reov, aTrayopevTiKos 8^ uv ov iroLrjTiov Alex. 
Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88. 

^ ' Chrysippus sic incipit : 6 vofios irdvTUv earl ^aaiKevs deiwv re /cat dvdpuswivcou 
Trpay/j.d.TOjv del 8e avTov ...Kavova elvai diKaiwu Kal ddiKwv' Marcianus i p. 11, 25 i 
(Arnim iii 314); 'lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda I 
sunt prohibetque contraria' Cic. Leg. i 6, 18- / 

A. 18 



274 ROMAN STOICISM 

conventional morality, though always of narrower range, and often 
of inferior purity, are yet a reflection of universal Law. The moral 
law must therefore first be studied in its bearings on man as a 
political and social animal. 

303. The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world- 
^j^g wide, a cosmopolis. This title arose from the 

cosmopoiis. practice, attributed to Socrates and Diogenes (as 
well as others), of replying to the current question ' Of what city 
are you .-' ' by the answer ' Of the universe".' We must therefore 
regard ourselves as members not of a clan or city, but of a world- 
wide society''. In this society all distinctions of race, caste and 
class are to be subordinated to the sense of kinship and brother- 
hood ^ This principle is equally opposed to the nationalist 
prejudices which rank Hellene above barbarian, to philosophical 
theories (such as that of Aristotle) which distinguish intelligent 
peoples fitted by nature to rule and others only fitted to obey**, 
and to ideal states (such as that of Plato) in which a ruling class 
is to be developed by artifice and schooling. Only the brute 
animals are excluded from this community, for they are not 
possessed of reason ; they have therefore no rights, but exist 
for the service of men^". All human beings are capable of 
attaining to virtue, and as such are natural-born citizens of the 
Cosmopolis". Loyalty to this state, however, in no wise hinders 
a due loyalty to existing states which may be regarded as partial 

® ' Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. totius enim 
mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur ' Cic. Tusc. disp. v 37, 108 ; [At07^?'7;s] ipurr)- 
dels irbdev e'li] ^^ KoajjLOirdXiT'qs" ^(f>-q Diog. L. vi 63; so Epict. Disc, i 9, i. 

^ Arnim i 262; 'patriam meain esse mundum sciam' Sen. Dial, vii 20, 5. 

^ ' membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit' Ep. 95, 52. 

^ ' quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet, quod argumenti satis est, 
nuUam dissimilitudinem esse in genere ' Cic. Leg. i 10, 29 and 30. 

^'^ api<TK€L avTois /J.rjdei' ehai Tifxtv b'lKaiov wpbs ra &\\a fijja 8ia r-qv dvoixoLbryjTa 
Diog. L. vii 129; ' quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic 
homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis ' Cic. Fin. iii 20, 67. The honour of being the 
first to recognise the principle of consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the 
Hindus. 

" 'nee est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire 
non possit ' Cic. Leg. i 10, 31 ; 'if the mind-element is common to us all, so likewise 
is that reason which makes us rational ; and therefore too that reason which bids us 
do or leave undone; and therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and 
share a common citizenship' M. Aurel. To himself iv 4. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 2/5 

realizations of it. Socrates submitted to the laws of Athens even 
when they bade him die ; Zeno and Cleanthes declined the citi- 
zenship of that famous city, lest they should be thought to hold 
cheap the places of their birth ^^ ; and amongst the Romans Seneca 
frequently insists that every man is born into two communities, 
the cosmopolis and his native city^^ 

304. The world-state is not held together either by force or 
The law ^Y state-craft, but by goodwill. We must be able 
of nature. gay ' Lovc is god there, and is a helpmate to make 

the city secure".' This feeling of love and friendship grows up 
naturally between wise men, because they partake in the reason 
of the universe ; so that we may equally well say that the bond 
of the state is the Logos i^ratio atqiie oratioy^. Since reason and 
the universal law exist in the community from the beginning, 
law does not need to be created ; it exists of itself, and by 
natural growth {<^v(tei)^^. The writing down of laws is only a 
stage in their development^''. 

305. The theory of the world-state, as first sketched by 
zeno's revoiu- Zeuo, found no placc for any of the cherished in- 
tionary views, stitutions of the Athens in which it was preached. 
In the heavenly city must be neither temples nor images^^; so 
far the aims of the Persian invader are to be carried out. The 
reason given is far from flattering to the artistic pride of the 

1^ Plut. Sto. rep. 4, r. 

^■^ ' duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua 
di atque homines continentur ;... alteram, cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi' Sen. 
Dial, viii 4, i. So too Epictetus: 'What is a man? a part of a state, of that first 
which consists of gods and men ; then of that which is called next to it, which is 
a small image of the universal state ' Disc, ii 5, 26. 

■^* kv TT? TToKiTeia 'i(p7) [6 Ti-qvwv'l tov "Epwra dehv etvai, avvepybv inrdpxovra irpos 
T7]v TTJs iroXeias (rcoTrjpiav Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263) ; ' salva autem esse societas nisi 
custodia et amore partium non potest' Sen. Dial, iv 31, 7. 

^^ 'eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae conciliat inter se "j 
homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate' Cic. OJ^. i 16, 50. 

i*" (pvff€i T€ t6 diKatov elvai Kal p-T] decrei, ws /cat rbv vdpiov Kal tov opdov \6yov, Kadd 
(pyjcTL Xpvffiinros Diog. L. vii 128; ' ius esse natura [Stoici censent] ' Cic. /^in. iii 
21, 71. 

1^ ' non turn denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est ' Cic. 
De£. ii 5, 10. 

^^ te|Oa deQv fxr) olKoSop.eiv Plut. Sto. rep. 6, i; a.-wo.'yopev^i dydXixdra reKTaiveiv 
Theod. Aff. iii 74 (Arnim i 264). 

18—2 



2/6 ROMAN STOICISM 

Athenians, for they are told that their magnificent buildings 
and statues of world-wide renown are only the work of common 
builders and workmen^'*. Nor must there be law-courtsj^ or 
gymnasia. The practice of hearing both sides in a law-court 
is unreasonable, because if the plaintiff has proved his case it 
is useless to hear the defendant, and if he has not proved it, it is 
superfluous^^ The training of the youth in gramrrjar, music, and 
gymnastic is worthless ^'^, for the true education is in virtue. Coined 
money, as in modern communistic Utopias, should not be required 
either for commerce or for traveP^. 

306. With regard to the position of women Zeno, agreeing 
„, ^ . to some extent with Plato, asserted the startlins: 

Women to be ' & 

in common. doctrinc that ' women should be in common, and 
men should mate with them as they pleased -^' That Zeno was 
suggesting, even for an imaginary state, any sort of loose living, 
need not for a moment be supposed ; his continence was 
notable'-^; he expressly approves of marriage^"; and the mem- 
bers of his school were honourably known by their aversion to 
adultery-''. But Zeno could not base his theory of the relation 
of the sexes merely upon established practice. We may assume 
that he observed that in the world of animals and of birds 
mating was free^^ whereas in human society it was encumbered 
by national prejudices, class privilege, and personal jealousy; 

19 Plut. Sto. rep. 6, i. 20 Yy'w^. L. vii 33. 

21 Plutarcli, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that upon the 
same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato's Republic; Sto. 
rep. 8, I. 

2^ Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial to the 
Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay of literature in imperial 
Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied the needed qualification that these 
studies are useful as a training preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and 
cf. § 3.^6. 

^* Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it was by 
Seneca: 'quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae centesimae?' Sen. 
Ben. vii 10, 4. 

2* Diog. L. vii 131. 

2^ ' More continent than Zeno ' became a proverb at Athens; ib. 27. 

28 ib. 121. 

"^ iKKKivovai, to ixoLxeiei-v ol to, toD Ti-qvwvos (j)iKocro(povi'Tes Origen coni. Celsum, 
vii 63 (Arnim iii 729). 

-^ This principle is stated by Chrysippus : irpos to, dtjpla (prjal de'iv aTro^XiTreiv Plut. 
Sto. rep. 22, I. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 2/7 

and in particular that woman was regarded as a chattel, con- 
trary to the fundamental principle of his state'-^ By his doctrine 
of ' free mating' he aimed at the root of these evils. The gradual 
abolition at Rome of the restrictions on 'connubium' illustrates 
the application of his principle, just as the prohibition of 'mis- 
cegenation ' in modern America illustrates its denial. Zeno may 
well have perceived how deeply the potentiality of marriage 
affects all social relations, and it is probable that the progress 
of Stoicism did much to break down the racial barriers that 
existed in Zeno's time, but which had almost completely dis- 
appeared five centuries later throughout the civilized world. 
Another application of his doctrine is found in the life of Cato 
of Utica^". But its general meaning is clear : marriage exists 
not by nature, but by institution {deaet) ; its law is human and 
mutable, but nevertheless within proper limits is one that may 
not be transgressed. By the side of the text of Zeno we still 
have the authorized comment of Epictetus^\ 

307. The Stoics did not shrink from insisting upon the 
Incest no abstract principle of the community of women even 

abomination, jj-j g^j-, extreme case in which their doctrine encoun- 
tered a violent prejudice. No natural law, they maintained, 
prohibits marriage relationship between near relatives^-. The 
tale of Oedipus and Jocasta, which is so prominent a theme in 
the great Athenian tragedies, appears to Zeno to be a matter 
about which too much ado has been made^^ For suppose the 

^ The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated in the develop- 
ment of Roman law: 'led by their theory of natural law, the [Roman] jurisconsults 
had evidently... assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity ' 
Maine, A/icieni Law, p. 154. Cf. on the whole subject Gomperz, Greek Thuikers, 
bk V ch. 13: e.g. 'to the common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation 
[of women] and the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming 
so much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as... in 
modern times' (vol. iii p. 119). •"' See § 431. 

^1 ' What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not the 
theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come (if you 
think proper) and eject one of them ! ' Epict. Disc, ii 4, 8. 

^^ KoX ixnyrpaaL [XpycriTTTros] Xe^et avvipxeoOat /cat dvyarpdcri Kai vlois Diog. L. vii 
188. A Church Father has caught the point better; elwov otl t<^ /Sty Xoyy dvyatpdcn 
ixiyvvadai dSi.d<pop6v icm, ei Kal /j,r) XPV f** ''"''•'S KadearwaaLS iroXiTeiais to tolovtov voieiv 
Origen cont. Cels. iv 45 (Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8. 

3^ Arnim i 2^6. 



278 ROMAN STOICISM 

case that all the world were destroyed by flood except one man 
and his daughter ; would it not be better that he should beget 
children by her, and that the whole human race should not 
perish^? In this reference to the traditional flood we may 
readily trace one reason why the Stoics insisted on their prin- 
ciple. For at the beginning of human history we are compelled 
to postulate an Adam and an Eve, a human pair related in their 
birth and at the same time united as parents of the race'". Go 
back to the beginnings of the universe ; there too we must 
postulate the same combination of relationships, and so only 
can we understand the poets when they speak of Hera as ' wife 
and sister of Zeus^".' 

308. Perhaps even more shocking to Hellenic feeling was 
Burial a Zcuo's indifference to the treatment of the dead, 

convention. Burial was to him no sacred duty to the departed 
one ; it was equally right to throw the body to the fire, as the 
Indians, or to the vultures, as the Persians^^. Nor is there any 
need to condemn those nations amongst which the dead are 
eaten by their own relatives^^ for all these things are matters 
not of principle but of convenience, and to eat human flesh nnay 
still be desirable if circumstances require it^^, as for instance in 
shipwreck, or if a limb is amputated^". The problem of the 
disposal of the dead became a favourite subject of discussion 
in Stoic circles. Chrysippus wrote at length on the subject, 
comparing the customs of various nations as well as the habits 
of animals, in order to ascertain the law of nature. He reaches 
the conclusion that dead bodies should be disposed of in the 
simplest possible way, not being regarded as of more importance 
than the hair or nail-parings from which we part in life*\ Cicero 
shortly sums up this discussion in the Tusculan disputations, and 
draws the conclusion that whilst the living must consider what 
it is fitting for them to do, to the dead man it is a matter totally 

^•^ Origen, as above. ^^ See below, § 478. 

^® See above, § 254. 37 Arnim i 253. 

^'^ ib. i 254. 39 Diog. L. vii 121. 

*" Arnim iii 748. 

"■^ Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz, Gi-eek Thinkers, 
i p. 403. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY ' 279 

indifferent^^. In the imperial period this consideration is of 
importance as showing that the tyrant has no power after 
death ^^ 

309. The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. 
Without proposing the immediate abolition of this 
social institution, the Stoics treated it as essentially 
contrary to nature'***. The earliest teachers seem to have passed 
over the subject in silence ; Panaetius (as might be expected 
from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments of 
Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases : ' all those who through 
the infirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are 
rightly made slaves '^l According to this theory we may speak 
of a ' natural slave ' {(f)V(T6i SovXo<;), who as such can no more 
have rights in the community than the lower animals. The 
true Stoic theory appears however to be formulated by a defini- 
tion of Chrysippus, who says that a slave is a ' labourer hired for 
life*®.' This definition makes of slavery a contract, to which 
there are two parties ; and Seneca rightly uses this definition 
to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of man 
to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave 
may do a service to his master*'. All this is really implied in 
the dogma that ' women and slaves may become philosophers,' 
as is realized by the Church Father Lactantius*^ 

*^i45. 108. 

*■* ' ille divinus animus egressurus homineni, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, 
ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant, non magis ad se iudicat 
pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem ' Sen. £/>. 92, 34 ; ' But you will be cast 
out unburied...If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the 
corpse, speak more properly' Epict. Disc, iv 7, 31. 

** For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo : dvOpurros yap 4k 
(pijcreus 8ov\os ovdeis Sept. etfest. di. p. 283 M (Arnim iii 352). 

^ 'est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui possunt esse' Cic. 
Rep. iii 25, 37. 

*® 'servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est' Sen. Ben. iii 22, i; 
' non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis : operam exigendam, 
iusta praebenda ' Cic. Off. i 13, 41. 

*^ ' potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam accipere ' Sen. 
Ben. iii 22, 3. 

^ 'quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et 
mulieres doceri, ut sapiant : populumque [sapientium] ex omni lingua et condicione et 
sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philoso- 
phandum esse dixerunt ' Lact. Div. itist. iii 25 (Arnim iii 253). 



28o ROMAN STOICISM 

310. The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under 
any form of government, and the theory of Consti- 

Constitutions. .,.,,. , , 

tutions, like that of grammar, belongs to a neutral 
ground on which philosophers of different schools may work in 
harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this 
study; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon^*, who himself acted 
as a political representative of Athens, is stated to have shown 
interest in this subject; and after him Panaetius developed a 
complete theory, of which the substance is preserved for us in 
Cicero's de Re piiblica^^. According to this theory, which Cicero 
puts in the mouth of Scipio Africanus, surrounded by Roman 
Stoics of distinction such as Laelius, Tubero, and Furius Philo, 



the best constitution is one in which the elements of monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy are combined, though a bias remains 
in favour of monarchy^^ This mixed constitution, according to 
the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best illus- 
trated in the Roman state ^^; whereas tyranny, the perversion of 
monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning 
the Roman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century 
A.D. alike persuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching sup- 
ported the position of the republican party. But in fact they 
were maintaining Peripatetic theories of government, and the 
real Stoic theory was far more in accord with that practice of 
the principate, according to which all citizens are treated with 
respect, and the government of them is placed in the hands of 
men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the 
whole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics 
in a later chapter**; but we may notice here that those Stoics 
practically abandoned the theory of providence who looked 
into the history of their own times with the intention of seeing 
nowhere the ' king,' and everywhere the ' tyrant' On the other 

^^ See above, § no. 
I ''" Schmekel, Phil, d. mittleren Stoa, pp. 63, 69. 

' ^^ ' eomm nullum ipsum per se separatum probo ; anteponoque singulis illud, quod 
conilatum fuerit ex omnibus, sed si unum ac simplex probandum sit, regium probem 
atque inprimis laudem' Cic. Rep. i 35, 54; 'optimus civitatis status sub rege iusto est' 
Sen. Be7i. ii 20, 2. 

^^ ' memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio... 
optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent ' 
Cic. Rep. i 21, 34. ^* See below, ch. xvi. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 28 1 

hand the practical statesmen who set about to re-create Roman 
law on the principle of substituting everywhere human rights 
for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic 
spirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philo- 
sophy. 

311. We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, 

whether it be called monarchy or democracy, calls 

The citizen. . ... 

for a revolt against nationalism, antiquity, custom, 
pride, and prejudice ; and a new construction based upon uni- 
versal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this 
state it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his 
mind with the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his 
will to a true independence: for it is not buying or selling that 
makes the slave, but the will within^^ All are in truth slaves 
except the wise man ; for freedom is the power of directing 
one's own actions'^^ Here then we pass from the community 
to the individual, from politics to ethics in the narrower 
sense. 

312. For the individual man the ethical problem is to 
The supreme bring himsclf, a part of nature, into harmony with 
^°°'^- the whole. Whether we think of destiny, of pro- 
vidence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual 
is to agree and to cooperate ; to struggle and to rebel is to fail. 
This success is the end (reXo'i) for which man exists, the supreme 
good {suininuni bonuni), the ultimate good {ultimum bonormn), 
that towards which all other right action works, whilst it works 
itself for no other end^l Its name in the individual is virtue 
(dperr), virtus), and it is an active and firmly-established dis- 
position of the souP^ It follows from the monistic principle 
that the end for man is one, and that virtue is one ; but never- 
theless each is capable of being regarded in many aspects. The 
harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic philo- 

^* Arnim iii 354. 

^^ Diog. L. vii 121. 

^^ t4\os eariv od eVe/ca iravra TrpdrTerat KaOyjKdvrais, aiiro de irpaTreTai. ovStvbs 
iveKa Stob. ii 7, 3 b. 

^"^ 'virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens ' Sen. Ep. 113, 2; 
'virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque ' Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 15, 34. 



282 ROMAN STOICISM 

sophy is marked by such phrases as 'life according to nature''^' 
the rule ' keep company with God^^' and the identification of 
virtue and reason''". 

313. Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes \ 
r^„o;ct«„.„ a man's life one consistent whole, and stands in 

Consistency ' 

with nature. sharp contrast to the changing and undecided 
ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined as 
consistency in life*'\ an even steady course of action*''^, self-con- 
sistency®^, a principle in agreement with its applications ^^ The 
opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of 
the man in the crowd ''^ Accordingly we are told that the earliest 
Stoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that 
it was something simple'^®; and similarly Zeno said that the end 
of life was 'to live consistently"''.' To this short definition the 
words 'with nature' were soon added"^ whereby the distinc- 
tiveness of the original definition was diminished : for all the 
philosophical schools are agreed that the right life must be 
f Iguided by nature (^vo-et), not by convention {Oecrei). From the 
time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to nature was 
further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the 'nature' referred to 

^^ In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote Cicero's phrase 
'convenienter naturae vivere ' Fin. iii 9, 31, etc., and from Seneca 'virtus secundum 
naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt ' Ep. 50, 8. Cf. also 'we ought to go to be 
instructed, in order that we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things that 
happen' Epict. Disc, i 12, 17. 

^^ '[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere ' Sen. Dial. 
vii 15, 5. 
— 60 'ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest ' Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 15, 34. 

®^ 'virtutis definitio est — habitus consentiens vitae' Comm. in Lucan. ii 380 
(Arnim iii 199). 

"^ 'perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi' Sen. 
Ep, 31, 8. 

®* 'ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi' ib. 35, 4. 

*"* 'virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant et con- 
gruunt ' ib. 74, 30. 

*^ '[stullitia] semper incipit vivere : quam foeda [est] hominum levitas cottidie 
nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu incohantium ! quid est turpius 
quam senex vivere incipiens?' ib. 13, 16 and 17. 

"'• 'Zeno is erat qui. ..id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum 
et unum bonum' Cic. Ac. i 10, 36. So Seneca: 'quid est sapientia? semper idem 
velle atque idem nolle' Sen. Ep. 20, 5. *'^ See above, § 81. 

68 Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a: Arnim i 
552) is a matter of no importance. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 283 

as ' universal and human nature*'V thereby further approximating 
to the teaching of rival schools ; but on the other hand he gave 
this new and more characteristic explanation ' to live virtuously 
is to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of 
nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is 
the Right Reason which pervades all things, and is the same 
as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this world ''".' Diogenes of 
Babylon introduced the words ' to take a reasonable course in 
choosing or refusing things in accordance with nature''^' Anti- 
pater's definition is ' to live with preference for what is natural, 
and aversion to what is against nature'"-,' thus throwing the stress 
on the doctrine of the ' things of high degree^^' Panaetius made 
a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal 
nature to be suprem.e, but (subject to them) held that each man 
should follow the pointings of his individual nature''* ; this 
teaching however comes rather near to naming a twofold end. 
Cicero follows Panaetius in his de Officiis"^, but in the de Finibus 
adheres more closely to Chrysippus'''', and Seneca agrees with 
him in laying stress on the need of scientific knowledge of 
natural events''''. In the main therefore ' life according to nature ' I 
means to the Stoics life in accordance with the general movement 
of the universe, to which the particular strivings of the individual I 
must be subordinated. ' 

314. From, the religious standpoint virtue is willing coopera-''| 
Obedience ^^°^ wlth. the deity, in preference to that unwilling I 
to God. cooperation to which even evil-doers are forced. 

This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a poem that we 

^* See above, § 108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes still greater; 
Tj dperr] TeXeidrjjs icrrl ttj's eKacTTOv (pijcreus Galen />/ac. Hipp, et Plat, v 5, p. 468 K 
(from Chrysippus). 

^» Diog. L. vii 87 and 88. ' ^^ Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, § 258. 

''2 Stob. ii 7, 6 a. ''•* See below, § 320. 

^* W.a.vairio's to ^tjv Kara ras deSofiiuas rnjuf eK (pijcreus d<poppLas tAos air ecprj faro 
Clem. Al. Strom, ii 21, 129. 

^^ 'sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus; ea tamen 
conservata, propriam naturam sequamur' 0J\ i 31, no. 

7« ' vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent ' P'in. 
iv 6, 14. 

'''' 'hue et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia 
consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia contingit et ars, per qui-m 
humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum bonum' Sen. £p. 31, 8. 



284 ROMAN STOICISM 

have quoted above''^ is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus also 
in varying phrases. ' I do not obey God,' says Seneca, ' I agree 
with him. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I musf".' 
With a slight change of language this leads us to the paradox 
that 'obedience to God is liberty^".' 'I have placed my im- 
pulses,' says Epictetus, ' in obedience to God. Is it his will that 
I shall have fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should 
obtain anything? It is my wish also. Does he not wish it? I 
do not wish iV^.' The personal bent of Epictetus leads him to 
develope this idea in the direction of suffering rather than of 
acting. ' If the good man had foreknowledge of what would 
happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death 
and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned 
to him in accordance with the universal arrangement ^l' The 
proof that this must be so rests on the unity of the Divine and 
individual purposes : ' Good cannot be one thing, and that at 
which we are rationally delighted another thing^l' 

315. It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue 
of the individual is that disposition which will make 

Social duty, 

him the best possible member of society, that is, the 
best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis. Vet this is everywhere 
implied. In the first place the wise man will take part in the 
life of the community**, he will marry and bring up children^. 
In the second place the virtue of man differs first from the 
corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by 
nature for social union ; hence his reason only comes into play 
simultaneously with the recognition that he is a member of a 
community, and as such bound to prefer the good of the whole 
to that of a part. ' Nature,' says Panaetius, ' through reason 
unites man to man, so that they have a common bond in con- 

78 See above, § 98. 

7** 'non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo ilium, non quia necesse est, sequor' 
Sen. i?/. 96, 2. 

^ 'deo parere libertas est' Dial, vii 15, 7. 

8^ Epict. Disc, iv I, 89 and 90. 

^2 id. ii 10, 5. 83 //,_ [[[ y^ y, 

8* 'Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit' Sen. Dial. 
viii 3, 2; TroKi.Te\j(Teadal cpaai tov (ro<p6v, cos cfy-qdi, Xpvai.Tnros Diog. L. vii I2i. 

85 See § 306, note 26. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 285 

versation and life ; it induces men to approve and take part in 
public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for 
a social and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all 
whom they hold dear**',' 

316. Virtue, as a disposition of the souP^, reflects all the 
Health aspects in which the soul itself is regarded. Since 

of soul. the principate is both wisdom and will, so virtue is 

wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates and the Cynics*^ 
Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught*%' in fact, it can only 
be acquired by teaching ; and equally evil-doing can be cured 
by teaching^". But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized 
this aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic ' strength 
of character' and with the Stoic 'tone^\' In so far as virtue is 
will, it is to be acquired by constant practice^-. A true judgment 
is endangered by hasty assent ; a healthy will by slackness of 
the soul's sinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength 
of mind is everywhere identified with the ' true tone ' (euTovia)^^ ; 
the possibility of overstrain is not considered. But in the de- 
velopment of the ideal we have two varying aspects of virtue 
presented to us. At one moment we see the man of action, 
engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty, horny- 
handed^^; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting 
altogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its 

^ Cic. Of. i4, 12. 

^^ Trjv a.peT7]v dLadeaiv elvai <paai ^vxv^ cnjfKpcovov avry irepl oKov tov ^iov Stob. 
ii 7, 5 b I. 

^ [6 ^uKpcLTTj? f^'?] T'S.crai' dperriv aocpiav elvai Xen. Mem. iii 9, 5 ; see also above, 
§§ 48, 52. 

^^ 5t5a/CT-^i' re tlvai. rrfli dperrjv /cat 'S.pvaLTnros /cat KXedpdris Kal Tloaeiddbvios Diog. 
L. vii 91. 

^^ 'They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and 
robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them their errors, and you 
will see how they desist from their errors' Epict. Disc, i 18, 3 and 4. 

^^ See above, § 177, note 28. 

^^ ' If you would be a good reader, read ; if a writer, write. Generally, if you 
would make anything a habit, do it ; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it ' 
Epict. Disc, ii 18, 2 and 4; 'nihil est quod non humana mens vincat, et in familiari- 
tatem adducat adsidua meditatio ' Sen. Dial, iv 12, 3. 

"^ wv Karopdoucrtv [avdpuiroi], ij opdij Kpicns e^TjyeiTai fxeTo. t-^s /card rrjv ypvxw 
evTovlas Chrys. ap. Galen plac. H. et Plat, iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim iii 473). 

^* 'virtutem convenies...pro muris stantem, pulveiTilentam, coloratam, callosas 
habentem manus' Sen. Dial, vii 7, 3. 



286 ROMAN STOICISM 

loss^^ At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, 
who goes his way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob 
or the threats of the tyrant^*^ ; he is distinguished by a mental 
calm®^ which no storms can shake. Any discrepancy between 
these views is finally reconciled by introducing a comparison 
between the soul and the body. The philosophers had at all 
times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice of 
the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves 'physi- 
cians of the soul.' Chrysippus spent much time in comparing 
diseases of the soul to those of the body^l Equally there must 
be a healthy state of the soul corresponding to that of the body, 
in which all its parts are in harmony'-"*. Hence in the Stoic 
prayer health of soul is asked for, side by side with health of 
body'""; and Seneca bases a singularly complete statement of 
the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy 
condition of the mind^''^ 

317. Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the 
,,. ^ ,. soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind 

Virtue lies ' 

in intention. (incHnatio), its aim {ititentio), its desire {jSovXrja-L';, 
voluntas) is everything ; the performance through the organs of 
the body is nothing"^ This Stoic dogma is to-day so familiar 

"^ 'Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut dicitur) 
"remittentes animum," nam "remittere" inquit Musonius "animum quasi atnittere 
est"' Gellius, N. A. xviii 2, i. 

38 'iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava iubentium, | non 
vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida' Hor. C. iii 3, 1-4. 

3^ 'hanc stabileni animi sedem Graeci eudv/xlai' vocant; ego tranquillitatem voco' 
Sen. Dial, ix 2, 3. 

8^ Cic. Tiisc. disp. iv 10, 23. 

33 'ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus constamus, 
sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque concordant, eaque animi est 
virtus' ib. 13, 30. 

100 'roga bonara mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis' Sen. 
Ep. 10, 4; 'orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano' Juv. Sat. x 356. 

1"^ 'beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere potest, 
quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis suae, deinde fortis 
et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta temporibus, corporis sui pertinentium- 
que ad id curiosa non anxie ' Sen. Dial, vii 3, 3. 

i*'^ 'actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas' Sen. Ep. 95, 57; 'gratus potest 
esse homo voluntate' Ben. ii 31, i; 'sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse pec- 
catum est, etiam sine effectu' Cic. Ein. iii 9, 32 ; 'The being of the good is a certain 
kind of will (irpoaipea-Ls) ; the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then 
are externals? Material for the will' Epict. Disc, i 29, i and 2. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 287 

in divinity, law, and society that it is not easy to realize how 
paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its proclamation 
^he Stoics defied the whole system of tabu by which the ancient 
world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and 
detestable ; a system still in force in many departments of life 
and theoretically defended by the ' intuitive system of morals.' 
The defenders of tabic were bitterly affronted, and indignantly 
asked questions which mostly concerned the sexual relations, 
with regard to which tabu appears to have been at the time 
most vigorous. ' Is there nothing wrong in cannibalism ? in 
foul language .-' in incest? in the accursed relations with boy 
favourites iiraihiKo) ? ' To these questions firm-minded Stoics 
were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying them- 
selves open to the charge of being defenders of immorality. 
This charge however is never to be taken seriously; the high 
practical morality of the Stoics placed them beyond reproach. 
But it was also easy to raise a laugh by quotations from these 
austere moralists which sounded like a defence of licentiousness. 
The solution of the difficulty in each individual case follows 
exactly the same lines as in politics ; and there is the same 
divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their 
principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are 
intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. 
Here we need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal 
with questions affecting practical life in another chapter"^ 

318. The principal tabiLS affecting the individual have to do 
with cannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and 

Tabus. 

obscenity. Of the first we have already spoken ; 
the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due to inherited 
prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself vile 
and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve. 
Hence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether 
commonly described as natural or as unnatural, is in itself to 
be condemned, but only according as it is seemly or unseemly 
for the individual ^"^ It was perhaps unnecessary to explain to 
Greeks that the naked body is in itself no offensive sight, but 

1°^ See below, § 383. i''^ Arnim i 250. 



288 ROMAN STOICISM 

doubtless the Stoics had to make this clear to their Oriental 
pupils ; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle when he said 
that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning 
such as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion 
prescribes), and hide no part of the body"l As to decency of 
language, it did not occur to the Stoics to discuss this question 
in connexion with the history of literature. Since truth is 
always good, and the very purpose of language is to express 
truth, a wise man will always say straight out what he needs 
to say"". 

319. Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between 
Virtue in its ^^^ ethical principles of the Stoics and the Cynics, 
applications. Both assert the sole supremacy of virtue, ridicule 
traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external circumstances. 
But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics virtue 
stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the 
universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that 
universal reason which is equally at work in the universe and in 
the human mind. The Stoics are therefore under the obligation 
of bringing virtue into touch with circumstances, the soul into 
harmony with the body. From this arises their doctrine that 
virtue is bound up with the study both of universal and of 
individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent there are 
some that the good man must seek, and others that he must 
avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard 
this doctrine as an afterthought "^ suggested by practical diffi- 
culties, and alien from the original teaching of Zeno, This seems 

1"^ Diog. L. vii 33. 

1"^ ' placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim disserunt, nihil 
esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu' Cic. Fam. ix 22, i. See further below, § 344. 

I"'' 'postea tims ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba 
versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus, concessit ut haberentur 
faestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae' Fin. iv 20, 56; 'the stricter Stoic theory 
of the good was modified by the admission of irpo'qyiJieva'' Zeller, Stoics, p. 290. The 
true note is struck by Kendall, Introd. p. xlv: 'the course of Stoic ethics is, in fact, 
the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal of conduct, under the 
stress of that larger conception of "nature" which was inherent in Stoic monism. The 
full content and interpretation of the formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper 
implications unfolded themselves through life even more than through thought, and 
find their fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.' 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 289 

to be a misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said : ' some 
things are good, some are evil, some indifferent. Good are 
wisdom, temperance, justice, fortitude, everything that is virtue 
or an aspect of virtue ; evil are folly, intemperance, injustice, 
cowardice, everything that is vice or an aspect of vice. Indif- 
ferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, 
riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth ^"1' But there is 
a difference between a principle and its application ; and this 
very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an un- 
derlying difference, though it is not the difference between good 
and evil. Zeno was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to 
examine the nature of this difference. 

320. This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a 
Worth and difference of worth (d^ia, aestimatioY"^. Health, 
unworth. jjfg^ Hchcs, have positive worth in greater or less 
degree ; disease, death, poverty, have negative worth (aTra^/a, 
inaestimabiley^^. Between these lie things that are absolutely 
indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on 
one's head is odd or even"^, or whether we take up one or the 
other of two coins that have the same general appearance and 
the same stamp "^. Even here a slight distinction has to be 
made ; as to whether the hairs on the head are odd or even in 
number we have not the slightest concern ; but in the matter of 
the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly. Let us then 
settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; 'for 
a reason that is not clear to us,' as the Stoics say, not willing to 
admit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much 
where it was"^ And now as to the things that have 'worth'; it 
is clear that in some sense they are ' according to nature,' and in 

"8 Stob. ii 7, 5 a. 

1"^ 'aestimatio, quae d^ta dicitur' Cic. Fin. iii 10, 34. Posidonius seems to have 
practically substituted dt,lav 'ixovra for trpoyjy/JLeva, but in strict usage the latter term 
is narrower, and includes only such things as have measurable worth. 

^1" 'inter ilia, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen quo 
differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum' 
^^- i5> 50; ■'"'2'' 8e d^iav ixovrojv ra fikv ^X^'" i"oXXr;v a^lav, to, Se ^paxeiav. 01x0101% dk 
/cat tQv dira^iav ixovTWv a fiev ^x^"' toXXtj^ aTra^iav, a 5e I3paxeia.v Stob. ii 7, 7g; 
'quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris' Cic. Ac. i 10, 37. 

'^^ Stob. ii 7, 7. ^^^ Arnim iii 122. 

"^ Plut. Sio. rep. 23, 6. 

A. 19 



290 ROMAN STOICISM 

the same sense those things that have ' negative worth ' are op- 
posed to nature"''; and the former in some way approximate to 
the character of the good "I It is then necessary to describe 
them by some term other than ' good.' Zeno selected the term 
irporjjfjLevov ' of high degree,' which Cicero translates variously 
by prodiicta, promota, praecipiia, praelata, and praeposita. This 
term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life : ' for no one 
would think of calling a king " of high degree," but only those 
who are of a rank next to his, though far below"^' The oppo- 
sites were described as dTroTrpoi-j'yixeva {remota, reiecta) ' things 
of low degree"''.' Seneca, who states the theory with great 
clearness"*, commonly uses the handier terms commoda (' advan- 
tages ') and m^<?w;7^^^<r? (' disadvantages')"^. In their treatment 
of the separate matters which fall under these divisions the Stoics 
were in close agreement with the Peripatetic theory of natural 
ends {ra Kara ^vaiv'y^'^ : but their loyalty to their own school 
came into question, if they actually termed them ' good ' or 
' evil,' as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient precautions 
were taken ^^^ and as Seneca often describes them in his less 
careful moods ^^2. 



""* 'cetera autem, etsi nee bona nee mala assent, tamen alia secundum naturam 
dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia interiecta et media nume- 
rabat' Cic. Ac. i lo, 36. 

■^1^ rb wpoTTYfi^vov cvveyyi^eiv ttws r^ tQiv dyadQv (pijaei Stob. ii 7, 7 g, 

^^s ' [hoc] Zeno Trporjy/j.ivoi' nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen 
nominibus ac novis. "ut enim," inquit, "nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi 
productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est irpoTjyfievov), sed eos qui in aliquo honore 
sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum"' Cic. Inn. 
iii 15, 51. 

1^^ 'quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae minoris' Ac. i 10, 
37; 'quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel 
praecipua, et ilia reiecta' Mn. iii 16, 52. 

^^s 'quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum virtus, negat 
etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se aliquid pretii et alia aliis esse 
potiora ? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur aliquid honoris, quibusdam multum ' Sen. Dial. 
vii 22, 4. 

1^^ 'itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta' £p. 74, 17. 

120 See above, § 82. 

^21 'bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum; nee ego 
solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis' Cic. J^zn. v 29, 89; 
cf. Arnim iii 137. 

1^^ 'sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; ilia animi bona a stulto ac 
malo submoventur' Sen. Ben. v 13, i. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 291 

321. The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory 
The aim ^^ ' advantages ' is essential to their system, because 

of virtue. without it virtuc has no meaning, and practical 

life no guide^-^ ; whereas as soon as this theory is established, 
we can assign to virtue the permanent and distinctive character, 
that it aims at securing 'advantages' and avoiding 'disadvan- 
tages^^^*.' Now we are able to enlarge, though we do not alter, 
our definition of the supreme good ; the ' consistent life,' the 
' life consistent with nature,' is the ' life which is accompanied by 
a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature ' ; to which 
words we now add ' choosing those things which are in accor- 
dance with nature, and avoiding those things which are against 
nature^^'.' Nevertheless, virtue consists wholly in the aiming at 
the mark, and not at all in the hitting it. As the true sportsman 
finds all his pleasure in throwing his quoit according to the rules 
of the game, and in aiming his arrow at the centre of the target, 
but cares not in the least (so it would seem) whether he suc- 
ceeds ^^''; so the wise man, even though (by those circumstances 
which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we call 
' the play of fortune ') he gain no ' advantage ' at all, but suffer 
dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the 
supreme good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed 
all things. This is the Stoic doctrine of the ' sufficiency of virtue,' 
expressed in the language of paradox, but nevertheless the cen- 
tral point of their whole ethical system ; and its force is really 

i'^"* 'deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quatn si non uUam esse diceremus, et 
confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone ; neque uUum sapientiae munus aut opus 
inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino 
interesset, neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret' Cic. Mn. iii 15, 50. 

124 'virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam sint, habere 
delectum' id. 4, 12. 

125 'relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum 
quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae contra naturam 
sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere' zd. 9, 31 (after 
Posidonius). 

^^ 'ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus 
assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad 
finem ; qui aliter, contra, neque tamen ilia praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem perti- 
nebit : sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur ilia quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim 
naturamque nihil pertinent' z6. 16, 54; compare also 6, 22; 'non est turpe non 
consequi, dummodo sequaris' Sen. Ben. v 5, 3. 

19 — 2 



292 ROMAN STOICISM 

intensified by the doctrine of ' advantages/ which to a superficial 
critic appears to relax it. 

322. The doctrine of the sufficiency (avrapKeia, siifficientid) 
Sufficiency ^^ virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of 
of virtue. ^jj periods, though in ever-varying phraseology. 

Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ' virtue is sufficient for happi- 
ness,' or in other words ' virtue needs but herself for a happy 
life^^^.' Chrysippus maintains that there are only three logical 
views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or 
both^-^, and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness there- 
fore is not made greater if advantages are added to virtue ; or 
rather, virtue does not permit addition {accessioy^^. In the tran- 
sition period Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to 
have attributed a little importance, though very little, to external 
advantages'^" ; but, as we have seen above'^'. his definition of the 
supreme good is in full accord with the general teaching of the 
school. Panaetius and Posidonius held to the orthodox doctrine 
both in word and deed, if we may trust the direct statements of 
Cicero'^^ ; nevertheless they were so anxious to assimilate their 
expressions to those of ordinary life, that the conclusion could 
easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached importance 
to external goods'^l One authority indeed states that they held 

■'-^ avTcLpKT] re elvai avrijv [ttjv dpexTjj'] Trpos evSaifiovlav Diog. L. vii 127 ; 'a Zenone 
hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur : virtus ad bene vivenduni se ipsa contenta 
est' Cic. I^in. v 27, 79; cf. Pearson, Fragments, p. 19. 

'^^ 'testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de 
finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque' Cic. 
Ac. ii 45, 138. 

^-8 'crescere bonorum finem non putamus' Cic. Fin. iii 14, 48; 'honestum nullam 
accessionem recipit' Sen. Ep. 66, 9; 'summuni bonum nee infringitur nee augetur; 
in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna gessit. utrum maiorem an minorem 
circulum scribas, ad spatium eius pertinet, non ad formam' zd. 74, 26 and 27. 

'^^ See above, § no. '^^ See above, § 313. 

'•'^ 'cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit' Cic. 
OJ^. iii 3, 12; 'solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, 
audire voluisse Posidonium ; sed cum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehe- 
menter eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere...itaque 
eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum esset, 
cubantem disputavisse : cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse : 
"nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse confitebor malum"' Tztsc. 
disp. ii 25, 61 ; cf. Sen. Ep. 87, 35. 

^'^'^ See above, § 114. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 293 

health, strength, and estate to be ' needful ' for happiness, thus 
abandoning the sufficiency of virtue^^* ; but in the absence of 
direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this state- 
ment as implying anything different from the distinction of 
Chrysippus, viz. that ' the wise man needs nothing, but has use 
for everything^^^' But any faltering shown by the transition 
writers was more than made good by the zeal of the teachers 
under the principate. Seneca enforces the paradox in a score 
of phrases ; in the form of a proverb ' virtue is its own re- 
ward^^^'; in rhetorical exuberance 'virtue can defy death, ill 
fortune, and tyranny ^^' ; it is 'independent even of the deity ^^^'; 
and *no circumstances can increase or impair its perfections^".' 
Epictetus often dv/ells on the same theme"", and the whole work 
of Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it'^^ Nor is the dogma 
merely scholastic ; the teachers of the Roman period lay special 
emphasis on the practical importance of upholding the ideal of 
virtue, as alike single and complete in itselP^l 

323. But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in 
Virtue and ^^^ applications ; though it can only be possessed as 
the virtues. ^ whole, it is attained by stages. By this ampli- 
fication of the Stoic doctrine the way is prepared for that 

"^ Diog. L. vii 128. 

s^® 'sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse' Sen. Ep. 9, 14. 

136 '[virtus] ipsa pretium sui' Dial, vii 9, 4; 'recte factorum verus fructus [est] 
fecisse' Clem, i i, i; 'virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est' Ep. 81, 20. 

s^ 'sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis tempestatibus 
vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus, cum illi fortuna se obposuit' 
ib. 85, 37. 

i« 'virtutem nemo unquam dec acceptam rettulit...iudicium hoc omnium mortalium 
est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam' Cic. N. D. iii 36, 
86 and 88; 'aequum mi animum ipse parabo' Hor. Ep. i 18, 112 ; 'monstro, quod ipse 
tibi possis dare ' Juv. Sat. x 363. 

s^" See note 129. 

s*" 'Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and 
just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy?' 
Epict. Disc, iii 24, 51 and 52. 

141 'What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life worse 
either, nor injure him, without or within ' To himself iv 8. 

"- 'nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile 
meliori' Sen. Dial, vii 15, i ; 'No man is able to make progress when he is wavering 
between opposite things ; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you 
choose to attend to this only, to work out this only, give up everything else' Epict. 
Disc, iv 2, 4. 



294 ROMAN STOICISM 

adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of circumstance 
which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By the 
side of virtue stand ' the virtues,' sometimes conceived as virtue 
herself endowed with various qualities"^, more often as virtue 
at work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes 
in turn the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly 
understood, namely Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness^"^; 
we may, if we please, reckon with a smaller or greater num- 
|-,gj.i45. yg|- ^yQ must always remember that the virtues are so 
knit together, that he who truly possesses one, possesses all"^ 
Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of which (whatever 
its sphere) is a ' right action ' (KaropOco/jia, recte factimiY^''. In 
proportion as virtue is displayed in its various qualities and 
spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself a larger 
field ; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread 
out and broadened "I 

324. Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also 
How virtue ^ history. This follows clearly from Stoic prin- 
is won. ciples, since virtue is an aspect of reason, and 

children are not possessed of reason^^'. Virtue therefore comes 
by training, not by birth i^''; by art, not by nature^^^ In the 
period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states 
of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of 
virtue ; and he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom 
we call ' the probationer ' {wpoKoirroiv, proficiens'^^'^), by learning 
and practice comes daily nearer to his goal, till in the crowning 
moment he wins it as a whole ; for virtue is no sum of lesser 

^^^ Chrysippus wrote a book irept tov Troias ehai. ras aperds ; see Arnim iii 256 

^** See below, §§ 335-350. ^^^ D'og. L. vii 92. 

^^'' Tas dperas Xiyovaiv avraKoXovOeiu dWrjXais, Kal tw fiiap ^XDj/ra Trdcras ^X^'*" 
Diog. L. vii 125 ; 'quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit, sed ex consilii sententia' Sen. 
£p. 6'j, 10; 'virtutibus inter se concordia [est]' Clem, i 5, 3- 

1^^ 'videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est perfectum 
officium' Cic. Fin. iii 18, 59; 'rectum, quod KarbpOoo/Jia dicebas' ib. iv 6, 15. 

'^'^ 'quamquam negant nee virtutes necvitia crescere; attamen utrumque eorum 
fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant' ib. iii 15, 48. 

^*^ See above, § 153, note 66. 

^^^ *scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri' Sen. Dial, iv 10, 6. 

^^^ 'non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri' Ep. 90, 44. 

^^^ Zeno probably took over the term irpoKoirT] from the Peripatetics, see Diog. L. 
vii 127 ; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See Plut. prof. virt. 12. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 295 

dispositions reached by a gradual addition of item to item, but 
a thing complete in itselP^^ Can virtue thus won be lost at a 
later time ? Virtue, it may seem, is not really such, unless it is 
indestructible ; and the Cynics and the earlier Stoics taught 
accordingly that virtue cannot be lost^^"*, that it is a ' possession 
for ever.' In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus yielded 
to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through 
intoxication or indigestion'^', to which causes might well be 
added the failure of the reason through insanity or old age^®". 
But in spite of these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic 
school held firmly to the doctrine that virtue once acquired is 
acquired for ever^"''. 

325. Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philo- 
sopher ; they exist and can be studied in human 

Wise men. 

shape, in the wise and foolish men of myth, history, 
and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best be learnt 
by considering virtuous men^'^^ Here the Stoics followed closely 
the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics ^'^ As the best of 
models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a 

^*'' 'hoc autem ipsum boniim non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris com- 
parando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum' Cic. Fin. iii 10, 34. 

^^ Stob. ii 7, iig; Diog. L. vii 1-27. 

155 ^^y a,peTr]v 'S.puannros airop\7jTT]v...8ia ixid7)v kol /xtXayxo^^iai' ih. 

i'** See above, § 289. 

•'"^ 'semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur virtus, con- 
traria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari possunt' Sen. Ep. 50, 8. 
Just in the same spirit we say that a new language or (say) the art of swimming, if 
once learnt, is learnt 'for good.' 

'^^^ 'aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic 
tanquam illo speclante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo vidente faciamus' Sen. Ep. 
II, 8, quoting however from Epicurus. 

159 'Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics held up for 
imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school. Antisthenes wrote a dialogue 
entitled "Heracles" and, with this for guidance, his followers delighted to tell again 
the story of the hero's laborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, 
the foul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the souls of 
men' Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, ii p. 151; 'the more generous Cynics aver that the 
great Heracles also, as he became the author of other blessings, so also left to man- 
kind the chief pattern of this (Cynic) life' Julian, Or. vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv. Sat. 
X 361). So also in Buddhism: 'besides the ideal King, the personification of Power 
and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of early 
Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the 
personification of Wisdom, the Buddha' Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, p. 141. 



296 ROMAN STOICISM 

god^®", who travelled over all the world, purging it of every 
lawlessness, and bringing with him justice, holiness, and 
peace^*'\ Next comes Ulysses, who like Hercules was untiring 
in his labours, triumphant over pain, and a conqueror through- 
out all the world ^''■- ; an example to all men of endurance and 
vigour"^ To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was a like 
example to prove that suffering is a good^*^. Many such are 
counted amongst the philosophers ; first Heraclitus, not for his 
insight into nature, but for his control over his passions ^*'^; then 
Socrates, who in life and death was equally a model as a man 
and as a citizen^®*. Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special 
honour, for he was so filled with love for mankind and obedience 
to God, that he willingly undertook a life of labour and bodily 
suffering, and thus won himself the true freedom'®'', and became 
truly happy, truly divine'*^. Zeno the most temperate of philo- 
sophers^''^ and Cleanthes^'''' the most enduring, were men of like 
type within the Stoic school itself. 

160 'Herculem ilium, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio 
caelestium collocavit' Cic. Off. iii 5, 25. 

1^1 'Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbetn terrarum transiit non concupiscendo sed vin- 
dicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum vindex, terrarum marisque pacator' 
Sen. Ben. i 13, 3. See also the brilliant descriptions in Epict. Disc, iii 24. 

1®'^ 'Ulixen et Herculem...Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos labori- 
bus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum' Sen. Dial, ii 2, i. Yet 
there is something to be said on the other side : ' Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and 
wept as he sat on a rock... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man' 
Epict. Disc, iii 24, 18. 

^®* So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: 'rursus quid vii-tus et quid patientia 
possit, I utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen' Hor. Ep. i 2, 17 and 18. 

1^ Diog. L. vi I, 2. 

165 ( gy acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly divine, and were 
so called' Epict. Manual 15. 

166 'praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus eademque frons, 
ut de Socrate accepimus' Cic. Off. i 26, 90; 'Socrates... violated nothing which was 
becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a penalty on 
himself; nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was 
a soldier' Epict. Disc, iii 24, 61. ''*'' See above, § 17. 

168 I si qui<5 (je felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de deorum im- 
mortalium statu' Sen. Dial, ix 8, 5 ; 'By acting thus Diogenes... was deservedly divine, 
and was so called' Epict. Manual 15. 

^^9 See above, § 306, note 25. 

^^^ 5ei/Tepos'Hpa/cX^s 6 YSKeavQr)% kKaXeiro Diog. L. vii 170; 'Learn how those live 
who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children; how 
Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to the school and drew water' 
Epict. Disc, iii 26, 23. 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 297 

326. To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the 

Romans were proud to add other names from their 

Wise Romans. , , . . , . , ., , . 

own history, thereby associatmg their philosophic 
principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology Aeneas 
was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may 
loyally cooperate with the destiny of his people ; from the times 
of the republic Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion 
Laelius^''^; whilst in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be 
found who, like Socrates, would not when on his trial consent to 
any other defence than a plain statement of the facts, in which 
he neither exaggerated his own merits nor made any plea for 
mercy^''^. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica was pre- 
eminent"^. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in 
political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and 
success, his testimony to Cato's sincerity is all the more valu- 
able"^; nor can we believe that Cato's voluntary death would so 
soon and so greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come 
as the climax of a life worthily spent "^ The period of the prin- 
cipate brought to the front both men and women whose fearless 
lives and quiet self-approved deaths proved them to be worthy 
successors to the heroes of the past ; and at the same time we 
notice a disposition to find some at least of the elements of the 
heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the soldier, the 
athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their degree 
as models for those that seek wisdom"^. 

327. The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men 
Wise men ^ad cxisted and did exist; they looked forward to 
are few. ^ time not far distant when there should be a Cos- 

i''! 'aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius' Sen. £p. 25, 6; 'elige remissions 
animi virum Laelium' id. li, 10. 

^^■^ 'nam cum asset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis, innocentiae, 
cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque sanctior, non modo supplex 
iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem aut liberius causam dici suam, quam 
simplex ratio veritatis ferebat' Cic. de Or. i 53, 229; cf. Sen. Dial, i 3, 4 and 7; and 
see further, § 430. 

^''^ 'Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales dedisse quam 
Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis' Sen. Dial, ii 2, i. 

^'^'^ 'ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil' Cic. Mm'. 29, 60. 

'^"^^ 'Catonis nobile letum' Hor. C. i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, § 430. 

1^^ 'nobis quoque militandum est' Sen. F.p. 51, 6; 'This is the true athlete. Great 
is the combat, divine is the work' Epict. Disc, ii 18, 28. See also below, § 402. 



298 ROMAN STOICISM 

mopolis in which every citizen should be wise. This robust behef 
was not maintained by their successors. According to Chry- 
sippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed ^^''; and he 
expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are 
amongst the number ^^^ The Stoics of the transition period 
avoided the topic as troublesome^''''; and their opponents natur- 
ally pressed it on them all the more. Zeno had said ' It is 
reasonable to honour the gods : it is not reasonable to honour 
the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.' This was now 
pa.rodied: 'It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not reason- 
able to honour the non-existent : therefore wise men exist,' If 
this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told^^°, to the Stoics, 
because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, 
we are not surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to 
the golden age^®^ at other times convert him into an ideal^^^. 
The Stoics under the Roman principate re-affirmed vigorously 
the existence of the wise man^^l Seneca however admits that 
his appearance is as rare as that of the phoenix 1^*, and altogether 
disclaims any such character for himself individually^^^ Epic- 
tetus is far more true to the spirit of the old doctrine, when he 
not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his own 
character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope 
of reaching perfection^®". 

1^^ Euseb. pr. ev. vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph. defato 28, p. 199, 16 B. 

1'8 Plut. Sto. rep. 31, 5. 

^''^ 'qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere' Cic. Ac. ii 47, 145. 
Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man; whilst Posidonius only defended 
his possible existence in the future (Schmekel, pp. 213, 278). 

^^^ Sext. math, ix 133. ^^^ See above, § 214. 

■^^^ Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an 'ideal character,' no- 
where else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed. So of the wise man; 'iste 
vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, 
inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et 
suae vitae et actae et consequenti, et bene de se iudicare' Fin. iii 8, 29. 

^^* 'non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri' Sen. Dial. 
ii 7, I. 

^^* 'ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel anno quin- 
gentesimo nascitur' Ep. 42, i, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2; 'scit [sapiens] paucissimos 
omni aevo sapientes evadere' Sen. Dial, iv 10, 6. 

^^^ See above, § 126. 

^^" ' Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending 
to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to 



THE LAW FOR HUMANITY 299 

328. Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple 
The lor basis of the good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, 

of virtue. ^nd the examples of wise men. In impressing this 

part of their system on their pupils, they made little use of de- 
finitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted to rhetorical 
description. As in their physics the Logos became almost a 
person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus 
in the old allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to 
her not by the pleasures she offers but by her majesty and 
beauty^^''. Cleanthes in particular heaps epithets of praise on 
virtue^^^; more usually it is sufficient to insist that virtue is good, 
praiseworthy, and expedient. That ' the wise man is a king"^ ' 
almost ceases to be a paradox, since the soul is rightly compared 
to a kingdom ; that he is rich, handsome, free, and invincible can 
equally be argued on Stoic principles'^". To carry such state- 
ments further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule them at 
any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest 
of all, that 'the wise man is happy even on the rack'^^' was 
many a time verified by the experience of individual Stoics^''-. 
That the wise man is a god, though subject to the limitations of 
mortality, is maintained without hesitation'''^. 

329. The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its 
reasoned basis, but in substance, both from the 

Stoic ethics. r \ • ii-iir 

popular morality of the time and the ideals of 
rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from those 
of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans called 

live as one who wishes to be a Socrates' Epict. Manual 1,0. Epictetus did not how- 
ever ignore failures: 'we [Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the 
things which are beautiful, but we do what is base' Disc, iii 7, 18. 
'^^ See above, § 42. 

188 See above, § 98. 

189 xhis is again a Socratic paradox : ^acnXeis S^ Kal dpxovras ov Toiis to. crKijirTpa 
^Xovras ^4>V elvai dWa tovs iwiaTajxivovs apxeif Xen. Mem. iii 9, 10. 

'^•^ Cic. Fin. iii 22, 75 and 76. 

13' 'eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti in omnibus 
tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti' ib. iii 13, 42; Arnim iii 585, 586; 'shew 
me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace 
and happy. Shew him ; I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic ' Epict. Disc, ii 19, 24. 

'^2 See below, §§431, 439. 

'9^ 'bonus tempore tantum a deo differt ' Sen. Dial, i i, 5; 'sapiens excepta 
mortalitate similis deo' ib. ii 8, 2; and see above, § 274. 



300 ROMAN STOICISM 

Jmmaiiitas, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown 
to an age of warriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular 
criticism and that of many Stoics unjustly described him, a man 
of gross tastes and reckless selfishness ; but he was essentially 
easy-going and a quietist, little inclined to risk his peace of mind 
by meddling with the troubles of others. To the Cynics the 
Stoics owed much in their principles, to the Academics (as we 
shall see) much in their application of them ; they stood between 
the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer 
in principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook 
which neither of these schools could claim. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

DAILY DUTIES. 

330. As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside 

from the supreme problems of the universe, such as 

From prin- 
ciples to gather round the questions of the divine purpose, 

the existence of evil, and unfettered choice, our way 
becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution 
of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and 
in the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they 
are of narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough 
ground we learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now 
feel ourselves, as it were, on a downward path. For all that, the 
problems of the universal law and the perfect man must still be 
compared to mountain tops, if not to the highest peaks of all. 
But from this point on we steadily descend towards the plains, 
to that common and practical life by which the worth of philo- 
sophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight 
or breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region 
of mists and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to 
new neighbours. But her meaning is the same as before, and 
the pathway to the heights is not closed behind her. 

331. The region we have now reached is that of ' daily 
The daii dutics,' by which phrase we propose to translate 
round. here the Greek Kadi^KovTa and the Latin officio^. 

This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ' that which it comes 

^ The English term, like so many we have to use, is an imperfect translation ; in 
discussing such questions as marriage and death we speak instead of ' ordinary ' or 
'simple' duties. 



302 ROMAN STOICISM 

in one's way to do-,' and its quiet sound at once brings it into 
contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in 
fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only 
possible for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men ; and 
within our view it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. 
But daily duty is common to the wise and the unwise^ ; it not 
only extends to children, but also to the unreasoning animals^ 
and to plants'. Virtue always contemplates the Universal law; 
for daily duty it is sufficient to follow the individual nature". 
Virtue cannot even be understood except by the trained philo- 
sopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained to 
the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty 
is the projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Be- 
tween the two there always remains an assured correspondence. 
Each Right Action which Virtue achieves is at the same time 
the performance of a daily duty, and that in the most complete 
manner^ ; each daily duty performed by the unwise is a step by 
which he may in the end climb to Wisdom^. 

332. The subject of ' daily duties ' was treated both by Zeno'' 
First laws ^^'^ ^X Clcanthes^", and is implied in the theory of 
of nature. Stoic cthics as a whole ; it has also a special relation 
to the doctrine of advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless 
the Stoics do not directly say that daily duty consists in the 
seeking of advantages, but that it is based upon primary ends 
which nature sets up {irpSiTa Kara (pvaiv, priiicipia naturaeY^. 
This phrase indicates the source of this part of the Stoic philo- 
sophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school and 
the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo^^. 
We are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated this 

^ KaTcovo/jLCLffdai, 5' ovtws virb irpiSjTov Tatjvuvo's to KadrJKOv, dwb tov ' /card rivas rjKeiv ' 
TTji irpoffovo/J-aaias eiK7]fXfji.ivr]s Diog. L. vii io8. 

^ 'est quoddam commune ofHcium sapientis at insipientis' Cic. I^in. iii i8, 59. 

'^ Stob. ii 7, 8. ^ Diog. L. vii 107. « Stob. ii 7, 8. 

'' tQiv KadyjKOVTiov to. jj^ev elvai (paai reXeta, a drj /cat Karopdufxara Xeyecrdai Stob. as 
above; '[sapiens] iudicat, cum agit, officium illud esse' Cic. Fin. iii 18, 59. 

^ See below, §§ 357, 358. ^ Diog. L. vii 4. i" id. 175. 

" 'omnia officia eo [referuntur], ut adipiscamur principia naturae' Cic. Fin. 
iii 6, 22. 

1^ 'Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae 
acceperat' id. iv 16, 45. 



DAILY DUTIES 303 

subject ; and when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of 
the Academy is firmly estabhshed. Thus the Stoic demand for 
certain knowledge is here set aside ; and we are told that the 
standard of daily duty is ' that which when done can reasonably 
be defended^-'''; which definition closely corresponds with the de- 
finition of the supreme good by Diogenes of Babylon ' to take a 
reasonable course in the choice of things according to nature".' 
Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer required ; 
the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and respec- 
tability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the 
founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are re- 
placed by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom : in short, by 
the doctrine of ' making the best of both worlds.' The subject 
was therefore congenial to Panaetius, who was both a practical 
statesman and an admirer of Plato and Aristotle ; and it was 
from this standpoint that Stoicism so rapidly won its way with 
the Roman nobility of the last century of the republic. Panae- 
tius' book irepl KadrfKovrcov was the basis of Cicero's work de 
Officiis, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess 
on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient 
source of information. As however this work leans very strongly 
towards Peripatetic views, it will frequently be necessary to refer 
to other authorities, amongst which Cicero's de Finibus best 
represents the older Stoics, and Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics 
of the Roman principate. 

333. It is no departure from the fundamental principles of 
Stoicism when we learn that the ' first lessons of 

From the 

animals naturc ' are those which are imprinted upon every 

animal at its birth^^ ; Zeno himself had sought for 

the natural law of marriage by a like method^". The first natural 

^^ KadrJKOv (pacLV elvai. 6 irpax&^v eiiXoyov tiv' 1(TX^'- a.wo\oyi(riJ.bv Diog. L. vii 107; 
'est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit' 
Cic. Fin. iii 17, 58; 'ratio [non] debet agere quidquam, cuius non possit causam pro- 
babilem reddere' Off. i 29, lor ; 'huic respondebimus, nunquam exspectare nos 
certissimam rerum comprehensionem, quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed ea 
ire, qua ducit verisimilitudo. omne hac via procedit officium' Sen. Ben. iv 33, 2; 
and see above, § 159. 

^^ See above, § 1 10. 

^•5 ' quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum sed 
initium boni' Sen. Ep. 124, 7. ^^ See above, § 306. 



304 ROMAN STOICISM 

lesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the 
Epicureans hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance 
of its life in its completeness^^. At a later stage is imparted the 
desire of sexual union for procreation's sake, and with it some 
kind of affection for each one's offspring^l But nature's best 
lessons are reserved for man ; as to look into the future, and 
regard life as a whole^^ ; to interest himself in his fellows, to 
attend public festivities, and to procure the amenities of a civi- 
lized life for himself and those dependent upon him^"; in spare 
hours, to acquire information on points of historical or philo- 
sophical interest^' ; in riper life to claim freedom, and to refuse 
to submit to any arbitrary commands^"^; and finally, to perceive 
in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance 
; of it by wilful action'^l ' Such,' says Cicero, ' is the picture of a 
I beautiful life ; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), 
great would be our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride^^' 

334. In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. 
The first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, 

Wavering J ^ f > 

as to the SO far as they are common to men and animals, for 

they point towards the acts of eating, drinking, and 
sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary man 
with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from 
which many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the 
terrible error of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is 
a first law of nature-^ It is therefore necessary to lay it down 

-'' 'placet his, simul atque natum sit animal, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari 
ad se conservandum, et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, 
diligenda' Cic. I^in. iii 5, 16; the maintenance of a complete life is illustrated by 
the desire to avoid the loss of a limb or deformity, ti. 17. 'Universally (be not 
deceived) every animal is attached to nothing so much as to its own interest' Epict. 
Disc, ii 22, 15. 

^^ 'commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi 
causa, et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt' Cic. OJ^. 14, 11. 

^^ ib. '<• ib. 12. 

21 Cic. Off. i 4, 13. 22 n^_ 23 /^. i^. 

^ 'formam quidem ipsam, Marce fill, et tanquam faciem honesti vides; quae si 
oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae' ib. 5, 14. 

25 'in principiis autem naturalibus plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse 
ponendam : quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis 
rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur' Fin. iii 5, 17. Yet 
Cicero, still vs^riting as a Stoic, can say: '[beluae] nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad 
eamque feruntur omni impetu' Off. i 30, 105. See below, §§ 346, 347. 



DAILY DUTIES 305 

that man should aim specially at those results which are charac- 
teristic of human nature, that is at the development of powers 
which he does not share with the lower animals. So far the 
Academy and the Porch might travel together. But the only 
higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the 
political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason ; such 
matters as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty 
could only be introduced under Academic influence. The last, 
however, as we shall see, is to become with Panaetius the pre- 
dominant consideration^^. 

335. From the enunciation of general principles we pass on 
The four ^° ^^^ Separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense 

virtues. can Only be possessed by the wise man ; he there- 

fore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless we may use this 
and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those adumbra- 
tions or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach of the 
ordinary man"". The classification of the virtues varies. Panae- 
tius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and 
Seneca follows him on this point-*. It was perhaps Chrysippus 
who distinguished between virtues that are ' arts ' (Texvai) and 
which are based on theoretical principles, and those which are 
' acquirements ' (Swd/jLei^;), being attained by practice^''. But 
generally speaking the division of Virtue into the four cardinal 
virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness is accepted 
as sufficient ; by subdivision the number of virtues may be in- 
creased to any extent; and in scholastic classifications of virtue 
we find lists which have multiplicity for their direct aim'"'. 

2« See below, §§ 343, 344. 

-^ 'in iis, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectuni 
honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt' Cic. O^. ill 3, 13; 'vivitur 
cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, si sunt simulacra virtutis' zd. i 15, 46; 'est autem 
quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem etiani cadat, cum curatione medicorum 
turbatio mentis aufertur' Tusc. disp. iv 13, 30. 

^* Diog. L. vii 92; 'in duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et 
actionem' Sen. Ep. 94, 45. 

^^ raiyras [ilv ovv rhs p'r)delaa.% dperas reXeias (leg. rexvcs Hirz. ii 482) eTvai. \iyov(n 
wepl rbv /St'oc Koi cri/j'ecmj/cecat e/c OeoipTfixaTwv ■ aXXas 5e einyLV€<Tdai rai^rais, ovk ^tl 
rex^as ovcas, aX\a dvvd/xeis rivds, e/c Trjs aaKrjaews TrepLyiyvo/ievas Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4. 

^^ For the virtues recognised by Chrysippus and others see Arnim iii 262-293 ; 
we find a sufficiently long list in Seneca : fortitudo, fides, temperantia, humanitas, 

A. 20 



306 ROMAN STOICISM 

336. Wisdom (^povrjcri'i, priidentia) is considered by Zeno 
not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foun- 
dation of all ; so that Courage is wisdom in suffering, , 
Justice is wisdom in distribution, and Soberness is wisdom in 
enjoyment^^ His successors treated Science {eTrio-TTJ/jbrj, sa'entia) 
as the parent virtue''-, thus placing Wisdom side by side with the 
other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point of Zeno's genealogy. 
The writers of the later periods desired to recognise separately 
contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced as a subdivision 
of the first cardinal virtue ' Speculation ' {ao^ia, sapieittia)^. But 
the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must justify itself by 
practical results. The study of the so-called ' liberal arts ' has a 
value for children, for it prepares the way for virtuous training^. 
Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious reasoning^^, and 
physics that we may rightly understand the universe and its 
providential government, upon which the conception of duty 
depends''*'; in this sense we may speak of logic and ph3^sics as 
virtues, that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom^^. The 
study of physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul^l 
Geometry, law, and astrology are useful in the several profes- 
sions^l But study when carried to excess, as by antiquarians, 

simplicitas, modestia ac moderatio, frugalitas et parsimonia, dementia, Up. 88, 29 
and 30. 

'^^ Plut. virt. mor. 2 ; de fort. 1 ; Sto. rep. vii i . 

^^ Thus (ppovrjcns became iTnari^iM} uv iroLTjreov /cat ov iroiTjTeov /cat ovSeTepoiv 
Stob. ii 7 5b I, cf. Alex. Aph. defato 37 (Arnim iii 283). 

^^ ' omnis cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis aut 
in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versatur' Cic. Off. i 6, 19; 'natura nos ad utrumque 
genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni' Sen. Dial, viii 5, i. 

3* 'quid ergo? nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia? ad alia multum, ad virtutem 
nihil, quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus? quia animum ad accipiendam 
virtutem praeparant' Ep. 88, 20. 

^ 'sine hac arte (so. dialectica) quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse' 
Cic. Fm. iii 21, 72. 

^® 'qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei proficiscendum est ab omni mundo 
atque ab eius procuratione ' ib. 22, 73. 

^ 'ad eas virtutes dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum 
nomine appellant' ib. 21, 72. 

'^ ' ad hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam. primo discedemus a sordidis ; 
deinde animum ipsum, quo summo magnoque opus est, seducemus a corpore ; deinde 
in occultis exercitata subtilitas non erit in aperta deterior' Sen. N. Q. iii Praef. 18. 

^9 'quae omnes artes [sc. astrologia, geometria, ius civile] in veri investigatione 
versantur, cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est ' Cic. Off. 16, 19. 



DAILY DUTIES 307 

bookworms, and other learned time-wasters, is nothing but 
folly*". 

337. The second cardinal virtue is Justice {StKaioa-vvr), ms- 
iitia), of which Chrysippus drew a striking allego- 
rical picture. ' She is of virgin form, to show that 
she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad men;... of firm 
and fierce aspect,... inspiring fear in the wicked, confidence in the 
good ; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at once sad and 
awe-inspiring'*^.' Cicero distinguishes Justice in the narrower 
sense from ' Beneficence.' Justice proper is a political virtue, 
and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals. 
By nature indeed all things are common ; but since they have \l| 
become private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, 
and so forth, individuals may keep their own, provided they do 
not forget that they have always the duty of contributing to the 
common good*^ and that even slaves have reasonable claims 
upon them^l Beneficence needs the guidance of principle, and 
must be determined by considerations of person and occasion. 
The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity; country, 
parents, wife and children must be first considered, then other 
relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general"". The con- 
sideration of the degrees of propinquity {(7')(k(jei<i) was a favourite 
subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who 
maintained that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection''^ 
The virtue of Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both 
its applications, and is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by 
Cicero after him. 

^^ 'est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium...in res conferunt non neces- 
sarias' ib. 6, 18. 

" A. Gellius, JV. A. xiv 4, 4. 

^2 Cic. Off. i 7, 21 and 22. *^ ib. 13, 41. 

^* 'principes sint patria ac parentes; proximi liberi, totaque domus, quae spectat 
in nos solos; deinde bene convenientes propinqui' Cic. Off. i 17, 58. 

*^ 'I ought not to be free from affections (aVa^Tjs) like a statue, but I ought to 
maintain the relations (o-xecrecs) natural and acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as 
a father, as a citizen' Epict. Disc, iii 2, 4; 'Duties are usually measured by relations 
(reus (Tx^cefft). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him 
in all things. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards 
him ' Manual 30. All the duties of relationship on the one side imply corresponding 
duties on the other side; 'invicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant, et parem deside- 
rant regulam, quae (ut ait Hecaton) difificilis est' Sen. Ben. ii 18, 2. 



308 ROMAN STOICISM 

338. The third cardinal virtue is Courage {dvhpeia, fortitudo), 

which retains the tradition of the ' strength and 
ourage. (qxcq ' of Socratcs. This again, according to Cicero, 
has two parts, one passive, which consists in despising fortune 
and its buffets, and is in harmony with the picture of the wise 
man as usually drawn; the other part, which we may call Great- 
ness of Soul (fMeyaXoylrvxt'Ct, niag7iitiido animi) is shown in the 
undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is cha- 
racteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart 
Wisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues ; the 
knowledge of good and evil can only be attained by the soul 
that is duly strung to vigorous resolution^". The Stoics of the 
principate perhaps insist most of all on this virtue, which alone 
makes men independent of all that it lies with Fortune to give 
and to take away. The man of courage will therefore detach 
himself from fortune's gifts ; , he will treat them as household 
furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled*''. 

339. Courage appears in its highest development in the 
Death not to ^'^^^ °^ tyranny and death. It is the tyrant's boast 
be feared. ihsX he has men in his power : but the brave man 

is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken away; 
he may be subjected to the torture ; his life may be forfeited ; 
but the soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant's 
reach**. To pain he answers 'if I can bear it, it will be light; 
if I cannot bear it, it cannot be long^l' Amidst all the extre- 
mities of fire and rack men have been found who never groaned, 
never begged for mercy, never answered a question, and indeed 

■*" '[fortitudo] scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit' Ep. 85, 
28; 'quomodo igitur Chrysippus? fortitudo est, inquit, scientia rerum perferendarum, 
vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summae legi parens sine timore' Cic. 
Tusc. disp. iv 24, 53. 

■*^ 'quicquid est hoc, Marcia, quod circa nos ex adventicio fulget, liberi honores 
opes, ampla atria et exclusorum clientium turba referta vestibula, clara nobilis aut 
formosa coniunx ceteraque ex incerta et mobili sorte pendentia, alieni commodatique 
adparatus sunt; nihil horum dono datur; coUaticiis et ad dominos redituris instru- 
mentis scena adornatur' Sen. Dial, vi 10, i; 'victrix fortunae sapientia' Juv. Sat. 
xiii 10. 

^8 'cum potentes et imperio editi nocere intendent, citra sapientiam omnes eorum 
impetus deficient' Sen. Dial, ii 4, i. 

^^ 'levis est, si ferre possum; brevis est, si ferre non possum' Ep. 24, 14. 



DAILY DUTIES 309 

laughed heartily^". Of death the Stoic has no fear; not only is 
it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part of the course of 
nature'^; it is the best of friends, for it offers a release from all 
troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the tyrant^^ 
We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage, that 
nature's first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in itself 
is a thing terrible to contemplate-'^; but life is not the more 
desirable for its length ^''; and when old age begins to shatter 
the powers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of 
a vegetable, nature is calling him to quit his mortal body'^l At 
no period is life worth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, 
without which it loses its savour^^. The philosopher therefore 
will not merely see with calm confidence the approach of death; 
he will go forward to meet it of his own free will, if only he is 
assured that reasonable choice points that way. 

340. The doctrine of ' reasonable departure ' {evXoyo<i i^a- 
Reasonabie J^JVy ratiojialis € vitu exccssus) plays a prominent 
departure. p^j.{- \-^ ^-^g Stoic ethics. It canuot rightly be de- 
scribed as the recommendation of suicide; for the Stoics do not 
permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself, but only 
to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The 
doctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death glori- 
ously met in fighting for one's country or one's friends ; next 
when intolerable pain or incurable disease plainly indicates the 

^* 'inter haec tamen aliquis non gemuit. parum est, non rogavit. parum est, non 
respondit. parum est: risit, et quidem ex animo' ib. 78, 19. 

^^ 'mors optimum inventum naturae' Dial, vi 20, i; 'fortem posce animum, mortis 
terrore carentem, | qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat | naturae' Juv. Sat. 

X 357-9- 

^^ 'caram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo' Sen. Dial, vi 20, 3; 'nuUo nos iuvida 
tanto I armavit natura bono, quam ianua mortis | quod patet' Silius Pun. xi 186-8; 
'adeo mors timenda non est, ut beneficio eius nihil timendum sit' Sen. Ep. 24, 11. 

^^ ' [mors] quin habeat aliquid in se terribile, ut et animos nostros, quos in amorem 
sui natura formavit, offendat, nemo dubitat' ib. 36, 8. 

^* So Heraclitus had said 'unus dies par omni est' ib. 12, 7; 'ut prorogetur tibi 
dies mortis, niiiil proficitur ad felicitatem : quoniam mora non fit beatior vita, sed 
longior' Ben. v 17, 6. 

^* 'si [senectus] coeperit concutere mentem, si partes eius convellere, si mihi non 
vitam reliquerit sed animam, prosiliam ex aedificio putri ac ruenti' Ep. 58, 35. 

^ 'melius nos | Zenonis praecepta docent; nee enim omnia, quaedam | pro vita 
facienda putant' Juv. Sat. xv 106 to 108. 



3IO ROMAN STOICISM 

will of the deity^^; in the development of Roman history a third 
reason was found in the loss of political freedom ^l These 
reasons are not added to, but only systematized, when we are 
told that it is an 'ordinary duty' to quit life when a man's 
natural advantages (ra Kara <^vaLv) are outweighed by the 
corresponding disadvantages^^ ; for amongst ' natural advan- 
tages ' are included in this connexion all those considerations 
of which an honourable man will rightly take account ; and the 
calculation may equally lead him to the conclusion that, in spite 
of old age and suffering, and though he has never attained to 
true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait quietly in life*^". 

341. The practice of ' reasonable departure ' was largely 
recommended to the Stoics by the examples of 
Socrates (whose death they regarded as voluntary^^) 
and of Cato''^; and it was at first no small matter of pride to 
them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their 
system thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors 
that beset humanity. But under the Roman principate ' free 
departure ' soon became so common that it was a reproach 
rather than a glory to its advocates, a social disease pointing 
to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy resolution '^^ Hence 

^"^ Diog. L. vii 130. Ingenious members of the school found five good reasons for 
voluntarily quitting life, resembling the causes for breaking up a banquet. As the 
guests part, because of (i) a sudden need, such as the arrival of a friend, (ii) revellers 
breaking in and using violent language, (iii) the food turning bad, (iv) the food being 
eaten up, or (v) the company being drunk ; so the wise man will depart, because of 
(i) a call to sacrifice himself for his country, (ii) tyrants doing him violence, (iii) disease 
hindering the use of the body, (iv) poverty, (v) madness, which is the drunkenness of 
the soul. See Arnim iii 768. 

^^ Notably in the case of Cato. 

®8 'in quo plura sunt, quae secundum naturam sunt, huius ofificium est in vita 
manere ; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria, aut fore videntur, huius officium est 
e vita excedere' Cic. Fin. iii 18, 60. 

^^ 'perspicuum est etiam stuitorum, qui iidem miseri sint, ofificium esse manere in 
vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum, quas secundum naturam esse dicimus' ib. 
iii 18, 61. 

^1 He might easily have obtained acquittal by a judicious defence: Xen. Mem. 
iv 4, 4. 

^^ 'Catoni gladium adsertorem libertatis extorque: magnam partem detraxeris 
gloriae' Sen. Ep. 13, 14. 

^^ 'ille adfectus multos occupavit, libido moriendi' ib. 24, 25; 'quid ergo? non 
multos spectavi abrumpentes vitam? ego vero vidi, sed plus moment! apud me habent 
qui ad mortem veniunt sine odio vitae, et admittunt illam, non adtrahunt' ib. 30, 15. 



DAILY DUTIES 3 II 

the philosophers turned from recommendation to reproof. * A 
brave and wise man must not flee from Hfe, but quit it,' says 
Seneca"; 'nothing is more disgraceful than to long for death'*'. 
' Friends,' says Epictetus, ' wait for God ; when he shall give you 
the signal, then go to him®".' 

342. The ' free departure ' is the most striking illustration 
Courage is °^ passivc courage, but even before it was abused 
active. Ciccro at least had perceived the attraction which 

this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to the spirit 
of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and which 
he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. 
Still the Stoics had already defined Courage as ' virtue fighting 
in the front rank in defence of justice'"'.' A good man must 
indeed regard power and wealth as things indifferent ; but he 
is to be blamed if he makes this an excuse for avoiding public 
life, and leaving to others magistracies at home or commands 
in the wars*^. In the old world the love of glory and praise 
on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, 
has led men to seek these positions ; but now they should seek 
them at home that they may have a wide field for the exercise 
of their virtues '*'', and in the wars in order that all war may be 
brought to an end''". By the older Stoics this Greatheartedness 
was advocated by precept and example : Zeno had said that 
the wise man should take part in public life^^ and his hearers 
Persaeus and Philonides had taken service under Antigonus 
Gonatas''^, and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of Sparta''^ 
We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman 
political life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in 
an age in which there was a strong current of fashion in favour 
of a quiet life. We must therefore recognise in Courage, fully 
as much as in Wisdom or Justice, a political as well as a 
private virtue, 

*^ id. 24, 25. ^^ id. 117, 12. ^® Epict. Disc. 19, 16. 

®^ ' probe definitur a Stoicis fortitude, cum earn virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem 
pro aequitate' Cic. GJ^. i 19, 62. 

"8 id. 21, 71. "^ id. 26, 92. ''" id. 23, 80. 

^^ 'Zenon ait; accedet ad rempublicam [sapiens], nisi si quid impedierit' Sen. 
Diai. viii 3, 2. 

''^ See above, §§ 89, 90. ''^ See above, § 91. 



312 ROMAN STOICISM 

343. The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness {a-w^pocrvvq, 
teinperantia). Of this there are various definitions, 
and amongst them that it is the principle which 
regulates our natural appetites so that they are neither in excess 
nor in defect"^. From Cicero's point of view Soberness embraces 
all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation of the impulses that 
virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a healthy state 
of the soul ; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy of the 
body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and 
becoming {irpeirov, decoruiny^. ' Just as bodily beauty is sym- 
metry established between the limbs mutually, and also between 
each and the whole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry 
between the reasoning power and its parts, and mutually between 
each of those parts''''.' Although this is in principle a doctrine 
accepted by the whole Stoic school, yet in its application we 
may easily find an entirely new departure, that is, if the appeal 
is made to an artistic standard which depends upon the taste 
of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an aban- 
donment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, 
and to the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which 
may easily be so stretched as to include existing prejudices 
and conventions. This danger is realized in Cicero's treatment 
of the virtue of ' decorum,' which in its distinctive sense is de- 
fined as having the element of ' gentlemanliness ' in itself^ It 
begins with respect for the feelings and opinions of others''^ ; 
it avoids all rough games and obscene jests''*' ; it makes choice 

^^ ' efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque praecurrant, 
nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque tranquilli atque omni perturba- 
tione animi careant' Cic. Off. i 29, 102. 

^* ' hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine decorum potest ; Graece enim irpkirov 
dicitur; huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari' ib. i 27, 93. 

^^ Stob. ii 7, 5 b 4; 'ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris 
quadam suavitate, ea quae dicitur pulchritude ; sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque 
aequabilitas et constantia, cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate, pulchritudo vocatur' 
Tusc. disp. iv 13, 31. 

■^^ ' id decorum [volunt] esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio 
et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali' Off. i 27, 96. 

^^ 'adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia ad versus homines, et optimi cuiusque 
et reliquorum' ib. 28, 99; 'to order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters' 
English Church Catechism. 

^* Cic. Off. i 29, 104. 



DAILY DUTIES 313 

of a profession adapted to the natural character of the indi- 
vidual^"; it observes, as the actor does, the proprieties of youth 
and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner*' ; it prescribes 
dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women^^ j^ parti- 
cular decorum is displayed in modesty {vereaindid). This is 
shown by keeping out of sight those parts of the body which 
nature, though she could not dispense with them, has concealed 
and covered ; in attending to their functions with the utmost 
secrecy; and in referring both to these parts of the body and 
to their uses by words that do not properly describe them*^ 

344. Cicero's treatment of ' decorum ' is so full of good sense 
Cynism or ^^^^ ^^^ '^^ OfficUs was the most widely-known text- 
' decorum'? book of Grcco-Roman ethics in medieval schools, 
and has retained its importance in the classical public schools 
of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic prin- 
ciples is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find 
that, just as Zeno and the main body of his followers had pro- 
claimed in advance that such doctrine was false in principle and 
ridiculous in detail, so conversely the followers of Panaetius found 
it necessary expressly to repudiate the teaching of a large num- 
ber of Stoics^*. We have in fact here a sharp conflict between 
the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the one side, and the 
general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero elsewhere 
treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that ' the wise man will 
blurt things straight out*^'; and the theory of 'gentlemanly 

^'^ 'id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum quis- 
que igitur noscat ingenium' ib. 31, 113-4. Retail trading, and all the arts that 
subserve luxury, are illiberal; agriculture is the most truly liberal: ib. 42, 150 
and 151. 81 ib. 34, 122-124. 

®^ 'venustatem inuliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem' ib. 36, 130. In 
the same spirit Epictetus says 'we ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes' 
Disc, i 16, 14. 

83 Cic. Off. i 35, 127. 

8* 'nee vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui 
reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus ; 
ilia autem, quae turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis' ib. i 35, 128; 'Cynicorum 
autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis eiusmodi forte 
casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit: alii nuUo modo' Fin. iii 20, 68. 

*•' ' habes scholam Stoicam, 6 (ro^6s evdvpprifxovT](TeL. ego servo et servabo (sic enim 
adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. itaque tectis verbis ea ad te scripsi, quae apertissimis 
agunt Stoici' Fain, ix 22, 5. See also above, § 318. 



314 ROMAN STOICISM 

professions ' can never have appealed to any large social circle. 
In the period of the principate we find the theory of ' decorum,' 
as a whole, abandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero 
himself, recognises the absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a 
plain meaning*^, nor does he limit his choice of illustration even 
when addressing a lady of high social position^^ We must look 
then in some other direction than the de Officiis for a duly pro- 
portioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of Soberness. 

345. Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find. 
The appe- amongst those that are generally accepted, first, 
tites. that it is ' the science of things that are to be 

sought or avoided or neither**^ ' ; secondly, that it is ' concerned 
with the human appetites*".' Now the term 'appetite' or 'im- 
pulse ' ippfxr], appetitus) includes in the Stoic philosophy all those 
first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some 
object, and which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring 
revision and control by reason. But it seems clear that Sober- 
ness has little to do with those higher impulses that are 
characteristic of man, such as the love of knowledge or of 
society, since other virtues are concerned with these. It remains 
that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with the appe- 
tites common to men and the lower animals, which we may 
shortly call the ' lower appetites ' ; they are, as we have already 
stated, the desires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is 
just in this sphere that Pleasure arises, in the sense in which 
it is condemned by the Cynics and popular moralists"". We may 
therefore shortly define Soberness as a right disposition of soul 
in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar characteristic is that it is 
in the main a negative virtue, displaying itself in abstinence from 
indulgence''^ 

*^ 'rem ineptissimam fecero, si nunc verba quaesiero, quemadmodum dicam ilium 
matelam sumpsisse' Sen. Ben. iii 26, 1. 

^' Dial, vi 20, 3. 

*^ abi<ppo(jiivf\v 8' eZvai iTnarrj/jiiijv aiperwu Kal (pevKTwv Kal ovderipcov Stob. ii 7, 5 b I. 

*^ T7]v 5e ffu<ppoaijvr}v irepl ras op/xas tov avdpdinov ib. 7, 5 b 2. 

^^ fia.vei'qv fxSXKov 7) ijcrdeirjv was the expression of Antisthenes, see Diog. L. vi 3 ; 
'voluptas est. ..res humilis, membrorum turpium aut vilium ministerio veniens' Sen. 
£en. vii 2, 2. 

"^ 'intellegitur appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse' Cic. O^. i 29, 103. 



DAILY DUTIES 315 

346. In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Sober- 
^ . ness, we need a clear idea of the attitude of the 

1 wo views ' 

of Pleasure. Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno, as we have seen, 
whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of things 
indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that 
it might be an advantage (Trpoijy/jLevov), and the seeking after it 
natural (Kara cfyvcnvy^; and this is stated to have been the 
express teaching of Hecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus'^ 
To other Stoics this appeared to be a disastrous concession 
to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had scornfully described 
the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure enthroned as 
queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her hand- 
maidens^^, interpreted the word ' indifferent ' more strictly ; he 
refused to admit that pleasure was 'natural' or possessed any 
worth^^ In this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, 
and practically by Archedemus, when he said that pleasure was 
natural but valueless, like the hairs under the armpit^l Hence 
followed the acceptable conclusion that no sensible man would 
pay much attention to so trivial a matter"''. Thus the one word 

®^ See above, § 319. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson's view (on Z. fr. 
128) that Zeno intended ttovos to be the vpo7)yixivov, and tiSovt) the a.iroirpo7)yixevov\ 
but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised the value of irbvos (toil) as 
a discipline. The following remarks communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw 
much light on a really difficult question. ' Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not 
all "pleasure" is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller's Socratics, p. 308), bvxt 
the only form of it which deserves consideration is that which is the result and after- 
effect of 7r6yoj. In other words, it may be argued that true pleasure is the cessation 
of pain (Plat. Phileb. 44 b). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corre- 
sponds ; but pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected. 
Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that -ridov^ was irporjyiJ.ivov, his 
remark can only have applied to the dirovia-ijSovrj ; and such certainly was the view 
of Chrysippus (Plut. S^o. rep. 30, 2).' In the passage here referred to from Plutarch 
dTTOj'ta takes the place of iidovri as a wpoyiytiivov ; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. 
Fin. iii 15, 51. See further §§ 347, 371. 

^^ T]dovrj as an advantage is contrasted with irdvos (suffering) as a disadvantage in 
the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102. 

^* Cic. Fin. ii 21, 69. 

^^ KXedvdrjs fJLTjTe Kara. (j)V(nv ai/rrjv [i73oi''^i'] elvai firjT d^iav exeiv ev rip ^itp 
Sext. mai/i. xi 74 (Arnim iii 155). 

^^ Arnim iii 136, 155. 

^' 'sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis, et titilla- 
tionem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem animi' Cic. Fin. iii i, i; 'quis 
mortalium per diem noctemque titillari velit?' Sen. Dial, vii 5, 4; 'quidni ista bene 
penset cum minutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus ? ' id. 4, 4. 



3l6 ROMAN STOICISM 

* indifferent' came to include two views which were substantially- 
opposed, the one incHning to the Academic standpoint, and the 
other to Cynism. 

347. From this contradiction an escape was sought by 
making a distinction. In one sense pleasure is an 

Pleasure an rr • r i i i i • i i- / • -u • \ 

aftergrowth, atlection oi the body, namely a tickhng {titiUatio) 
of the organs of sense, most readily illustrated in 
the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is 
not an advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to 
one ; though it is not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be 
welcomed when nature grants it to us as an extra"®. This new 
view practically coincides with that of Aristotle, who calls 
pleasure an ' aftergrowth ' {iin'yevv'riixa, accessid), which of itself 
follows on virtuous action, and is attached to it as the scent 
to a flower^l But much more commonly, in ethical discussions, 
' pleasure ' denotes the excitement which is more strictly termed 
' hilarity ' (eirapaL^;, sublatio a7iimi), and is the unhealthy con- 
dition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of 
choice^"". For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin term lae- 
iitia, which is perhaps not altogether adequate^''^ This ' pleasure ' 
may be unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but 
actually contrary to nature^°^; whilst the virtuous and natural 
disposition is that of the man who not only contemplates toil 

^^ 'voluptas habet quiddam simile natuiali bono' Cic. Leg. i ii, 31; '[voluptas] 
condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit' Off. iii 33, 120; 'volup- 
tatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine 
quibus non possumus vivei'e, gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio' Sen. Ep. 116, 3; 
'[virtus voluptatem] non praestat, sed et banc; nee huic laborat, sed labor eius, 
quamvis aliud petal, hoc quoque adsequetur' Dial, vii 9, i. That this view was 
held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a); see also 
above, notes 92 and 93. 

»9 Eth. N. X 7. 

^^^ ijdovT] de eariv dXoyos ^napcris f(f> aiperip Sokovvti virdpxeiv Diog. L. vii 1 14 (of 
Chrysippus); 'hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici 
putant, qui earn sic definiunt; sublaiionem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno 
bono frui' Cic. Em. ii 4, 13; 'vitium esse voluptatem credimus' Sen. Ep. 59, i. 

^"^ 'quam [perturbationem] Stoici ijdovrjv appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, 
quasi gestienlis animi elationem voluptariam' Cic. Em. iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero 
translates with more fulness by laetitia gestiens or niniia; Tusc disp. iv 6, 13. 

^^^ nacairtos 5e [■^Soi'^i' ^t^cti] two. fiJkv Kara tpvaiv virapxeiv, riva 8^ Trapa <f>v(nv 
Sext. math, xi 73 (Arnim iii 155). 



DAILY DUTIES 317 

and pain with calm mind, but actually welcomes them as possible 
stepping-stones towards his own true advantage ^''^. 

348. Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching 
Active ^^ ^° consider Soberness as a negative virtue, and 
soberness. ^s opposed to the perturbation of Hilarity, there is 

not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For Soberness 
also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul 
in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex ; 
abstinence is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season 
is both a folly and a fault. But this point of view is not ade- 
quately treated by any Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing 
daily duties omitted to consider the proper care of the body, 
as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of Tyre ; and Cicero 
gets little further than a general recommendation of common 
sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life^^'^. The 
Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter 
to the physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to 
allay hunger, drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep 
away cold"^; but it is probable that popular moral discourses 
stopped short of this, and favoured some amount of endurance 
as a discipline for the soul"". 

349. With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic 

tradition was favourable to a more positive treat- 
ment. Accordingly the Stoics (not without some 
feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position) assert 
that love (epfo?, amor) is an essential, both for the maintenance 
of the State"^ and for the character of the good man. Zeno 

^"•^ See below, §§371, 402, 403. On the whole subject see further Hicks, Stoic 
and Epicurean, pp. no to 112. 

^"■^ 'Antipater Tyrius, Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuus, praeterit[am] censet 
a Panaetio valetudinis curationem. valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et obser- 
vatione, quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque 
cultu corporis tuendi causa, postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent' 
Cic. Off. ii 24, 86. 

^"•^ 'banc sanam et salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis, 
quantum bonae valetudini satis est...cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis 
arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit ad versus infesta corporis' Sen. Ep. 8, 5; and so 
Musonius, below, § 381. 

"" Epict. Disc, iii 22 and 26. ^*"' See above, § 304. 



3l8 ROMAN STOICISM 

had laid it down that ' the wise man will love"^' We must, 
however, make a sharp distinction between love as the desire 
of sexual union, and the higher Love (ipcoriKT] dperTJ) which is 
defined anew as ' an effort to make friends suggested by a 
beautiful object"^' Upon this impulse, which is natural in 
the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the 
more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self- 
restraint on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons 
of philosophy, the Stoics introduced a new relation between 
husband and wife based upon equality and comradeship"**. A 
notable precedent was fufnished by the Cynic community, when 
the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates in the life of 
the beggar-preacher"^ ; and Roman Stoicism supplies us with 
numerous instances of the same companionship"^ Under such 
conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice ; it is 
a civic duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the 
Roman principate well perceived the danger that threatened 
the society in which they lived through the growing practice 
of celibacy "^ 

350. The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated 
by the following extract from a discourse by Anti- 

Of marriaere. , ,- t- 

pater oi i arsus : 

' A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social duty, 
will feel that no life and no household is complete without wife and child. He 
will also bear in mind his duty towards the State, for how can that be main- 
tained unless, as the fathers decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine 
tree, the sons marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh 
shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection against its 
enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty towards the gods ; 
for if the family dies out, who will perform the accustomed sacrifices? 

^'•^ Diog. L. vii 129; 'Stoici sapientem amaturum esse dicunt' Cic. Tmsc. disp. iv 

34. 72. 

1**^ €Trt.^o\7]v (piXoTTouas 5ta /cdXXos ifufyawoixevov Diog. L. vii 130; '[Stoici] amorem 
ipsum conatum amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie definiunt ' Cic. as above. 
The iin8o\rj or conatus is a variety of the bpixi] or appetitio, Hirzel p. 390. 

^^^ Not of course new in any absolute sense ; in the country at least such relations 
must always have been common. 

"1 Diog. L. vi 96-98. 

"'•* See above, § 300, and § 306, note 29; and below, §§ 431, 439, 444, and 446. 

^^* 'in consensu vidui caelibatus nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit' Sen. Ben. 
i 9, 4. 



DAILY DUTIES 319 

Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not tasted 
the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are hke platefuls of 
beans or other Hke mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and 
wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any other case of penetra- 
tion {Kpaais Si' oXcov); for they are united not only by the ties of substance 
and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances 
are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of life, so that the 
parents on each side gladly allow that the wife should be first in her hus- 
band's affection, and the husband in his wife's. 

But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change for the 
worse and marriage is thought a hard thing ; and men call the celibate life 
divine because it gives opportunity for licentiousness and varied pleasures, 
and they bar the door against a wife as against an enemy. Others have 
their fancy taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is 
piously brought up and obedient and a good manager ; nor do they trouble 
to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man would attend to the 
warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a lawful wife would be the lightest 
and sweetest. Such a man would have four eyes instead of two, and four 
hands instead of two, to supply all his needs : and if he desired leisure to 
write books or take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business 
of housekeeping to his partner^^*.' 

351. The four cardinal virtues, however widely they are in- 
Advantages tcrprcted, do not exhaust the field of daily duties, 
sought. All objects that are ' advantages ' (irpoTjyfu^eva) are 

prima facie such that the good man aims at securing them ; 
although if sufficient reason appears, he will entirely forego 
them. The advantages of the soul, good natural disposition, 
' art,' and ' progress ' are discussed elsewhere in this chapter ; as 
advantages of the body are reckoned life, health, strength, good 
digestion, good proportions, and beauty; whilst external advan- 
tages are wealth, reputation, noble birth, and the like"'. In all 
the details there is a lack of exactitude and of agreement amongst 
the teachers. According to Seneca, men may reasonably wish 
for tallness"", and there is a kind of beauty (not dependent on 
youth) of which women may be proud without blame"''. Fine 
clothes make no one the better man, but a certain degree of 

^^^ Stob. iv 22, 25; and see further, §§ 406, 407. 
"^ Diog. L. vii 106. 

"® 'non contemnet se sapiens, etiamsi fuerit minimae staturae; esse tamen se 
procerum volet' Sen. Dial, vii 22, 2. 

^^'^ 'unicum tibi ornamentum pulcherrima et nuUi obnoxia aetati forma' ib. xii 16, 4. 



320 ROMAN STOICISM 

neatness and cleanliness in dress is an advantage"^ For nobility 
the Stoics have little regard ; all men are derived through an 
equal number of degrees from the same divine origin; virtue 
is the true nobility^^". Good name {86^a, gloria) is commonly 
reckoned amongst 'advantages'^^"; but Chrysippus and Diogenes 
are said to have taught that a good man need not move a finger 
for the sake of reputation, unless some advantage can be 
obtained by it. Later teachers, influenced (as we are told) by 
the criticisms of Carneades, made it absolutely plain that they 
reckoned good name (apart from anything attainable by it) as 
an advantage, and they even considered it natural that a man 
should think of posthumous reputation^-^ The general feeling 
of the school seems to be that the approval of others is too 
uncertain to be a fitting aim ; its place is taken by the approval 
of ' conscience.' This term, which originally expressed the 
burden of a guilty secret, became in the Roman period modified 
in meaning, and could thus express the approval awarded to a 
man by his inner and personal consciousness, even when all the 
world disapproves his acts : this self-approval is closely akin to 
peace of mind^^^ 

352. On no subject would it be easier to find apparently 

contradictory views amongst Stoic writers than on 

that of wealth. To decry wealth and praise poverty 

is to some extent a commonplace with all the philosophical 

schools ; and with Seneca in particular this was so frequent a 

^^^ 'contra naturam est, faciles odisse munditias ' Sen. Ep. 5, 4; 'non splendeat 
toga, ne sordeat quidem' ib. 5, 3. 

"^ 'unus omnium parens mundus est: ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perducitur' 
Ben. iii 28, 2; '[philosophia] stemma non inspicit... animus facit nobilem' Ep. 44, i 
and 5. 

^^* Diog. L. vii 106; Cic. Fin. iii 15, 51. 

121 'de bona autem fama... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes, detracta utilitate, ne 
digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. qui autem post eos fuerunt, 
cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, banc quam dixi bonam famam propter se prae- 
positam et sumendam esse dixerunt' ib. 17, 57. Cicero and Seneca were both keenly 
sensitive to the judgment of posterity: 'paucis natus est, qui popukim aetatis suae 
cogitat: multa annorum milia, multa populorum supervenient: ad ilia respice. etiamsi 
omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor indixerit, venient qui sine offensa sine gratia 
iudicent' Sen. Ep. 79, 17. 

^*^ 'pacem demus animo, quam dabit...intenta mens ad unius honesti cupiditatem. 
conscientiae satis fiat; nil in famam laboremus' Dial, v 41, 2. 



DAILY DUTIES 32 1 

practice^^ that his hearers found some inconsistency between 
his words and his deeds; for he was, as is well known, a rich 
man. But the position of the school is clear. ' Riches are not 
a good ' is a Stoic paradox, emphasized in a hundred forms, and 
by every teacher^^-*; but nevertheless they are an 'advantage,' 
and thus are rightly aimed at by the good man^^^ To the 
wealthy Stoics generally, and to the Romans of the republican 
period especially, the maintenance of the family property {res 
familiaris) was a duty of high importance ; and the wasting of 
it in wholesale largess, a serious misdeed ^-^. The Stoic view 
was sufficiently summed up in a proverb borrowed from Epi- 
curus or one of his followers : 'he who feels the need of wealth 
least, can make the best use of it^^''.' Although Panaetius did 
not write a special chapter on the acquisition and use of 
wealth^-®, yet his views on the latter point are made sufficiently 
plain in his treatment of the virtue of Justice^^^ The justifica- 
tion of wealth lies in the intention to use it well, and this 
was a favourite subject with Hecato of Rhodes'^". As to its 
acquisition and investment, Cicero is content to refer us to the 
high-principled men who conduct the financial affairs of the 
capitaP^\ 

1-23 'iiiyitis 2A philosophandum obstitere divitiae; paupertas expedita est, secura 
est' Ep. 17, 3; 'tianseamus ad patrimonia, maximam humanarum aerumnarum 
materiam' Dial, ix 8, i. 

^-'* 'Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animo dant nee 
fiduciam nee securitatem, non sunt bona, divitiae autem.. .nihil horum faciunt; ergo 
non sunt [bonum]' Ep. 87, 35. 

123 'divitias nego bonum esse; nam si essent, bonos facerent. ceterum et habendas 
esse et utiles et magna commoda vitae adferentis fateor' Dial, vii 24, 5 ; '[sapiens] non 
amat divitias, sed mavult. maiorem virtuti suae materiem subministrari vult' ib. 21, 4. 

126 'largitio quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit' Cic. Off. 
ii 15, 52; 'mentitur prodigus liberalem, cum plurimum intersit utrum quis dare sciat 
an servare nesciat' Sen. Ep. 120, 8. 

'^ 'is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget' ib. 14, 17. 

^^^ Cic. Off. ii 24, 86. ^'-^ See above, § 337. 

i"*" 'Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de 
Officiis scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere "sapientis esse, nihil contra mores leges instituta 
facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. neque enim solum nobis divites esse 
volumus, sed liberis propinquis amicis, maximeque reipublicae. singulorum enim 
facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis'" Cic. Off. iii 15, 63. 

^*^ 'toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, commodius a qui- 
busdam optimis viris, ad lanum medium sedentibus, quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in 
schola disputatur' ib. ii 25, 90; and see further, § 408. 

A. 21 



322 ROMAN STOICISM 

353. Amongst those popular terms which hold an ambiguous 

place in the Stoic philosophy we must reckon 
> er y. , liberty ' {eXevOepla, libertas). In one sense liberty 
is a condition of soul such as characterizes the free-born citizen 
in contrast to the slave ; this liberty differs but little from the 
virtue of Greatness of Soul already described ^^^ and in its full 
meaning is a good, which the wise man alone can possess *^^ 
But in another sense liberty is an external advantage, sometimes 
defined as ' the power of living as you wish^^^' and as such eagerly 
desired by the slave ; more often perhaps it is conceived as ' the 
right of saying what you please^^l' In this sense liberty is 
equivalent to the irapprjala which was the watchword of the 
democracy of Athens, and was the equally cherished privilege 
of the nobility of Rome^^*^; in a slightly different sense it was 
the boast of the Cynic missionary. The Stoics take a middle 
position ; whilst all recognise that some sort of liberty is a 
precious privilege ^^'j and are prepared on occasion to sacrifice 
life or position for its sake^'**', there are not wanting voices to re- 
mind us that it is unreasonable to speak out one's mind without 
regard to persons or circumstances^^'', that the wrath of tyrants 
ought not lightly to be provoked^''", and that the most terrible 
of all oppressors is the soul that has lost its self-control"*. 

354. Just as virtue chooses advantages in accordance with 
Disadvan- natural laws, so it refuses disadvantages in accor- 
tages. dance with a disinclination (e/c/cXicrt?, alienatio), 

^^^ See above, § 342. 

133 ^^y ^^j, ^(j^' aXTj^gjo.j' iXevOepiav dya66v,...Si 6 8t] Kal tov a-jrovdaiov eli'at fxdvov 
iXeidepov Stob. ii 7, iii. 

1^* 'quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis' Cic. Par. 5, 34. 

^^^ 'asperitas agrestis | vult libertas dici mera' Hor. Ep. i 18, 6 and 8. 

1^8 Juv. Sat. i 151-153. 

^^'' 'non potest gratis constare libertas; hanc si magno aestimas, omnia parvo 
aestimanda sunt' Sen. Ep. 104, 34, where the reference is to 'libertas' in both senses. 

^^^ 'nee civis erat, qui libera posset | verba animi proferre, et vitam impendere 
vero' Juv. Sai. iv 90 and 91. 

139 q{j y^p (j^gj ^£jj TravraxoO Kal vpbs ovtlvovv XeKriov a (ppopou/xei> Muson. apud Stob. 
iii 40, 9 (Hense, p. 754, 6). 

^'"' ' sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit ; immo declinabit, non aliter quam 
in navigando procellam' Sen. E/>. 14, 7. 

^''1 'Can we abolish the acropolis that is in us, and cast out the tyrant within us, 
whom we have daily over us?' Epict. Disc, iv r, 86. 



DAILY DUTIES 323 

which is equally natural and right so long as it is controlled 
by reason ^''^. Since to every advantage there is opposed a 
corresponding disadvantage, to choose the one is necessarily 
to refuse the other; and the doctrine of 'reasonable refusal' is 
that of reasonable choice in its negative form. It will therefore 
be sufficient to give a formal statement of the theory. Disad- 
vantages, or things that have negative value (dTra^ia), may be 
subdivided according as they are disadvantages in themselves, 
as an ungainly figure ; or as they bring about other disadvan- 
tages, as shortness of ready money; or for both reasons, as bad 
memory or ill-health "^ They may also be subdivided into three 
classes, according as they affect the soul, the body, or things 
external. Disadvantages of the soul are such things as inborn 
vulgarity or dulness of wit ; of the body, ill-health, and dulness 
of the organs of sensation ; of external things, poverty, loss of 
children, and the contempt of our neighbours"^ 

355. Since the virtues are permanent dispositions (Sm^ecret?) 
Healthy ^^ ^^6 soul, rootcd in firm principles in which the 

affections. wise man never wavers, but to which none else can 
attain, some other name is required to describe those more 
passing but yet wholesome moods which stand in contrast with 
the evil ' affections ' or perturbations of the soul which will be 
discussed in our next chapter. A beginning is made in this 
direction with the three ' good affections ' (eviraOeiai, constantiae, 
sapientis affectioiies). Here a new use of terms is introduced. 
Strictly speaking an ' affection ' is an evil state of soul ; but as 
we have no corresponding word for a good and calm condition, 
the use of the word ' affection ' is extended in this direction ^*^. 
Each of these ' good affections ' is introduced to us in contrast 
with a perturbation to which it bears a superficial resemblance. 
Thus contrasted with Fear is ' Caution ' {evXa^eia, caiitid), which 
is right avoidance, and is entirely consistent with Courage 

^*^ Xpi;cri7rir6s (pr\(jL fj-alveadai. to{/s...t7jv airoviav iv ix-qdevl ttolovix^vovs Plut. Sio. rep. 
30, 2 ; 'in aliis satis esse causae [Stoici voluerunt] quamobrem quibusdam anteponeren- 
tur, ut...in doloris vacuitate' Cic- Fin. iii.15, 51. 

^** Stob. ii 7, 7 b; Cic. Fin. iii 17, 56. ^^^ Stob. as above. 

^^^ For a similar change in the meaning of the word 'conscience' see above, § 351; 
the new use of this word as of the word 'affection' is that now commonly understood 
in ethical discussion. 

21 — 2 



324 ROMAN STOICISM 

rightly understood. Subdivisions of Caution are (i) 'Shame' 
(alSco'i, vereamdia), the avoidance of deserved blame, and 
(ii) ' Sanctity ' (dyveia), the avoidance of offences against the 
gods^^^ Contrasted with Greed is ' Readiness ' (^ovX7]ai<i, vo- 
luntas), the reasonable stretching out after future advantages"''; 
contrasted with Hilarity is Joy (^yapa, gmidiuin), the reasonable 
appreciation of present advantages '^^ Both Readiness and Joy 
are entirely consistent with Soberness rightly understood. To 
the perturbation of Grief no good affection is named as bearing 
any resemblance ; but we need not for that reason question but 
that the wise man may entertain some quiet form of sympathy 
for the troubles of others, and of regret for the blows which 
fortune deals to him in political disappointment or personal 
bereavement"". 

The 'good affections' are possessed by the wise man only^^"; 
but not all wise men possess them, nor any at all times ^-'^ On 
the other hand it is a daily duty to approximate to them, so 
that on this ground the good citizen enters into competition with 
the wise man on not altogether uneven terms ^■'■^. The whole 
doctrine of ' good affections ' may be conceived as an answer 
to those who accuse the Stoic of lack of feeling^^^; for the much 
derided ' apathy ' of the school is substituted the doctrine of 
' eupathy.' Wisdom is not to be compared to the surface of 
a frozen sea, but to that of a rippling river. The lectures of 
Musonius and Epictetus bring out on every point the meaning 
of ' eupathy ' in its various applications. 

^^^ Diog. L. vii ii6; 'declinatio [malorum] si cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, 
eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente' Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 6, 13. 

■'*'' 'eiusmodi appetitionem Stoici /SoyXTjcriJ' appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem: 
quam sic definiunt — voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat' ib. 6, 12. 

i-'S 'cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, turn illud gaudium 
dicitur' ib. 6, 13. 

"9 See below, §§374, 379. 

150 'scio gaudium nisi sapienti non contingere. est enim animi elatio suis bonis 
verisque fidentis' Sen. Ep. 59, i and 2; 'sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum' 
ib. 27, 3. 

i^i ■Xp.poLv 5^ Kai ev<ppoaivrfl> Koi (ppovifiov Trepnrdr'ija'n^ [Xeyovatv^ ovre iracn roTi 
<j>poviixois vwapxei-v ovre aUi Stob. ii 7, 5 c, 

15^ 'in huius gaudii possessione esse te volo' Sen. £p. 23, 4. 

153 'avoKyrjcria enim atque aTrddeia quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu pruden- 
tiorum hominum, sicut iudicio Panaetii, inprobata abiectaque est' A. Gellius JV. A. 
xii 5, 10. 



DAILY DUTIES 325 

356. We have now sketched the Stoic system of daily duties 
The ethical ^^ ^^^ main features, and this sketch will be made 
motive. more complete in many particulars in the course 

of the next two chapters. To the modern reader the question 
here suggests itself — what compelling force has this system ? 
what motive is supplied to the ordinary man for thus planning 
out his life ? To this question the ancient philosophers did 
not directly address themselves ; nevertheless their answers are 
implied in their teaching as a whole. Thus the Stoics would 
doubtless reply, first, that daily duties- are prescribed to us by 
reason ^^*; not perhaps always by reason in its highest sense, 
to which we must not appeal in every individual action, but at 
least by the spirit of reasonableness (euXoyLaria). Secondly, 
that the common opinion of mankind, growing daily stronger, | 
recommends them ; they are, as we have seen from the begin- ^ 
ning, things that it comes in our way to do, that every good 
citizen and good man will be sure to do. As to future rewards 
and punishments, though these are not excluded by Stoicism, 
they are certainly never pressed as motives for right living. 
But the strongest of all motives is undoubtedly the mental 
picture of the wise man, the vision of that which is ' absolutely 
good.' Critics may urge : ' it is a picture that never has been 
or will be realized in men's lives, a vision of that which is very 
far off and which you will never see or touch.' This the Stoics 
hardly care to deny, but the difficulty does not disturb them. 
The vision attracts by its own beauty, the hope of attainment 
is cherished by all but the worst ^^^ We have spoken of the 
' ordinary man,' or, as the Stoics put it, of ' us who are not wise 
men.' But, strictly speaking, there is no room for the ordinary 
man in the system, but only for the 'probationer' (TrpoKoirTcov, 
proficiens). It remains for us to trace the upward path from daily 
duty to virtue, along which every good man is endeavouring to 
advance. 

' ^^^ TO 'XoyLKOv ^ipov a.Ko\ovd7]TLKOv (pvcTEi €aTL T(^ \6yui Kal Kara Tov \6yov (is av 
riyf-ixova irpaKTiKov Galen plac. Hipp, et Plat, iv 2, p. 368 K. 

loD 'negat [Zenon] Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa, qua tyrannum 
Dionysium. huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae; illi propter 
spem vivere' Cic. Fin. iv 20, 56. 



326 ROMAN STOICISM 

357. The doctrine of progress {irpoKoirri, progressio) is not 
peculiar to Stoicism, but it is nevertheless an 

Progress. . . ^ _. /->.• .iii- 

essential feature of it^™ Critics may indeed dis- 
pute as to whether virtue has ever been in practice attained ; 
but the Stoic must hold fa.st to the ethical principles that 
' virtue can be taught^^'' ' and that ' virtue is an art^^^.' Every- 
man has from birth a capacity for acquiring virtue^^", which 
varies in degree according to his natural disposition of soul^'"'; 
on this foundation every man builds by concurrent learning 
and practice^*'^ The child is greatly helped if he posses.ses 
the trait of ' modesty ' (atScw?, verecimdid), which is essentially 
a readiness to defer to others and to learn from those who are 
older and wiser ^•'^ ; though later it may turn to ' false shame,' 
which is a hindrance^*'^ He will then learn to understand and 
perform his daily duties ; and as his character ripens, this per- 
formance will daily become easier and more pleasurable to 
him^^*, more certain and more steady in itself And now daily 
duties come near to Right Actions, which are indeed daily duties 
perfected {jkXeiov KadrjKov, perfecUini officitmi), and complete in 
every point^^l In order to rise to this higher standard the good 
man must first perform his duty in all particulars^^**; he must do 

^^® See above, §§ 289, 324. 

^^■^ For the Socratic paradox 'virtue can be taught,' see above, § 46, also Diog. L. 
vii 91 ; 'nemo est casu bonus, discenda virtus est' Sen. Ep. 123, 16. 

^^^ Arnim iii 214. 

159 'omnibus natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum' Sen. Ep. 108, 8. 

■"''' The emphasis occasionally laid on ev<f>vta (bona indoles) reflects aristocratic and 
Platonic influences, see Pearson, pp. 205, 206; 'those who have a good natural 
disposition (oc eixjivels) , even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more to reason' 
Epict. Disc, iii 6, 9. 

161 'Modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him; 
actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him' ib. 
ii 9, II ; 'What then is progress? if any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, 
turns to his own will (vpoaLpeais) to exercise it and to improve it by labour' ib. i 4., 18. 

^^^ Cic. de Off. i 28, 99 (§ 343 above); 'verecundiam, bonum in adulescente 
signum' Sen. Ep. 11, i. 

••^^ '[obstitit] verecundia, quae multorum profectus silentio pressit' Dial, vi 24, 2; 
cf. Ep. 40, 14. 

^^ 'paulatim voluptati sunt quae necessitate coeperunt' Dial. 14, 15. 

165 Stob. ii 7, 8, 8 a, and 11 a; Cic. Off. i 3, 8 and iii 3, 14. 

186 ^ 5 ^^' ciKpov, ^7]<rl [Xpvcrnriros], TrpoKhwruv airavra irdvTUS airo5l8(o<n to. 
Kad-qKovra Kal oiidev irapaXelirei Stob. iv (Flor.) 103, 22 M (Arnim iii 510). 



DAILY DUTIES 327 

SO with regularity and in harmony with the order of nature ^"^ ; 
he will then need only a certain fixity, conviction, and stability 
to pass into the ranks of the wise^*^^. 

358. The stages of progress are variously expounded by 
Stoic writers ^^''; but on one principle all are agreed. 
Progress is not a half-way stage between vice and 
virtue, as the Peripatetics teach'™; it is a long preparation, to be 
followed by a change sudden and complete (fxera^oXij, con- 
versioY"^^. The final step, by which a foolish man becomes in 
an instant wise, is different in kind to all that have gone before. 
This position is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that 
' the good is not constituted by addition '''V and is enforced by 
various illustrations. The probationer is like a man who has 
long been under water ; little by little he rises to the surface, 
but all in a moment he finds himself able to breathe. He is 
like a puppy in whom the organ of sight has been for days 
past developing; all at once he gains the power of vision'''^ 
Just so when progress reaches the end there dawns upon the 
eyes of the soul the complete and dazzling vision of the good, 
of which till now only shadows and reflections have been per- 
ceived. For a moment he is wise, but does not even yet realize 

^^"^ 'primum est officium, ut se conservet in naturae statu; deinceps ut ea teneat, 
quae secundum naturam sint ;...deinde ea [selectio] perpetua; turn ad extremum con- 
stans consentaneaque naturae ; in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, quid sit, quod 
vere bonum possit dici' Cic. Fin. iii 6, ■zo. 

^®^ iiriyiyvecrOat [rw 7rpoK6irTovTi~\ ttjv evdaifioviav orav at fxeaai irpd^eLS avrat, 
TTpocrXdpojcn to ^i^aiov koI €ktik6v /cat Idiav TrTJ^iv two. Xd^oicn Stob. as above; 'illud, 
quod ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas et recta ire te via credas' Sen. Dial, ix 2, 2. 
Epictetus uses the technical term diierairTwaia ' unchangeable firmness of mind ' 
Disc, iii 2, 8. 

^^8 See especially Seneca, Epp. 75 and 95. 

^'''' Diog. L. vii 127. 

171 T^^ 5^ fieTa(TTpo(prjv rrji' iwl ra deia oi fiev 'ZtuI'koI e/c ^tera/SoX-)}? ^acrt ylveaOai, 
^era/3aXAoi/<Tr;s t7]s ^vxvs eh <To<pLav Clem. Al. Strom, iv 6, 28 (Aniim iii 221). 

^''^ Cic. Fin. iii 14, 45 ; and see above, § 322. 

^^^ 'ut qui demersi sunt in aqua, nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt 
a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam turn essent in profundo ; nee 
catulus ille, qui iam appropinquat ut videat, plus cernit quam is qui mode est natus; 
item, qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis aditum, nihilominus in miseria est, quam ille 
qui nihil processit' Cic. Fin. iii 14, 48. 



328 ROMAN STOICISM 

his own wisdom ; then again in a moment he passes on to the 
complete fruition of happiness^""*. 

359. Thus from the lowlier conception of ' daily duties ' we 
have again climbed upwards to the supreme ethical 
" ^' end, to absolute goodness, which is Virtue in her 

full royalty and the Universal Law {Kotvo<i vofio'i) as it appeals 
to the individual man. In this connexion the ideal is familiar 
in modern times under the name of Duty. Th'e ancient Stoics 
perhaps never quite reached to any such complete formulation 
of their ethical theory in a single word ; but their general 
meaning is perfectly expressed by it. Just as the Socratic 
paradoxes mark the quarrel of philosophy with outworn 
ideas expressed in conventional language, so its reconciliation 
with the general opinion is marked by those newly-coined terms 
such as ' conscience ' and ' affection ' which are now familiar 
household words. We cannot indeed demonstrate that ' Duty 
exists,' any more than we can that deity or providence exists ; 
but we may well say that without it ethical discussion would 
in our own day be hardly possible. The following stanzas from 
Wordsworth's ' Ode to Duty,' based upon a Stoic text^''^ may be 
a useful reminder, not only of the dominant position of this con- 
ception in modern thought, but also of the continued tendency 
of the human mind to express its supreme convictions in 
anthropomorphic language. 

' Stern daughter of the Voice of God ! 
O Duty ! if that name thou love 
Who art a light to guide, a rod 
To check the erring, and reprove : 
Thou who art victory and law 
When empty terrors overawe : 
From vain temptations dost set free ; 
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity ! 

Stern Lawgiver! yet thou dost wear 
The Godhead's most benignant grace ; 

'''^ As to the man who is 'wise wathout knowing it' {diaXeXrjdw ao(p6s) see Arnim 
iii 539 to 542, and Plut. S^o. rep. 19, 3 and 4. 

175 'iam non consilio bonus, sed more eo perductus, ut non tantum recte facere 
posset, sed nisi recte facere non posset' Sen. Ep. 120, 10. 



DAILY DUTIES 329 

Nor know we anything so fair 
As is the smile upon thy face : 
Flowers laugh before thee on thy beds 
And fragrance in thy footing treads : 
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong; 
And the most ancient heavens, through thee, are fresh and strong. 

To humbler functions, awful Power ! 
I call thee : I myself commend 
Unto thy guidance from this hour; 
O let my weakness have an end ! 
Give unto me, made lowly wise. 
The spirit of self-sacrifice ; 
The confidence of Reason give ; 
And in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live! 'I''" 

176 Written in 1805. 



Sin. 



CHAPTER XIV. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS. 

360. The Stoic view of the universe is coloured by opti- 
mism. All comes from God, all works towards 
good. None the less the Stoic morals are stern. 
Men in the mass are both foolish and wicked ; they defy God's 
will and thwart his purpose. The world is full of sin, and all 
sins (to use the Socratic paradox) are equal. What then is sin ? 
It is a missing of the mark at which virtue aims {d/jbdpTr)ij.a); it 
is a stumbling on the foad {peccatuni); it is a transgressing of 
the boundary line\ It is the child of ignorance, the outward 
expression of ill health of the soul. Everywhere and in every 
man it weakens, hampers, and delays the work of virtue. It 
cannot however finally triumph, for it is at war with itself 
The Persians were wrong when they conceived an Evil Power, 
a concentration of all the powers of mischief in one personality. 
This cannot be, for sin lacks essential unity. It destroys but 
does not build ; it scatters but it does not sow. It is an earth- 
born giant, whose unwieldy limbs will in the end be prostrated 
by a combatant, small to the outward view, but inspired with 
divine forcefulness. If we understand what sin is, we shall see 
its repulsiveness ; if we learn how it spreads, we shall seek pro- 
tection against its infecting poison ; if we attack it in detail, in 
individual men and in their daily acts, we shall in the end lay it 
low. Philosophy then proceeds to arm itself for its task. 

^ 'est peccare tanquam transilire lineas' Cic. Par. iii 20. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 331 

361. Sin is ignorance ; more accurately, it is that which 
appears to be knovvledsfe, but is not knowledge ; 

The four sin- ^^ ^ , . , Jl . ^ ' 

fui conditions it is false judgment. If we follow the process by 
which knowledge is attained, we find that there 
is no error in the mind-picture {visiuii), whether it is sensory 
or partly sensory and partly rational ; this is an adumbration 
automatically presented to the mind. But ' assent is in our 
power ' ; it is both an intellectual and a moral act. A too hasty 
assent to that which appears to be but is not is both an error 
and an offence ; and most particularly so when it lies in the 
application of the general conceptions (TrpoXij-^ea) of ' good ' 
and 'evil' to particular cases^ In this way we quickly reach 
four sinful conditions, which come about by mistaking things 
indifferent, that is, advantages and disadvantages, for things 
good or e^il. These are : 

(i) Fear {(f)6^o<;, metiis), in which a future disadvantage is 
mistaken for a future evil ; 

(ii) Greed {eTndvfita, libido), in which a future advantage is 
mistaken for a future good ; 

(iii) Grief (kviri], aegritudd), in which a present disadvantage 
is mistaken for a present evil ; 

(iv) Hilarity {-qhoviq, laetitid), in which a present advantage is 
mistaken for a present good^ 

In the case of the last two evils the title presents difficulty in 
all languages ; thus for Grief we might substitute any term such 
as Discontent, Vexation, Worry or Fretfulness ; it is a lack of 
Courage in bearing pain or disappointment. Again for Hilarity 
we might substitute Elation, Exaltation, Excitement: it is a lack 
of Soberness in the moment of pleasure. 

^ 'Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful and not useful?... 
Adapt the preconception properly to the particular things' Epict. Disc, ii 17, 10 
and II. 

^ 'omnes [hae perturbationes] sunt genere quatluor, partibus plures; aegritudo, 
formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi T]bovi]v appellant, 
ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam' Cic. Fin. 
iii 10, 35; 'est igitur aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, ...laetitia opinio recens 
boni praesentis ;...metus opinio impendentis mali,... libido opinio venturi boni' Tusc. 
disp. iv 7, 14; 'hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque' Verg. Aen. vi 733. See 
also Diog. L. vii no and Stob. ii 7, 10 b. 



332 ROMAN STOICISM 

362. From another point of view all sin is due to a lack of 
They are also Hioral forcc, a Want of tonc in the moral sinews, an 
maladies. unhealthy condition of the soul^ Ultimately this 

point of view agrees with that just described : for it is the lack 
of health and strength which leads to hasty and ill-judged 
assents But for practical purposes we may use this distinction 
to lead up to a difference of grade. Thus we may associate 
ignorance with that rooted perversity of mind which is the 
exact opposite of virtue, and which is therefore in the strictest 
sense 'vice' (KaKca, vilmmY; and want of tone with a passing 
condition which we cannot deny to be an evil, but may 
nevertheless describe by the gentler terms ' perturbation ' and 
'affection".' Such an evil is a disturbance of the soul's calm, 
an 'infection' of its health. It may exist in three grades to 
be hereafter described, as a ' ruffling,' a ' disturbance,' a ' disease '; 
and in both the latter forms it must be rooted out, for in both 
grades it is an evil, and in the last it is a vice which threatens 
to poison the man's whole nature. Hence Ave reach the Stoic 
paradox that 'the affections must be extirpated''.' But although 
this is our only ethical standard, we are not debarred from 
suggesting remedies which may alleviate the malady in particular 
persons and under special circumstances. 



•* Xpv(ninros airoSeiKvivai ireipaTat, Kpiaecs Kevas eTvai tov \oyi<XTLKOv to, wddr], Zrjvuju 
8e ov TCLS Kpicreis a^urds, dWd rds eTnyLyvofievas avrais CFVcrroKas /cat xty(Tets, iirdpcreis re 
Kai TTTwaeis ttjs xpvxv^ ivdfii^ev elvai. rd wddrj Galen Hipp, et Plat, v i, p. 429 K; 
cf. ib. iv p. 387 K (Arnim i 461). 

° In this sense there are four vices, each the precise opposite of one of the virtues; 
they are d<j>po<T'Livr} (insipienfia) , ddiKia {iniustitia), BeiXia [igiiavia) and aKokaaia 
(intenipei-antia) ; and each of these is rooted in a fixed perverse judgment, so that 
he who has one vice has all (Stob. ii 7, iik, p. 106, 7 Wachsmuth). 

*> This view is summed up in the phrase that 'the perturbations are Ko.Kd, but not 
KaKiaC (Stob. ii 7, 5 b), which accords with the principle that only vice and what is akin 
to vice is evil. The Roman writers realized the difficulty in the use of words : 'morbi 
autem et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis; sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem 
partes quaestio est. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem 
raoventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse' Cic. Tiisc. disp. ivi3, 
29 and 30. 

'' 'utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est; nostri 
illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant' Sen. Ep. 116, i; 'vacandum omni est animi 
perturbatione, turn cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia et 
iracuudia' Cic. Off. i 20, 69; 'contra adfectus impetu, non subtilitate pugnandum est' 
Sen. Dial, x 10, i. • 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 333 

363. The evil of Fear {^6^o<;, forniido, inetiis) is practically- 

opposed to the virtue of Courage. Here philosophy 
builds upon the foundations of common opinion, 
and its task is the easier. The youth who is brought up not 
to regard suffering, poverty, exile, or death as evils, will never 
be afraid. Since it is death that most alarms mankind by its 
grim aspect, he who can face this giant without trembling will 
not know fear, or at the most will only feel a slight ruffling of 
the soul. In asserting that ' fear should be rooted out ' the 
Stoics cross no general sentiment ; the tradition of the heroic 
age is the same. 

364. The treatment of Greed {eiridv^iia, libido) is similar. 

This fault is opposed to the Soberness with which 
men should aim at advantages ; and when we have 
determined the standard of Soberness every transgression of it 
reveals Greed. But under this heading the Stoics include the 
vices of Anger® and Cruelty, for which the heroic age had no 
condemnation. In regard to the former they come into conflict 
with the Peripatetics also, who maintain that Anger serves useful 
ends, and should be controlled, not extirpated''. The considera- 
tion of this condition of mind will therefore bring out the 
divergence between the two schools. 

365. The Peripatetics assign Anger to the passionate part 

of the soul {to e7ndv/M7]Ti/c6v); they admit that it 
"^^^' needs to be restrained by reason, but hold that 

within proper limits it is both natural and necessary. In war 
it is essential to heroic action ; he who is filled with it despises 
danger, and rushes on to great achievements". It is no less 
necessary in peace, in order that the wicked may not go un- 
punished". Aristotle says compendiously that 'anger is the 

^ opyrj fiev ovv icmv eircdv/xia tou Ti./ji,Mprjcraa6ai rbv doKOvvTa ijdiKrjKevai Stob.. 
ii 7, lo c; vtto ttjv eTndvfxiav vwdyerai opyrj 2d. 10 b. 

^ Here Panaetius is faithful to the Stoic view: 'ira procul absit, cam qua nihil 
recte fieri, nihil considerate potest' Cic. O^. i 38, 136. 

^^ '[ira] extollit animos et incitat; nee quicquani sine ilia magnificum in bello 
fortitudo gerit' Sen. Dial, iii 7, i. 

^1 "'non potest" inquit "fieri" Theophrastus, "ut non vir bonus irascatur malis"^ 
id. 14, I ; ' "quid ergo?" inquit "vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, 
si rapi matrem?'" ib. 12, i. 



334 ROMAN STOICISM 

spur of virtue^-,' the armour of the man of high soul. To this 
point of view the Stoics are opposed alike on the ground of 
principle and of experience. We do not need disease as a 
means to health ^^, or armour which sways instead of being 
swayed^"*. A good man will face danger unmoved, from the 
sense of duty; and will face it more firmly and more perse- 
veringly than he whose passions are excited ^^ He will punish 
wrong-doers either for their amendment or for the protection 
of others, without being angry with them^**. Fabius the Delayer 
conquered his own spirit before he overcame Hannibal^''; and 
the very gladiators strike, not when their feelings move them, 
but when the opportunity has come^l 

366. Anger is technically defined as ' the greedy desire of 
Degrees of avenging an injury,' or (more precisely) as 'the 
anger; greedy desire to punish one whom you deem to 

have injured you unjustly^^.' That it is a temporary madness 
has always been held by the wise^**; and this is indicated by the 
appearance of the angry, the threatening look, the heightened 
colour, the gnashing teeth, the stamp of the foot^' ; also by the 
fact that children are specially prone to anger, even for frivolous 
causes^^, and that anger is often directed against harmless persons 
or objects ^l Nevertheless anger does not consist of a merely 

^- 'stat Aristoteles (fr. 80 Rose) defensor irae et vetat illam nobis exsecari; 
calcar ait esse viitutis' Sen. Dial, v 3, i. 

1* 'abominandum remedii genus est sanitatem debere morbo' ib. iii 12, 6. 

^* 'haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant 
manum, et habeut non habentur' ib. 17, i. 

^^ 'adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio' ib. \i, ^. 

^'° 'corrigendus est qui peccat meliorque faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine 
ira' ib. 15, i. 

^"^ '[Fabius] iram ante vicit quam Hannibalem' ib. 11, 5. 

^^ 'nee [athletae] cum ira suadet, feriunt, sed cum occasio...ira enim perturbat 
artem' ib. iv 14, 2 and 3. 

^8 bp-^ni] (jAv ovv icTTiv iindv/xia [toC} Ti/iupificTaadai. rov SoKodfTa rj5iK7)Kevai Trapa to 
■jTpoffTJKov Stob. ii 7, 10 c; 'ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae, aut, ut ait Posidonius, 
cupiditas puniendi eius, a quo te inique putes laesum' Sen. Dial, iii 2, 4. 

^^ 'ira furor brevis est' Hor. £p. i 2, 62; 'quidam ex sapientibus viris iram 
dixerunt brevem insaniam' Sen. JDiaL iii i, 2. 

21 ib. 4. 

^^ 'non pietas iram, sed infirmitas movet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis 
flebunt quam nucibus' ib. 12, 4. 

^' 'nee in ea tantum, quae destinavit, sed in oeeurrentia obiter furit' ib. v i, 3. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 335 

instinctive feeling, but implies the assent of the will^ ; so that 
we can always trace the three stages, first the appearance of 
an injury done {species oblata inhiriae^, secondly the assent 
{animus adsentit atque adprobaf), thirdly the outbreak of anger 
remedies {scquitur iruY^. To check anger the first necessity 

^°^ **• is time^® : reflection will often show us that we have 

not been injured at all, or not so much as we supposed^''. Then 
it is well to put ourselves in the place of the offender, and try to 
look at the offence from his point of view'^ Where anger has 
become a disease {iracundia), more violent remedies must be used ; 
some have been cured by looking at themselves in a mirror-^ ; 
others must apply the ' contrary twist^",' and learn when struck 
to turn quietly away^^ 

367. Anger is an evil that has many varieties, and the pre- 
variations cisians cxercise their ingenuity in distinguishing the 
of anger, bittcr-humoured {amarus), the fiery {stomachosus), 

the fierce {rabiosus), the man who is hard to get on with {diffi- 
cilis), and many other shades of character. But one variety 
deserves special notice, because the evil disposition exists though 
its expression is checked. The angry man of this type does not 
allow himself to go beyond complaint and criticism, but he nurses 
his feeling in the depths of his heart^-. He would on no account 
express himself in loud outcries, but his displeasure is easily 
excited and persistent. This evil we call moroseness ; it is a 

-^ 'nobis placet nihil [iram] per se audere, sed animo adprobante' ib. iv i, 4; 
'nunquam impetus sine adsensu animi est' ib. 3, 4. 

25 ib. 3-5. 

"^ 'maximum remedium irae mora est' ib. 29, i; 'Keep quiet, and count the days 
on which you have not been angry' Epict. Disc, ii 18, 12. 

■■^^ 'pleraque eorum, propter quae irascimur, offendunt nos magis quam laedunt' 
Sen. Dial, v 28, 4; 'contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much 
or more than the hurt itself Bacon, Essay 57. 

^^ 'eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur' Sen. Dial. 12, 3. 

^ ' quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit adspexisse speculum ' ib. iv 36, i . 

^* See below, § 403. 

^^ 'percussit te: recede, referiendo enim et occasionem saepius feriendi dabis et 
excusationem' ib. 34, 5. 

^2 'quaedam [irae] ultra querelas et adversationes non exeunt, quaedam altae 
gravesque sunt et introrsus versae' ib. iii 4, 3. 



336 ROMAN STOICISM 

feeling characteristic of a decadent society ^^ and (like all other 
kinds of anger) it calls for unsparing repression. 

368. Cruelty, a tendency to excess in punishments^ is an evil 

constantly attendant upon the possession of power, 
and directly opposed to the virtue of clemency. 
Roman history has exhibited many examples of it, beginning 
with Sulla who ordered seven thousand Roman citizens to be 
slain on one day^^ continuing with the many masters who are 
hated for cruelty to their slaves^^ It cuts at the root of the 
ties of humanity and degrades man to the level of the beast ^'; 
in its extreme form it becomes a madness, when the slaying of 
a man is in itself a pleasure ^^ As a remedy for cruelty in its 
milder forms it is well to consider the true objects of punish- 
ment ; first, to reform the offender; secondly, to make others 
better by a warning; thirdly, to give a sense of safety to the 
community by removing offenders^**. All these objects are better 
effected if punishment is moderate and rare, and appears to be 
awarded with reluctance. When cruelty has become a disease 
it is necessary to remind the tyrant that his manner of life is 
a pitiable one*", and that a complete cure can be worked by 
putting him to death*\ 

369. In recko'ning Grief in its countless varieties as an evil 

the Stoics did not altogether run counter to public 

opinion. In the heroic age grief was indeed not 

forbidden, but it was sharply limited ; women might grieve, men 

s^ 'inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus, quaedam enim 
sunt irae, quae intra clamorem concidant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam 
frequentes' Sen. Dial. i and 3. 

■** Defined as ' atrocitas animi in exigeirdis poenis ' or ' inclinatio animi ad 
asperiora' Sen. Clem, ii 4, i and 3. 

'^^ ib. i 12, I. 

s^ 'domini crudeles tola civitate commonstrantur invisique et detestabiles sunt' 
ib. 18, 3. 

s^ 'ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere et vulneribus' ib. 24, 3. 

s^ 'tunc ille dirus animi morbus ad insaniam pervenit ultimam, cum crudelitas 
versa est in voluptatem et iam occidere hominem iuvat' ib. 25, 3. 

'^'^ ib. 22, I. 

^ 'puta tutam esse crudelitatem ; quale eius regnum est?' ib. 2b, 1. 

'*^ 'optimum est abire ei, qui ad se nunquam rediturus est' Ben. vii 20, 3. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 337 

should remember. But in prescribing the total extinction of this 
state of mind the Stoics appeared to pass the bounds of human 
nature; public feeling revolted against what seemed impossible 
of attainment. Our position to-day is not greatly altered; but 
we may notice that whereas in ordinary social life Grief is not 
only tolerated but approved, yet in battle, earthquake, flood, and 
pestilence our ideal of the hero is one which almost entirely ex- 
cludes the indulgence of this emotion. 

Grief takes many forms, as Fretfulness, Disappointment, 
Restlessness, Pity, and Mourning ; we proceed to examine them 
in order. 

370. The simplest form of Grief is fretfulness under bodily 
pain, the effect of depression of the soul and con- 
traction of its sinews*^. In all ages and under all 
philosophies the capacity of bearing pain without flinching is the 
primary test of virtue; and in the Cynic and Stoic schools alike 
the dogma ' pain is no evil ' is of critical importance. In this 
matter correct doctrine needs to be strengthened by life-long 
discipline; but it is not required by Stoic principles that general 
principles should be forced upon the acceptance of individual 
sufferers. Panaetius therefore acted quite correctly when, in 
writing to Quintus Tubero on the subject of the endurance of 
pain, he abstained from pressing the usual paradoxal But all 
who see this trial awaiting them will do well to consider how 
much hardship men willingly endure for evil purposes, such as 
those of lust, money-making, or glory. Cocks and quails will 
fight to the death for victory: jugglers will risk their lives 
swallowing swords, walking on tight ropes, or flying like birds, 
when in each case a slip means death ■*^. If we compose our 
minds long before to meet suffering, we shall have more courage 
when the time Gomes'*'. 

*'-^ \ijTr7iv 5' elvai (rvaToKriv i/'i'X^s aweidri Xbyig Stob. ii 7, 10 b; 'est aegritudo opinio 
recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti conti'ahique animo rectum esse videatur' Cic. 
Tusc. disp. iv 7, 14. 

'*■■' See above, §114. 

■*■* Muson. ap. Stob. iii 29, 75. 

■*' 'nemo non fortius ad id, cui se diu composuerat, accessit et duris quoque, si 
praemeditata erant, obstitit' Sen. Ep. 107, 4; and see further, § 339. 

A. 22 



338 ROMAN STOICISM 

371. Still more effective is active training*". Happy was the 
Discipline Spartan youth who came to Cleanthes to ask him 
of pain. whether pain was not a good ; his education had 

taught him that this was a more practical question than that 
other, whether pain is an evil'*''. Recruits cry out at the slightest 
wound, and are more afraid of the surgeon's touch than of the 
sword; on the other hand veterans watch the life-blood draining 
away without a sigh^. Some men groan at a box on the ear, 
whilst others smile under the scourge*^. Inexperience therefore 
is the chief cause for weakness under pain ; familiarity with it 
brings strength^", 

372. The Grief that gives way to pain of mind has very 
Disappointed various forms ; but that which is due to disap- 
ambition. pointed ambition is perhaps the most typical. 

Even men who had overcome the fear of death were known to 
shudder at the bitterness of soul {aegritiido animi) which accom- 
panies defeat in a contested election {i^epidsd) in a republic, or 
displacement from the favour of the powerful under a monarchy®^ 
For this malady the complete remedy is found in the paradox 
that ' the wise man is king,' that virtue can never be unseated 
from the curule chair ^^; temporary alleviations may be found, 
even by philosophers, in biting sarcasms aimed at the incapacity 
of one's fellow-citizens^''. It may be in the abstract the duty of 

*® 'id ill quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit. ad contemnendam malorum 
potentiam animus patientia pervenit' Sen. Dial, i 4, 13. 

*'' Stob. ii 31, 125 (Wachsmuth, p. 242, 30). The point is however compHcated 
by the ambiguity of the Greek word ■Kbvo%, which corresponds equally to dolor and 
labo7- in Latin; see Cic. Tusc. disp. ii 15, 35. 

*8 'tirones leviter saucii tamen vociferantur et manus medicorum magis quam 
ferrum horrent; at veterani, quamvis confossi, patienter ac sine gemitu velut aliena 
corpora exsaniari patiuntur' ib. xii 3, i. 

*■• 'scio alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho' Ep. 13, 5. 

^^ 'magna autem pars apud imperitos mali novitas; hoc ut scias, ea quae putave- 
rant aspera, fortius, cum adsuevere, patiuntur' ib. 76, 34. 

^^ 'quae maxima credis | esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam' Hor. 
Ep. i I, 43. 

^^ ' virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, | intaminatis fulget honoribus ; | nee sumit aut 
ponit secures | arbitrio popularis aurae' Hor. C. iii 2, 17-20. 

^^ 'Chrysippus, when asked why he took no part in politics, replied: "because, if 
a man is a bad politician, he is hateful to the gods ; if a good politician, to his fellow- 
citizens' Stob. iv 4, 29. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 339 

a good man to take part in politics ; but experience shows that 
the State has yet to be discovered which can tolerate a sage, or 
which a sage can tolerate^^ Hence we find even Stoic teachers 
relapsing into practical Epicureanism, and bidding their followers 
to let the community go hang, and to reserve their energies for 
some nobler occupational To these lapses from sound principle 
we need not attach any serious importance; the individual Stoic 
did not always live up to his creed. 

373. Restlessness is grief of mind without known cause ; 
the unquiet soul rushes hither and thither, vainly 

Restlessness. i • , i r r •, co t-'i 

seekmg to be tree from its own company^l 1 he 
lesson that Horace had pressed a century earlier, that disquiet 
can only be cured by quiet, has not been learnt^^ In Homer 
Achilles tosses on his bed in fever, lying first on his face, then 
on his back, never long at rest in any position ; and so to-day 
our wealthy man first travels to luxurious Campania, then to 
the primitive district of the Bruttii ; north and south are tried 
in turn, and alike disapproved, whilst after all the fault is not 
in the place, but in the man^^. In this temper men come to 
hate leisure and complain that they have nothing to do-'^ This 
folly reaches an extreme when men trust themselves to the sea, 
take the chance of death without burial, and place themselves 
in positions in which human skill may avail nothing"". It even 
leads to great political disasters, as when Xerxes attacks Greece 
because he is weary of Asia, and Alexander invades India be- 
cause the known world is too small for him"^. The times will 

^^ 'si percensere singulas [res publicas] voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem 
aut quam sapiens pati possit' Sen. £>m/. viii 8, 3. 

^^ 'si potes, subdue te istis occupationibus; si minus, eripe' £f. 19, i. 

^^ 'mobilis et inquieta homini mens data est. nunquam se tenet, vaga et quietis 
impatiens, et novitate rerum laetissima' id. xii 6, 6. 

^^ 'ratio et prudentia curas | ...aufert; | caelum non animum mutant, qui trans 
mare currunt' Hor. £^. i 11, 25-27. 

^^ Sen. Dia/. ix 12-15. 

^® 'inde ille adfectus otium suum detestantium querentiumque nihil ipsos habere 
quod agant' id. 2, 10. 

"" 'incertam fortunam experimur, vim tempestatum nulla humana ope superabilem, 
mortem sine spe sepulturae. non erat tanti' JV. Q. v 18, 6 and 7; 'non eadem est his 
et illis causa solvendi, sed iusta nulli' ib. 16; 'quid non potest mihi suaderi, cui per- 
suasum est ut navigarem?' Ep. 53, i. 

61 N. Q. V 18, 10. 



340 ROMAN STOICISM 

come, when men will seek novelty by travelling through the air 
or under the sea ; they will force their way through the cold of 
the poles and the damp heat of the forests of Africa. The remedy 
lies either in humbler submission to the will of the deity, or in 
a sense of humour which sees the absurdity of taking so much 
trouble for so little advantage*^-. 

374. Pity is that weakness of a feeble mind, which causes it 

to collapse at the sight of another man's troubles^^ 
' ^' wrongly believing them to be evils. Pity looks at 

the result, not at the cause, and it is most keenly felt by women 
of all ages, who are distressed by the tears even of the most 
abandoned criminals, and would gladly burst open the doors of 
the gaols to release them^t The cause of pity lies in a too rapid 
assent ; we are caught napping by every sight that strikes on our 
senses. If we see a man weeping, we say ' he is undone ' : if we 
see a poor man, we say ' he is wretched ; he has nothing to eat*^^' 
Now we Stoics have a bad name, as though we recommended to 
governors a system of harsh punishments^''; but, on the contrary, 
none value more highly than we the royal virtue of clemency*'''. 
Only let it be considered that a wise man must keep a calm and 
untroubled mind, if only that he may be ready to give prompt 
help to those who need it ; a saving hand to the shipwrecked, 
shelter to the exile, the dead body of her son to a mother's tears. 
The wise man will not pity, but help'^^ 

375. Nearly akin to the evil of pity is that sensitiveness to 

the sufferings of others which leads men, contrary 
1 1 y. ^^ reason, to turn the other way and avoid the 

^^ 'magis ridebis, cum cogitaveris vitae parari, in quae vita consumitur ' Sen. 
JV. Q. i6. 

^'^ 'misericordiam [boni viri] vitabunt; est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem 
alienorum malorum succidentis' Clem, ii 5, i. 

^* 'anus et mulierculae sunt, quae lacrimis nocentissimorum moventur, quae, si 
liceret, carcerem effringerent ' ii>. 

®^ Epict. Disc, iii 3, 17. 

8" 'cum dicas esse pares res | furta latrociniis, et magnis parva mineris | falce 
recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum | permittant homines' Hor. Sai. i 3, 1 21-124;, 
'scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum tanquam nimis duram et minime 
principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium... sed nulla secta benignior leniorque 
est' Sen. Clem, ii 5, 2 and 3. 

^^ See below, § 409. 

^^ 'non miserebitur sapiens, sed succurret' Sen. C/em. ii 6, 3. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 34I 

sight of them. Of this weakness Epictetus gives us a lively 
picture : 

' When he was visited by one of the magistrates, Epictetus inquired of 
him about several particulars, and asked if he had children and a wife. 
The man replied that he had ; and Epictetus inquired further, how he felt 
under the circumstances. ' Miserable,' the man said. Then Epictetus 
asked 'In what respect.'' For men do not marry and beget children in 
order to be wretched, but rather to be happy.' 'But 1,' the man replied, 
'am so wretched about my children that lately, when my little daughter 
was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not endure to stay 
with her, but I left home till a person sent me news that she had reco- 
vered.' 'Well then,' said Epictetus, 'do you think that you acted right?' 
'I acted naturally,' the man replied; 'this is the case with all or at least 
most fathers.' 'Let us be careful,' said Epictetus, 'to learn rightly the 
criterion of things according to nature. Does affection to those of your 
family appear to you to be according to nature and to be good?' 'Cer- 
tainly.' ' Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction 
with affection?' 'I think not.' 'Well then, to leave your sick child and 
to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it 
is ; but it remains to inquire if it is consistent with affection.' ' Yes, let 
us consider.' ' Has the mother no affection for her child ? ' ' Certainly 
she has.' ' Ought then the mother to have left her, or ought she not ? ' 
' She ought not.' ' And the nurse, does she love her ? ' ' She does.' 
'Ought then she also to have left her?' ' By no means.' 'But if this is 
so, it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate act^^." 

Seneca draws for us the same picture of sentimental neglect 
of duty. ' Of our luxurious rich,' he says, ' no one sits by the 
side of his dying friend, no one watches the death of his own 
father, or joins in the last act of respect to the remains of any 
member of his family''*'.' 

376. Another form of the evil of Grief is that of undue 
sensitiveness to criticism and abuse. This mental 
weakness is illustrated by the case of Fidus Cor- 
nelius, who burst into tears because some one in the senate 
called him a 'plucked ostrich'; and in an earlier period Chry- 
sippus had been acquainted with a man who lost his temper 
merely because he was called a ' sea-calf".' Others are annoyed 

®® Epict. Disc. in. 

^^ 'ex his nemo morienti amico adsidet, nemo videre mortem patris sui sustinet. 
quotusquisque funus domesticum ad rogum sequitur? fratrum propinquorumque extrema 
hora deseritur' Sen. N. Q. iii 18, 6. 

''1 Dial, ii 17, I. 



342 ROMAN STOICISM 

by seeing their eccentricities imitated, or by reference to their 
poverty or old age. The remedy for all these things is humour; 
no one can be laughed at who turns the laugh against himselPl 
Another is to cease thinking about oneself ''I 

377. The hardest to bear of all distresses is the loss of 
friends by death, and most particularly, the loss 

ournmg. ^^ parcuts of their children. To meet this trouble 
a special class of literature, called consolationes, grew up, not 
confined to any one school of philosophers. The treatise of 
Grantor the Academic was famous in Cicero's time''"'; and in 
the letter of Servius Sulpicius to Cicero upon his daughter's 
death we have an admirable example of the ' consolation ' in 
private correspondence^^ Sulpicius bids Cicero think of all 
the grief and trouble in the world, the loss of political liberty 
at Rome, the destruction of so many famous cities of antiquity, 
until he feels that man is born to sorrow, and that his own loss 
is but a drop in the ocean of the world's suffering. He also calls 
on the mourner to think of his own character, and to set an 
example of firmness to his household "I Cicero found his real 
comfort in none of these things, but in industrious authorship. 
We have unfortunately no example of a ' Consolation ' by Mu- 
sonius. Seneca has left us two treatises in this style, one a 
formal document addressed to the minister Polybius on the 
death of his brother, the other a more personal appeal to Marcia, 
a lady of an ' old Roman ' family, on the death of a son. Besides 
the arguments already used by Sulpicius", he recommends to 

''^ '[Vatinius] in pedes suos ipse plurima dicebat et in fauces concisas. sic inimi- 
corum et in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat' Sen. Dial, ii 17, 3; ' nemo risum 
praebuit qui ex se cepit' ib. 1. 

^^ 'cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet' Ep. 63, 3. 

"^"^ Cicero wrote a treatise 'de Consolatione' based on this work, but only a few 
fragments remain. Plutarch's 'Consolation' for Apollonius was drawn from the 
same source (Schmekel, p. 150). 

''^ Cic. Fam. iv 5. 

^® 'denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse, et eum qui aliis consueris praecipere 
et dare consilium' ib. 5, 5. 

''^ ' maximum ergo solatium est cogitare id sibi accidisse, quod ante se passi sunt 
omnes omnesque passuri' Sen. Dial, xi r, 4. On the other side 'malevoli solatii 
est turba miserorum' ib. vi 12, 5; '[cogita] fratribus te tuis exemplo esse debere' 
ib. xi 5, 4. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 343 

Polybius attention to the public service and the reading of 
Homer and Virgil'l Both to him and to Marcia he pictures 
the happiness of the soul now admitted to the company of the 
blest''^ or at any rate at peace and freed from all the pains of 
life^". In writing to Marcia he recalls with effect the examples 
of Octavia the sister, and Livia the wife of Augustus, each of 
whom lost a promising son in early manhood. Octavia gave 
herself up to her grief, never allowed her dead son to be men- 
tioned in her presence, and wore mourning to the day of her 
death, though she was surrounded by her children and grand- 
children. Livia, after paying the last tokens of respect, laid 
aside her grief, recalled with pleasure her son's achievements, 
and (advised so to act by her philosopher Areius) devoted her- 
self to her social duties, refusing to make all Rome sad because 
one mother had lost a son^\ 

378. The consolations of Epictetus include less philosophical 
speculation, and more religious resignation. To 
esigna ion. {-,ggjj^ with, preparation should be made for the 
loss of children. Parental affection should not pass the bounds 
of reason ; every time that a father embraces his child, he should 
reflect 'this child is only lent to me,' 'this child is mortal^l' If 
the child dies, his first thought should be ' he who has given 
takes avvay^l' To others he will say ' I have restored the child^*.' 
His abiding mood will be that of resignation to the divine will. 
He will realize that in the course of a long life many and various 
things must happen ; and that it is impossible to live to old age, 
without seeing the death of many whom we love^^ 

^^ ib. 8, 2. ''^ ib. 9, 3; 'inter felices currit animas' ib. vi 5, i. 

^ ib. xi 9, 4; 'excepit ilium magna et aeterna pax' ib. vi 19, 6. See also above, 
§§ 298, 299. 

^1 Sen. Dial, vi 3 to 5 ; above, § 123. 

®^ ' If yovi are kissing your wife or child, say that it is a human being whom 
you are kissing; for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed' Epict. 
Manual 3 (after Anaxagoras). 

*^ Disc, iv I, loi. 

^^ 'Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your 
child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored' 
Manual 11. 

^ Disc, iii 24, 27. 



344 ROMAN STOICISM 

379. All 'consolations' aim at diminishing the grief of 

mourners, nature being inclined rather to excess 
than to defect in this matter. But the Stoics could 
not altogether avoid the direct issue whether or not grief is a sin, 
and weeping a weakness. The plain teaching of the school was 
that ' death is no evil,' and therefore that grief for the dead is 
against reason. And to this view the teachers give from time 
to time formal adhesion, as being the better cause^®. But in 
individual cases they find that to a certain extent there is not 
only excuse, but justification, for grief and tears ; and thus they 
come into touch with the common feelings of humanity*'', whilst 
the plea of ' natural necessity ' serves to ward off the criticism 
of sterner philosophers *l From this concession emerges in the 
Roman period the definite precept of a time-limit for grieP"; 
and its undue continuance is sternly denounced as due to love 
of ostentation^", and the morbid enjoyment of sorrow by an ill- 
balanced mind®^ Grief in this shape is a dangerous disease; 
there must be no trifling with it, but it must be totally de- 
stroyed ^^. 

380. Lastly, we include under the heading of Grief a weak- 

ness which often developes into serious disease; that 

general discontent, which is voiced in complaints 

as to the wickedness of the age**^ and the degeneracy of young 

Rome. Such discontent has always been characteristic of the 

old^*; but under the principate it has developed into a special 

*^ 'illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. sed cui ista 
firmitas animi continget?' Sen. £p. 63, i. 

^"^ ' inhumanitas est ista, non virtus, funera suoiuni iisdem oculis, quibus ipsos, 
videre' Sen. £p. 99, 15; cf. Dm/, xii r, 2. 

^* 'cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, lacrimas naturalis necessitas 
exprimit' Ep. 99, 18. 

*^ 'nos quod praecipimus, honestum est; cum aliquid lacrimarum adfectus eiifuderit, 
non esse tradendum animum dolori' z6. 27. 

*"* 'at enim naturale desiderium suorum est. quis negat? sed plus est quod opinio 
adicit quam quod natura imperavit' Dial, vi 7, i. 

"1 ' fit infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor' i/>. i, 7. 

^^ 'non possum molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem; frangendus est' li. 

^^ 'obirascens fortunae animus et de seculo querens' Sen. Dial, ix 2, 11. 

9* 'difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti | se puero, censor castigatorque 
minorum' Hor. A. P. 173, 174. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 345 

evil, the * hatred of the human race ' {odium generis hnmani). 
Of this fault even philosophers may be suspected ; for it must 
be admitted that men are bad, have been bad,, and always will be 
bad^^ ; in short, that the whole human race is made up of mad- 
men'"'. But wise men will bear with this fact quietly and with a 
smile^^. It is futile to bring accusations against the whole race''^, 
and a delusion to think our own times worse than those of our 
predecessors. The old Romans, to whom we look up as models 
of virtue, made just the same complaints of their own times ; 
and as a matter of fact the standard of general morality never 
varies greatly from its average, either in an upward or a down- 
ward direction °^ 

381. The fault of Hilarity (dXoyo<i eirapa-i'i, elatio aniini) is a 
departure from Soberness and cheerful Joy with 
^ '"^" regard to the things that appeal to our appetites, 
and this in the direction of excess. With regard to food, it ^ 

corresponds to 'greediness' in modern speech. The matter is / 

but little discussed, but we have two interesting lectures by 
Musonius, which are chiefly concerned with this vice, from which 
we take the following extracts : 

' Greediness is an unpleasant fault, making men to resemble pigs and 
dogs : but on the other hand healthy eating requires much supervision 
and practice (eVt/neXfia kul aa-K-qais). Of all pleasures that tempt men, 
greediness is the hardest to contend against ; for it assails us twice every 
day. To eat too much is wrong; to eat too fast is wrong; so it is also 
to take too much pleasure in food, to prefer the sweet to the wholesome, 
or not to give your companions a fair share. Another fault is to let 
meals interfere with business. In all these points we should look chiefly 
to health. Now we observe that those who use the simplest foods are 
generally the strongest ; servants are stronger than their masters, country- 
folk than townsmen, the poor than the rich. There is therefore good 

^^ 'idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus; males esse nos, malos fuisse, 
invitus adiciam et futures esse' Sen. Ben. i lo, 3 ; 'cupidi omnes et maligni omnes et 
timidi omnes' ib. v 17, 3. 

^^ 'non est quod irascaris; omnes insaniunt' z'(^. 

^ 'satius est humana vitia placide accipere' ib. ix 15, 5; 'omnia vulgi vitia non 
invisa nobis, sed ridicula videantur' ib. 2. 

^^ 'generi humano venia tribuenda est' ib. iv 10, 2. 

^^ 'hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, 
eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista 
eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultra aut citra mota' Ben. i 10, i. 



346 ROMAN STOICISM 

reason to prefer cheap food to that which is costly, and that which is 
ready to hand to that which is only obtained with great trouble. Further, 
some foods are more congenial than others to men's nature ; as those 
which grow from the earth, or can be obtained from animals without 
killing them. Food that requires no cooking has an advantage, as ripe 
fruit, some vegetables, milk, cheese, and honey. Flesh food is for many 
reasons objectionable. It is heavy and impedes thought; the exhalations 
from it are turbid and overshadow the soul. Men should imitate the 
gods, who feed on the light exhalations of earth and water. But to-day 
we have even worse corruptions. Many men are dainty and cannot eat 
food without vinegar or some other seasoning. Also we call in art and 
machinery to aid our pleasures, and actually have books written on 
cookery. All this may serve to titillate the palate, but is mischievous to 
health 100.' 

The sarcasms of Seneca are aimed not so much against excess 
in quantity or fastidiousness in quahty, as against the collection 
of dainties from all parts of the world i"'. 

382. As to drinking, the Stoic period marks a great change 
in feeling. In the times of Zeno, hard drinking had 
almost the honour of a religious ceremony; and the 
banquet (a-vfiTroaiov) was the occasion of many a philosophical 
discussion. Zeno began by laying it down as a principle that 
'the wise man will not be drunken"-,' and Chrysippus went so- 
far as to name drunkenness as causing the loss of virtue^^l But 
the prohibition was carefully guarded. The earlier teachers 
permitted ' wininess"*' ; and Seneca justifies this means of 
banishing care, pointing out many instances of public men of 
drinking habits who discharged their duties admirablyi''^ Yet 

1°" Stob. iii 17, 42 and 18, 37. 

If*! 'ad vos deincle transeo, quorum profunda et insatiabilis gula hinc maria scru- 
tatur, hinc terras, alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno 
labore persequitur. nullis animalibus nisi ex fastidio pax est' Sen. £p. 89, 22. 
Another form of luxury is in the eating of food extremely hot or extremely cold : 
'quemadmodum nihil illis satis frigidum, sic nihil satis calidum est, sed ardentes 
boletos demittunt' .A''. Q. iv 13, 10. 

1*^^ See above, § 83, note 82. 

■^"•^ See above, § 324, note 155. 

1"^ Kal OLVwOrjcreffdai /xev [top ffocpdv], ov /jLedvcrdrjcrecrOai 5e Diog. L. vii 118. This 
was the view of Chrysippus; see A. C. Pearson mjoiirn. Phil, xxx pp. 221 sqq. 

^^^ 'nonnunquam et usque ad ebrielatem veniendum [est], non ut mergat nos, sed 
ut deprimat. eluit enim curas et ab imo animum movet' Sen. Dial, ix 17, 8; see 
further Ep. 83, 14 and 15. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 347 

on the whole he inclines to a stricter view, finding that ' drunken- 
ness is a voluntary madness/ and that it removes that sense of 
shame which most hinders men from wrongdoing"*^. Meanwhile 
a change in public taste, and perhaps the continual example of 
Cynic missionaries, had produced a tide of feeling in favour 
of simple living. The philosophical discussions sketched by 
Cicero take place at all times of the day, but most usually in 
the morning hours ; they are never associated with riotous 
banqueting, but if necessary the meal is cut short to make room 
for the talk. Under the principate the fare is of the simplest ; 
Seneca himself was a vegetarian in his youth ^°''; his teacher 
Attalus was well content with porridge and water, and found 
an audience ready to approve his taste"^. 

383. A similar but more profound change had taken place 
Sexual in- ^it the samc time in regard to sexual relations. In 
duigence. |-]-^g time of Socrates courtesans and boy-favourites 
played a large part in social life ; associated with the banquet, 
they formed part of the accepted ideal of cultured enjoyment ; 
even moralists approved of them as providing a satisfaction to 
natural desires and indirectly protecting the sanctity of the 
home"''. The same attitude of mind is shown by Seneca under 
similar circumstances, when he recommends that princes be in- 
dulged with mistresses in order to make their character more 
gentle"°. But little by little a more severe standard prevailed"^ 
From the first the Stoics set themselves against the pursuit of 
other men's wives"^ With regard to other relations, they did 

106 'nihil aliud esse ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam' Ep. 83, 18; 'omne 
vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet. 
plures enim pudore peccandi quam bona voluntate prohibitis abstinent' ib. 83, 19. 

^''^ See above, § 126. 

^"^ Sen. Ep. no, 14 and t8. 

"9 Xen. Me77t. ii i, 5. 

^1" 'si pro magno petet munere artifices scenae et scorta et quae feritatem eius 
emolliant, libens ofiferam' Sen. Beit, vii 20, 3. The furthering of the amour of Nero 
with Acte was a practical application of this theory: 'tradit Cluvius...Senecam contra 
muliebres illecebras subsidium a femina petivisse, immissamque Acten libertam ' Tac. 
Ann. xiv 2, 2. 

^11 'non est itaque quod credas nos plurimum libidini permisisse. longe enim 
frugalior haec iuventus quam ilia est ' Sen. Ep. 97, 9. 

^^^ See above, § 306, note 27. 



348 ROMAN STOICISM 

not feel called upon to condemn them in other men"*; they 
were indeed, in themselves, matters of indifference"^ ; but they 
found it contrary to reason that a man's thoughts should be 
occupied with matters so low, or that he should bring himself 
into subjection to irregular habits and become a slave to a 
woman "^ As the courtesan was gradually excluded by this 
rule"", the general opinion fell back on the slave as the most 
accessible and least dangerous object of indulgence"''. But 
the philosophers of the principate, following Zeno, who in these 
matters took the irpeirov {decorum) as his rule"^ find it in a high 
degree unfitting that the master, who should in all things be a 
model of self-control in his own household, should display so 
grave a weakness to his slaves. 

384. Thus little by little there emerged the ideal of a strict 
chastity, to the principle of which not even the 
marriage relation should form an exception"^ 
Every falling off from this ideal is sin or transgress ion ^2"; and 
it is especially true in this matter that each act of weakness 
leaves its trace on the character, and that he who yields becomes 
a feebler man'^\ The Socratic paradox, that the wise man will 

^^^ 'As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage; but if 
you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not how- 
ever be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures' Epict. Mamial 33, 8. 

^^* rh dk epau airb iibvov dSid(popov elvai Stob. ii 7, 5 b 9; cf. § 317. 

^^^ 'eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, 
an sapiens amaturus esset: "de sapiente" inquit "videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc 
a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, 
impotentem, alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi"' Sen. £p. ij6, 5; 'Did you never love 
any person, a young girl, slave or free?... have you never flattered your little slave? 
have you never kissed her feet? What then is slavery?' Epict. Disc, iv i, 15 and 17. 

11^ 'magno pudoris impendio dilecta scorta' Sen. Dial, ii 6, 7. 

^^^ Hor. Sat i 2, 116-119. 

^^^ See above, § 318, note 104. 

11" 'Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the 
adulterer' Epict. Disc, i 18, 11. Ascetic principles were already practised in Seneca's 
time; 'vino quidam, alii Venere, quidam omni umore interdixere corporibus' Dial. 
iv 12, 4. 

1^" 'lapsa est libido in muliere ignota.-.peccavit vero nihilominus, si quideni 
est peccare tanquam transilire lineas' Cic. Par. iii i, 20. 

121 'When you have been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not 
reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also increased your incon- 
tinence' Epict. Disc, ii 18, 6. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 349 

be a lover^^^, is consistently maintained by the Stoics; but the 
practical limitations of this doctrine are well illustrated by 
the following striking passage from the lectures of the Stoic 
Musonius : — * 

' Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider that 
sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for the begetting of 
children ; such as aim at mere pleasure are lawless, even in marriage. 
Even apart from adultery and unnatural relations, all sexual connexions 
are disgraceful ; for what sober-minded man would think of consorting 
with a courtesan, or with a free woman outside marriage ? and least of 
all would he do so with his own slave. The lawlessness and foulness of 
such connexions is a disgrace to all who form them ; as we may see that 
any man who is capable of a blush does his utmost to conceal them. Yet 
one argues: "in this case a man does no injustice; he does not wrong 
his neighbour or deprive him of the hope of lawful issue." I might reply 
that every one who sins injures himself, for he makes himself a worse and 
less honourable man. But at any rate he who gives way to foul pleasure 
and enjoys himself like a hog is an intemperate man: and not least he 
who consorts with his own slave-girl, a thing for which some people find 
excuse. To all this there is a simple answer ; how would such a man 
approve of a mistress consorting with her own man-servant.'' Yet I pre- 
sume he does not think men inferior to women, or less able to restrain 
their desires. If then men claim the supremacy over women, they must 
show themselves superior in self-control. To conclude ; sexual connexion 
between a master and his female slave is nothing but licentiousness i^^.' 

385. Thus our detailed study of the four perturbations has 
' Bear and l^d US to lay little strcss on Fear and Greed, the 
forbear.' wcakucsses of the heroic period when men's minds 

were actively turned to the future, and to concentrate our 
attention on Grief and Hilarity, the two moods in which life's 
troubles and temptations are wrongly met with as they arrive. 
As we follow the history of Stoic philosophy through the times 
of the Roman principate, we find that this tendency to lay stress 
on the training of the passive character increases : till Epictetus 
tells us that of all the vices far the worst are ' lack of endurance ' 
{intolerantia), which is the developed form of Grief, and ' lack of 
restraint ' {inco7itinentid), which is the persistent inclination 

^"^ KoX epacrdricreffdaL 8e rbv ao^ov tQsv viuv Diog. L. vii 129. 
123 Stob. iii 6, 23. 



350 ROMAN STOICISM 

towards Hilarity'-^. Hence the cure for vice is summed up by 
him in the golden word, 'bear and forbear^-''; that is, practise 
Courage and cast off Grief, practise Soberness and keep Hilarity 
far from you. ' A good rule,' a Peripatetic would reply, ' for 
women and slaves.' 

386. This negative attitude is most strongly marked in 
Avoidance of Epictetus iu connexion with the dangers of sexual 
temptation. passion. Thus his short advice to all young men 
with regard to the attractions of women is ' Flee at once^-" ' ; 
and even in this his advice was countenanced in advance by the 
more tolerant Seneca^^^ It would appear from both writers that 
the battle between the sexes had become unequal at this period, 
so often is the picture drawn of the promising and well-educated 
youth literally and hopelessly enslaved by a mistress presumably 
without birth, education, or honour^-*^. It causes us some sur- 
prise to find that the distinction between heavenly and earthly 
lQygi29 jg j^Q^ brought in as a corrective of the latter. Only in a 
general way the suggestion is made that seductive attractions 
should be driven out by virtuous ideals : 

' Do not be hurried away by the appearance, but say : " Appearances, 
wait for me a little ; let me see who you are and what you are about ; 
let me put you to the test." And do not allow the appearance to lead 
you on and draw lively pictures of the things which will follow ; for if 
you do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather bring in to 
oppose it some other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out this 
base appearance. And if you are accustomed to be exercised in this way, 
you will see what shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have.... This 
is the true athlete.... Stay, wretch, do not be carried away. Great is the 

^-* ' idem ille Epictetus solitus dicere est duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima ac 
taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, cum aut iniurias, quae sunt ferendae, non 
toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus, non 
tenemus' A. Gellius, JV. A. xvii 19, 5. 

125 ' verba haec duo dicebat : avexov et awix^^ i^- 6. 

^2^ 'At first fly far from that which is stronger than yourself; the contest is 
unequal between a charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy' Epict. Disc, iii 
12, 12. 

^2'' 'id agere debemus, ut inritamenta vitiorum quam longissime profugiamus' Sen. 
^J>- 5 1) 5; 'eij qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti 
corporis' ib. 69, 3. 

1^* Epict. Disc, iv i, 15-21. 

^^^ See above, § 349. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 351 

combat, divine is the work ; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness. 
Remember God; call on him as a helper and protector i^**.' 

- 387. From the study of the separate evils we revert to the 
Gradations general theory of Vice, And here we must recal 
of vice. the point that so far as vice is weakness or ill-health 

of the soul, it admits of gradations, which may conveniently be 
stated as three, namely (i) rufflings of the soul ; (ii) commotions, 
infections, or illnesses ; (iii) diseases or vices proper^^^ It is not 
quite easy to classify the rufflings or first slight disturbances of 
the soul {prima agitatio anivti) under the four perturbations ; but 
the bodily indications of them seem to be more marked in the 
weaknesses of the active or heroic character, namely Fear and 
Greed. Thus in the direction of Fear we meet with hair standing 
on end — pallor of complexion — trembling limbs — palpitation, 
and dizziness, all of which are bodily indications that fear is not 
far off; in the direction of Anger (a form of Greed) we meet 
with heightened colour, flashing eyes, and gnashing teeth^^^. 
In the direction of Grief we meet with tears and sighs, and in 
that of Hilarity the automatic sexual movements, amongst 
which we must perhaps include blushing. 

388. It does not appear that the early Stoic masters occu- 
pied themselves much with the gradations of vice ; 
although a text can be taken from Zeno for a 
discourse on this subject. Neither does the earnest and cyni- 
cally-minded Epictetus care to dwell on such details. On the 
other hand Seneca lays the greatest possible stress on the 
doctrine that ' rufflings ' are not inconsistent with virtue. For 
this two arguments are available, which are perhaps not quite 
consistent. First, the bodily indications are beyond the control 

^^" Epict. Disc, ii i8, 24-29. 

^^^ The terms 'ruffling' {levis motus), and 'commotions' (emotiones) or 'perturba- 
tions' {perturbationes) are metaphors taken from the disturbance of a calm sea; the 
remaining terms properly describe bodily ill-health. The English words 'emotions,' 
'affections' have almost entirely lost their original force, and are therefore no longer 
suitable as translations. The substitution of 'commotion' for 'emotion' has already 
been adopted by Maudsley, Pathology of the Human Mind. 

^■^^ 'ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, et rubor ad improba verba subfunditur 
sequiturque vertigo praerupta cernentes' Sen. Dial, iv 2, i; 'erubescunt pudici etiam 
loqui de pudicitia' Cic. Leg. i 19, 50. See also the following notes. 



352 ROMAN STOICISM 

of the mind; they are necessary consequences of the union of 
body and soul, that is, of our mortal condition'-'^. Secondly, the 
' rufflings ' correspond to the mind-pictures presented to the soul 
in thought, and therefore are neither moral nor immoral until the 
soul has given its assent to them'^-*. From either point of view 
we arrive at a result congenial to this philosopher. The wise 
man is, in fact, subject to slight touches of such feelings as grief 
and fear^^^; he is a man, not a stone. Secondly, the sovereignty 
of the will remains unimpaired ; give the mind but time to collect 
its forces, and it will restrain these feelings within their proper 
limits^^*^. The doctrine is in reality, though not in form, a 
concession to the Peripatetic standpoint ; it provides also a con- 
venient means of defence against the mockers who observe that 
professors of philosophy often exhibit the outward signs of moral 
weakness. 

389. If the soul gives way to any unreasoning impulse, it 
makes a false judgment and suffers relaxation of 
its tone : there takes place a ' commotion ' or ' per- 
turbation ' {irddo'^, affectits, perturbatio), which is a moral eviP^''. 
The Greek word irddo'i admits of two interpretations ; it may 
mean a passive state or a disease ; we here use it in the milder 
sense. By an ' emotion ' we mean that the soul is uprooted 

^^'^ 'si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem hunioris obsceni 
altumve suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus 
animique signum putat, fallitur nee intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus' Sen. Dial. 
iv 3, 2; 'est primus motus non voluntarius quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam 
comminatio' ib. 4, i. 

^^^ 'prima ilia agitatio animi, quam species iniuriae incussit, non magis ira est 
quam ipsa iniuriae species' ib. 3, 5. 

^^ '[sapiens] sentit levem quendam tenuemque motum, nam, ut dicit Zenon, in 
sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque 
suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum; ipsis carebit' ib. iii 16, 7; 'scio inveniri 
quosdam, qui negent doliturum esse sapientem; hi non videntur mihi unquam in 
eiusmodi casum incidisse' ib. xi 18, 5; 'nuUo [dolore adfici] inhumana duritia est' 
ib. xii 16, I. 

136 (jjgc hoc dico, non sentit ilia, sed vincit' ib. i 2, 2; 'invicti esse possumus, 
inconcussi non possumus' N. Q. ii 59, 3. 

■^''^ 'adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis et 
hunc fortuitum motum prosequi' Dial, iv 3, i; '[Zeno] perturbationes voluntarias 
esse putabat opinionisque iudicio su.scipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur 
matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam ' Cic. Ac. i 10, 39; 'perturba- 
tiones autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones et iudicia 
levitatis' Fin. iii 10, 35. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 353 

from its foundation, and begins as it were to toss on the sea ; 
by ' affection ' that it is seized or infected by some unwholesome 
condition ^^^; by ' perturbation ' that it has ceased to be an orderly 
whole, and is falling into confusion. When we regard these 
words in their true sense, and shake off the associations they 
carry with them in English, it is clear that all of them denote 
moral evils; nevertheless they cannot rightly be called 'diseases' 
of the souP^". The evils and weaknesses which have been dis- 
cussed are commonly displayed in ' commotions ' or * perturba- 
tions,' and are normally equivalent to them. 

390. The soul by giving way to perturbations becomes 
Diseases of worsc ; it acquircs habits of weakness in particular 
the soul. directions. This weakness from a passing dispo- 

sition (e|i<?) changes into a permanent disposition or habit 
(Sta^eo-t?), and this is in the full sense a 'disease' of the soul"". 
These diseases or vices are, strictly speaking, four in number"^ : 
but the Stoics run into great detail as regards their titles and 
subdivisions. Diseases in the ordinary sense {dppwa-rrjiJbaTa) 
display restlessness and want of self-control; such are ambition, 
avarice, greediness, drunkenness, running after women"-, pas- 
sionate temper, obstinacy, and anxiety. An opposite class 
of maladies consists of unreasonable dislikes {Kara TrpoaKOTrr^v 
r/Lvo/jbeva, offensiones); such are inhospitality, misogynism, and 
quarrelling with the world in general"^. 

^38 'neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur adfectus, sed in 
adfectum ipse mutatur' Sen. Dial, iii 8, ^, 

139 ' perturbationes animorum, quas Graeci Trd^j? appellant, poteram ego verbum 
ipsum interpretans, morbos appellare: sed non conveniret ad omnia, quis enim 
misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? sed illi dicunt Trd^oy. 
sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur' Cic. Fin. iii lo, 35. 

i''" ^rav els fidvL/jLov dcplKr)Tai diddecrii' 17 aWoiucris, 6vo/xd^€Tac v6crr]ij,a Gal. /oc. aff. 
i 3, p. 32 K (Arnim iii 429) ; on the other hand a vbarifxa. is called ^^ts Stob. vii 7, toe ; 
'adfectus sunt motus animi improbabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique 
fecere morbum' Sen. Ep. 75, \i; 'morbi sunt inveterata vitia et dura; altius haec 
animum implicuerunt et perpetua eius mala esse coeperunt' ib. 11. 

"^ For the technical terms see above, § 362, note 6. 

^^^ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 11, 25. 

'■** elvat 5^ TLva. [I'ocT'^^aTa] /card TTpocrKOwijv ytv6/xeva, olov /xicroywiav, fiLtroiviav, 
/jLLaavOpunriav Stob. vii 7, 10 e; 'offensionum autem definitiones sunt eius modi, ut 
inhospitalitas sit opinio vehemens valde fugiendum esse hospitem, eaque inhaerens et 
penitus insita, et mulierum odium, ut Hippolyti, et ut Timonis generis humani' Cic. 
2'itsc. disp. iv II, 27. 

A. 23 



354 ROMAN STOICISM 

391. The study of vice in its various forms and gradations 
Men are good l^avcs untouched the main positions of Stoic ethics, 
or bad. including the Socratic paradoxes. Men are of two 

classes only, the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad"^ 
This bold dualism the Stoics hold in common with the Per- 
sians "'^ ; and though it is on the one hand tempered so as to meet 
the common opinion that most men are of middling character, 
and on the other hand subordinated to the monistic principle 
that good shall in the end prevail, it remains the key-stone of 
this department of philosophy. Virtue is a right state of mind ; 
everything that falls short of it is therefore a wrong state of 
mind. Virtue and vice lie in the inward disposition, not in the 
outward act^^" ; and one who has crossed the line is equally out 
of bounds whatever the distance to which he has travelled on 
the far side^*^. Each man has therefore an all-important choice 
to make. The great Stoic teachers were filled with a yearning 
after righteousness and reconciliation with the divine purpose 
and a disgust and horror of the condition of the man who 
is at variance with his Creator, his neighbour, and himself"**. 
These convictions they encased as usual in paradoxes and 
syllogisms. 

392. That 'the affections must be extirpated""' ceases to be 
.... a paradox, as soon as we have defined affections as 

All sins are J^ ' 

equal. statcs of mind contrary to reason, and have made 

room for the ' reasonable affections ' of caution, good will, and 
JQyi5o_ That * all sins are equal^^^ ' remains still, as of old, a 

^''^ apeffKei. yap rcfJ re ZrjPiovt Kal toIs dtr' avrov SrwlVots <pi\ocr6(pots dijo yiv-q tQiv 
dvBpiijTrwi' elfat, to fxev twv (nrovoaiuv, to 5e tQv (paiXuv Stob. ii 7, 1 1 g. 

"■5 See above, § 8. 

i-is See above, § 317. 

i*'' 'cum [lineam transilieris] culpa commissa est; quam longe progrediare, cum 
semel transieris, ad augendam culpam nihil pertinet' Cic. Farad, iii 20. 

1^^ Here we must altogether part company from Bishop Lightfoot, who writes 'the 
Stoic, so long as he was true to the tenets of his school, could have no real conscious- 
ness of sin' Philippians, p. 290. It may however be admitted that the feelings we 
ascribe to the Stoics are more forcibly expressed by Cleanthes, Antipater, Musonius 
and Epictetus than by Seneca. 

^4^ See above, § 362, note 7. ^^^ See above, § 355. 

1^^ dpiffKei re avrois icra iiyeTcrOai ra d/^apTTj/xara, Kadd (p-qni. XpivcrnrTros koX Jle/xratos 
Koi Ti-ffvwv Diog. L. vii r^o. 



SIN AND WEAKNESS 355 

Stumbling block^®^. Yet this Socratic paradox has a simple 
interpretation ; it is a protest against the light-heartedness 
which tolerates ' petty ' acts of wrong-doing, and is indifferent 
to the evil habits of mind thus acquired^^^. Two of the Stoic 
teachers of the transition period, Heraclides of Tarsus and 
Athenodorus, are said to have abandoned the paradox^-^^, and 
all Stoics were ready to admit that sins are ' unlike '^^^ But, 
as usual, the main body held firmly to a doctrine in which 
they had discovered a real practical value. Just the same 
principle is expressed by other paradoxes, as that ' he who 
has one vice has all, though he may not be equally inclined 
to alP^" ' ; and again that 'he who is not wise is a fool and 
a mad man ^5''.' 

393. In spite of the parallelism of virtue and vice the 
Sin is latter is destined to subordination, not only in 

curable. the history of the universe, but also in the indi- 
vidual man. Even if sins are equal, vice as ill health of the 
soul has degrees. The first 'rufflings' of the soul are, as we 
have seen, not to be reckoned as real evils ; its ' perturbations ' 
give the hope of a coming calm ; and grievous though its 
' diseases ' are, we have no suggestion of incurable sin, or of 
the hopeless offender. Even he who has most fallen retains 
the germs of virtue, and these may again ripen under a proper 
discipline^^l 

1^^ 'omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nee minus delinquere eum qui gallum 
gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit' Cic. Mur. 
ig, 6i. 

^^^ ' parva, inquis, res est. at magna culpa, nee enim peccata rerum eventu, sed 
vitiis hominum metienda sunt' Cic. Par. iii 20; 'facilius est excludere perniciosa quam 
regere' Sen. Dial, iii 7, 2; 'optimum est ipsis repugnare seminibus' ti>. 8, i; 'si das 
aliquid iuris tristitiae timovi cupiditati ceterisque motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra 
potestate' £/>. 85, 11. 

i-'^ Diog. L. vii 121. 

1^^ Tcrd re iravTa XiyovcrLv elvai ra d/JLapTrj/xaTa, ovKeri d' o/xoia Stob. ii 7, 11 1. 

1^^ 'stultus omnia vitia habet, sed non in omnia natura pronus est; alius in 
avaritiam, alius in luxuriam, alius in petulantiam inclinatur...' Sen. Ben. iv 27,. i; 
'omnes stulti mali sunt; qui autem habet vitium unum, omnia habet' id. v 15, i. 

^5'' 'intellegendum est eos sensisse hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter 
Stoici retinuerunt, omnes insipientes esse non sanos' Cic. Tusc. disp. iii 5, lo. 

^^^ TTctJ'ras 7ap dvOpdnrovs d(pop/J.ds ^X^"* ^'^ (p^cews Trpbs dperriv 6dev dreKets fJ-ev 
6vTas eivai (l)av\ovs, TeXeiwdevras 8e cnrovdaiovs Cleanthes ap. Stob. ii 7, 5b 8; 'in 
pessima ab optimis lapsus necesse est etiam in malo vestigia boni teneat. nunquam 

23—2 



3S6 ROMAN STOICISM 

394. The attitude of the Stoic school towards sin and 
Stoic weakness exposed it, as we have seen, to constant 

austerity. cHticism and ridicule. To some extent this was 
due to the profession of philosophy in itself: for every such 
profession implied some claim to clearer knowledge and more 
consistent action than that of the crowd '^". But the Stoics 
also sought to be ' austere ' with regard to social pleasures, and 
thus it seemed that they neither offered others a share in their 
own happiness nor sympathetically partook in that of others^^"; 
whilst at the same time they claimed exemption from the 
weaknesses and failings of their neighbours. We have seen 
both Seneca and Epictetus anxious to meet criticism on these 
points by laying stress on those touches of natural feeling in 
which wise and foolish alike share. But in addressing the 
members of the sect their tone is very different ; they hold 
out, as a prize worth the winning, the prospect of attaining 
to that calm and unchanging disposition of mind which has 
for ever left behind the flutterings of fear and greed, of grief 
and hilarity, and which is attuned to reason alone^^'. Epictetus 
indeed often expresses elation and pride upon this theme : 

' I will show the sinews of a philosopher. What are these ? A desire 
(ope^is) never disappointed, an aversion (eKKXiais) which never meets with 
that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (opfirj), a diligent purpose 
(irpodeais), an assent which is not rash. These you shall see'^V 

' Men, if you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are 
doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor hindrance, 
but you will pass your time without perturbations and free from every- 
thing. When a man has this peace (not proclaimed by Caesar, for how 
should he be able to proclaim it ?) but by God through reason, is he not 
content when he reflects — Now no evil can happen to me^''^.?' 

tantum virtus exstinguitur, ut non certiores animo notas imprimat, quam ut illas eradat 
ulla mutatio' Sen. Ben. vii 19, 5; 'inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet, 
modo deliciis ac situ, modo officii inscitia' i^. v 25, 6. 

^^^ 'satis ipsum nomen philosophiae, etiamsi modice tractetur, invidiosum est' 
Ep. ^, 1. 

1*0 avffTijpovs 8i (paaiv elvai irdvras rotis ffTrovdaiovs, ry firire avrods irpos i]8oyrjv 
opiKeiv prjre Trap' dWuv to, wphs r}5ovr}v irpoa'S^x^"'^'" Diog- L- vii 117. 

'^^^ '[sapiens] nee cupit nee timet beneflcio rationis' Sen. Dial, vii 5, i; 'erectus 
laetusque est, inde continue gaudio elatus' ib, ii 9, 3. 

^^'■^ Epict. Disc, ii 8, 29. ^®^ ib. iii 13, 11 to 13. 



CHAPTER XV. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION. 

395. We have now set forth the Stoic theory of ethics, 
both in its hig^h philosophic framework and in its 

Precepts. . . 

more detailed treatment, in which it prescribes 
what is to be done and what to be left undone, and how the soul 
is to be disciplined in health and medicined in sickness. It 
remains for us to study the application of the system to individual 
cases, a matter which perhaps lies outside the scope of philosophy 
as understood at the present day, but is an essential part of the 
work of churches and social organizations. This department of 
philosophy was termed by the ancients ' precepts,' or (more 
fully) ' advice, dissuasion, admonition, exhortation, consolation, 
warnings, praise, reproof and so forth ^ ; by some philosophers, 
as for instance by Aristo of Chios, it was held in contempt, by 
others (less inclined to Cynism) it was considered alone worthy 
of pursuits But the steady conviction of the main body of Stoic 
teachers was that theory and precept must go hand in hand^; 
that moral principles have no strength apart from their daily 
application^ and that practical suggestions apart from a sound 
and reasoned system are like leaves cut from the bough, without 

^ ' omnia ista[monitiones, consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes, obiurgationes, 
laudationes] monitionum genera sunt ' Sen. Ep. 94, 39. 

^ 'earn partena philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta... 
quidam solam receperunt, sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario banc partem levem exis- 
timat' ib. 94, i and 2. Tiie Cynics gave exhortations, but without having a system 
for the purpose. See above, § 52. 

^ ' Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem 
et exhortationem necessariam iudicat' ib. 95, 65. Cf. Cic. Off. i 3, 7; Sen. Ep. 94, 34. 

* ' ipsum de malis bonisque iudicium confirmatur off|ciorum exsecutione, ad quam 
praecepta perducunt ' ib. 



358 ROMAN STOICISM 

lasting greenness". Since precepts apply directly to individual 
persons and particular circumstances, they presuppose some 
relationship between teacher and hearer*^ ; the latter must be 
either a convert to the school or one who has grown up under its 
influence. In the Roman period the department of precepts is 
of increasing importance ; we have something to learn from 
Antipater, Panaetius and Cicero, but we find much more material 
in the lectures {Siarpi^ai, 'diatribes') and letters of Musonius, 
Seneca, Epictetus and other teachers of the period of the prin- 
cipate. 

396. The ' precepts ' which we find illustrated by our various 
Trainin of authorities are not easily systematized, but they 
the young. havc all the more the charm of personal intimacy ; 
through them we are admitted to the home life of the Stoics. 
As Seneca wrote to Lucilius, so every day did Stoic fathers. 
Stoic teachers. Stoic jurists, address those who came within 
their influence. Believing every man to have the seed of 
virtue in him, they had confidence that by their words it would 
often be stirred to life'^ ; and that in other cases, in which the 
promising shoot had become overshadowed by ignorance or evil 
habits, it would by the same means begin to grow again^ But 
the full benefits of precepts could only be seen where they fell on 
well-prepared ground, and formed part of a training extending 
from infancy to the grave ; where the instructor could daily 
ensure their enforcement and observe their effect. This oppor- 
tunity was necessarily found most often in the teaching of the 
young ; and the Stoic system of precepts, though not restricted 
to one period of life, was to a large extent a foreshadowing of a 
' Theory of Education.' It was under all circumstances guided 
by the rule of ' little by little.' Precepts must be few", and must 

° ' quemadmodum folia virere per se non possunt, ramum desiderant ; sic ista 
praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent ; infigi volunt sectae ' Sen. Ep. 95, 59. 

^ See below, § 397, note 21. ' Sen. £/>. 94, 29 and 108, 8. 

* 'inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet; modo deliciis et situ, modo 
officii inscitia' Ben. v 25, 6. 

^ ' plus prodesse, si pauca praecepta sapientiae teneas, sed ilia in promptu tibi el 
in usu sint, quam si multa quidem didiceris, sed ilia non habeas ad manum ' 
Ben. vii X, 3; ' We ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with 
them to proceed to the greater' Epict. Disc, i 18, 18. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 359 

be in themselves easy for the individual to carry out^** ; but by 
steady practice great things will be accomplished. 

397. Since the value of precepts depends on the personal 
The teacher's influence of the instructor, it is clear that his 
example. example will be of the greatest importance, and we 

may first ask what the discipline is to which he himself 
submits. Here the Cynic teacher seems to have the advan- 
tage, for he lives in the sight of all men ; and the Indian, 
who allows himself to be scorched or burnt to show his contempt 
for pain, makes a still more forcible appeal". The Stoic does 
not parade himself in this fashion, but neither does he lock the 
door of his private life against any who wish to examine it^^. In 
the early morning he shakes off sleep, rousing himself to do the 
day's work of a man^^ Having clothed himself, he turns his 
mind towards his Maker, and sings his praises ; he resolves 
during the coming day to cooperate in his purposes, and to bear 
cheerfully any burden that may be placed upon him^"*. He will 
then give a short time to gymnastic exercises for the good of his 
health 1° ; after which, if his strength allows it, he will take, winter 
or summer, a plunge into the cold bath^" ; next comes the 
slightest of meals^''; then a short nap or reverie^*. From this he 
is aroused by the stir around him, and he then applies himself to 
the day's studies, being careful to alternate reading and writing, 
so that his mind may be neither exhausted by the latter nor 

'* ' debet semper plus esse virium in actore quam in onere. necesse est oppriniant 
onera, quae ferente maiora sunt ' Sen. Dial, ix 6, 4. 

^^ Arnim i 241. 

■^^ 'sic certe vivendum est, tanquam in conspectu vivamus' Sen. Ep. 83, i. 

^^ ' In the morning, when you feel loth to rise, fall back upon the thought "I am 
rising for man's work. Why make a grievance of setting about that for which I was 
born, and for sake of which I have been brought into the world ? Is the end of my 
existence to lie snug in the blankets and keep warm?"' M. Aurel. To himself v i. 

1'' ' I obey, I follow, assenting to the words of the Commander, praising his acts ; 
for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go away when it pleases him ; and 
while I lived it was my duty to praise God ' Epict. Disc, iii 26, 29 and 30. See also 
above, § 258. 

^^ ' minimum exercitationi corporis datum ' Sen. Ep. 83, 3. 

^® ' ab hac fatigatione magis quam exercitatione in frigidam descendi ' ib. 5. 

^^ ' panis deinde siccus et sine mensa prandium ' ib. 6. 

18 • brevissimo somno utor et quasi interiungo. satis est mihi vigilare desiisse. 
aliquando dormisse me scio, aliquando suspicor' ib. 



360 ROMAN STOICISM 

relaxed by the former^". Later on he will consider his practical 
duties towards his relatives, his friends, and society in general. 
He will order his household and settle the disputes of his 
dependents. He will visit his friends, saying a word here and 
there in season-", but not (like the Cynics) to all and sundry^^ 
He will encourage those who are making progress in virtue, and 
sharply warn those who are in danger of a fall 2-. He advises a 
young mother to nurse her child at her own breast ; and when 
he meets with objections, points out the wisdom and propriety 
of obeying the prescriptions of nature^'. Returning home, he 
will again enjoy some slight bodily exercise, joining perhaps in 
a game of ball ; his thoughts however will not always turn on 
success in the game, but he will consider how many principles 
in physics and ethics may be illustrated by it^^ Now that 
evening comes on, he sits down to a meal (not over-elaborate) in 
the company of one or two favourite pupils^^ Afterwards comes 
the temptation to burn the midnight oil in gathering seeds of 
wisdom for the morrow from the well-thumbed manuscript of 
Cleanthes or, it may be, of Epicurus^". Retiring to his chamber, 
he will examine his conscience, review the events of the past 
day, and be at peace with himself before he sleeps ^l 

398. With the training of children the Stoic teacher is 

The child's perhaps not altogether familiar, but he knows its 

^'f^- importances^ ; it must be based on simplicity and 

austerity, for just at this time indulgence and luxury are 

'** ' nee scribere tantum nee tantum legere debemus ; altera res contristabit, vires 
exhauriet (de stilo dico), altera solvet ac diluet' Sen. Ep. 84, 2. 

^^ 'nuUi enim nisi audituro dicendum est' ib. 29, 1. 

s^ ' [Diogenes et alii Cynici] libertate promiscua usi sunt et obvios monuerunt. 
hoc, mi Lucili, non existimo magno viro faciendum' ib. 29, r and 3. 

^- ' audebo illi mala sua ostendere ' ib. 4. 

23 A. Gellius, N. A. xii i . Favorinus, of whom this is related, was not himself a 
Stoic. 

^ Sen. Ben, ii 17, 3 to 5 and 32, i to 4. 

^ See above, § 125, note 90. 

28 'at te nocturnis iuvat impallescere chartis; | cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris 
aures | fruge Cleanthea' Pers. Sat. v 62-64; 'q^i^l est tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri 
voces putes esse, non publicas?' Sen. Ep. 8, 8. 

-^ 'qualis ille somnus post recognitionem sui sequitur? quam tranquillus, quam 
altus ac liber ! ' Dial, v 36, 2. 

^ 'plurimum proderit pueros statim salubriter institui ' ib. iv 21, i. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 361 

most dangerous stimulants to the passions-l The child must 
learn to eat and drink in a mannerly way^*, to refrain from 
loud talking and laughing^^ to express himself in respectful 
and graceful words "^ He must be taught to do right before he 
can understand the reason why^*, or else by doing wrong he will 
make it difficult for himself afterwards to do right ; he must be 
ruled until he can rule himself^^ For this reason we give 
children proverbs {sententiae) or anecdotes (xpeiac) to write out 
and learn, such as ' honesty is the best policy ' or ' Socrates 
being asked of what city he was...'; and these short pithy sayings 
sink deep^l But in the school life of children no attempt must 
be made to grapple with the real problems of life, because these 
are too hard for them, though parents often forget this objection^^ 
Games and amusements may be permitted ; for though in 
discussions on high principle the Stoics may be entirely opposed 
to 'relaxation of soul^V yet in practical life they freely admit its 
importance''^ All dealings with children should be gentle ; the 
discipline of the rod has long ago been abandoned by all sensible 
parents and teachers ^^. 

^ ' tenuis ante omnia victus [sit] et non pretiosa vestis ' td. 11 ; ' nihil magis facit 
iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda ' z'd. 6. 

^^ 'if he. ..eats as a modest man, this is the man who truly progresses' Epict. 
Disc, i 4, 20 and 21. 

^^ ' veritatis simplex oratio est ' Sen. £p. 49, 12 ; ' Let silence be the general rule, 
or let only what is necessary be said, and in a few words. Let not your laughter be 
much ' Epict. Mamial 33, 2 and 4. 

^^ 'loquendum est pro magnitudine rei impensius et ilia adicienda — pluris quam 
putas obligasti' Sen. Ben. ii 24, 4. 

^^ ' inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necesse est aliquem praeire — hoc vitabis, hoc 
fades ' Ep. 94, 50. 

^^ ' regi ergo debet, duni incipit posse se regere ' ib. 5 1 . 

3'' ' facilius singula insidunt circumscripta et carminis modo inclusa. ideo pueris 
et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant ' ib. 33, 6 and 7. 

3^ ' He is ridiculous who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, 
for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things ; and we ought to use this fact 
as an argument to parents ' Epict. Disc, i 26, 4 and 5. 

^^ See above, § 316. 

^ ' lusus quoque proderunt. modica enim voluptas laxat animos et temperat ' Sen. 
Dial, iv 20, 3 ; ' danda est animis remissio' ib. ix 17, 5 ; 'mens ad iocos devocanda 
est' ib. 4. 

^3 Chrysippus had approved of the rod : ' caedi discentis, quamlibet receptum sit 
et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim ' Quint. Ittst. Or. i 3, 14. But Seneca 
writes quite otherwise : ' uter praeceptor dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si 
memoria illis non constiterit...an qui monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere 
malit?' Cletn. i 16, 2 and 3. 



362 ROMAN STOICISM 

399. Soft living is at all ages to be avoided'*". It is in these 
Harm of days a danger to the bodily health ; for when a 
soft living. ,-)-jaj-, \^ accustomed to be protected from a draught 

by glass windows, to have his feet kept warm by foot-warmers 
constantly renewed, and his dining-room kept at an even 
temperature by hot air, the slightest breeze may put him 
in danger of his life*. Those who envy men who ' live 
softly' forget that their character becomes soft thereby*-. In 
particular clothing should not be such as altogether to protect 
the body from heat in summer, and from cold in winter. It is 
better to wear one shirt than two, best still to have only a coat. 
Then again, if you can bear it, it is better to go without shoes ; 
for after all to be shod is not very different from being fettered, 
and runners do not use shoes'*^. So also avoid luxurious fur- 
niture ; of what use is it that couches, tables and beds should be 
made of costly woods, and adorned with silver and gold ? We 
eat, drink, and sleep better without these things. In all these 
matters the Spartans set us a good example ; for while disease 
injures the body only, luxury corrupts both body and soul**. 

400. Boys and girls must be educated alike. This nature 
Training tcaches US, for we train colts and puppies without 
of girls. any regard for the difference of sex. The true 

education of children is in the practice of the virtues, and 
these are the same for men and for women. Women need 
Wisdom to understand the ordering of a household. Justice 
to control the servants, Soberness that they may be modest and 
unselfish. But they also need Courage ; in spite of the name 
mliness ' (avSpeta), this is not a virtue reserved for men. 
Without it women may be led by threats into immodest acts. 
Females of all kinds fight to defend their young ; the Amazons 
too were good fighters, and it is only for want of practice that 

^^ ' fugite delicias, fugite enervatam felicitatem ' Sen. DiaL i 4, 9. 

*^ 'quern specularia semper ab adflatu vindicaverunt, cuius pedes inter fomenta 
subinde mutata tepuerunt, cuius cenationes subditus ac parietibus circumfusus calor 
temperavit, hunc levis aura non sine periculo stringet ' id. 

^2 ' audire solemus sic quorundam vitam laudari, quibus invidetur — molliter vivit. 
hoc dicunt — mollis est' £p. 82, 2, 

^^ Stob. iii 29, 78 (from Musonius). 

4* id. 29, 75. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 363 

women cannot do the same to-day. That men, being the 
stronger, should do the heavier work, and women the hghter, is 
an arrangement which is often convenient, but circumstances 
may require the contrary. Girls at any rate must learn equally 
with boys to bear suffering, not to fear death, not to be in low 
spirits about anything that happens ; to avoid grasping habits, 
to love equality and benevolence, and to do no harm to man or 
woman ^^ 

401. Children should obey their parents, but in the spirit of 
Obedience fcason. We do not obey a father who gives orders 
to parents. for the treatment of a sick person contrary to those 

of the physician ; nor one, who being himself ill, demands 
things that are not good for him ; nor one who bids his 
son steal, or appropriate trust funds, or sacrifice his youthful 
bloom. We do not even obey him when he tells us to spell 
a word wrongly or strike a false note on the lyre. If your father 
forbids you to philosophize, show him by your manner of life, by 
prompt obedience, by good temper, by unselfishness, how good 
a thing philosophy is. But after all, the command of the 
universal Father is more urgent upon you ; which is, to be just, 
kind, benevolent, sober, high-souled ; above labours and above 
pleasures ; pure from all envy and plotting. You need not 
assume the outward appearance of a philosopher ; for the power 
of philosophy is in the innermost part of the soul, which the 
father can no more reach than the tyrant''"'. 

402. The fancy of young men is easily attracted by the 

vision of virtue, but it is hard for them to persevere; 

Example of _ ^ 

gladiators and they are like soft cheese which slips away from the 
hook by which it is taken up'*''. We must therefore 
put before them an ideal which appeals to them, and in which 
the advantages of fixed purpose and severe training are apparent 
to the eye. Such is the training of the athlete, the gladiator, 
and the soldier^**. The teachers of wrestling bid the pupil try 

^^ Muson. apud Stob. ii 31, 123. 
■*® Muson. ib. iv 79, 25. 

■"' ' It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it easy to hold soft 
cheese with a hook' Epict. Disc, iii 6, 9. 
** See above, § 326. 



364 ROMAN STOICISM 

again after each fall^^; the trained boxer is eager to challenge 
the most formidable opponent''''. The gladiator has learnt the 
lesson that pain is no evil, when he stands up wounded before a 
sympathetic crowd and makes a sign that it matters nothing''^ 
But most of all the soldier's oath serves as an example, when he 
pledges himself to serve Caesar faithfully all his life: let the 
young philosopher pledge himself to serve his God as faithfully, 
to submit to the changes and chances of human life, and to obey 
willingly the command to act or to suffer^l Without effort, as 
Hesiod has taught us, no greatness can be attained^^ 

403. In youth bad habits are apt to acquire some strength 
The 'contrary bcfore they Can be rooted out, and it will be well 
*^'®*-' to anticipate this evil by exercising body and soul 

in advance in a direction contrary to that of the most common 
temptations. The teacher will therefore give to his precepts 
an exaggerated character, reckoning upon human frailty to 
bring about a proper standard in practice^^ Thus since 
luxury is a chief enemy of virtue, the body should at least 
occasionally be brought low. A practice approved by the 
example of eminent men is to mark out from time to time 
a few days for the exercise of the simple life ; during this time 
life is to be maintained on coarse bread and water, in rough 
dress and all the surroundings of poverty^^ Since Cynism 

*^ ' See what the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen ? Rise, they say, wrestle 
again till you are made strong' Epict. Disc, iv 9, 15. 

^^ '[athletis] cura est, cum fortissimis quibusque confligere' Sen. Dial, i 2, 3. 

^^ ' [gladiator fortissimus] respiciens ad clamantem populum significat nihil esse et 
intercedi non patitur' ii. ii 16, 2. 

^" 'ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia' i6, vii 15, 7; Epict. 
Disc, i 14, 15 and 16. 

^^ See above, § 33 ; and compare Horace in his Stoic mood : ' nil sine magno | 
vita labore dedit mortalibus ' Sai. i 9, 59 and 60. 

^* ' quaedam praecipimus ultra modum, ut ad verum et suum redeant ' Sen. 
Ben. vii 22, I ; ' We ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there 
is great slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of exercise. I am 
rather inclined to pleasure ; I will incline to the contrary side above measure for the 
sake of exercise' Epict. Disc, iii 12, 6 and 7. 

^^ 'interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo cibo, dura atque 
horrida veste, dicas tibi " hoc est quod timebatur?"...grabatus ille verus sit et sagum 
et panis durus ac sordidus — hoc triduo ac quatriduo fer' Sen. £/>. 18, 5 and 7; 
'quod tibi scripsi magnos viros saepe fecisse ' il>. 20, 13. 



/ 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 365 

is a ' short cut to virtue°V philosophers may well employ the 
methods of Diogenes for short periods, as a corrective to any 
tendency to excess ; rich peopl^ do as much for love of 
change*'. 

404. On the question of personal appearance there is much 
, to be said on both sides. Foppishness is a dis- 

Personal f^^ 

appearance. agreeable vice, and it is contemptible that a young 
man should smell of perfumes. On the other hand a total 
disregard of appearances is not approved by the Stoics ; ' it 
is against nature ' says Seneca ' to be averse to neatness in 
appearance^V In these outward matters a sensible man will 
conform to fashion, nor will he wish to make the name of 
philosopher still more unpopular than it is'^^. The founders of 
Stoicism laid it down that men and women should wear the 
same dress ; but the later teachers laid stress on the natural 
distinction of the sexes ; and to men the beard should be an 
object of just pride, for it is more becoming than the cock's 
comb, or the lion's mane®\ This is to the Stoic a point of 
honour ; he should part with his head more readily than with his 
beard ^^ But the beard may be trimmed ; for, as Zeno has 
observed, nature provides rather against the ' too little ' than 
against the 'too much,' and reason must come to her help. 
Women do right to arrange their hair so as to make themselves 
more beautiful ; but for men any kind of artistic hair-dressing is 
contemptible®^. 



^® Diog. L. vii 121. 

5^ ' divites sumunt quosdam dies, quibus humi cenent, et remoto auro argentoque 
fictilihus utantur ' Sen. Dial, xii 12, 3. 

^8 'contra naturam est faciles odisse munditias' Sen. Ep. 5, 4; 'I would rather 
that a young man, who is making his first movements towards philosophy, should 
come to me with his hair carefully trimmed' Epict. Disc, iv 11, 25. 

^"^ 'asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorem barbam evita. intus 
omnia dissimilia sint, frons populo conveniat' Sen. Ep. 5, 2. 

^^ 'We ought not to confound the distinctions of the sexes.. ..How much more 
becoming is the beard than the cock's comb and the lion's mane ! For this reason we 
ought to preserve the signs which God has given' Epict. Disc, i 16, 13 and 14. 

'■^ ' Come then, Epictetus, shave yourself.' If I am a philosopher, I answer, 
' I will not shave myself.' ' But I will take off your head.' ' If that will do you any 
good, take it off' Epict. Disc, i 2, 29. ®^ Stob. iii 6, 24 (from Musonius). 



366 ROMAN STOICISM 

405. The young should train themselves alternately to bear 
Solitude and soHtude and to profit by society''^: since the wise 
society. i-^an is ncvcr dependent on his friends, though 

none can take better advantage of them*'*. In living alone 
a man follows the example of the deity, and comes to know 
his own heart*'^ But solitude must not be a screen for secret 
vices ; a man only uses it rightly when he can without shame 
picture the whole world watching his hours of privacy*'*. The 
right choice of friends calls for true wisdom ; for the soul 
cannot but be soiled by bad company*'^ The only true friend- 
ship is based on the mutual attraction of good folk*'^ ; therefore 
the wise are friends one to another even whilst they are 
unacquainted'*''. It is well to consider much before choosing a 
friend, but afterwards to give him implicit trust™ ; for a true 
friend is a second self". Such friendship can only arise from 
the desire to love and be loved '■^; those who seek friends for 
their own advantage, will be abandoned by them in the day of 
triaP^ In the companionship of well-chosen friends there grows 
up the ' common sense,' which is an instinctive contact with 
humanity as a whole, making each man a partner in the thoughts 
and needs of all around him. This feeling is a principal aim of 

"^ ' miscenda tamen ista et alternanda [sunt], solitudo ac freqiientia ' Sen. Dial, ix 

^^ ' ita sapiens se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit ' 
Ep. 9, 5. 

^3 ' proderit per se ipsum secedere ; meliores erimus singuli ' Dial, viii i , i ; 'A 
man ought to be prepared in a manner to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be 
his own companion. For Zeus dwells by himself and is tranquil by himself Epict. 
Disc, iii 13, 6 and 7. 

^® ' tunc felicem esse te iudica, cum poteris vivere in publico ; parietes plerumque 
circumdatos nobis iudicamus, non ut tutius vivamus sed ut peccemus occultius' Sen. 

Ep. 43. 3- 

^"^ ' It is impossible that a man can keep company with one who is covered with 
soot without being partaker of the soot himself Epict. Disc, iii 16, 3. 

"8 Diog. L. vii 124. 

^^ ' Stoici censent sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos ; nihil est enim 
virtute amabilius' Cic. N. D. i 44, 121 ; so Stob. ii 7 ii i. 

'■*' ' post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum' Sen. Ep. 3, 2. 

''^ Tir\v(j3v ipwrrjOeis ri iffTi (piXos " d'Wos iyd) " 'i<j>7] Diog. L. vii 23. 

^2 ' Hecaton ait ; ego tibi monstrabo amatorium : si vis amari, ama ' Sen. Ep. 9, 6 ; 
' multos tibi dabo, qui non amico sed amicitia caruerunt ' ib. 6, 3. 

73 ib. 9, 8. . 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 367 

philosophy''*. But the young philosopher should make no 
enemies ; he should be free from that dislike of others which so 
often causes a man to be disliked, and should remember that he 
who is an enemy to-day may be a friend to-morrow''^ 

406. As the young Stoic passes from youth to manhood, he 
Comradeship ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ mind towards marriage as a political 
in marriage. ^nd social duty''"; but if he is really touched by the 
divine flame, he will also find in it that enlargement of his own 
sympathies and opportunities of which the wise man is always 
glad''''. Under the Roman principate we observe a rapid de- 
velopment of personal sympathy between husband and wife ; 
and though in society girls who attended philosophers' classes 
had an ill name as being self-willed and disputatious'^, yet it is 
from this very circle that the ideal of a perfect harmony of mind 
and purpose was developed most fully. Musonius often speaks 
on this subject : 

' Husband and wife enter upon a treaty to live and to earn together, and 
to have all things in common, soul, body and property. Unlike the lower 
animals, which mate at random, man cannot be content without perfect 
community of thought and mutual affection. Marriage is for health and for 
sickness alike, and each party will seek to outrun the other in love, not 
seeking his own advantage, but that of his partner'^^.' 

'A man should look for a healthy body, of middle stature, capable of 
hard work, and offering no attraction to the licentious. But the soul is far 
more important ; for as a crooked stick cannot be fitted with one that is 
straight, so there can be no true agreement except between the good*''.' 

Seneca is reticent as to marriage, but we have no reason to 
doubt that his life with Paulina was typical of the best Stoic 
marriages. Thus he excuses himself for taking more thought 

''* ' hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et 
congregationem ' t'd. 5,4;' nuUius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est ' id. 6, 4. 

'^^ 'monemus, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum ' id. 95, 63. 

''" See above, § 349. 

''^ '[sapiensjducituxorenise contentus, et liberos tollit se contentus' Sen. £p. 9, 17; 
'If indeed you had [this purpose], you would be content in sickness, in hunger, and 
in death. If any among you has been in love with a charming girl, he knows that I 
say what is true' Epict. Disc, iii 5, 18 and 19. 

''^ dWa vTj Ala, (paai rives, 8ti avdadeis ws iiri iroXi) /cat dpacreias £?j'at dvdyKT) ras 
■n-pocnova-as rots ^i\o<T6<pois yvvaiKas Mus. apud Stob. ii 31, 126. 

''^ Stob. iv 22, 90. 

^^ Stob. iv 22, 104. 



368 ROMAN STOICISM 

for his health than a philosopher should, by saying that the 
happiness of Paulina depends upon it. 'Her life is wrapped up 
in mine, for its sake I must take care of my own. What can 
be more delightful than to be so dear to one's wife, that for her 
sake one becomes dearer to himself^' ! ' 

407. On the question of marriage Epictetus strikes a 
contrary note, characteristic of his time, and of his 
bias towards Cynic practice : 

' In the present state of things, which is like that of an army placed in 
battle order, is it not fit that the Cynic should without any distraction be 
employed only on the ministration of God ? To say nothing of other things, 
a father must have a heating apparatus for bathing the baby ; wool for his 
wife when she is delivered, oil, a bed, a cup ; and so the furniture of the 
house is increased. Where then now is that king, who devotes himself to 
the public interests, 

" The people's guardian and so full of cares *^" 

whose duty it is to look after others ; to see who uses his wife well, who 
uses her badly, who quarrels, who administers his family well, and who does 
not .'' Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down to, how we are taking 
his royalty from him^^ !' 

To this very definite conception of a celibate order of 
philosophers, devoting themselves to the good of humanity and 
entitled thereby to become the rulers of society, Musonius makes 
the following reply in advance from the true Stoic standpoint : 

' Marriage was no hindrance to Pythagoras, Socrates or Crates ; and who 
were better philosophers than they ? Since marriage is natural, philosophers 
should set the example of it. Why else did the Creator separate the human 
race into two divisions, making the honourable parts of the body distinct for 
each, and implanting in each a yearning for the other, but that he wished 
them to hve together and to propagate the race ? He who would destroy 
marriage, destroys the family and the commonwealth. No relationship is so 
essential or so intimate ; friend does not agree so well with friend, nor does 
a father feel so keenly separation from his son. And why should a philo- 
sopher be different from other men? Only that which is unbecoming is a 
hindrance to a philosopher ; but by doing his daily duty as a man he will 
become kindlier in disposition and more social in his thoughts^*.' 

^^ 'nam cum sciam spiritum illius [sc. Paulinae] in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consu- 
1am, mihi consulere. quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse, ut propter 
hoc tibi carior fias?' Sen. Ep. 104, 2 and 5. 

^■2 Horn. //. ii 25. *^ Epict. Disc, iii 22, 69 to 75. 

^ Stob. iv 22, 20. 



/ 
/ 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 369 

408. The head of a household must have a means of living; 
Means of ^^^ therefore the making of money ('x^pri/xaTia/xo'i, 
livelihood. ^^^^^ y^i faviUiaris) comes within the range of 
precepts. The Greek writers recognised three proper means of 
livelihood ; (i) from kingship, that is, to be either a king or a 
king's minister or general ; (ii) from politics, that is, by acting 
as a magistrate or a judge ; (iii) from sophistry, that is, by 
teaching philosophy to those who are wishing to learn ^. To 
each profession there are obvious objections ; indeed the sharp 
critic of Stoicism can see no reason why a wise man, who lacks 
nothing, should trouble himself about money-making. Each of 
the three professions named assumes the existence of men 
willing to be guided by philosophy, and these are not easily 
found. If pupils are taken, the question arises whether fees 
should be paid in advance or not. Now it is certainly more 
reasonable that a student should only pay if he profits by his 
teaching ; but on the other hand no one can absolutely promise 
to make a man good in a year, and deferred payments are often 
found unsatisfactory^". Under the Roman principate we hear 
little of the professions connected with public life; but it is clear 
that the teacher and the physician are held in special regard *^ 
Seneca has not the breadth of mind to respect the painter or the 
sculptor, any more than the wrestler or the stage-engineer^l 
Yet Chrysippus had suggested a bolder standpoint when he said 
that ' the wise man will turn three somersaults for a sufficient 
fee®^'; and no rule can be laid down except that a man should 
earn his own living without injuring his neighbour"". Agriculture, 
as a calling- favourable both to health of body and to innocence 
of soul, continued to be praised, but was seldom practised except 
as an amusement^^ 

*^ Stob. ii 7, II m. 

86 Plut. Sto. rep. 20, 10. 

8^ ' omnium horum [medicorum et praeceptorum] apud nos magna caritas, magna 
reverentia est' Sen. Ben. vi 15, i ; 'ex medico ac praeceptore in amicum transeunt ' 
ib. 16, I. 
" 88 Ep. 88, 18 and 22. 

89 Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 3. ' 

9" ' sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est ; 
alteri deripere ius non est ' Cic. Off. iii 10, 42. 

^^ See below, § 412. 

A. 24 



170 ROMAN STOICISM 

409. For every profession philosophy has appropriate pre- 

cepts, beginning with the king. There came one 

Kingly duties. . ^„.-., 

day to JVlusonius a kmg of Syria, for in those times 
there were kings subject to the Roman empire. Musonius 
addressed him thus : 

*You ought to be a philosopher as much as I. Your wish is to protect 
and benefit your fellow-men ; to do that, you must know what is good and 
what is evil. A king too must understand Justice ; for wars and revolts 
come about because men quarrel about their rights. Also he must show 
Soberness and Courage, that he may be an example to his subjects^^. The 
ancients thought that a king should be a living law (vo/ioy efiylrvxos), and an 
imitator of Zeus. Only a good man can be a good king.' 

The king was highly pleased, and asked him to name any 
boon he would. ' Abide by my words,' said Musonius, ' that 
will be the best boon both for me and for you^^' 

Two precepts in particular are addressed to kings. The 
first, that they should encourage friends who will speak the 
truth to them. Even Augustus Caesar needed this lesson ; 
bitterly as he lamented the deaths of Agrippa and Maecenas, 
he would not have allowed them to speak frankly had they 
lived^^ The second, that they should practise clemency, follow- 
ing the example of Julius Caesar, who destroyed the evidence 
upon which he might have punished his enemies^'. None does 
this virtue better become than kings and rulers^**. 

410. To the man of high rank it is natural to desire to 

move in the society of the great and the powerful. 

Court life. t- • • -i • i • • <- i 

Jipictetus gives us a striking description oi the 
man who desires to be on the list of the ' Caesaris amici,' which 
he thinks to be a good, though experience shows that it is not 
such. 

' Of whom shall we inquire ? What more trustworthy witness have we 
than this very man who is become Caesar's friend ? " Come forward and tell 
us, when did you sleep more quietly, now or before you became Caesar's 

^^ So too Epictetus : ' To whose example should [the many] look except yours [the 
governors']?' Disc, iii 4, 3. 

"•' Stob. iv 7, 67. ^^ Sen. Ben. vi 32, 4. 

**■' DiaL iv 23, 4. 

"^ ' nullum tamen dementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet ' 
Clem, i 3, 3. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 3/1 

friend?" Immediately you hear the answer, "Stop, I entreat you, and do 
not mock me ; you know not what miseries I sufifer, and sleep does not come 
to me ; but one comes and says, Caesar is already awake, he is now going 
forth ; then come troubles and cares." " Well, and did you sup with more 
pleasure, now or before?" Hear what he says about this also. He says 
that if he is not invited, he is pained; and if he is invited, he sups like a 
slave with his master, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do 
anything foolish. As befits so great a man, Caesar's friend, he is afraid that 
he may lose his head. I can swear that no man is so stupid as not to 
bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friendship to Caesar^''.' 

It is exactly under these circumstances that a thorough 
training in philosophy is of really practical value. 

' When you are going in to any great personage, remember that another 
also from above sees what is going on, and that you ought to please him 
rather than that other. He then who sees from above asks you : " In the 
schools what used you to say about exile and bonds and death and disgrace?" 
" That they are things indifferent." " And the end of life, what is it ? " " To 
follow thee." " Do you say this now also ?" "I do." Then go in to the great 
personage boldly and remember these things : and you will see what a youth 
is who has studied these things, when he is among men who have not studied 
them. I imagine that you will have such thoughts as these ; " Why do we 
make such great and so many preparations for nothing? Is this the thing 
which is named power? All this is nothing^^."' 

Yet a wise man will never challenge the anger of the power- 
ful ; he will turn aside from it, as a sailor from a storm®^ The 
virtuous affection of caution must be called in to help him, so 
many are his dangers. An independence of look, a slight 
raising of the voice, an outspoken expression, an appeal to 
public opinion, even unsought popularity are enough to excite 
suspicion^"". Perhaps after all the poet may be the wisest, who 
advises good men to stay away from court altogether, for it is a 
place where there is no room for them^''^ 

411, A common cause of moral corruption is the routine of 
Life in the ^'^^Y ^'^^^- Here fashiou dictates a round of occupa- 
*=»*y- tions which are unnatural, but in which men and 

^'^ Epict. Disc, iv i, 46 to 50. ^^ td. i 30, i to 7. 

®^ ' sapiens nunquam potentium iras provocabit, immo declinabit, non aliter quam 
in navigando procellam ' Sen. £!/>. 14, 7. 

i»» Dial, iii 18, 2. 

^"^ ' exeat aula | qui volet esse pius. virtus et summa potestas | non coeunt : semper 
metuet, quern saeva pudebunt' Lucan Fkars. viii 493 to 495. 

24-2 



372 ROMAN STOICISM 

women are alike absorbed ^°-. Half of the morning is absorbed in 
sleep '"^; then follows the visit to the public shows, which are centres 
of demoralisation ^"^ and conversation with numerous friends, 
each one of whom suggests some abandonment of principle"^ 
In the clubs all the most worthless members of society fore- 
gather"". The baths, which were at one time simply constructed, 
and for the purpose of cleanliness, are now instruments of luxury; 
and the water is now so hot as to be better fitted for torture 
than pleasure'"''. For the evening meal there must always be 
some novelty discovered, even if it is only to begin with the 
dessert and end with the eggs"^ ; even the order of the seasons 
must be inverted, that roses may adorn the table in winter"''. 
Upon the ill-spent day follows a disorderly night, and a heavy 
headache the next morning"". From the temptations of such a 
life the adherent of Stoicism will gladly escape. 

412. A more real happiness is reserved for the man who 
Life in the givcs up town life for that of the country. For it 
country. jg most natural to win sustenance from the earth, 

which is our common mother, and liberally gives back many 
times over what is entrusted to her ; and it is more healthy to 
live in the open than to be always sheltering in the shade. It 
matters little whether one works on one's own land or on that of 
another ; for many industrious men have prospered on hired 
land. There is nothing disgraceful or unbecoming in any of the 
work of the farm ; to plant trees, to reap, to tend the vine, to 
thrash out the corn, are all liberal occupations. Hesiod the 
poet tended sheep, and this did not hinder him from telling the 
story of the gods. And pasturage is (says Musonius) perhaps 
the best of all occupations ; for even farm work, if it is exhaust- 
ing, demands all the energies of the soul as well as of the body, 

"^ Sen. Ep. 77, 6, and 95, 20 and 21. 

103 'turpis, qui alto sole semisomnus iacet, cuius vigilia medio die incipit' ib. 
122, I. 

1°^ ' nihil tarn damnosum bonis moribus quam in aliquo spectaculo desidere ' ib. 7, 2. 

105 ' inimica est multorum conversatio ; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut com- 
mendat aut imprimit aut nescientibus adlinit ' ib. 

106 « vilissimus quisque tempus in aliquo circulo [terit] ' Dial, i 5, 4. 

"7 Ep. 86, 9 and 10. "» ib. 114, 9. "9 ib. 122, 8. 

"" 'oculos hesterna graves crapula' ib. 122, 2. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 373 

whereas whilst tending sheep a man has some time for philoso- 
phizing also. 

It is true that our young men to-day are too sensitive and 
too refined to live a country life ; but philosophy would be well 
rid of these weaklings. A true lover of philosophy could find no 
better discipline than to live with some wise and kindly man in 
the country, associating with him in work and in relaxation, at 
meals and in sleeping, and so ' learning goodness,' as Theognis 
tells us to do, ' from the good "\' 

413. Within the household the head of it is a little king, 
The house- ^"^ nceds to display the kingly virtues of Justice 
holder. ^nd Sobcmess. In his dealings with the perverse 

he must consider how far each man is capable of bearing the 
truth"-. Indeed, willingness to listen to reproof is no small 
virtue ; few words are best, so that the wrongdoer may be left as 
far as possible to correct his own ways "I Punishment must be 
reserved for extreme cases, and is always to be administered 
with calmness ; it is felt more keenly when it comes from a 
merciful master"^. Persistent kindness wins over even bad 
men"^ It is further the privilege of the head of a household to 
distribute kindnesses to those below him. His wealth he must 
regard as given him in trust ; he is only the steward of it, and 
must neither hoard nor waste ; for he must give both a debit 
and a credit account of all"". But if the right use of money 
causes the possessor anxious thought, no trace of this should 
appear to others ; giving should be without hesitation, and as a 
delight"''. The good citizen will pay his taxes with special 

"^ Stob. iv 15, 18. Seneca gives a more qualified approval to country life: ' non 
est per se magistra innocentiae solitudo, nee frugalitatem decent rura; sed ubi testis 
et spectator abscessit, vitia subsidunt, quorum monstrari et conspici fructus est ' 
Ep. 94, 69. 

^1^ * de cetero vide, non tantum an verum sit quod dicis, sed an ille cui dicitur veri 
patiens sit ' Dial, v 36, 4. 

^'^ ' moneri velle ac posse secunda virtus est ; flectendus est paucis animus, sui 
rector optimus' Ben. v 25, 4. 

in 'gravior multo poena videtur, quae a miti viro constituitur ' Clem, i 22, 3. 

1^^ ' vincit malos pertinax bonitas ' Ben. vii 31, i. 

^^® ' quid tanquam tuo parcis ? procurator es, in depositi causa [divitiae] sunt ' 
Ben. vi 3, 2; ' donabit cum summo consilio dignissimos eligens, ut qui meminerit tarn 
expensorum quam acceptorum rationem esse reddendam ' ib. 23, 5. 

^^^ 'demus ante omnia libenter, cito, sine uUa dubitatione ' Beti. ii i, i. 



374 ROMAN STOICISM 

pleasure, because in his eyes the welfare of the community 
stands higher than his own or that of his family"^; but he will 
not refuse a kindness even to an enemy who is in need""; and in 
giving a farthing to a beggar, he will imply by his manner that 
he is only paying what the other is entitled to as his fellow- 
man^-". In short, he will give as he would like to receive^^^ and 
with the feeling that the chief pleasure of ownership is to share 
with another^^l 

414. The good householder will associate on easy terms 
Treatment of "^^^^ his slavcs, remembering that they too are 
slaves. men, made of flesh and blood as he is himselP^. 

It is however a difficult matter to decide whether a master 
should dine with his slave. Men of the old Roman type find 
this a disgraceful practice, but the philosopher should decide in 
its favour^^*. We do not need to inquire into a man's social 
position, if his character is attractive^-"'. Plato has well said 
that we cannot find a king who is not descended from a slave, 
or a slave who is not descended from a king^'^; and in fact 
many a Roman slave was far better educated than his master^^^ 
Even if we do not suppose that Seneca's rule was commonly 
practised in great Roman houses, the suggestion itself throws a 
pleasing light on the position of a Roman slave. But if the 
master was thus called upon to ignore differences of social 
position, as much might be expected of the slave. With him it 

118 cic. 0^ i 17, 57. 

11" 'non desinemus opem ferre etiam inirnicis' Sen. Dial, viii i, 4. 

1^" '[sapiens] dabit egenti stipem (non hanc contumeliosam, qua pars maiorhorum 
qui se misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos adiuvat contingique ab his 
timet) sed ut homo homini ex communi dabit ' Clem, ii 6, ^. 

1^1 ' sic demus, quomodo vellemus accipere ' Ben. ii i, i. 

1'^^ ' nullius boni sine socio iucunda possessio est ' Ep. 6, 4. 

123 'servi sunt? immo homines, servi sunt? immo humiles amici ' ib. 47, i; 
' animas servorum et corpora nostra | materia constare putat paribusque dementis ' 
Juv. Sat. xiv 16 and 17. 

12-1 ' cognovi familiariter te cum servis tuis vivere. hoc eruditionem decet. rideo 
istos, qui turpe putant cum servo suo cenare ' Sen. Ep. 47, r and 2. 

125 'refert cuius animi sit, non cuius status' Ben. iii 18, ^. 

''' Ep. 44, 4- 

12^ ' [Calvisius Sabinus] niagna summa emit servos, unum qui Homerum teneret, 
unum qui Hesiodum. novem praeterea lyricis singulos adsignavit. magno emisse ilium 
non est quod mireris: non invenerat, faciendos locavit ' Ep. 27, 6. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 375 

was doubtless an instinct to prize liberty, ' the power of living 
as you like,' as the dearest of possessions. Yet many a slave 
who won this reward by years of faithful service found that 
liberty delusive, and would have been wiser to stay in the home 
where he was valued ^^®. 

415. A question of pressing practical importance is that of 
Large large families (TToXuTTatSia). Statesmen have always 
families. considered it best that the homes of citizens should 

be crowded with children ; and for this reason the laws forbid 
abortion and the hindrance of conception ; they demand fines 
for childlessness, and pay honours to those who bring up large 
families. Public opinion takes the same view; the father of 
many children is honoured as he goes about the city, and how 
charming is the sight of a mother surrounded by a swarm of 
children ^2^! No religious procession is so imposing. For such 
parents every one feels sympathy, and every one is prepared to 
cooperate with them^^". But nowadays even rich parents 
refuse to rear all their children, so that the first-born may be 
the richer. But it is better to have many brothers than few ; 
and a brother is a richer legacy than a fortune. A fortune 
attracts enemies, but a brother helps to repel them^^^ 

416. We have now accompanied the man of mature years 
Comfort in ^^ ^'^ duties aud his temptations : philosophy has 
poverty. ^Iso a word to speak with regard to his trials. It 

is well indeed if he is convinced that the buffets of fortune are 
no real evils ; but this doctrine can be supplemented by other 
consolations. Of the most bitter of all sufferings, bereavement 
by the death of friends and children, we have already spoken ; 
we may now consider two other conditions usually held to be 
evil, namely poverty and exile. In poverty the first comfort 
is in the observation that poor men are usually stronger in body 

^^^ Epict, Disc, iv I, 33 to 40. 

1^ But hear Epictetus on the other side : ' Are those men greater benefactors to 
mankind who introduce into the world to occupy their own places two or three grunt- 
ing children, or those who superintend as far as they can all mankind? Did Priamus 
who begat fifty worthless sons contribute more to the community than Homer?' 
Disc, iii 22, 77 and 78. 

1^" Stob. iv 24, 15 (from Musonius). ^^^ ib. 2"], 21. 



376 ROMAN STOICISM 

than the rich'*-, and quite as cheerful in mind''**. Further the 
poor are free from many dangers which beset the rich ; they can 
travel safely even when highwaymen are watching the road'**. 
Poverty is an aid to philosophy, for a rich man, if he wishes to 
philosophize, must freely choose the life of the poor'*^ A poor 
man is not troubled by insincere friends'**^. In short, poverty is 
only hard for him who kicks against the pricks'*''. 

417. The subject of exile has the special interest that in 
Comfort in ^^^^ ^° many philosophers endured this evil. To 
^^^^^- the Stoic there is in principle no such thing as 

exile, since the whole world is his country ; but he does not for 
this reason disregard other sources of consolation. Cicero was 
plainly miserable, not only when he was formally exiled, but 
also when he was away from Rome in an honourable position ; 
Seneca at least made the attempt to bear exile more bravely. 
Is it then so hard to be away from one's native place ? Rome 
is crowded with strangers, who have come thither for pleasure 
or profit, study or novelty'*^ True, it is a beautiful town ; but 
there is no place on earth so bare and unsightly, not even this 
Corsica to which Seneca is banished, but that some men choose 
it to reside in as a matter of taste'***. Whole peoples have 
changed their abode, and we find Greek cities in the midst of 
barbarism, and the Macedonian language in India''*"; wherever 
he conquers the Roman dwells'*'. The exile has everywhere the 
company of the same stars above'''^ of the same conscience 
within him'**; even if he is separated from those near and dear 

'*'^ See above, § 399. 

'** ' compara inter se pauperum et divitum voltus ; saepius pauper et iidelius ridet ' 
Sen. £p. 80, 6. 

'** *etiam in obsessa via pauperi pax est' zd. 14, 9. 

'*^ 'si vis vacare animo, aiit pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis' id. 17, 5. 

136 '[paupertas] veros certosque amicos retinebit; discedet quisquis non te, sad 
aliud sequebatur. vel ob hoc unum anianda paupertas quod, a quibus ameris, 
ostendet' id. 20, 7. 

'*'' ' paupertas nulli malum est nisi repugnanti ' id. 123, 16. 

'*^ Dial, xii 6, 2. 

'*3 ' usque eo commutatio ipsa locorum gravis non est, ut hie quoque locus a patria 
quosdam abduxerit ' id. 5. 

'^^ id. 7, I. '^' 'ubicunque vicit Romanus habitat' id. 7, 7. 

'*2 id. 8, 6. 

'■** ' licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre' id. 8, i. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 377 

to him, it is not for the first time, and he can still live with them 
in his thoughts and affections. 

418. Free or slave, rich or poor, powerful or insignificant, 

wherever a man stands in the order of society, 

Old age. , , , . . , ,, 

old age comes at last and imperiously stops all 
ambitions. It is, in the general opinion, a time of sadness^^ ; to 
associate it with pleasure is not scandalous, only because it is 
paradoxical "^ Cicero's work de Senectute shows how old age 
became attractive according to Roman tradition ; Seneca is 
hardly so successful. With the fading of hope the stimulus to 
effort dies away in old age"*^ ; but though philosophy forbids 
idleness, nature cries out for rest. We cannot then approve 
when old men follow their professional occupations with un- 
diminished zeal"'', and we must highly blame those who cannot 
quit their pleasures^l The great boon which old age brings is 
leisure ; for this many great men, amongst them Augustus, have 
longed in vain"^ This leisure gives the opportunity of making 
acquaintance with great men through their books, but better 
still, that of making acquaintance with our own selves. 

419. ' Give me,' said one to Musonius, ' a viaticum for old 
Musonius' age.' He replied as follows : 

' viaticum.' 

' The rule is the same as for youth, to live methodically and according to 
nature^^'^. Do not grieve because you are cut off from the pleasures of 
youth ; for man is no more born for pleasure than any other animal : indeed 
man alone is an image of the deity ^^^ and has like excellences. And do not 
consider the divine excellences as beyond your reach ; for we have no other 

1^* ' subeunt morbi tristisque senectus ' Verg. G. iii 67 quoted by Sen. Ep. 108, 29. 

^^ ' plena est voluptatis [senectus], si ilia scias uti ' Sen. Ep. 12, 4. 

^*^ ' nihil magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat ' 
Cic. 0^. i 34, 123; 'iuvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adliuc 
tractabilem ad meliora convertere' Sen. Ep, 108, 27. 

"^ 'adeone iuvat occupatum mori?' Sen. Dial, x 20, 3. He instances an old 
gentleman of 90, who had consented to resign his official post at that age ; but when 
the time came, he threw his whole household into mourning until he got his work 
back again. 

^^ ' luxuria cum omni aetate turpis, turn senectuti foedissima est ' Cic. OJ^. i 

34. 123- 

^^'^ Sen. Dial, x 4, i and 2. 1^" t6 ^tju 65i^ /cat /cara (pvcrii'. 

^^1 dvOpuTTos fiinrt/xa 6eo0 jxovov rwu iTriyeiuv (see on hymn of Cleanthes, 1. 5, 
in § 97). 



378 ROMAN STOICISM 

notion of the gods than such as we derive from observing good men, whom 
therefore we call divine and godlike. He who has acquired in youth sound 
principles and systematic training will not be found to complain in old age 
of the loss of pleasures, of weakness of body, or because he is neglected by 
friends and acquaintance ; he will carry about with him a charm against all 
these evils, namely his own education. But if he has not been rightly 
educated, he will do well to go to a friend wiser than himself, and listen to 
his teaching and profit by it. And specially he will ponder over death, how 
it comes in nature's course to all, and therefore is no evil. With such 
thoughts he will be cheerful and contented, and so he will live a happy life. 
But let no one say that wealth brings happiness in old age ; that it does not 
bring a contented spirit is witnessed every day by a crowd of rich old men, 
who are in bad temper and low spirits, and feel deeply aggrieved '^^.' 

420. When we see death before us there remains a last act 

to be performed. We look at the wealth which no 

■Will-making. ' 

longer belongs to us, and consider to whom it can 
most worthily be entrusted. We stand in the position of a 
judge who can no longer be bribed, and, with all the wisdom and 
good will that we have, we give this last verdict on those around 

us^'^l 

421. For death the whole of philosophy is a preparation ; 

yet when it is no longer a matter of uncertain fear, 
but close at hand and sure, some last words are to 

be said. All this is in the course of nature, is according to the 

will of the Creator. 

' God opens the door and says to you, " Go." " Go whither ?" To nothing 
terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, 
to the elements'^*. What there was in you of fire goes to fire ; of earth, to 
earth ; of air, to air ; of water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, 
nor Cocytus, but all is full of gods and demons ^^s, Qod has invited you ; be 
content when he calls others to the feast in your place.' 

The philosopher does not look forward to renewing his 
personal life, or to meeting again with parent, wife, or child. 
But death is a release from all his pains and troubles ; and he 

152 Stob. Flor. 117, 8 (M). 

153 «ubi mors interclusit omnia et ad ferendam sententiam incorruptum iudicem 
misit, quaerimus dignissimos quibus nostra tradamus ; nee quicquam cura sanctiore 
componimus quam quod ad nos non pertinet ' Sen. Ben. iv 11, 5. 

154 I reverti unde veneris quid grave est?' Dial, ix 11, 4. 

155 Epict. Disc, iii 13, 14 and 15; ib. iv r, 106. 



COUNSELS OF PERFECTION 379 

who has striven to live his Hfe well will know how to meet death 
also at its due time^^®. If it come to him in the shipwreck, he 
will not scream nor blame God; if in the arena, he will not shrink 
from his enemy, whether man or beast. In this last short crisis 
he will bear witness that he accepts contentedly his mortal lot^^'^. 

^^* 'male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori' Sen. Dial, ix ii, 4; and see above, 
§§ 298, 299. 

^^^ ' quod tam cito fit, timetis diu ? ' Sen. Dial, i 6, 9 ; * puto fortiorem eum esse, 
qui in ipsa morte est quam qui circa mortem, mors enim admota etiam imperitis 
animum dedit non vitandi inevitabilia ; sic gladiator tota pugna timidissimus iugulum 
adversario praestat et errantem gladium sibi adtemperat ' Ep. 30, 8 ; ' the ship is 
sinking ! what then have I to do ? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned 
full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced 
must also perish ; for I am not an immortal being ' Epict. Disc, ii 5, 11 to 13. 



CHAPTER XVI, 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE. 

422. Although up to this point it has been our main 
Spread of purpose to set forth the doctrines of Stoicisnn, 
stoicism. ^g have seen incidentally that these came to 
exercise a wide influence in Roman society, and that the later 
teachers are far less occupied in the attainment of truth than in 
the right guidance of disciples who lean upon them. In the 
present chapter we propose to describe more particularly the 
practical influence of Stoicism. Our information, whether drawn 
from history or from poetry, refers generally to the upper classes 
of Roman society ; as to the influence of the sect amongst the 
poor we have no sufficient record. But although it is very 
generally held that the Stoics made no effort to reach the 
working classes of Rome, or met with no success in that 
direction \ the evidence points rather to an opposite conclusion, 
at any rate as regards all that development of the system which 
was coloured by Cynism, the philosophy of the poorl Our 
actual records are therefore rather of the nature of side-lights 
upon the system ; the main stream of Stoic influence may well 
have flowed in courses with which we are imperfectly acquainted, 
and its workings may perhaps come to light first in a period of 
history which lies beyond our immediate scope. 

^ Lightfoot, Philippians, p. 319; Dill, Roman Society, /p. 334; Warde Fowler, 
Social Life at Rome, p. 27. 

^ The practice of street-preaching, as described by Horace and Epictetus, points 
this way ; and the world-wide diffusion of Stoicism, in more or less diluted forms, is 
hardly reconcileable with its restriction to a single class of society. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 38 1 

423. Individual Romans who professed themselves disciples 

of the Porch owed their allegiance to the sect to 

Conversion , , 

direct and two causcs, in Varying proportion. On the one hand 
they had attended lectures or private instruction 
given by eminent Stoic teachers, or had immersed themselves 
in Stoic literature. This influence was in almost all cases the 
influence of Greek upon Roman, and the friendship between the 
Stoic Panaetius and Scipio Aemilianus was the type of all 
subsequent discipleship. Scipio himself did not perhaps formally 
become a Stoic, but he introduced into Roman society the 
atmosphere of Stoicism, known to the Romans as humanitas : 
this included an aversion to war and civil strife, an eagerness to 
appreciate the art and literature of Greece, and an admiration 
for the ideals depicted by Xenophon, of the ruler in Cyrus, and 
of the citizen in Socrates^. All the Stoic nobles of the time of 
the republic are dominated by these feelings. On the other hand 
individuals were often attracted by the existence of a society 
which proclaimed itself independent of the will of rulers, and 
offered its members mutual support and consolation. Such men 
were often drawn into Stoicism by the persuasion of friends, 
without being necessarily well-grounded in philosophical principle; 
and in this way small groups or cliques might easily be formed 
in which social prejudice or political bias outweighed the formal 
doctrine of the school. Such a group was that of the ' old 
Romans ' of the first century of the principate ; and with the 
spread of Stoicism this indirect and imperfect method of attach- 
ment constantly grows in importance as compared with direct 
discipleship. 

424. Of the first group of Roman Stoics the most notable 
The scipionic ^^^ ^' Laelius, the intimate friend of Scipio, 
circle. ^ho became consul in 140 B.C. In his youth he 

had listened to the teaching of Diogenes of Babylon, in later 
life he was the friend of Panaetius*. He was in his time a 

■' ' semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus habebat ' Cic. Tusc. disp. 
ii -26, 62; 'Cyrus ille a Xenophonte ad effigiem iusti imperi scriptus...quos quidem 
libros Africanus de manibus ponere non solebat ' ad Quint. I i 8, 23. 

* ' ille [Laelius] qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, post autem Panaetium audi- 
erat ' Fin. ii 8, 24. 



382 ROMAN STOICISM 

notable orator with a quiet flowing style^ ; his manners were 
cheerful*', his temper was calm"; and, as we have seen^, he seemed 
to many the nearest of all the Romans to the ideal of the Stoic 
sage. He is brought on as the chief speaker in Cicero's de 
Amicitia. Another close friend of Africanus was Sp. Mummius, 
the brother of the conqueror of Achaia; his oratory was marked 
by the ruggedness characteristic of the Stoic schools Passing 
mention may be made of L. FURIUS Philus, consul in 136 B.C., 
and a member of the same group, though his philosophical views 
are not known to us^". 

425. From the ' humane ' movement sprang the Gracchan \ 
The Gracchan fcforms, which all alike aimed at deposing from 
period. power the class to which the reformers by birth 

belonged. To the temper of mind which made such a desire 
possible Stoic doctrine had largely contributed. The Greeks 
had taught their Roman pupils to see in the nascent Roman 
empire, bearing the watchword of the ' majesty of the Roman 
name' {inaiestas riominis Romani), at least an approximation 
to the ideal Cosmopolis: and many Romans so far responded 
to this suggestion as to be not unfriendly towards plans for ex- 
tending their citizenship and equalizing the privileges of those 
who enjoyed it. C. Blossius of Cumae, a pupil of Antipater of 
Tarsus, went so far as to instigate Tiberius Gracchus to the 
schemes which proved his destruction"; whilst other Stoics, 
equally sincere in their aims, disagreed with the violence shown 
by Tiberius in his choice of method. Amongst the latter was 
Q. Aelius Tubero, a nephew of Africanus^^ who became 
consul in 118 B.C. He devoted himself day and night to the 

® 'lenitatem Laelius habuit' Cic. de Or. iii 7, 28; 'C. Laelius et P. Africanus 
imprimis eloquentes ' Brtif. 21, 82. 

® 'in C. Laelio multa hilaritas' Off. i 30, 108. 

^ ' praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut 
de Socrate itemque de C. Laelio accepimus ' ib. 26, 90. 

^ See above, § 326. 

^ ' Sp. [Mummius] nihilo ornatior, sed tamen astrictior; fuit enim doctus ex disci- 
plina Stoicorum ' Cic. Brut. 25, 94. 

^^ ' non tulit ullos haec civitas humanitate politiores P. Africano, C. Laelio, 
L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Graecia palam semper hab'uerunt ' de 
Or. ii 37, 154. " Cic, Amic. 11, 37. 

^- ' Ti. Gracchum a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus ' ib. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 383 

study of philosophy ^% and though of no mark as an orator, won 
himself respect by the strictness and consistency of his life^^ 
Panaetius, Posidonius, and Hecato all addressed treatises to 
him^^; and he is a leading speaker in Cicero's Republic. 

426. After the fall of the Gracchi the Stoic nobles con- 
Laeiius to tinued to play distinguished and honourable parts 
Luciiius. ill public life, A family succession was main- 
tained through two daughters of Laelius, so that here we 
may perhaps recognise the beginning of the deservedly famous 
'Stoic marriages.' Of the two ladies the elder was married to 
Q. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA, known as 'the augur,' who was consul in 
117 B.C. He was a devoted friend of Panaetius, and famous for 
his knowledge of civil law^®. The younger daughter was married 
to C. Fannius, who obtained some distinction as a historian^''. 
In C. LuciLIUS we find the Latin poet of Stoicism ; the views 
which he expresses in his satires on religion and ethics are in the 
closest agreement with the teaching of Panaetius ^^, and the large 
circulation of his poems must have diffused them through wide 
circles^'*. At the same time his attacks on the religious institu- 
tions of Numa and his ridicule of his own childish beliefs may 
well have brought philosophy into ill odour as atheistic and 
unpatriotic : and we find the statesmen of the next generation 
specially anxious to avoid any such imputations. 

427. A dominating figure is that of Q. MuciUS SCAEVOLA, 
scaevoia'the commonly Called 'the pontifex,' who was a nephew 
pontifex.' Qf }^jg namesake mentioned above, and derived 

from him his interest in civil law ; he was consul in 95 B.C. 
He overcame the difficulty about the popular religion by distin- 

^* de Or. iii 23, 87. 

^^ ' quoniam Stoicorum est facta mentio, Q. Aelius Tubero fuit illo tempore, nuUo 
in oratorum numero, sed vita severus et congruens cum ea disciplina quam colebat ' 
Brut. 31, 117. ^^ Fin. iv 9, 23; Off. iii 15, 63. 

1^ ' Panaetii illius tui ' Cic. de Or. i 11, 45 ; '[Mucius augur] oratorum in numero 
non fuit: iuris civilis intellegentia atque omni prudentiae genere praestitit ' Brut. 26, 
102. 

^' ' C. Fannius, C Laeli gener, ...instituto Laelii Panaetium audiverat. eius 
omnis in dicendo facultas ex historia ipsius non ineleganter scripta perspici potest ' 
ib. loi. 

^8 Schmekel, Mittlere Stoa, pp. 444, 445. 

^' See especially his praise of virtue, beginning ' virtus, Albine, est pretium per- 
solvere verum | quels in versamur, queis vivimu' rebu' potesse ' fr. i . 



c 



/^ 



\5 



384 ROMAN STOICISM 

guishing on Stoic lines three classes of deities, (i) mythical 
deities, celebrated by the poets with incredible and unworthy 
narrations-"; (ii) philosophical deities, better suited for the 
schools than for the market-place ; (iii) civic deities, whose 
ceremonies it is the duty of state officials to maintain-^, inter- 
preting them so as to agree with the philosophers rather than 
with the poets-l In this spirit he filled the position of chief 
officer of the state religion. He was however no time-server ; 
for being appointed after his consulship to be governor of Asia, 
he joined with his former quaestor P. RUTILIUS RUFUS in the 
design of repressing the extortion of the piiblicaiii. A decisive 
step taken by him was to declare all dishonourable contracts 
I invalid^^; and more than a generation later his just and sparing 
administration was gratefully remembered both at Rome and in 
the provinces-^. The eqintes took their revenge not on Scaevola 
but on Rutilius^^ whom they brought to trial in 92 B.C., when 
Scaevola pleaded his cause in a simple and dignified way that 
became a Stoic, but did not exclude some traces of elegance^®- 
He is regarded as the father of Roman law, for he was the first 
to codify it, which he did in eighteen volumes-''. He also wrote 
a special work on definitions, which no doubt reflected the 
interest which the Stoics took in this part of logic. 

428. It seems beyond dispute that the systematic study 

The Stoic ^^ \2^N , which developed in later centuries into 

lawyers. ^he science of Roman jurisprudence, and as such 

has exercised a weighty influence on the development of 

Western civilisation, had its beginnings amongst a group of 

men profoundly influenced by Stoic teaching. It does not 

^^ ' primum genus [poeticum] nugatorium dicit [Scaevola] esse, quod multa de dis 
fingantur indigna' Aug. Civ. De. iv 27, on the authority of Varro. 

^^ ' teitium genus ' inquit VaiTO ' quod in urbibus cives, maxima sacerdotes, nosse 
atque administrare debent' Aug. Civ. De. vi 5. 

^ ' maior societas nobis debet esse cum philosophis quam cum poetis ' ib. 6. 

-^ ' ego habeo [exceptionem] tectiorem e.\ Q. Mucii P. F. edicto Asiatico ; extra 
qiiam si ita negotium gesUun est, ut eo stari iion oporteat ex fide bona; multaque sum 
secutus Scaevolae' Cic. Att. vi i, 15. 

^ 'banc gloriam iustitiae et abstinentiae fore inlustriorem spero.. quod Scaevolae 
contigit' ib. v 17, 5. "^ See above, § 326. 

^ ' dixit causam illam quadam ex parte Q. Mucins, more suo, nullo adparatu, pure 
et dilucide ' Cic. de Or. i 53, 229 ; ' Scaevola parcorum elegantissimus ' Brut. 40, 148. 

"^ ' Q. Mucius pontifex maximus ius civile primus constituit, generatim hi libros 
xvni redigendo ' Pompon. Dig. i 2, 2, 41. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 385 

therefore follow that the fundamental ideas expressed by such 
terms as ins geiitmm, lex naturae, are exclusively Stoic in origin. 
The former phrase appears to have been in common use at this 
time to indicate the laws generally in force amongst the peoples 
that surrounded Rome ; the latter is a philosophical term yi^ 
derived from the Greek, denoting an ideal law which ought to - 
exist amongst men everywhere-l The principle of obedience to 1 
nature is not peculiar to the Stoic philosophy, but belongs to the 
common substratum of all philosophical thought. It does ■ 
however seem to be the case that the Stoic theory of the 
' common law ' {koivo^ vo^os:) was in fact the stimulus which 
enabled the Romans to transform their system of ' rights,' 
gradually throwing over all that was of the nature of mechanical 
routine or caste privilege, and harmonizing contradictions by the 
principle of fairness. The successor of Scaevola was C. Aquilius 
\ Gallus, praetor in 66 B.C. with Cicero, of whom it is specially 
noted that he guided his exposition of law by the principle of 
equity-"; and after him S. SULPICIUS RUFUS, the contemporary 
and intimate friend of Cicero. We do not know that he was 
a Stoic, but he was a student of dialectic under L. LUCILIUS 
BalbuS, who as well as his brother belonged to this school'^"; and 
he followed Stoic principles in studying oratory just enough to 
make his exposition clear'*^ He was the acknowledged head of 
his profession, and compiled 180 books on law^-. In the civil 
war he took sides with Caesar''^ 



429. Amongst men of high rank definitely pledged to 
stoics of the Stoicism in the generation preceding Cicero are 
suiian period, farther L. Aelius Stilo (circ. 145-75 B.C.)^*, who 
devoted himself to Roman grammar and antiquities, and was 

-^ H. Nettleship, Ins Gentiutn (Journal of Philology xiii 26, pp. 169 sqq.). 

^^ 'qui iuris civilis rationem nunquam ab aequitate seiunxerit ' Cic. Caec. 27, 78. * 

'^ 'cum discendi causa duobus peritissimis operam dedisset, L. Lucilio Balbo et 
C. Aquilio Gallo ' Britt. 42, 154; cf. de Orat. iii 21, 78. 

31 ' Servius [mihi videtur] eloquentiae tantum assumpsisse, ut ius civile facile possit 
tueri' Brut. 40, 150. 

3- '[Servius] longe omnium in iure civili princeps ' ib. 41, 151; Pomp. Dig. i 
2, 2, 43. 

3* For an interesting account of his career and death see Warde Fowler, Social 
Life at Rome, pp. 118-121. 

3^ ' idem Aelius Stoicus esse voluit ' Cic. Brutus 56, 206. 
A. 25 



386 ROMAN STOICISM 

the teacher of both Cicero and Varro ; O. LUCILIUS BalbuS, 
whose knowledge of this philosophy rivalled that of his Greek 
teachers^^, and who is the exponent of the Stoic view in Cicero's 
de Natura Deo?'uin, the scene of which takes us back to about 
76 B.C. ; Sextus Pompeius, uncle of Pompey the Great, and 
distinguished both as a philosopher and as a jurist"®; and more 
particularly P. RUTILIUS RUFUS, to whom we have already 
referred"". A pupil and devoted admirer of Panaetius''**, a trained 
philosopher"^ and a sound lawyer""^, he brought his career at 
Rome to an abrupt end by his firm resistance to the publicani^ 
as already recounted ^^ With true cosmopolitanism he retired 
to Smyrna, and accepted the citizenship of that town. His stern 
principles did not prevent him from saving his life in the massacre 
ordered by Mithradates, by assuming Greek dress^^; the massacre 
itself was the ripe fruit of the abuses which he had endeavoured 
to repress. He is one of the characters in Cicero's de Repiiblica. 

430. Of the Stoics of Cicero's time the most eminent was 
M. PORCIUS Cato (95-48 B.C.). In him Stoicism 
received a special colouring by association with the 
traditions of ancient Roman manners. In his early years he 
became a pupil of Antipater of Tyre*^, and so far adopted the 
Cynic ideal as to train himself for public life by freely submitting 
to hunger, cold, and hardship^*. After a period of service in the 
army he made a journey to Asia to secure the companionship of 
Athenodorus the elder^l He became a practised speaker ; and 
though he adhered firmly to the Stoic tradition of plain language 
and short sentences '^^ yet could become eloquent on the great 

"^ ' Q. Lucilius Balbus tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, iit cum excellentibus 
in eo genere Graecis compararetur ' N. D. i 6, 15. 

^^ ' Sextus frater praestantissimum ingenium contulerat ad summam iuris civilis et 
rerum Stoicarum scientiam ' Brutus 47, 175. '*'' See § 427. 

^® ' Posidonius scribit P. Rutilium dicere solera, quae Panaetius praetermisisset, 
propter eorum quae fecisset praestantiam neminem esse persecutum ' Cic. Off. iii 1, 10. 

'^^ ' [P. Rutilius], doctus vir et Graecis litteris eruditus, prope perfectus in Stoicis ' 
Brutus 30, 114. 

'"' ' multa praeclara de iure ' il>. *^ See above, § 326. 

^^ Cic. p7V Rabir. 10, 27. '^^ Pint. Cato i7iinor \, i. 

■*■* ib. 5, 3. 45 j,-^_ jo^ j_ 

"*^ 'Cato perfectus, mea sententia, Stoicus, ...in ea est haeresi, quae nullum sequi- 
tur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum; sed minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi 
punctis, quod proposuit efficit ' Cic. Par. Pro. 2. 



. STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 387 

themes of his philosophy*^, and could win the approval of the 
people even for its paradoxes'*®. He was resolutely opposed to 
bribery and extortion. As quaestor in B.C. 66 he introduced 
reform into the public finances, and put an end to embezzlements 
by officials. His popularity became very great, and he was 
elected tribune of the plebs towards the end of the year 63 B.C., 
when his voice decided the senators to decree the death of the 
associates of Catiline. With his subsequent policy Cicero finds 
fault, because Cato refused to connive at the extortions of the 
piiblicani: and from Cicero's criticisms has arisen the accepted 
view that Cato was an unpractical statesman. On the other 
hand it may well be held that if the Roman aristocracy had 
included more men like Cato, the republic might have been 
saved : and towards the end of his life Cicero bitterly lamented 
that he had not sufficiently valued the sincere friendship which 
Cato offered him^". In the year 54 B.C. the candidates for the 
office of tribune paid him a singular compliment; each deposited 
with him a large sum of money, which he was to forfeit if in 
Cato's opinion he was guilty of bribery^". His whole political 
life Avas guided by the strictest moral principle-'^ ; even in so 
unimportant a matter as Cicero's request for a triumph he would 
do nothing to oblige a friend =-. In private life he attempted to 
put into practice the principle of the community of women 
taught in Zeno's Republic. He had married Marcia, daughter 
of Philippus, and had three children by her : in 56 B.C. he gave 
her up to his friend C. Hortensius, whose family was in danger 
of becoming extinct : finally on the threatening of the civil war 
in B.C. 50 he took her back to his own home. At a time when 
the marriage bond was lightly treated by many of his con- 
temporaries he at least rose above petty motives. In the civil 

""' ' Cato dumtaxat de magnitudine animi, de moite, de omni laude virtutis, Stoice 
solet, oratoriis ornamentis adhibitis, dicere ' Cic. Par. Pro. 3. 

^^ ' animadverti Catonem...dicendo consequi ut ilia [ = loci graves ex philosophia] 
populo probabilia viderentur' ib. i. 

'8 '[doleo] plus apud me simulationem alioium quam [Catonis] fidem valuisse ' 
ad Alt. iii 15, 1 (in B.C. 48). 

50 ib. iv 15, 7. 

5^ ' Catoni vitam ad certain rationis normam dirigenti et diligentissime perpendenti^ 
riiomenta officioruni omnium ' Mtir. 2, 3. 

^^ Cato apud Cic. ad Fam. xv 5, 2. 

25 — 2 



388 ROMAN STOICISM 

war he took sides strongly against Caesar, his old political 
opponent. His self-sought death after Pharsalia won him a 
distinction which he had earned better by his life : and the 
unmeasured praise bestowed upon him a century later is perhaps 
due more to political bias than to philosophical respect^l The 
few words with which Virgil honours his memory are more 
effective, when he pictures Cato as chosen to be a judge in the 
world of the blest^*. Cato represents the Stoic view as to the 
-^ smnimim bommi in Cicero's de Fitiibiis. 

431. Contemporary with Cicero and Cato was M. TeRENTIUS 
varro, Brutus Varro (b.C. 1x6-28). In his public Career and 
and Porcia. political principles he was not unlike Cato ; in his 
literary activity he more resembled Cicero. Both Varro and 
Cicero were deeply influenced by Stoic teaching, but as they 
were by no means professed adherents of this philosophy®-^, 
they may be here passed by. In the next generation 
M. Junius Brutus (85-42 b.c.) concerns us more : for by 
his marriage with PORCIA, Cato's daughter and an ardent Stoic, 
he came into a family connexion with the sect, with which his 
personal views, as we have seen, were not entirely in agreement®". 
Still Brutus was not altogether unfitted to play the part of 
Cato's successor ; he was no mean orator®'^, and wrote more than 
one philosophical treatise®^; whilst Cicero dedicated several of 
his philosophical works to him®^ But the practical Stoicism of 
Porcia, who stabbed herself in the thigh to show that she was 
fit to be trusted with a political secret, shines out more brightly 
than the speculations of her husband. In her honour Martial 

^^ See for instance below, § 441, note 94. 

®* ' his [sc. piis] dantem iura Catonem ' Verg. Aen, viii 670. 

^® 'illam 'AKad7]fiiK'^v...a.d Varronem transferamus : etenim sunt 'Ai^rtoxeio, quae 
iste valde probat' Cic. Att. xiii 12, 3; 'in iis quae erant contra aKaTa\-q\j/iav praeclare 
collecta aL Antiocho, Varroni dedi;...aptius esse nihil potuit ad id philosophiae 
genus, quo ille maxime mihi delectari videtur ' ib. 19, 3 and 5. 

®® See above, § 123. 

®^ ' tu, [Brute,] qui non linguam modo acuisses exercitatione dicendi, sed et ipsam 
eloquentiam locupletavisses graviorum artium instrumento ' Cic. Brutus 97, 331. 

*s ' Brutus in eo libro quern de virtute composuit ' Sen. Dial, xii 9, 4 ; ' Brutus in 
eo libro quern irepl Kad-qKovros inscripsit, dat multa praecepta' Ej>. 95, 45. There was 
also a treatise de patientia, 

®^ The de Finibus, de Natura Deorum, and Tusculanae disputationes. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 389 

has written one of the few epigrams in which he allows himself 
to be caught in a mood of admiration : yet his story of Porcia's 
death must be rejected as unhistoricaP". 

432. After the death of Brutus Stoicism ceases for a while 

to play a prominent part in Roman history; but its 

Horace. , . . _ 

indu'ect mfluence is very marked in the two great 
poets of the Augustan epoch, Horace and Virgil. Of these 
Horace is in the main an Epicurean, and as such is quite entitled 
to use the Stoic paradoxes as matter for ridicule, and even to 
anticipate dangerous consequences from their practical applica- 
tion*'\ But in fact his works show a constantly increasing 
appreciation of the ethics of Stoicism. He recognises the high 
ideals and civic activity of its professors ''", and he draws a noble 
picture of the Stoic sage, confident in his convictions, and bidding 
defiance to the crowd and the tyrant alike*'^ Of that practical 
wisdom and genial criticism which has made Horace the 
favourite poet of so many men eminent in public life, no small 
part consists of Stoic principles deftly freed from the paradoxical 
form in which they were conveyed to professed adherents. 

433. With this picture of Stoicism seen from without we 

must contrast that given us by ViRGiL, who inherited 

Virgil. . . 

the Stoic tradition from Aratus*'^, his model for the 
Georgics. Virgil's mind is penetrated by Stoic feeling, and his 
works are an interpretation of the universe in the Stoic sense ; 
but like so many of his contemporaries he holds aloof from 
formal adherence to the sect, and carefully avoids its technical 
language. Quite possibly too he incorporated in his system 
elements drawn from other philosophies. In physics he accepts 
the principle that the fiery aether is the source of all life'^^ ; it is 
identical with the divine spirit^'' and the all-informing mind*'^ 
From this standpoint he is led on to the doctrine of purgatory"^, 

* Mart. Ep. i 42. si ggg above, § 374, note 66. 

^^ ' nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis, | virtutis verae custos rigidusque 
satelles' Ep. i i, i6 and 17. 

®' See above, § 316, note 96. '^^ See above, § 90. 

■^^ ' igneus est oUis vigoi et caelestis origo | seminibus ' Aen. vi 730, 731. 

^^ ' caelum et terras | spiritus intus alit ' ib. 724, 726. 

**'■ 'totamque infusa per artus | mens agitat molem ' ib. 726, 727. 

''8 See above, §§ 295 to 297. 



390 ROMAN STOICISM 

and from that he looks forward to the time of the conflagration, 
when all creation will be reconciled by returning to its primitive 
unity in the primal fire-spirif^l Still Virgil's picture must be 
regarded rather as an adaptation than as an exposition of 
Stoicism ; it lacks the sharp outlines and the didactic tone of 
the poetry of Cleanthes or Lucretius, and other interpretations 
are by no means excluded. 

434. With the problem of the government of the universe 
Virgil's Virgil's mind is occupied throughout the Aeneid. 

theology. f^g jg constantly weighing the relative importance 
of the three forces, fate, the gods, and fortune, precisely as the 
philosophers do. To each of the three he assigns a part in the 
affairs of men ; but that taken by fate is unmistakably predomi- 
nant. The individual gods have very little importance in the 
poem ; they are to a large extent allegorical figures, representing 
human instincts and passions ; they cannot divert destiny from 
its path, though with their utmost effort they may slightly delay 
its work or change its incidence. Above all these little gods 
Jove towers aloft, a power magnificent and munificent ; at his 
voice the gods shudder and the worlds obey. But the power 
of Jove rests upon his complete acceptance of the irrevocable 
decrees of fate'^°. The critic may even describe him as a puppet- 
king, who wears an outward semblance of royalty, but is really 
obedient to an incessant interference from a higher authority. 
Virgil however appears truly to hold the Stoic principle that 
Fate and Jove are one ; he thus takes us at once to the final 
problem of philosophy, the reconciliation of the conceptions of 
Law formed on the one hand by observing facts (the modern 
' Laws of Nature ') and on the other hand by recognising the 
moral instinct (the modern ' Moral Law '). As we have seen, a 
reconciliation of these two by logic is intrinsically impossible. 
Virgil however shows us how they may be in practice reconciled 
by a certain attitude of mind ; and because that attitude is one 
of resignation to and cooperation with the supreme power, it 

'''* ' donee longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe, | concretam exemit labem, purumque 
reliquit | aetherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem ' Aen. vi 745 to 747. 
^** 'desine fata deum flecti sperare precando' ih. 376. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 39 1 

would seem right to place Virgil by the side of Cleanthes as one 
of the religious poets of Stoicism. 

435. Virgil's conception of ethics is displayed in the character 
virgirs of Aeneas. Much modern criticism revolts against 
ethics. ^Y^Q character of Aeneas exactly as it does against 

that of Cato, and for the same reason, that it is without sympathy 
for Stoic ethics. To understand Aeneas we must first picture a 
man whose whole soul is filled by a reverent regard for destiny 
and submission to Jove, who represents destiny on its personal 
side. He can therefore never play the part of the hero in revolt ; 
but at the same time he is human, and liable to those petty 
weaknesses and aberrations from which even the sage is not 
exempt. He can hesitate or be hasty, can love or weep ; but 
the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. In a happy phrase 
Virgil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism : 

'Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down, but in vain".' 

In contrast to Aeneas stands Dido, intensely human and 
passionate, and in full rebellion against her destiny. She is to 
him Eve the temptress, Cleopatra the seducer; but she is not 
destined to win a final triumph. A modern romance would 
doubtless have a different ending. 

436. Amongst writers who adopted much of the formal 

teaching of Stoicism without imbibing its spirit 
we may reckon OviD (43 B.C.- 18 A.D.). Not only 
does he accept the central idea of Stoicism, that it is the divine 
fire by virtue of which every man lives and moves'", but he opens 
his greatest work by a description of the creation '^•^ which appears 
to follow Stoic lines, and in which the erect figure of man is 
specially recognised as the proof of the pre-eminence which 
Providence has assigned to him over all the other works of the 
Creator'^''. But the tales related in the Metamorphoses show no 

^^ ' mens immota manet ; lacrimae volvuntur inanes ' Aen. iv 449 ; the ' lacrimae 
inanes ' indicate the ruffling of the soul, in which the intelligence and will take no 
part. 

''^ ' est deus in nobis : agitante calescimus illo ' Ov. F. vi 5. 

'2 'ante mare et terras, etquod tegit omnia caelum, | unus erattoto Naturae vultus 
in orbe, | quem dixere Chaos, etc' Met. i 5 to 88. 

^* ' OS homini sublime dedit, caelumque tueri | iussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere 
vultus' ib. 8s and 86. 



392 ROMAN STOICISM 

trace of the serious religious purpose of Virgil ; and the society 
pictured in Ovid's love poems gives only a caricature of the 
Stoic doctrines of the community of women, the absence of 
jealousy, and outspokenness of speech. Finally the plaintive 
tone of the Tristia shows how little Ovid was in touch with 
Stoic self-control amidst the buffetings of fortune. 

437. In the time of the next princeps we first find 
cremutius Stoicism associated with an unsympathetic atti- 
cordus. tude towards the imperial government. There was 

nothing in Stoic principles to suggest this opposition. Tiberius 
himself had listened to the teaching of the Stoic Nestor, and the 
simplicity of his personal life and the gravity of his manners 
might well have won him the support of sincere philosophers. 
But if Stoicism did not create the spirit of opposition, it con- 
firmed it where it already existed. The memory of Cato 
associated Stoic doctrines with republican views : vague ideali- 
sations of Brutus and Cassius suggested the glorification of 
tyrannicide. Cremutius Cordus (ob. A.D. 25) had offended 
Seianus by a sarcastic remark : for when Tiberius repaired the 
theatre of Pompey, and the senate voted that a statue of Seianus 
should be erected there, Cordus said that this meant really 
spoiling the theatre'^'. Seianus then dropped a hint to his client 
Satrius, who accused Cordus before the senate of writing a 
history in which he highly praised Brutus, and declared Cassius 
to have been ' the last of the Romans.' A word of apology 
would have saved the life of Cordus ; he resolved to die by his 
own acf^", to the great annoyance of his prosecutors". From 
this time on suicide became an object of political ambition. The 
Stoic tradition continued in the family of Cordus, and to his 
daughter Marcia, as a fellow-member of the sect, Seneca ad- 
dressed the well-known Consolatio''^\ but the title of 'old Romans' 

^" ' exclamavit Cordus tunc vere theatrum perire ' Sen. Dial, vi 11, 4. 

^^ Tac. Ann. iv 34. Tacitus entirely ignores the personal motives underlying the 
story, and quite unnecessarily suggests that Tiberius was adopting the policy of re- 
pressing freedom of historical narration. 

'''' ' accusatores queruntur mori Cordum ' Sen. Dial, vi 22, 7. 

'■^ That Cremutius Cordus was a professed Stoic seems a fair inference from the 
story as a whole, and yet, as in several similar cases, is not expressly stated. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 393 

describes far better the true leanings of the men of whom Cordus 
was the forerunner. 

438. In the reign of Gaius (Caligula) we first find philoso- 
Kanus phers as such exposed to persecution ; and we may 
luhus. infer that, like the Jews, they resisted tacitly or 

openly the claim of the emperor to be worshipped as a god. 
lULluS Graecinus, according to Seneca, was put to death for 
no other reason than that he was a better man than a tyrant 
liked to see alive'^^. Kanus Iulius reproved the emperor to 
his face, and heard with calmness his own doom pronounced. 
During the ten days still left to him he went quietly on with his 
daily occupations ; he was engaged in a game of chess when the 
centurion summoned him. 'After my death,' he said to his 
opponent, 'do not boast that you won the game.' His philosopher 
accompanied him, and inquired how his thoughts were occupied. 
' I propose,' said Kanus, ' to observe whether at the last moment 
the soul is conscious of its departure. Afterwards, if I discover 
what the condition of departed souls is, I will come back and 
inform my friends*".' 

439. In the reign of Claudius we find Stoics engaged in 
Arria the actual conspiracy against the emperor. The name 
^'*^"- of Paetus Caecina introduces us to a famous 

Stoic family, for his wife was Arria the elder. Pliny tells us, 
on the authority of her granddaughter Fannia, how when her 
husband and son both fell sick together, and the latter died, she 
carried out the whole funeral without her husband's knowledge ; 
and each time that she entered his sick chamber, assumed a 
cheerful smile and assured him that the boy was much better. 
Whenever her grief became too strong, she would leave the 
room for a few minutes to weep, and return once more calm. 
When Scribonianus in Illyria rebelled against Claudius, Paetus 
took his side ; upon his fall he was brought a prisoner to Rome. 
Arria was not allowed to accompany him, but she followed him 
in a fishing boat. She encouraged him to face death by piercing 

''^ ' quem [Graecinum lulium] C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat 
quam esse quemquam tyranno expedit' Sen. Ben. ii 21, 5. 
^ Dial, ix 14, 4-10. 



394 ROMAN STOICISM 

her own breast with a dagger, declaring ' it doesn't hurt*\' and 
upon his death she determined not to survive him. Thrasea, 
her son-in-law, tried to dissuade her. ' If I were condemned, 
would you,' said he, ' wish your daughter to die with me } ' 
' Yes,' said Arria, ' if she had lived with you as long and as 
happily as I with Paetus.' Here we have a deliberate justification 
of the Hindu practice of the Satl. 

440. In the reign of Nero the Stoics are still more promi- 
nent, and almost always in opposition. Seneca, of 
course, the emperor's tutor and minister, is on the 
government side ; and from his life we can draw the truest 
picture of the imperial civil servant in high office. We shall 
certainly not expect to find that Seneca illustrated in his own 
hfe all the virtues that he preached ; on the other hand we shall 
not readily believe that the ardent disciple of Attains*- and 
affectionate husband of Paulina was a man of dissolute life or of 
avaricious passions. Simple tastes, an endless capacity for hard 
work, and scrupulous honesty were the ordinary marks of the 
Roman official in those days, as they are of members of the 
Civil Service of India to-day*l Seneca, is often accused of 
having been too supple as a rninister ; but he was carrying out 
the principles of his sect better by taking an active part in 
politics than if he had, like many others, held sullenly aloof^^ 
He did not indeed imitate Cato or Rutilius Rufus, who had 
carried firmness of principle to an extent that laid them open 
to the charge of obstinacy ; but in submitting frankly to power 
greater than his own he still saw to it that his own influence 
should count towards the better side. For the story of his 
political career we cannot do better than to refer to the latest 

^^ ' casta suo gladium cum traderet Arria Paeto, ] quern de visceribus traxerat ipsa 
suis, I "si qua fides, vulnus quod feci non dolet," inquit, | "sed quod tufacies, hoc mihi, 
Paete, dolet"' Martial^/. ii4; 'praeclarum illud eiusdem, ferrum stringere, perfo- 
dere pectus, extrahere pugionem, ponigere marito, addere vocem immortalem et 
paeiie divinam "Paete, non dolet " ' Pliny £p. iii i6, 6. 

^^ See above, § 126. 

** ' non derunt et frugalitatis exactae homines et laboriosae operae ' Sen. Dial, x 
18, 4. For the British official the authority of the author of Tales froifi the Hills will 
suffice. - 

^■* See below, § 448, note 115. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 395 

historian of his times®' ; of his work as a philosopher, to which 
he himself attributed the greater importance, a general account 
has been given above®'' and more particular discussions form the 
central theme of this book. 

441. From Seneca we pass naturally to some mention of 
Persius and the pocts Pcrsius and Lucan. A. Persius Flaccus 
Lucan. (34-62 A.D.) became at 16 years of age the pupil 

and companion of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus : he was also 
a relative of the Arriae already mentioned. He gives us a 
charming picture of his teacher's ways of life, which were 
doubtless typical®^ : and his summary view of the scope of 
philosophy well indicates how its proportions had shrunk at 
this period. Dialectic is not mentioned, and physics has 
interest only in its bearing upon the position and duty of 
the individual. 

'Go, study, hapless folk, and learn to know 
The end and object of our life — what are we ; 
The purpose of our being here ; the rank 
Assigned us at the start, and where and when 
The turn is smoothest round the perilous post ; 
The bounds of wealth ; life's lawful aims ; the use 
Of hoards of coin new-minted ; what the claims 
Of fatherland and kinsfolk near and dear ; 
The will of God concerning thee, and where 
Thou standest in the commonwealth of man®^.' 

His contemporary M. Annaeus Lucanus (39-65 A.D.), a 
nephew of Seneca, plunged more deeply both into philosophy 
and into politics. In both he displayed ardour insufficiently 
tempered with discretion ; he had a far keener sense of his 
personal grievances than became a Stoic, and was much more of 
a critic than of a reformer. Yet hardly any writer expresses 
more forcibly the characteristic doctrines of Stoicism, as they 
seized the imagination of young Romans of the upper classes. 



Henderson's 7V"i?r^, pp. 31-38, 50-142, 257-288. 

See above, §§ 127-129. 

See above, § 125. 

Persius Sat. iii 66-72. The translations in this section are by Mr W. H, Porter. 



396 ROMAN STOICISM 

Amongst such doctrines that of the conflagration was clearly 
prominent. 

'So when this frame of things has been dissolved, 
And the world's many ages have received 
Their consummation in one final hour, 
Chaos recalled shall gain his utmost seat, 
The constellations in confusion dire 
Hurled each on each together clash; the stars 
Flaming shall fall into the deep ; the earth 
No longer shall extend her barrier shores, 
And fling the waters from her ; and the Moon 
Shall meet the Sun in fratricidal war*^.' 

'One pyre awaits the Universe; in ruin 
'Twill mix with bones of men the heavenly spheres'^".' 

Lucan emphasizes the pantheistic interpretation of the divine 
nature ; 

'God is all eye can see or heart can feeP^' 

'The powers of heaven are round about us all ; 
And though from out the temple come no voice, 
Nought can we do without the will of God^^.' 

To the idealized Cato he addresses the noblest praises ; 

'For sure a consecrated life is thine. 
The laws of heaven thy pattern, God thy guide^^.' 

'See the true Father of his country, worth 
The homage of thine altars, Rome ; for they 
Who swear by him shall never be ashamed. 
If e'er the yoke is lifted from thy neck, 
Now or hereafter he shall be thy God^**.' 

442. The careers of Seneca and Musonius, and the early 
„. ., years of Lucan himself, indicate sufificienth^ that 

Civil service -' ' ^ _ 

and 'old there was no essential opposition between Stoic 

Romans.' . , , -r, • • • i 

principles and the Roman prmcipate ; in other 
words, that Stoics as such were not ' republicans.' Rather the 
contrary; for nearly all the Greek philosophers had been inclined 

89 Phars. i 72 to 80. y** ib. vii 814 and 815. 

9^ See above, § 242, note 9. ^^ Phars. ix 573 and 574. 

"3 ib. 556 and 557. 

9'* ib. 601 to 604. The force of this tribute is impaired by the similar praise given 
to Pompey [Phars. vii 682-689) and to Brutus [ib. 588 and 589). 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 397 

to favour monarchy, and the Stoics had been conspicuous in the 
desire to abolish the distinctions of birth and class upon which 
the Roman aristocracy laid so much stress, and which the princi- 
pate was disposed to ignore. But in fact Stoicism was the : 
common mould in which the educated youth of Rome were 
shaped at this period ; it produced honest, diligent, and simple- 
minded men, exactly suited to be instruments of the great 
imperial bureaucracy. Large numbers entered the service of 
the state, and were heard of no more ; such an one (except for 
Seneca's incidental account of him) was C. LUCILIUS, Seneca's 
correspondent. The great work of Roman government was 
carried on in silence, just as that of India in the present day. 
This silence was probably on the whole beneficial to society, 
though it was often felt as a constraint by the individual. For 
this reason and many others there were at Rome (as everywhere 
and at all times) many able but disappointed men; they became 
the critics of the government, and from being critics they might 
at any time become conspirators ; but at no period did they 
seriously aim at restoring the republican system. Their political 
creed was limited, and did not look beyond the interests of the 
class from which they sprang. They claimed for members of 
the senate at Rome their ancient personal privileges, and 
especially that of libertas, that is, freedom to criticize and even 
to insult the members of the government ; they sang the praises 
of Cato, celebrated the birthdays of Brutus and Cassius^^, and 
practised a kind of ' passive resistance ' based on Oriental 
methods, by quitting life without hesitation when they were 
baulked in their immediate wishes by the government. When 
the administration was carried on decently these men were 
ridiculous ; when from time to time it became a scandal they 
were heroes. 

443. The early years of Nero's reign show us plainly that] 
Republican ^^ ^'"'^^ Spirit of Stoicism was far more developed j 
prejudices. qj^ j-^g si(jg of ^^g government than on that of the ' 
aristocracy. Nothing distinguishes Seneca more honourably 
than his humane attitude towards the slave population ; and he 

9^ ' quale coronati Thrasea Helvidiusque bibebant | Brutorum et Cassi natalibus ' 
Juv. Sat. V 36 and 37. See also G. Boissier, L' Opposition sous les Cesar s. 



398 ROMAN STOICISM 

was chief minister of the princeps when in the year a.d. 6i a 
' notable case'-"" ' arose, in which the human rights of slaves were 
involved. The city prefect, Pedanius Secundus, was killed by 
one of his slaves. It was contended in the senate that by ancient 
custom the whole household, old and young, guilty and innocent, 
must be put to death alike ; and this view prevailed and was 
carried into effect. Public opinion, according to Tacitus"^, was 
unanimous against such severity; it looked, not unreasonably, to 
the emperor and his minister to prevent it''^**. They on the con- 
trary left the decision to the free judgment of the senate. 
Where now were the men of philosophic principle, of world-wide 
sympathies, of outspoken utterance ? The historian tells us that 
not one was found in the senate. The honourable men who could 
defy an emperor's death-sentence still lacked the courage to speak 
out against the prejudices of their own class; many indeed uttered 
exclamations, expressing pity for the women, the young, and the 
indubitably innocent, and even voted against the executions ; 
but even in so simple a matter there was not a man to follow 
the lead of Catiline in Cicero's days, and take up as his own the 
cause of the oppressed. The leader of the merciless majority 
was C. Cassius Longinus, a celebrated jurist, and one who 
regularly celebrated the honours of Cassius the conspirator. 

444. But although the administration of which Nero was 
Nero and the ^^^ head was largely manned by professed Stoics, 
stoics. and stood as a whole for the better sympathies of 

the Roman people, the course of court intrigue brought about a 
fierce conflict between the government and a growing force of 
public opinion of which the ' old Roman ' group of Stoics were 
sometimes the spokesmen, and at other times the silent repre- 
sentatives. To Nero the consideration of his own safety was 
predominant over every consideration of justice to individuals/"' 
and herein he stood condemned (and knew that it was so) by 
the judgment of all men of philosophic temper. The first of his 

'^^ Henderson's Nero, pp. 90 sqq. ^^ Atmals xiv 42, 2. 

^''^ The government had in fact appointed an officer for the prevention of cruelty to 
slaves : ' de iniuriis dominorurn in servos qui audiat positus est, qui et saevitiam et 
libidinem et in praebendis ad victum necessariis avaritiam compescat ' Sen. Ben. iii 
22, 3- 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 399 

victims, and perhaps the most deserving of our admiration, was 
RUBELLIUS PlautuS,, accused b}- Tigeliinus because he main- 
tained the irritating cult of the 'tyrannicides,' and had joined the 
disloyal sect of the Stoics^*. The charge of disloyalty against 
himself and his companions he disproved ; for, advised by his 
Stoic teachers Coeranus and ]\Iusonius, he declined to take part 
in a rising which might have been successful, and calmly awaited 
his fate (60 A.D.). In the conspiracy of Piso, which broke out a 
few years later, Plautus Lateranus is named by the historian 
as one of the few whose motives were honourable and whose 
conduct was consistently courageous ■'^. The later years of Xero's 
reign are illuminated in the pages of Tacitus by the iirmness of 
men like Thrasea Paetus, Paconius Agrippinus, and Barea 
Soranus, and the heroic devotion of women like the younger 
Arria, Thrasea's wife, and Servilia, the daughter of Soranus"". 
In the persecution of this group the modern historian finds ex- 
tenuating circumstances, but at Rome itself it appeared as though 
the emperor were engaged in the attempt to extirpate virtue 
itselP". 

445. Upon the fall of Nero the ' old Romans ' came for a 

Heividius short time into power under the principate of Galba, 

Priscus. ^i-k;! amongst others Helvidius PriSCUS, Thrasea's 

son-in-law, returned from exile. From the account of Tacitus 

he appears to have been a very sincere adherent of the Stoic 

school. 

' He was not like others who adopt the name of philosopher in order to 
cloak an idle disposition. He followed those teachers who maintain that 
only the honourable is good, and only the base is e\al ; power, nobility, and 
other things external to the soul being neither good nor evil. He designed 
so to fortifv' himself thereby against the blows of fortune that he could plav 
his part in public affairs without flinching^"-.' 

His first act on returning to Rome was to commence a 
prosecution of the accuser of Thrasea. The senate was divided 
in opinion as to the wisdom of this step, and when Helvidius 

^' Tac. A/m. xiv 57. ^^ See Henderson's iVero, pp. 257-283. 

^*'*' Tac. Ann. xvi 21-35. 

101 ' N'ero \-irtutem ipsam exscindere concupi\4t " 76. 21. 

"•- msi. iv 5. 



400 ROMAN STOICISM 

abandoned the suit some praised his charity, whilst others 
lamented his indecision^"''. He resumed his attempt, as we shall 
see, at a later time. 

446. Vespasian was undoubtedly tolerant in his views : his 

reign began with the restitution of honours to the 
deceased Galba, and the much-respected Musonius'"^ 
seized the opportunity to attack in the senate P. Egnatius Celer, 
whose treachery had brought about the fall of Soranus^''^ for 
false evidence. The trial was postponed, but resulted a little 
later in the condemnation of Celer^'"'. Public opinion took the 
side of Musonius : but the accused found a champion in 
Demetrius the Cynic philosopher, and at least defended himself 
with the ability and courage of his sect. Thereupon Helvidius 
resumed his prosecution of the accuser of Thrasea ; but the 
emperor, now anxious to let bygones be bygones, refused to 
approve^"''. This second failure appears to have embittered 
Helvidius : his opposition to Vespasian became open and insult- 
ing, and brought about his death i"^. The life of his wife Fannia 
was worthy of the two Arriae, her grandmother and her mother. 
Twice she followed her husband into exile ; a third time she 
brought this punishment upon herself, by encouraging his friend 
Senecio to publish his biography, supplying him with the 
materials, and openly justifying her action. In her private life 
she had singular charm and affability ; and her death appeared 
to Pliny to close an era of noble women ^''^. 

447. It seems probable that the Stoic nobles found the low 

birth of Vespasian as intolerable as the tyranny of 

Renewal of i , . . , 

the Stoic JNero; at any rate they soon resumed their attitude 

opposi ion. ^^ opposition to the government, and the punish- 
ment of Helvidius, if intended as a warning, proved rather a 
provocation. It appears that he and the ' old Romans 'began 
a systematic propaganda in favour of what they called 
' democracy™,' that is, the government of the Roman empire 

^"^ Tac. I/zsi. iv 6. ^"'^ See above, §§ 130, 131. ^"^ See above, § 444. 

108 Tac. Bts(. iv 40. i"'' id. 43 and 44. 

i*>8 Dill, Roman Society, p. 152. i"^ Pliny Ep. vii 19, 7. 

110 Tcp o'xXy irpocriKeiTo, jSactXet'as re del KaT7]y6p€i, /cat SrifioKpariav iwjjvei Dion 
Cassius Ixvi 12. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 4OI 

by the senatorial class ; and they probably involved many 
professed philosophers in this impracticable and reactionary 
movement. Vespasian resolved on expelling all the philosophers 
from Rome. From this general sentence the best known of all, 
Musonius, was excepted "\ and we must infer that he had shown 
the good sense to keep himself free from political entanglements. 
In spite of this act of Vespasian, Stoicism continued to gain 
, 'ground, and during the greater part of the period of the Flavian 
dynasty met with little interference. 

448. But towards the end of the reign of Domitian a more 
Persecution Violent persecution broke out. ArulenusRusticus 
by Domitian. j^^d been tribune of the plebs in 66 A.D., and had 
then proposed to use his veto in an attempt to save the life of 
Thrasea Paetus"^. In 69 A.D. he was praetor, and as such headed 
an embassy sent by the senate to the soldiers under Petilius 
Cerealis. On this occasion he was roughly handled and wounded^ 
and barely escaped with his life"^. After many years of quiet, 
he was accused in 93 A.D., when Pliny was praetor, of having 
written and spoken in honour of Thrasea Paetus, Herennius 
Senecio, and Helvidius Priscus; he was condemned to death and 
his books were destroyed"*. Senecio was condemned at the 
same time for having written the biography of Helvidius Priscus, 
and for the further offence that since holding the quaestorship he 
had not become a candidate for any higher office "I About the 
same time were banished Artemidorus, the most single-minded 
and laborious of philosophers, whom Musonius had selected out 
of a crowd of competitors as the fittest to claim his daughter in 
marriage"*'; Junius Mauricus, brother of Arulenus Rusticus, who 
had joined Musonius in the attempt to secure the punishment of 
the delatores of Nero's time"''; Demetrius, and Epictetus"^; and 
further many distinguished ladies, including Arria and her 
daughter Fannia"''. But from the time of the death of Domitian 

^^^ Dion Cassius Ixvi 13. "^ See above, § 444. 

"^ Tac. Hist, iii 80. ^^* Agr. 2; Suetonius, Doni. 10. 

"^ Dion C. Ixvii 13, Tac. Agr. 45. "® Pliny Ep. iii 11, 7. 

^^^ Tac. Hist, iv 40. 

"8 A. Gellius iV. y^. XV II, 5 (for Epictetus). 

"^ Pliny ^/. iii 11, 3; 'tot nobilissimarum feminarum exilia etfugas' Tac. Agr. 45. 

A. 26 



402 ROMAN STOICISM 

in A.D, 96 the imperial government became finally reconciled 
with Stoicism, which was now the recognised creed of the great 
\majority of the educated classes at Rome, of all ages and ranks. 
As such it appears in the writings of J u VENAL, who not only 
introduces into serious literature the Stoic principle of ' straight 
speaking,' but actually expounds much of the ethical teaching 
of Stoicism with more directness and force than any professed 
adherent of the system. 

449. Stoicism, received into favour in the second century 
Stoic reform ^•^■, won ncw Opportunities and was exposed to 
of law. YiQ^y clangers. Its greatest achievement lay in the 

development of Roman law. As we have just seen^"", the 'old 
Romans ' of Nero's day, in spite of their profession of Stoicism, 
were unbending upholders of the old law, with all its harshness 
f and narrowness; and we have to go back a hundred years to the 
great lawyers of the times of Sulla and Cicero ^^^ to meet with 
men prepared to throw aside old traditions and build anew on 
the foundations of natural justice. But the larger view had not 
been lost sight of It remained as the ideal of the more generous- 
minded members of the imperial civil service ; and in the times 
] of the emperors Antoninus Pius (i 38-161 A.D.) and Marcus 
I Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) it became the starting-point for a new 
i development of Roman law, which is one of the great achieve- 
ments of Roman history. The most eloquent of the historians 
of the origins of Christianity thus describes this movement. 

' Le stoicisme avait [deja] pdnetre le droit romain de ses larges maximes, 
et en avait fait le droit natural, le droit philosophique, tel que la raison peut 
le concevoir pour tous les hommes. Le droit strict cede a I'equitd ; la 
douceur I'emporte sur la severite ; la justice parait inseparable de la bien- 
faisance. Les grands jurisconsultes d'Antonin continuerent la meme oeuvre. 
Le dernier [Volusius Moecianus] fut le maitre de Marc-Aurele en fait de 
jurisprudence, et, a vrai dire, I'oeuvre des deux saints empereurs ne saurait 
etre separ^e. C'est d'eux que datent la plupart de ces lois humaines et 
sensdes qui flechirent la rigueur du droit antique et firent, d'une legislation 
primitivement etroite et implacable, un code susceptible d'etre adopts par 
tous les peuples civilisds^''^^.' 

1-" See above, § 443. 

^^1 See above, §§ 428, 429. 

1^'^ Renan, Marc-AttrHe, pp. 22, 23; cf. Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 55, 56. ^N-, 



- 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 403 

In the legislation of Antoninus and Aurelius the humane and 
cosmopolitan principles of Stoic politics at last triumph over 
Roman conservatism. The poor, the sick, the infant, and the 
famine-stricken are protected. The slave is treated as a human 
being ; to kill him becomes a crime, to injure him a misdemean 
our ; his family and his property are protected by the tribunals. 
Slavery in fact is treated as a violation of the rights of nature ; 
manumission is in every way encouraged. The time is within 
sight when Ulpian will declare that ' all men, according to natural 
right, are born free and equal ^^^' This legislation is not entirely U 
the work of professed Stoics ; it is nevertheless the offspring of \ 
Stoicism. 

450. There was in the second century, as there is still, a 
o „ sharp antagonism between the manners of culti- 

Repression r o 

of zeal. vated society and the ardent profession of intellectual 

convictions. An anecdote related by Gellius well illustrates the 
social forces which were now constantly at work to check super- 
fluous enthusiasm. 

' There was with us at table a young student of philosophy who called 
himself a Stoic, but chiefly distinguished himself by an unwelcome loquacity. 
He was always bringing up in season and out of season recondite philosophical 
doctrines, and he looked upon all his neighbours as boors because they were 
unacquainted with them. His whole talk was strewn with mention of syllo- 
gisms, fallacies, and the like, such as the "master-argument," the "iquiescent," 
and the " heap " ; and he thought that he was the only man in the world who 
could solve them. Further he maintained that he had thoroughly studied 
the nature of the soul, the growth of virtue, the science of daily duties, and 
the cure of the weaknesses and diseases of the mind. -Finally he considered 
he had attained to that state of perfect happiness which could be clouded by 
no disappointment, shaken by no pains of death i^'*.' 

Such a man, we may think, might soon have become an 
apostle of sincere Stoicism, and might have left us a clear and 
systematic exposition of Stoic doctrine as refined by five 
centuries of experience. It was not to be. The polished Herodes 
Atticus crushed him with a quotation from the discourses of 
Epictetus. Not many offended in the same way. Even Seneca 

1"^ Renan, Marc-Aurele, p. 30. 
12^ Aulus Gellius N. A.'i 2, 3 to 5. 

26 — 2 



404 ROMAN STOICISM 

had been severe on useless study in the regions of history and 
antiquity^'--'; the new philosophers despised the study even of 
philosophy. 

451. The Stoicism of the second century is therefore much 
less sharply defined than that of earlier times. Its 

State estab- . . 

lishment of doctrincs, acquired in childhood, are accepted with 

philosophy. . 

ready acquiescence ; but they are not accompanied 
by any firm repudiation of the opposing views of other schools. 
Once more, as in the time of Augustus, the 'philosopher' comes 
to the front; the particular colour of his philosophy seems of 
less importance^-®. It is philosophy in general which wins the 
patronage of the emperors. Nerva allowed the schools of the 
philosophers to be re-opened ; Trajan interested himself in them 
as providing a useful training for the young. Hadrian went 
further, and endowed the teachers of philosophy at Rome • 
Antoninus Pius did the same throughout the provinces. Marcus 
Aurelius established representatives of each of the philosophic 
schools at Athens ; and amongst later emperors Septimius 
Severus, aided by his wife Julia Domna, was conspicuous in the 
same direction. The philosophers, who had firmly resisted 
persecution, gradually sacrificed their independence under the 
influence of imperial favour. They still recited the dogmas 
of their respective founders, but unconsciously they became the 
partisans of the established forms of government and religion. 
Yet so gentle was the decay of philosophy that it might be 
regarded as progress if its true position were not illuminated by 
the attitude of Marcus Aurelius towards the Christians. For 
Marcus Aurelius was universally accepted as the most admirable 
practical representative of philosophy in its full ripeness, and no 
word of criticism of his policy was uttered by any teacher of 
Stoicism. 

^-^ 'nam de illis nemo dubitabit, quin operose nihil agant, qui litterarum inutilium 
studiis detinentur, quae iam apud Romanes quoque magna manus est...ecce Romanos 
quoque invasit inane studium supervacua discendi,' etc. Sen. Dial, x 13, i and 3. The 
condemnation extends to the whole study of history, N. Q. iii Pr. 

^^^ ' In the purely moral sphere to which philosophy was now confined, the natural 
tendency of the different schools, not even excluding the Epicurean, was to assimila- 
tion and eclecticism ' Dill, Roman Society, p. 343. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 405 

452. The decay of precise philosophic thought was accom- 
The a an panicd by a strong revival of pagan religious 
revival. sentiment. The atmosphere in which Marcus 

Aurelius grew up, and by which his political actions were 
determined far more than by his philosophic profession, is thus 
sympathetically described by the latest editor of his Reflections. 

' In house and town, the ancestral Penates of the hearth and the Lares of 
the streets guarded the intercourse of hfe ; in the individual breast, a minis- 
tering Genius shaped his destinies and responded to each mood of melancholy 
or of mirth. Thus all life lay under the regimen of spiritual powers, to be 
propitiated or appeased by appointed observances and ritual and forms of 
prayer. To this punctilious and devout form of Paganism Marcus was 
inured from childhood ; at the vintage festival he took his part in chant and 
sacrifice ; at eight years old he was admitted to the Salian priesthood ; " he 
was observed to perform all his sacerdotal functions with a constancy and 
exactness unusual at that age ; was soon a master of the sacred music ; and 
had all the forms and liturgies by heart." Our earliest statue depicts him as 
a youth offering incense ; and in his triumphal bas-reliefs he stands before the 
altar, a robed and sacrificing priest. To him " prayer and sacrifice, and all 
observances by which we own the presence and nearness of the gods," are 
"covenants and sacred ministries" admitting to "intimate communion with 
the divinei2r.'" 

The cult thus summarized is not that of the Greek mythology, 
much less that of the rationalized Stoic theology. It is the" 
primitive ritualism of Italy, still dear to the hearts of the 
common people, and regaining its hold on the educated in 
proportion as they spared themselves the effort of individual 
criticism. 

453. It was by no mere accident that Marcus Aurelius 
State perse- became the persecutor of the Christians, He was 
cution. at heart no successor of the Zeno who held as 

essential the doctrine of a supreme deity, and absolutely rejected 
the use of temples and images. In the interval, official Stoicism \ 
had learnt first to tolerate superstition with a smile, next to 
become its advocate ; now it was to become a persecutor in its 
name. Pontius Pilatus is said to have recognised the innocence 

^^ Rendall, M. Aurelius to himself, Introd. pp. cxxvii, cxxviii. 



406 ROMAN STOICISM 

of the founder of Christianity, and might have protected him 
had his instructions from Rome allowed him to stretch his 
authority so far ; Gallio^-^ was uninterested in the preaching of 
Paul ; but Aurelius was acquainted with the Christian profession 
and its adherents^-^, and opposed it as an obstinate resistance to 
authority"". The popular antipathy to the new religion, and 
the official distaste for all disturbing novelties, found in him a 
willing supporter^*^ Thus began a new struggle between the 
. power of the sword and that of inward conviction. Because 
reason could not support the worship of the pagan deities, 
violence must do so"^. It became a triumph of the civil 
authority and the popular will to extort a word of weakness by 
two years of persistent torture^^^ No endowed professor or 
enlightened magistrate raised his voice in protest ; and in this 
feeble acquiescence Stoicism perished. 

454. For the consciences of the young revolted. Trained at 
Revolt of the ^0^11^ ^nd in school to believe in providence, in duty, 
young stoics. ^nd in patient endurance of evil, they instinctively 
recognised the Socratic force and example not in the magistrate 
seated in his curule chair, nor in the rustic priest occupied in his 
obsolete ritual, but in the teacher on the cross and the martyr on 
the rack^^''. In ever increasing numbers men, who had from 
their Stoic education imbibed the principles of the unity of the 
Deity and the freedom of the will, came over to the new 
society which professed the one without reservation, and dis- 

128 The connexion (if any) of Gallic the proconsul of Achaia (Acts xviii 12) with the 
Junius Gallio who adopted Seneca's elder brother is uncertain. 
^29 Renan, Marc-Aurele, p. 55, note 1. 

130 M. Aurel. To himself ^\ 3. 

131 Renan M.-A. p. 329. 

132 ' quia ratione congredi non queunt, violentia premunt ; incognita causa tan- 
quam nocentissimos damnant' Lact. Inst. Epit. 47 (52), 4. 

133 ' vidi ego in Bithynia praesidem gaudio mirabiliter elatum tanquam barbarorum 
gentem aliquam 'subegisset, quod onus qui per biennium magna virtute restiterat, 
postremo cedere visus asset ' Div. inst. v ir, 15. 

134 ' nam cum videat vulgus dilacerari homines et invictam tenere patientiam, 
existimant nee perseverantiam morientium vanam esse nee ipsam patientiam sine dec 
cruciatus tantos posse superarc.dicit Horatius: " iustum ac tenacem..." quo nihil 
verius dici potest, si ad eos referatur qui nullos cruciatus nullam mortem recusant ' 
ib. 13, 1 1 to 17. 



STOICISM IN ROMAN HISTORY AND LITERATURE 407 

played the other without flinching. With them they brought in 
large measure their philosophic habits of thought, and (in far 
more particulars than is generally recognised) the definite tenets 
which the Porch had always inculcated. Stoicism began a new 
history, which is not yet ended, within the Christian church; and 
we must now attempt to give some account of this after-growth 
of the philosophy. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY. 

455. During the first century and a half of the Christian era 
M»„i,K .,..0 Stoicism maintained an active and successful pro- 

Neignbours, r 

but strangers. paganda, without becoming conscious that mean- 
while a new force was spreading in the Hellenic world which 
was soon to challenge its own supremacy. There is no evidence 
to show that any of the Stoic teachers with whom we have been 
concerned knew anything of Christianity beyond the bare name, 
until the two systems came into conflict in the time of Marcus 
Aurelius ; and it is in the highest degree improbable that any of 
them were influenced in their opinions, directly or indirectly, by 
the preaching of Christianity^ On the other hand the apostles 

1 of the newer faith, as often as they entered any of the chief 

I cities of the Roman empire, met at once not only with the 
professed adherents of Stoicism, but also with a still wider world 
of educated men and women which was penetrated by Stoic 

\ conceptions. From the first it was incumbent on Christian 
teachers to define their attitude towards this philosophy ; and it 
is our purpose in this chapter to sketch shortly the manner in 
which they did so. This task belongs primarily to the historian 
of Christianity, but the present work would be incomplete with- 
out some adumbration of this important field of study. From 

' the middle of the second century the relations between the two 

i 

I systems alter in character : there then sets in a steady stream 
of conversion by which the younger Stoics are drawn away 
from the older creed, and carry over to its rival not only their 
personal allegiance but also their intellectual equipment. 

^ As to supposed instances to the contrary see Winckler, Stoicisinits, pp. 5 to 14. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IX CHRISTIANITY 409 

456. It is necessarily a difficult task to estimate the influence 

of Stoicism upon the historical development of 

Common '^ '^ 

influences. Christianity, and it is impossible to do so without 
trenching upon ground which is highly debateable. Upon 
parallels between phrases used b}' Stoic and Christian writers 
respectivel}- not too much stress should be laid-. I\Ian}- of these 
can be traced back to common sources from which each religion 
drew in turn. From Persism the Stoic creed inherited much 
through Heraclitus, and Christianity through Judaism. The 
kindred doctrines of Buddhism and Cynism present themselves 
to our view in Christianity in the Sermon on the mount, and 
in Stoicism through the discourses of Epictetus. Individuals in 
either camp were also influenced in varying degrees by a wave 
of feeling in favour of asceticism and resignation which spread 
over the whole Greco-Roman world about this time, resulting 
from exaggerated attention being paid to the individual conscious- 
ness at the cost of social and political life. We should therefore 
endeavour to keep our eyes steadily fixed on the essential 
features of Stoicism rather than on its details, and inquire how 
these were regarded b}' Christian teachers in successive genera- 
tions. 

457. A starting-point is obviously afforded us by the speech 

of St Paul upon ]\Iars' hill, in which he accepts a 

Progressive ^ 

iniiuenceof verse from the Stoic poet Aratus^ as a text upon 
which to proclaim the fatherhood of God. This 
Stoic doctrine (like many others to which he refers in his 
writings) is treated by Paul as embodying an elementar}- truth, 
and as a starting-point for fuller knowledge; from any other 
point of view philosophy is regarded as a snare and an im- 
posture^ A generation later we find that the editor of the 
fourth gospel boldly places the Stoic version of the history of 
^creation in the fore-front of his work'. Later on in the second 
century we find the doctrines of the double nature of the Christ 
and of the variet}- inherent in the Deit\- becoming incorporated 

- For material of this kind see Wiiickler's dissertation just quoted, and Lightfoot's 
Philippians, pp. 278-290. 

5 ' For we are also his oiTspring ' Acts x\-ii 28. 

^ I Cor. i 20-25. •' John i i. 



41 ROMAN STOICISM 

in technical Stoic forms as part of a defined Christian creed. 
From whatever point we regard the Stoic influence, it appears 
during this period as an increasing force. We shall speak of it 
here as the ' Stoic strain ' in Christianity ; meaning by this that 
a certain attitude of the intellect and S3mnipathies, first developed 
in Stoicism, found for itself a home in early Christianity ; that 
men, Stoics by inheritance or training, joined the church not 
simply as disciples, but to a large extent as teachers also. This 
point of view can perhaps best be explained by a sketch of the 
development of Christian doctrine as it might be regarded by 
fair-minded Stoics, attached to the principles of their philosophy 
but suspicious of its close relations with the religion of the State, 
and ready to welcome any new system which might appeal to 
their reason as well as to their moral sense. 

458. A Stoic of the time of Vespasian (a.d. 69 to 79) might 
well be supposed to be made acquainted with the 

Jesus from the '■ '■ ^ _ _ 

Stoic stand- beginnings of Christianity by some Christian friend. 
The story he would hear would take the form of 
one of those 'oral gospels' which are now generally supposed to 
have preceded the shaping of the ' gospels ' of our New Testa- 
ment, and to have corresponded generally to the common parts 
of the first three gospels and some of the narratives of the 
fourth^. He would thus learn that the founder was a Jew named 
Jesus, the son of Joseph a carpenter of Nazareth". This 
Jesus had in his childhood sat at the feet of the philosophic 
Rabbis of Jerusalem®, and had learnt from them to interpret 

'^ In the references to the New Testament books in this chapter no attempt is made 
to apply any precise critical theory of their origin or date. Since we suppose that all 
Christian doctrine was enunciated orally long before it was committed to writing, the 
date and circumstances of the written record become for the present purpose of 
secondary importance. Translations from the New Testament are, as a rule, taken 
from Dr R. F. Weymouth's A/'ew Testament in Modern Speech (London 1903). This 
admirable translation has for the present purpose the great negative advantage of 
keeping in the background the mass of associations which hinder the modern reader 
from taking the words of the writers in their simple and natural sense ; but on the 
other hand, Dr Weymouth sometimes disguises the technical terms of ancient 
philosophy so far as to make them unrecognisable. In such cases the Revised 
Version is quoted, and occasionally the Greek text. 

^ Matt, xiii 55, Luke ii 48 ; and see below, § 482. 

8 Luke ii 46, 47. Such men would of course be typical of the spirit of 'Judaism,' 
see § 22 above. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 41I • 

the documents of Hebraism, ' the law and the prophets,' in the 
sense of the world-religions, and by the principle of allegorism 
to give a new and truer meaning to such parts of them as seemed 
obsolete or incredible^ Upon reaching manhood he had been 
shocked to find that the general body of the Pharisees, to which 
his teachers belonged, was far more interested in maintaining \ 
prejudices of race and class than in boldly proclaiming principles ' 
of world-wide application ; and that whilst freely avowing their 
own opinions amongst friends, they held it indiscreet to reveal 
them to the crowd". After a period of prolonged reflection and 
inward struggle" he resolved on coming forward as a teacher in 
his own name. 

459. At this point our Stoic would assuredly be impressed 
by the ' strength and force ' of character displayed 

The wise man. . . 

in the preaching of the young Jesus, and would so 
far be disposed to rank him wath Socrates and with Zeno. In 
the content of Jesus' teaching he would at once recognise some 
of the prominent characteristics of Zeno's Republic. For Jesus 
too spoke of a model state, calling it the ' kingdom of heaven ' ; 
and in this state men of all nations were to find a place. Not 
only the ceremonies of the old Hebrew religion, its sacrifices and 
its sabbaths, were to be superseded ^^ ; the temple itself at 
Jerusalem was to cease to be a place of worship^-'; the social and 
economic system of the Jewish people was to be remodelled; the 
rich were to be swept away, and the poor to enter into their 
inheritance". Men's prayers were no longer to be offered to the 
Godrof Abraham, but to the Father in heaven, surrounded by 
spirits like those of Persism, the Name, the Will, the Kingdom, 
the Glory and the Majesty^l That Jesus also spoke, after the 
Persian fashion, of rewards for the good and the wicked in a 

^ See the treatment of the Jonah myth (Matt, xii 40 and 41), and of the prophecy 
of the return of Elijah (Matt, xvii 10 to 13). 

1* Matt, xxiii 13. 

" Matt, iv I to II ; Mark 113; Luke iv i to 14. 

^^ Matt, xii I to 13 ; Mark ii 23 to 28 ; Luke vi i to 10. 

13 John iv 21. " Matt, v 5. 

^•^ Matt, vi 9 to 13; a doxology is first found in the MS of the Teaching of the 
Apostles, and it was probably not specifically connected with the prayer originally. 



412 ROMAN STOICISM 

future existence might interest our Stoic less, but would not be 
inconsistent with the traditions of his own sect. 

460. Whilst recognising this strength of character and 
The emotions Sympathizing generally with the gospel message, 
in Jesus. QUI- Stoic could not fail to observe that the Christian 
tradition did not claim for the Founder the imperturbable calm 
which the wise man should under all circumstances possess. 
From time to time his spirit was troubled^*'; sometimes by 
Anger, as when he denounced in turn the Pharisees, the scribes, 
and the traders in the temple ; sometimes by Pity, as when he 
wept over Jerusalem; by Fear, as in the garden of Gethsemane^''; 
then again by Shame, as in the meeting with the woman taken 
in adultery 1^; and even by Hilarity, as when he participated 
in the marriage revels at Cana. Yet perhaps, taking the character 
as a whole, a Stoic would not be surprised that the disciples 
should remember only the sweetness, the patience, and the 
perseverance of their master; that they should account him a 
perfect man^", attributing his faults to the weakness of the 
body"", and not to any taint of soul; and finally that they 
should accept him as their Lord and their God-\ For all these 
points of view, without being specifically Stoic, find some kind 
of recognition within Stoicism itself 

461. But as our inquirer proceeded to trace the history of 
Mythoiogic Christianity after its Founder's death, he would soon 
Christianity. f^j^jj ^j^g beginnings of division within the Christian 
body. He would learn, for instance, that the Christians of 
Jerusalem, who even during their Master's lifetime had heen 
puzzled by his condemnation of Hebrew traditions, had quickly 
relapsed upon his death into the ways of thinking to which in 

^^ John xiii 21. ^'' Luke xxii 44. 

IS John viii 6 and 8. i" Matt, v 48 ; Luke vi 40. 

-° Matt, xxvi 41 ; Mark xiv 38. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews adopts 
the technical terms of Stoicism more completely. According to him Christ was 
touched with all the passions of weak men, but to a degree falling short of sin ; ov ykp 
^XOf^^f apxi^ep^a, fx-q Bwd/uLevov av/xTradTJa-ai. rais aadevelais 7]fiQv...x'^pis afiaprlas Heb. iv 
15. Thus the agony in the garden, though accompanied by loud cries and tears, did 
not pass the limits of the healthy affection of caution (eiM^eia), or (as we might 
say) 'anxiety ' ; id. v 7. 

21 John XX 28. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 413 

their childhood they had been accustomed. They had become 
once more Hebrews, and even ardent advocates of an obsolete 
ceremonialism ; and in this respect they seemed entirely to have 
forgotten the teaching of their Founder. But their allegiance to 
his person was unshakeable ; and they cherished the conviction 
that during the lifetime of most of them he would rejoin them, 
and establish that earthly kingdom which in their hearts they 
had never ceased to covet. In view of this imminent revolution, 
quite as much as out of respect for the teaching of the Sermon 
on the mount, they encouraged their members to spend their 
savings on immediate necessities, and soon fell into dire poverty. 
To Christianity as an intellectual system they contributed 
nothing ; 'little children' at heart ^2, they were content to live in 
a perfect affection one towards another, and their miserable 
circumstances were cheered by visions of angels and a sense of 
their master's continual presence^^ From this company our 
Stoic might easily turn aside as from a band of ignorant fanatics, 
displaying the same simplicity and conservatism as the idol- 
worshippers of Rome, with the added mischief of being disloyal 
towards the majesty of the empire, and a possible danger to its 
security ^^ 

462. In startling contrast to this band of simple-minded 
Philosophic brethren would appear the Christian propagandists 
Christians. whose temper is revealed to us in the latter part of 
the book of Acts, in the epistles of Paul, the first epistle of Peter, 
and the epistle to the Hebrews. These fiery preachers, equally 
attached to the name of their Lord, might appear to have been 
singularly indifferent to his person and his history, and even to 
have paid little heed to the details of his teaching as recorded in 
the oral gospels^-^ But they were entirely possessed by his \ 
secret — the transmutation of Hebraism into a world-religion; \ 
and they had an ardent desire to present it to the Roman world \ 
in a form that would win intellectual assent. Into this effort 

22 Mark x 15. ■ 2* Acts xii 15. 

^* This antipathy to the Roman government finds biting expression in the Apoca- 
lypse of John. 

'^^ There seems to be no definite reference even to the Lord's prayer, or to any of 
the parables, in the books named above. 



414 ROMAN STOICISM 

they threw their whole personaHty ; all the conceptions which 
filled their minds, some of them childish and common to them 
with uncivilised peoples, others derived from Jewish tradition or 
Hellenistic philosophy, were crudely but forcibly fused in the 
determination to present 'the Christ' to the world, as the solution 
of its difficulties and the centre of its hopes. The outpourings of 
these men were as unintelligible and unsympathetic to the 
fraternity at Jerusalem as they are to the average church-goer 
to-day ; only breaking out here and there into the flame of clear 
expression when at last some long-sought conception had been 
grasped"". Of such preachers St Paul is for us the type, and we 
may describe them as the ' Paulists.' Paul himself is self- 
assertive in tone, as a man may be who feels himself misunder- 
stood and misjudged in his own circle^l But an ardent Stoic 
might well have recognised in him a kindred spirit, an intellect 
grappling boldly with the supreme problems, and laying the 
foundations of a new philosophy of life. 

463. Paul was a man of Jewish descent, intensely proud of 
St Paul and ^^^ nationality ; but nevertheless brought up in the 
stoicism. cj^-y Qf Targiis^ which had for centuries been a centre 

of Hellenistic philosophy of every type^*, and more especially of 
Stoicism ^^. This philosophy is to Paul's mind entirely inadequate 
and even dangerous ; nevertheless he is [steeped in Stoic ways of 
thinking, which are continually asserting themselves in his 
teaching without being formally recognised by him as such. 
Thus the ' universe ' {Koafxo^), which to the Stoic includes every- 
thing with which he is concerned, and in particular the subject- 
matter of religion, becomes with Paul the ' world,' that out of 
which and above which the Christian rises to the ' eternal ' or 

"^ For instance, that of ' love ' in i Cor. xiii, and of ' faith ' in Hebrews xi. 

^'' For the conflict between St Paul and the church at Jerusalem, see below, § 480 ; 
for his tone towards those who differed from him, see Galatians i 8 and 9 ; Col. ii 4 ; 
I Tim. i 20, vi 3 to 5 ; Titus i ro. A gentle expostulation as to this style of controversy 
is found in the epistle of James, see note 39. 

^^ ' With such zeal do the inhabitants [of Tarsus] study philosophy and literature, 
that they surpass Athens, Alexandria, and all other schools of learning.... Rome knows , 
well how many men of letters issue from this city, for her streets swarm with them 
Strabo xiv p. 673. 

2* Juv. Sat. iii 117 and 118 ; and see above, § 25, note 65. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 415 

spiritual life,' Yet this contrast is not final""; and whether or 
not the Pauline 'spii^it' is derived from the Stoic irvev/j^a, the 
Pauline system, as it is elaborated in detail, increasingly accom- 
modates itself to that of the Stoics. Our supposed inquirer 
would examine the points both of likeness and of contrast. 

464. The teaching of Paul was, like that of the Stoics, 
The Pauiist positive and dogmatic ®\ He accepted unquestion- 
logic. ingly the evidence of the senses as trustworthy, 

without troubling himself as to the possibility of hallucinations, 
from which nevertheless his circle was not free^'l He also 
accepted the theory of ' inborn ideas,' that is, of moral principles 
engraved upon the heart^^ ; and for the faculty of the soul which 
realizes such principles he uses the special term ' conscience ' 
{crvveihr](TL<i)^ ; conscience being described, with a correct sense of 
etymology and possibly a touch of humour, as that within a man 
which becomes a second witness to what the man says^l From 
another point of view the conscience is the divine spirit at work 
in the human spirit^**. Closely associated with conscience in the 
Pauline system is ' faith ' {iriaTLs:), a faculty of the soul which pro- 
perly has to do with things not as they are, but as we mean them 
to be^''. The_Stoic logic had failed to indicate clearly how from 
the knowledge of the universe as it is men could find a basis for 

j their hopes and efforts for its future ; the missing criterion is 
supplied by the Pauiist doctrine of ' faith,' which may also be 

\paradoxically described as the power always to say ' Yes^^' The 
fraternity at Jerusalem appear to have been alarmed not so 
much at the principle of faith, as at the manner in which St Paul 
used it to enforce his own doctrines ; we find them by way of 

^^ Romans viii 20 and 21. > ^^ Romans vi 17, i Cor. i 10. 

^^ 2 Cor. xii 2 to 5. 

^ *a knowledge of the conduct which the Law requires is engraven on the 
hearts [of the Gentiles] ' Rom. ii 15. 

^ ib. ^^ 'my conscience adds its testimony to mine' Rom. ix 1. 

'^ ib. 

^' 'Faith is a well-grounded assurance of that for which we hope' Heb. xi i. 
Thus whilst sense-knowledge, and especially sight, calls for acceptance because it is 
'objective,' and detached from personal bias, faith is essentially subjective, and 
suggests a power by which (in harmony with a divine source) personality dominates 
fact. 

^ 2 Cor. i 19. 



4l6 ROMAN STOICISM 

contrast asserting the Academic position that ' none of us are 
infallible''''.' We may here notice that the next generation of 
Christians again brought the theory of faith into harmony with 
Stoic principles, by explaining that the power of knowing the 
right is strictly dependent upon right action**. 

465. In their metaphysical postulates the Paulists started, 
p^^jjjg^ like all ancient philosophers, with the contrast 

metaphysics. between soul and body, but" this they transformed 
into that between 'spirit' and 'flesh.' To them the 'spirit'', 
included the whole message of Christianity, the ' flesh ' the / 
doctrine and practice of the Gentile world^^ The terms them- 
selves were in use in the oral gospel^^, but the Paulists developed 
the content of ' spirit,' until it included a whole world of con- 
ceptions, fencircling and interfused with the world of sense- 
experience. But Paul did not desire that this spiritual world 
should be regarded as wanting in reality, or as a mere product 
of the irnagination : and to express this objectivity of spirit he 
adopted the Stoic term ' body.' Body then expresses the under- 
lying monistic principle of all nature ; and we may say ' spirit- 
body ' exists^^, with the same confidence with which we speak of 
animal body or ' flesh-body.' There has been a flesh-body of 
Jesus ; with that we have no more concern"^. There exists 
eternally a spirit-body of Christ; from that his church draws its 
life. The Christian feeds upon the spirit of his Master; but in 
paradoxical phrase we may say that he eats his body and drinks 
his blood ^. What is not 'body' has no real existence at alH®. 

^^ ' Do not be eager to become teachers ; for we often stumble and fall, all of us ' 
James iii i and 2. 

^^ ' He who does what is honest and right comes to the light ' John iii 21 ; 'if any 
one is willing to do His will, he shall know about the teaching ' ib. vii 17. 

*i ' The cravings of the [flesh] are opposed to those of the spirit, and the cravings 
of the spirit are opposed to those of the [flesh]' Gal. v 17 ; cf. Romans viii 12 and 13. 

^2 See above, § 460, note 20. 

*^ ' There are bodies which are celestial and there are bodies which are earthly ' 
I Cor. XV 40 ; ' as surely as there is an animal body, so there is also a spiritual body ' 
ib. 44. 

** 2 Cor. V 16. 

■*^ I Cor. xi 24, 25. 

^8 ' which are a shadow of the things to come, but the body is Christ's ' Col. 
ii 17 (Revised Version). 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 417 

466. St Paul in his letters appears entirely lacking in that 
The Christian fsverent feeling towards the physical universe, that 
universe. admiration for sun, moon and stars, which marked 

the earlier world-religions, and which he perhaps associated with 
Babylonian idolatry. As we have seen, he only used the Stoic 
term for universe in disapproval. And yet the conception of the 
history of the universe was deeply impressed upon the Paulists, 
and almost precisely in Stoic form. God, the Father, is the 
beginning of all things ; from him they come, and to him they 
shall all return-''. From the Father went forth an image of 
him^, his first-born Son"*^, his word, the Christ; by this he 
created the world, and for this the world exists^". By a further 
outpouring of the divine spirit, men are created with the capacity 
of becoming the ' images ' or bodily representations of God and 
his Son'\ To this general doctrine individual Paulists add 
special features; St Paul himself introduces ' woman ' as a fourth 
order of creation, an image or ' vessel ' bearing the same relation 
to man as man to Christ^^; and a writer (of distinctly later date) 
seems to refer not only to the creation of the elements^^, but also 
to their coming destruction by the conflagration^'*. Of the 
creation of the animals no notice is taken ^^ 

■*'' ' The universe (to. iravra) owes its origin to Him, was created by Him, and has 
its aim and purpose in Him ' Rom. xi 36 (Weymouth's translation) ; ' of him and 
through him and unto him are all things' id. (Revised Version) ; ' God, the Father, 
who is the source of all things ' i Cor. viii 6. See further z'd. xv 24 and 28. 

••^ ' Christ, who is the image of God ' 2 Cor. iv 4 ; ' he brightly reflects God's 
glory and is the exact representation of His being ' Hebr. i 3. 

■*8 ' Christ is the visible representation of the invisible God, the First-born and 
Lord of all creation ' Col. i 15 ; ' it is in Christ that the fulness of God's nature dwells 
embodied ' zd. ii 9. 

"" 'in him were all things created... ; all things have been created through him 
and unto him' id. i 16 (Revised Version); ' through whom [God] made the ages' 
Hebrews i 2. Compare the discussion on the four causes above, § 179, and the phrase 
of Marcus Aurelius : e'/c (tov irdvTa, els ak wdvTa, iv aoi iravra To himself, iv 23. 

^1 ' Those he has also predestined to bear the likeness of his Son ' Rom. viii 29 ; 
' a man is the image and glory of God ' i Cor. xi 7. 

^■^ ' woman is the glory of man ; woman takes her origin from man ' i Cor. xi 7 
and 8 (with special reference to Eve) ; of. i Thess. iv 4 (R.V.), i Pet. iii 7. 

^* 'there were heavens which existed of old, and an earth, the latter arising out of 
water by the [word] of God' 2 Pet. iii 5. 

^^ ' the heavens will pass away with a rushing noise, the elements be destroyed in 
the fierce heat, and the earth and all the works of man be utterly burnt up ' ib. 10. 
But compare i Cor. iii 13 to 15. 

5^ The omission is due to contempt of dumb creatures, see i Cor. ix 9. 
A. 27 



4l8 ROMAM STOICISM 

467. From this theory of creation it would seem to follow 

The divine as a coiisequence that the world is inhabited by 

immanence. ^^^ Deity, and is essentially good. This is the 

Stoic doctrine, and it is accepted boldly by Paul. God dwells 

in the universe, and the universe in him ; man is not in the strict 

sense an individual, for apart from God he does not exist at all^**. 

I But there nevertheless remains the fact of the existence of evil, 
both physical and moral, in apparent defiance of the divine will. 
Here too the Paulists agree with Stoic teaching ; they hold that 
;' evil serves a moral purpose as a training in virtue^'' ; that God 
turns evil to his own purpose, so that in the final issue all things 
are working together for good^^ ; that God is active through his 
Word in restoring a unity that has been for a time broken^". 
Neither can man shift on to his Maker the responsibility for 
his own wrongdoing ; that is (as Cleanthes had taught before) 
the work of men following out their own ways in accordance 
with some bias which is in conflict with their divine origin®". In 
spite of all this common ground Paul maintains with at least 
equal emphasis doctrines of a gloomier type. The universe, as 
it is, is evil ; its rulers are the powers of darkness®^ St Paul by 
no means put out of sight, as the Stoics did, the doctrine 
of an Evil Spirit ; on the contrary, this conception dominates 
his mind and multiplies itself in it. Sin in particular is in 
his eyes more widespread, more hideous, more dangerous than 
it is to the Stoic philosopher. To this point we must revert 
later. 



s^ ' It is in closest union with Him that we live and move and have our being ' 
Acts xvii 28 ; 'one God and Father of all... rules over all, acts through all, and dwells 
in all ' Eph. iv 6. 

^'^ ' God is dealing with you as sons ; for what son is there whom his father does 
not discipline?' Heb. xii 7. 

58 ' for those who love God all things are working together for good ' Rom. viii 28. 

59 'God was in Christ reconciling the Avorld to Himself 2 Cor. v 19; cf. 
Col. i 20. 

^'^ 'these men are without excuse, for. ..their senseless minds were darkened... 
in accordance with their own depraved cravings ' Romans i 20 to 24. The point 
is brought out still more plainly by a writei of the opposite party, James i 13 
to 15. 

61 'ours is not a conflict with mere flesh and blood, but with the despotisms, 
the empires, the forces that control and govern this dark world, the spiritual hosts of 
evil arrayed against us in the heavenly warfare ' Eph. vi 12. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 419 

468. With regard to religious belief and practice (we are here 

using the word ' religion ' in the narrower sense, as 

Religion. 1 

in the previous chapter on this subject) Paul was 
in the first place a monotheist, and addresses his prayers and 
praises alike to the Father in heaven, and to him alone. At 
the same time he does not regard the Deity as dwelling in a 
world apart ; he is to be worshipped in and through the Christ, 
who is the point of contact between him and humanity^l From 
the ceremonial practices of Hebraism all the Paulists break 
away completely. Its bloody sacrifices take away no sin**^ ; the 
solemn rite of circumcision is nothing in itself^, and in practice 
it is an impediment to the acceptance of Chrisf^l The dispo- 
sition to observe days and seasons, sabbaths and new moons, is 
a matter for serious alarm"". In place of this ritualism is to be 
substituted ' a worship according to reason"',' which is in close 
agreement with Stoic practice. To think rightly of the Deity"^, 
to give thanks to him"^, to honour him by an innocent life''", is 
well pleasing to God ; and the writings of Paul, like those of 
Epictetus, include many a hymn of praise, and show us the 
existence at this time of the beginnings of a great body of 
religious poetry". 

469. In the analysis of human nature Paul again started 
„ from the Stoic basis. In the first place he recog- 

Human Jr & 

nature. nised the fundamental unity of the man as a com- 
pacted whole''- ; subject to this monism, he recognised three 

^^ ' let your thanks to God the Father be presented in the name of our Lord Jesus 
Christ ' ib. v 20. 

"* ' it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins ' Hebr. x 4. 

®* 'in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any importance ' 
Gal. V 6. 

"^ ' if you receive circumcision Christ will avail you nothing ' ib. v 2. 

^•^ ' you scrupulously observe days and months, special seasons, and years. I am 
alarmed about you ' ib. iv 10 and 11 ; cf. Col. ii 16 to 19. 

"^ irapaKaXQ odv vfids TrapacTTTJcrai to. adofiara vfxutv dvcriav ^Qaav ayiav, ttji/ XoyiKTjv 
XcLTpeiav vfiQi' Rom. xii i. 

^8 2 Cor. xiii 5. "^ i Cor. xiv 15. ™ i Tim. ii 8. 

^1 Rom. xvi 25 to 27 ; i Cor. i 4 ; 2 Cor. i 3 ; Eph. i 3 to 14, iii 20 and 21 ; 
1 Tim. i 17. Compare i Peter i 3 to 5. 

''^ 'The whole body— its various parts closely fitting and firmly adhering to one 
another — grows by the aid of every contributory link, with power proportioned to the 
need of each individual part' Eph. iv 16 ; cf. Rom. xii 4 and 5. 

27 — 2 



420 ROMAN STOICISM 

parts, the spirit, the animal life, and the flesh ^l Of these only 
the two extremes, the spirit and the flesh, are usually men- 
tioned ; but these do not strictly correspond to the traditional 
distinction of soul and body. The soul (^|rvx^], animd) is that 
which man has in common with the animals ; the spirit {Trvevfxa, 
spiriUts) is that which he has in common with God. Where 
therefore only two parts are mentioned, the soul and the flesh 
must be considered both to be included under the name ' flesh.' 
Soul and flesh are peculiar to the individual man ; spirit is the 
common possession of the Deity and of all men''^ Thus God 
and man share in the spiritual nature, and become partners in 
an aspect of the universe from which animals, plants, and stones 
are definitely excluded ''^ The 'spirit' of St Paul therefore 
corresponds closely to the ' principate ' of the Stoics, and though 
the Christian apostle does not lay the same emphasis on its 
intellectual aspect, he fully recognises that the spiritual life is 
true wisdom, and its perversion folly and darkness''®. 

470. From this analysis of human nature Paul approaches 
the central doctrine of the Christian community, 

Resurrection 

and immor- that of the rcsurrcction of its Founder. To the 
simple-minded fraternity at Jerusalem the resur- 
rection of Jesus was a marvel, an interference with the orderly 
course of divine providence, a proof of the truth of the gospel 
message^ Jesus has returned to his disciples in the body as he 
lived ; he has again departed, but before this generation has 
passed away he will return to stay with them and establish his 
kingdom. To St Paul all this is different. He accepts impli- 
citly the fact of the resurrection, but as typical, not as abnormal. 
As Christ has risen, so will his followers rise. But Christ lives 
in the spirit ; by their intrinsic nature neither the flesh-body 
nor the soul-body can become immortal". And in the spirit 

■^^ I Cor. XV 44. 

''^ The point is continually emphasized that there is only one spirit. In English 
translations the double printed form, Spirit and spirit, disguises the real meaning, 
'if there is any common sharing of the spirit' Philipp. ii i. 

^^ ' You may, one and all, become sharers in the very nature of God ' 2 Peter i 4. 

'^^ eCKorlady] 7} dcriJveTos avrQv Kapdia Rom. i 21. 

^ ' our mortal bodies cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor will what is 
perishable inherit what is imperishable ' i Cor. xv 50 ; ' if we have known Christ 
as a man (/card crdp/ca), yet now we do so no longer' 2 Cor. v 16. The Pauline 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 42 1 

Christ's followers are joined with him, and will be more fully- 
joined when they are rid of the burden of the flesh '^^ This 
continued existence is no mere fancy; it is real, objective, and 
(in philosophical language) bodily. Though by the creation all 
men have some share in the divine spirit, yet immortality (at 
any rate in the full sense) is the privilege of the faithful only; it 
is won, not inherited. Paul does not venture to suggest that 
human individuality and personality are retained in the life 
beyond. He draws no picture of the reunion of preacher and 
disciple, of husband and wife, or of mother and child. It is 
enough for him to believe that he will be reunited with the 
glorified Christ, and be in some sense a member of the heavenly 
community''^. 

471. On its philosophical side the Paulist view of immor- 
The seed tality is closcly akin to the Stoic, and is exposed 
theory. to the Same charge of logical inconsistency. If the 

whole man is one, how can we cut off the flesh-body and the 
soul-body from this unity, and yet maintain that the spirit-body 
is not also destroyed ? To meet this difficulty St Paul, in one 
"of his grandest outbursts of conviction, propounds the doctrine 
of ' seeds,' closely connected with the Stoic doctrine of ' seed- 
powers ' (a-TrepfiariKol XoyotY^, and with the general principles of 

doctrine of the spiritual resurrection, in spite of its place in thfe sacred canon, has 
never been recognised by popular Christianity, but it has found notable defenders in 
Origen in ancient times, and in Bishop Westcott recently. ' No one of [Origen's] 
opinions was more vehemently assailed than his teaching on the Resurrection. Even 
his early and later apologists were perplexed in their defence of him. Yet there is no 
point on which his insight was more conspicuous. By keeping strictly to the Apostolic 
language he anticipated results which we have hardly yet secured. He saw" that it is 
the " spirit " which moulds the frame through which it is manifested ; that the body 
is the same, not by any material continuity, but by the permanence of that which 
gives the law, the ratio as he calls it, of its constitution (Frag, de res. ii i, p. 34). 
Our opponents say now that this idea is a late refinement of doctrine, forced upon us 
by the exigencies of controversy. The answer is that no exigencies of controversy 
brought Origen to his conclusion, It was, in his judgment, the clear teaching of 
St Paul ' Westcott, Religious Thought in the West, p. 244. 

^^ ' my earnest desire being to depart and to be with Christ' Philipp. i 23. 

79 4 -^g shall be with the Lord for ever' i Thess. iv 17. So another Paulist 
writer : ' we see them eager for a better land, that is to say, a heavenly one. For 
this reason God has now prepared a city for them ' Heb. xi 16. 

^" The term used is k6kkos 'grain' in i Cor. xv 37, but ffirip/xa 'seed' id. 38. 
The Stoic term (Tirep/xaTiKos \6yos is found in Justin Martyr A/>oL ii 8 and 13. 



422 ROMAN STOICISM 

biological science as now understood. This seed is the true 
reality in man; it may throw off both soul and flesh, and assume 
to itself a new body, as a tree from which the branches are 
lopped off will throw out new branches. Thus, and not other- 
wise, was Christ raised ; and as Christ was raised, so will his 
followers be raised^^ Man is not in any final sense a unit; as 
the race is continued by the breaking off of the seed from the 
individual, so is the spirit-life won by the abandonment of soul 
and flesh. 

472. At this point we are brought face to face with a very 
Life and old paradox, that life is death, and death is life, 
death. What is commonly called life is that of the soul 

and the flesh, which the animals share and which may mean 
the atrophy of man's higher part ; on the other hand death 
has no power over the life of the spirit, which is therefore called 
' eternal life ' or ' life of the ages.' To enter upon this ' eternal 
life ' is the very kernel of the gospel message*^; in the language of 
philosophy it is the bridge between physics and ethics. Although 
the steps by which it is reached can be most clearly traced in 
the Pauline epistles, yet the general conclusion was accepted by 
the whole Christian church. From this point of view Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob, by virtue of their communion with God, are 
still alive*'' ; he who holds his life dear, loses it ; and he who 
makes it of no account keeps it to the life of the ages*^ ; he who 
listens to the teaching of Jesus and believes in the Father who 
sent him, has passed over out of death into life*". 

473. From the doctrine of ' eternal life ' follow the first i 
principles of morals : eternal life is the moral end 

Mora i^ i^ 

■ principles. (reXo?) or siLimnum bonwn^^\ The spirit is every- 
thing, the act nothing ; good lies in the intention, not in the 

*i I Cor. XV i6, 17. 

*'^ ' while we are at home in the body we are banished from the Lord ; for we are 
living a life of faith, and not one of sight ' 2 Cor. v 6 ; ' we by our baptism were 
buried with him in death, in order that we should also live an entirely new life ' 
Rom. vi 4 ; ' surrender your very selves to God as living men who have risen from 
the dead' ib. 13. 

83 ' He is not the God of dead, but of living men ' Matt, xxii 32. 

*■* Matt. X 39, xvi 25, John xii 25. ^^ John v 24. 

S6 ' the end eternal life ' Rom. vi 22 (Revised version) ; ' you have the Life of the 
ages as the final result' ib. (Weymouth). 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 423 

I performance^^ ; we are saved by faith, not by works ^^ There- 
' fore all tabus fall away; 'to the pure everything is pure^^'; 'in 
its own nature no food is impure ; but if people regard any food 
as impure, to them it is^"'; 'our ungraceful parts come to have a 
more abundant grace ''^'; 'everything that God has created is 
good^l' And because God and all men share in one spirit, all 
men are fellow-citizens in the cosmopolis*'. To this St Paul 
sacrifices all personal advantages of which otherwise he might 
be justly proud, his Hebrew descent, his free citizenship in the 
Roman empire, and even his standing in sex above an inferior 
part of the creation H The spiritual condition is expressed in 
terms of certain emotional attitudes which correspond to the 
three Stoic ' constancies"'^' ; the details vary, but love, joy, peace, 
gentleness and sweet reasonableness ''*^ are frequently recurring 
terms, whilst faith, hope and love are recommended in one 
passage of the highest eloquence, love {a^airrj, caritas) being 
given the highest place of alP^. 

474. In the treatment of the virtues and vices we miss the 
Virtues and familiar series of the four virtues, though three of 
vices. them find a place here or there in some more 

elaborate list^l The vices are treated with much more fulness. 
Those connected with the sexual relations and functions are 
invariably the first to be condemned ; incest, adultery, harlotry, 
foul conversation, are named in almost every list"". Next in 
importance are ill-feeling and quarrelsomeness ; heavy drinking 
comes after these. More upon Stoic lines is the reproof of 

^^ ' the end sought is the love which springs from a pure heart, a clear conscience, 
and a sincere faith' i Tim. i 5. 

^ ' it is as the result of faith that a man is held to be righteous, apart from actions 
done in obedience to Law ' Rom. iii 28. 

^^ Titus i 15. ""^ Romans xiv 14. 9i i Cor. xii 23. 

"2 I Tim. iv 4. ^^ Eph. ii 19. 

^* ' in Him the distinctions between Jew and Gentile, slave and free man, male and 
female, disappear ' Gal. iii 28. 

"^ See above, § 355. 

"® irpaoTTis /cat iirielKeia 2 Cor. x i. 

®^ I Cor. xiii. For the constancy of Caution see § 460, note 20. 

^^ Justice (diKaioffvvr]) i Tim. vi 11 ; Courage (viro/jLov^) r Tim. vi 11, {ddvafiis) 
2 Tim. i 7 ; Soberness (e^/cpdreta) Gal. v 23. 

"" Rom. i 26 to 30 ; Gal. v 19 and 20 ; Col. iii 5. 



424 ROMAN STOICISM 

'excessive grieP"".' The necessity of steady progress is strongly 
pressed, and the term used {irpoKoirr)) is that with which we are 
familiar in Greek philosophy '"i. In all the Paulist writers there 
is also incessant insistence upon the importance of the regular | 
performance of daily duties^''". Experience not only of the 
disasters which befel the church at Jerusalem, but also of similar 
tendencies nearer at hand, had impressed deeply on Paul the 
insufficiency of moral teaching which relied on general principles 
and emotional feeling only, especially if such teaching (as in the 
Sermon on the mount) was mainly negative. The Paulists at 
any rate set forth, almost in a fixed form, a body of instructions 
to serve the community as a whole, and social^"* rather than 
ethical in nature. This teaching follows closely the Stoic teach- 
ing of the same period, and is based upon the relationships 
(o-%e(Tet9), such as those of king and subject, master and slave, 
husband and wife, parent and child^''^ It is conservative in 
character, advocating kindness, contentment, and zeal in social 
relations as they exist. Thus whilst we recognise the spirit of 
Zeno in the Sermon on the mount, we find that of Panaetius in 
the Paulist discourses. 

475. As against the Stoic sage the Paulists set up as their 
, ideal the saint, and used all the resources of 

Sage and ' 

Saint. eloquence in his commendation. He is the true 

king and priest'""^; even if he is a beggar, he is surpassingly 
richi*^; he alone, though a slave, is free"^ On the other hand 
the sinner is always a slave^"** ; even his good acts are without 

^'*** 2 Cor. ii 7, vii lo. 

1"^ ' I shall go on working to promote your progress ' Philipp. i 25 ; ' with my eyes 
fixed on the goal I push on ' ib. iii 14. There is also (paradoxically) progress in 
wrongdoing; 'they will proceed from bad to worse in impiety' 2 Tim. ii 16. 

^"^ The technical term used is rot avIjKovTa (Eph. v 4, Philem. 8), once only (in 
negative form) Kadr}KovTa, (Rom. i 28). 

1"^ In the sense in which the word ' political ' is used above, §§ 302-31 1. 

1**^ Rom. xiii i to 9 ; Ephes. v and vi ; Col. iii 18 to 25 ; Titus ii i to 10 ; i Peter 
ii and iii. 

105 ' You are a priesthood of kingly lineage ' i Peter ii 9. 

^"^ ' as poor, but we bestow wealth on many ; as having nothing, and yet we 
securely possess all things ' 2 Cor. vi 10. 

107 1 where the spirit of the Lord is, freedom is enjoyed ' 2 Cor. iii 17. 

108 'every one who commits sin is the slave of sin' John viii 34. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 425 

real value"". All such phrases would be familiar to our Stoic 
inquirer; but perhaps he might be specially impressed by find- 
ing once more the doctrine of the 'sufficiency of virtue' amongst 
the Christians. The term is indeed altered"", but it bears the 
same meaning as regards independence of wealth, health and 
liberty, though with more emphasis upon support from a divine 
source. 

476. It is generally agreed that in the writings of St Paul 
St Paul there is displayed a special sense of shame and 
and sin. horror in speaking of sin"\ which entirely differ- 
entiates his teaching from that of the Stoics. This difference, 
however, cannot be due to St Paul treating sin as ' defiance 
towards a loving Father"V fof this view was also that of 
Cleanthes and the Stoics generally ; and Paul's horror of sin 
depends on no reasoning, but is felt by him as instinctive. It 
remains to add that our Stoic inquirer would find an apparent 
conflict between this instinct and Paul's reasoning. The sin 
of which St Paul finds it 'a shame even to speak"*' is sexual; 
and so far as it consists in abnormal social habits, such as those 
relations between persons of the same sex which had found 
excuse in the classical world, the Stoic would at once agree that 
these practices were 'against nature"^' and were unseemly. Again, 
the marriage of near relations, though not against nature in the 
sense in which nature is illustrated by the animal world, is still 
opposed to so deep-seated a social tradition as to merit instinc- 
tive condemnation"'. But the instincts of St Paul go far 
deeper ; the marriage relation is to him at the best a concession 
to human frailty, and falls short of the ideal '^^ Nor is this 
merely a personal view of Paul ; it is deeply impressed upon 

109 I jf J g^j^ destitute of love, I am nothing' i Cor. xiii 2. 

^^** It is iKavhrris not avrapKeta (2 Cor. iii 5 and 6), the latter word being used in a 
different sense, for which see § 480, note 135. 

^" The term {afj-apria, peccatnm) is Stoic. 

^^^ Lightfoot, Pkilippiajis,^. 296. This view has become familiar through Milton's 
treatment of the Fall of man in Paradise Lost. There the prohibition of the forbidden 
fruit is nothing but a test of readiness to obey. This point of view seems quite foreign 
to St Paul, who always speaks of sin as sinful in itself, not in consequence of the 
Creator's will. 

"^^ Eph. v 12 (R.V.). 1" Rom. i 26. 

"5 I Cor. VI. "« I Cor. vii i to 8. 



426 ROMAN STOICISM 

the consciousness of the whole Christian church. How, it would 
be asked, can this be reconciled with the abolition of the tabit, 
with the principle that ' all things are pure,' or even with the 
obvious purpose of the Creator when he created mankind male 
and female ? 

477. It would seem that here we have touched a fundamental 
point in the historical development of the moral 

The sex tabus. . 

sentiments. The sexual tabus are the most primitive 
and deeply-seated in human history. From this point of view 
woman is by nature impure, the sex-functions which play so 
large a part in her mature life being to the savage both dangerous 
and abhorrent. Hence the view, so strongly held by St Paul, 
that woman as a part of the creation is inferior to man. But 
man too becomes by his sex-functions impure, though for shorter 
periods ; and by union with woman lowers himself to her level. 
Hence the unconquerable repugnance of St Paul to the sexual 
relation under any conditions whatever"'' ; a repugnance which 
reason and religion keep within limits"*, but which yet always 
breaks out afresh in his writings. Hence also he assumes as 
unquestionable the natural unseemliness of the sexual parts of 
the body ; in all these points not going beyond feelings which 
are to-day as keen as ever, though no philosopher has found it 
easy to justify them. But in certain points St Paul outpaces the 
general feeling, and shows himself an extreme reactionary 
against the philosophic doctrines which he shared with the Stoic. 
He extends his dislike, in accordance with a most primitive 
tabu^ to woman's hair"'' ; he desires the subordination of 
woman to man to be marked in her outward appearance^^" ; 
and he forbids women to speak in the general meetings of 
church members ^^\ 



"^ ' It is well for a man to abstain altogether from marriage. But because there 
is so much fornication every man should have a wife of his own ' i Cor. vii r and i. 

118 ' If you marry, you have not sinned ' ib. 28. 

^'^ ' if a woman will not wear a veil, let her also cut off her hair ' i Cor. xi 6. 
For the savage tabu of women's hair see Jevons, httroduction to the History of 
Religion, p. 78. 

^^^ 1 Cor. xi 10. 

^2^ ib. xiv 34 and 35. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 427 

478. This intense feeling on the part of St Paul required, 
Hebrew ^s liis Writings assume, no justification ; it was 
feeling. therefore an inherited feeling, as familiar to many 

an Oriental as it is usually strange and unsympathetic to the 
ancient and modern European. It appears also to be rooted in 
Hebrew tradition ; for if we are at liberty to interpret the myth 
of Adam and Eve by the parallel of Yama and YamI in the 
Rigveda^", the fall of man was nothing else than the first 
marriage, in which Eve was the suitor and Adam the accomplice. 
In the dramatic poem of the Rigveda Yama corresponds to the 
Hebrew Adam, his sister YamI to Eve^^\ YamI yearns to 
become the mother of the human race ; Yama shudders at the 
impiety of a sister's embrace. Zeno had already conceived the 
world-problem in much the same shape ^^^ ; but to the Oriental 
it is more than a problem of cosmology ; it is the fundamental 
opposition of sex attitude, the woman who longs for the family, 
affections against the man who seeks an ideal purity. In 
Genesis the prohibition of the apple appears at first sight 
colourless, yet the meaning is hardly obscure. After touching 
the forbidden fruit man and woman first feel the shame of 
nakedness; and Eve is punished by the coming pains of child- 
bearing, and a rank below her husband's. None the less she has 
her wish, for she becomes the mother of all living. It is hard 
to think that Paul, who always traces human sin back to the 
offence of Adam, and finds it most shamelessly displayed in the 
sex-relationships of his own time, could have conceived of the 
Fall in any very different way. 

479. According then to a point of view which we believe to 
The taint in ^e latent in all the teaching of Paul on the subject 
procreation. q|- gjj-,^ ^y^^ Original taint lay in procreation, and 

through the begetting of children has passed on from one 
generation of mankind to another ; ' through the succession 
from Adam all men become dead ^2®.' As an ethical standpoint 

1^^ Rigveda x 10. 

^^'^ See the author's translation in his Rigveda (London, 1900). 
^"^ See above, § 307. 

^2^ 'just as through Adam all die, so also through Christ all will be made alive 
again ' i Cor. xv 22. 



428 ROMAN STOICISM 

this position is very alien from Stoicism ; with the Stoic it is 
a first law of nature which bids all men seek for the continuance 
of the race ; with the Apostle the same yearning leads them to 
enter the pathway of death. It would lead us too far to attempt 
here to discuss this profound moral problem, which has deeply 
influenced the whole history of the Christian church. We are 
however greatly concerned with the influence of this sentiment 
on Pauline doctrine. For it follows that in order to attain to 
a true moral or spiritual life man needs a new begetting and 
a new birth^^*^ ; he must become a son of God through the out- 
pouring of his spirit^-". This is one of the most familiar of 
Pauline conceptions, and for us it is easy to link it on to the 
Stoico-Pauiine account of the creation, according to which man 
was in the first instance created through the Word of God, and 
endowed with his spirit. But to the community at Jerusalem 
all conceptions of this kind appear to have been hardly in- 
telligible, and tended to aggravate the deep distrust of the 
teachings and methods of St Paul and his companions, which 
was rooted in his disregard of national tradition. 

480. This difference of mental attitude soon broke out into 
an open quarrel. So much was inevitable ; and the 

The quarrel. 

fact that the quarrel is recorded at length in the 
texts from which we are quoting is one of the strongest evidences 
of their general accuracy. The Christians at Jerusalem formed 
themselves into a nationalist party ; they claimed that all the 
brothers should be in the first instance conformists to Hebrew 
institutions. Paul went up to Jerusalem ^^^, eager to argue the 
matter with men of famous name. He was disillusioned, as is 
so often the traveller who returns after trying experiences and 
much mental growth to the home to which his heart still clings. 
Peter and the others had no arguments to meet Paul's ; he could 
learn nothing from them^^"; they had not even a consistent 
practice^^". At first Paul's moral sense was outraged; he 
publicly rebuked Peter as double-faced. After a little time he 

^^® ' God in his great mercy has begotten us anew ' i Peter 13;' you have been 
begotten again from a germ not of perishable, but of imperishable life' ib. 23. 
i"-i7 I yQ^ are all sons of God through faith ' Gal, iii 26. 
128 Gal. ii I. 12« ib. 6. 1^" ib. 12. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 429 

realized that he had met with children ; he remembered that he 
had once thought and acted in the same way^^K Jews in heart, 
the home apostles still talked of marvels ^^2, still yearned for the 
return of Jesus in the flesh ^^. A philosophic religion was as 
much beyond their grasp as a consistent morality. Through 
a simple-minded application of the doctrines of the Sermon on 
the mount they had slipped into deep poverty ^^^ ; they were ready 
to give Paul full recognition in return for charitable help. This 
was not refused them ; but to his other teaching Paul now added 
a chapter on pecuniary independence^^^ ; and in his old age he 
left to his successors warnings against 'old wives' fables ^^*^' and 
'Jewish legends 1^'',' 

481. Thus for the first time the forces of mythology within 
The develop- the Christian church clashed with those of philo- 
chrisHan sophy. For the moment Paul appeared to be the 

mythology. victor ; he won the formal recognition of the church, 

with full authority to continue his preaching on the under- 
standing that it was primarily directed to the Gentile world ^^l 
External events were also unfavourable to the Hebraists : the 
destruction of Jerusalem deprived them of their local centre ; 
the failure of Jesus to reappear in the flesh within the lifetime 
of his companions disappointed them of their most cherished 
hope. But their sentiments and thoughts remained to a great 
extent unchanged. To Paul they gave their respect, to Peter 
their love ; and the steady tradition of the Christian church has 
confirmed this judgment. No saint has been so loved as Peter ; 
to none have so many churches been dedicated by the affectionate 
instinct of the many ; whilst even the dominant position of Paul 
in the sacred canon has hardly secured him much more than 
formal recognition except by the learned. So again it was with 
Paul's teaching ; formally recognised as orthodox, it remained 
misunderstood and unappreciated : it was even rapidly converted 

^^^ I Cor. xiii 11. ^^^ z6. i 22. ^^^ James v 8. 

^'^* James i 27, ii 15 to 17, v i to 3. 

^^^ 2 Cor. ix 8 (the technical term is avrapKeia) ; ' if a man does not choose to 
work, neither shall he eat ' 2 Thess. iii 10. 

136 < worldly (i.e. materialistic) stories, fit only for credulous old women, have 
nothing to do with ' i Tim. iv 7. 

^^^ Titus i 14. ^^^ Galatians ii 9. 



430 ROMAN STOICISM 

into that mythological form to which Paul himself was so fiercely- 
opposed. 

482. This divergence of view is illustrated most strikingly 
^^ „. . in the two doctrines which for both parties were 

The Virgin _ '^^ _ 

birth and the the Cardinal points of Christian belief, the divine 

resurrection. r i t^ i i i • • a-> 

nature ot the rounder and his resurrection. Un 
the latter point the standpoint of the Hebraists is sufficiently 
indicated by the tradition of the gospels, all of which emphatically 
record as a decisive fact that the body of Jesus was not found in 
his grave on the third day ; to the Paulists this point is entirely 
irrelevant, and they pass it by unmentioned^-'^ To Paul again 
the man Jesus was of human and natural birth, born of the 
posterity of David, born of a woman, born subject to the law^*" ; 
in his aspect as the Christ he was, as his followers were to be, 
begotten of the spirit and born anew"\ His statement as to 
descent from David (which hardly means more than that he was 
of Jewish race) was crystallized by the mythologists in two 
formal genealogies, which disagree so entirely in detail that they 
have always been the despair of verbal apologists, but agree in 
tracing the pedigree through Joseph to Jesus, The phrase 
' begotten of the spirit ' was interpreted with equal literalness ; 
but the marvel-lovers were for a time puzzled to place the 
' spirit ' in the family relationship. In the first instance the 
spirit seems to have been identified with the mother of Jesus"^; 
but the misunderstanding of a Hebrew word which does not 
necessarily connote physical virginity"^ assisted to fix the 

^■'^ ' [Christ] was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit ' 
I Peter iii i8. 

1*" '[Jesus Christ] who, as regards His human descent, belonged to the posterity 
of David, but as regards the holiness of His Spirit was decisively proved by the 
Resurrection to be the Son of God ' Romans 14",' God sent forth His Son, born of 
a woman, born subject to Law ' Gal. iv 4. 

1*1 I Peter i 3. 

^*^ In the account of the transfiguration in the Gospel to the Hebrezos (p. 15, 
36 Hilgenfeld ; Preuschen Antileg. 4) Jesus says ' Lately my mother, the holy spirit, 
seized me by one of my hairs and carried me away to the great mountain of Thabor.' 
Here Origen restores a philosophical interpretation by referring to Matt, xii 50 ; 
'whoever shall do the will of my Father. ..is my mother' Comm. in [oh. ii 12, 
p. 64 D. Modern writers find an identification of Mary with the Wisdom {(TQ<pl(x) of 
God. See Gruppe, Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgesckichte, vol. ii p. 1614. 

1*' Matt, i 23. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 431 

function of fatherhood upon the divine parent. The antipathy 
to the natural process of procreation which we have traced in 
St Paul himself, and which was surely not less active amongst 
many of the Hebraists, has contributed to raise this materialsa- 
tion of a philosophic tenet to a high place amongst the formal 
dogmas of historic Christianity. 

483. But if the tendency to myth-making was still alive in 
The doctrine ^he Christian church, that in the direction of 
of the Word. philosophy had become self-confident and active. 
The Paulists had taken the measure of their former opponents ; 
they felt themselves superior in intellectual and moral vigour, 
and they knew that they had won this superiority by contact 
with the Gentile world. More than before they applied them- 
selves to plead the cause of the Christ before the Gentiles ; but 
the storm and stress of the Pauline epistles gave way in time to 
a serener atmosphere, in which the truths of Stoicism were more 
generously acknowledged. A Stoic visitor of the reign of 
Trajan would meet in Christian circles the attitude represented 
to us by the fourth gospel, in which the problem of the Christ- 
nature stands to the front, and is treated on consistently Stoic 
lines. St Paul had spoken of Jesus as ' for us a wisdom which 
is from God^^' and had asserted that 'from the beginning he 
had the nature of God"'''; his successors declared frankly that 
Christ was the Logos, the Word"*^; and in place of the myth of 
the Virgin Birth they deliberately set in the beginning of their 
account of Christ the foundation-principles of Stoic physics 
and the Paulist account of the spiritual procreation of all 
Christians. 

' In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came 
into being through him, and apart from him nothing that exists came into 
being 1*^' 

' To all who have received him, to them — that is, to those who trust in his 
name — he has given the privilege of becoming children of God ; who were 

"■» I Cor. i 30. "5 Philipp. ii 6. 

146 e That which was from the beginning... concerning the Word of life ' i John i r ; 
' his name is the Word of God ' Rev. xix 13. 
"'' John i I to 3. 



432 ROMAN STOICISM 

begotten as such not by human descent, nor through an impulse of their own 
nature, nor through the will of a human father, but from God. 

'And the Word came in the flesh, and lived for a time in our midst, so 
that we saw his glory, the glory as of the Father's only Son, sent from his 
presence. He was full of grace and truth ^*^.' 

The Stoic character of this teaching is no longer latent, but 
proclaimed ; and the Church Fathers recognise this in no 
doubtful terms "^. 

484. During the whole of the second century A.D. men 
^, , trained in Stoic principles crowded into the Christian i 

The doctrine ^ '^ '■ 

of the community. Within it they felt they had a special 

Trinity. , ,.,.,,. ^^, . . 

work to do m buildmg up Christian doctrine so 
: that it might face all storms of criticism. This effort gradually 
took the shape of schools modelled upon those of the philosophic 
sects. Such a scKoo'I was founded by an ex-Stoic named 
Pantaenus at Alexandria in i8i A.D. ; and his successors 
Clemens of Alexandria (ob. c. 215 A.D.) and Origenes 
(c. 186-253 A.D.) specially devoted themselves to developing the 
theory of the divine nature upon Stoic lines. Not all the 
particulars they suggested were accepted by the general feeling 
of the Christian body, but from the discussion was developed 
gradually the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity^^'*. The 
elements of this doctrine have been already traced in St Paul's 
epistles, in which the dominating conceptions are those of God 
the Father, the Christ, and the divine spirit. For these in the 
next generation we find the Father, the Word, and the Spirit ; 
and the last term of the. triad becomes increasingly identified 
with the 'holy spirit' of Stoicism. But these three conceptions 

^^^ John i 12 to 14. 

^*^ ' apud vestros quoque sapientes \6yov (id est sermonem atque rationem) constat 
artificem videri universitatis ' Tert. ApoL 21; ' Zeno opificem universitatis \6yov 
praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem et animum lovis nuncupat ' Lact. Div. inst. 
iv 9. Naturally the Christian writers regard the Stoic doctrine of the Logos as an 
' anticipation ' of their own, exactly as in modern times the Darwinists, having 
borrowed from Epicurus the doctrine of atoms, regard the original doctrine as a 
' marvellous anticipation ' of modern science. Justin Martyr goes further, and con- 
cludes that all believers in the Logos were (by anticipation) Christians : 01 jj-erh. \6yov 
^nicravres Kpiariavoi elcri Kciv ddeoi evo^iiad-qaav Apol. i 46. 

1^° The term is first used by Theophilus (c. 180 A.D.), of God, his Word, and his 
Wisdom. 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 433 

(with others) are in Stoic doctrine varying names or aspects 
of the divine unity. Seneca, for instance, had written in the 
following tone : 

'To whatever country we are banished, two things go with us, our part in 
the starry heavens above and the world around, our sole right in the moral 
. instincts of our own hearts. Such is the gift to us of the supreme power 
which shaped the universe. That power we sometimes call "the all-ruling' 
God," sometimes " the incorporeal Wisdom " which is the creator of mighty 
works, sometimes the "divine spirit" which spreads through things great 
and small with duly strung tone, sometimes "destiny" or the changeless 
succession of causes linked one to another^^^.' 

Here the larger variety of terms used by the early Stoic 
teachers^®^ is reduced to four aspects of the first cause, namely 
God, the Word, the divine spirit, and destiny. The Christian , 
writers struck out from the series the fourth member, and the 
doctrine of the Trinity was there. Its stiff formulation for 
school purposes in the shape ' these three are one ' has given 
it the appearance of a paradox ; but to persons conversant withi 
philosophic terminology such a phrase was almost commonplace!,, 
and is indeed found in various associations ^^^ The subsequent 
conversion of the members of the triad into three ' persons ' 
introduced a simplification which is only apparent, for the 
doctrine must always remain meaningless except as a typical 
solution of the old problem of ' the One and the many,' carried up 
to the level of ultimate Being^^^ 

485. In the ages that have since followed mythology and 

Subsequent philosophy havc been at work side by side within 

history. ^^le Christian church. At no time had Christians 

of philosophic temperament entirely thrown off the belief in 

marvels, and this in increasing degree infected the whole 

1°^ In this passage an ' anticipation ' of the doctrine of the Trinity has many times 
been discovered ; for instance in the i8th century by the Jesuit Huet (Winckler, der 
Stoicismtis, p. 9) ; in our own country by Dr Heberden (see Caesar Morgan, An 
investigation of the Trinity of Plato, Holden's edition, 1853, p. 155) ; and again 
recently by Amedee Fleury and. others (Winckler, p. 8). 

1^^ See above, § 242. 

163 Yox instance in i John v 8, and (in substance) in i Cor. xiii 13. 

164 Whatever may be the ecclesiastical or legal sense of the word 'person,' in its 
original philosophical meaning it expresses an aspect of individuality, and not an 
individual: see Cicero's use of the term quoted above, § 271, note 42. 

A. 28 



434 ROMAN STOICISM 

Hellenistic world from the second century onwards. But this 
spirit of concession proved no sure protection to men who, after 
all, were guilty of thinking. It was substantially on this ground 
that the first persecutions began within the church. Demetrius, 
bishop of Alexandria (circ. 230 A.D.), excommunicated Origen, 
and obtained the support of the great majority of the Christian 
churches for his action ; still Origen steadily held his ground, 
and has found advocates in all ages of Christian history^'''. 
Throughout the ' dark ages ' philosophical thought lay almost 
extinguished, and a childish credulity attained such monstrous 
dimensions as to threaten the very existence of social life. In 
the ecclesiastical chronicles of the middle ages miracles are so 
frequent that the orderly course of nature seems the exception ; 
angels and devils are so many that men are almost forgotten. 
To these hallucinations and fictions of the monastery, so de- 
servedly ridiculed in the Ingoldsby Legends'^^^, the practical 
experience of daily life must always have supplied some 
corrective ; the swollen claim of ' faith ' to say yes to every 
absurdity had to be met by the reassertion of criticism, the right 
to say ' no.' The Reformation, at the cost of infinite effort and 
sacrifice, swept away the miracles of the saints ; modern criticism 
has spared none of the marvels of the Old Testament, and is 
beginning to lay its axe to the root of those of the New. Every 
day the conviction that ' miracles do not happen ' gains ground 
amongst intelligent communities; that is (in philosophic language) 
the dualism of God and Nature is being absorbed in the wider 
monism according to which God and Nature are one. 

486. As the credit of Christian mythology diminishes, the 
Christian philosophic contcnt of the new religion is regaining 
philosophy, -^g authority. The doctrine of the 'spiritual life' 
has not yet lost its freshness or its power ; but the more closely 
it is examined, the more clearly will it be seen that it is rooted 
in the fundamental Stoic conceptions of providence and duty, / 
and that, in the history of the Christian church, it is specially 
bound up with the life and writings of the apostle Paul. It is 

1^-' See above, § 470, note 77. 

^^^ This book claims rank as a classic ; amongst others of similar purpose may 
be mentioned R. Garnett's Twilight of the gods (New edition, London 1903). 



/ 



/ 



THE STOIC STRAIN IN CHRISTIANITY 43$ 

not suggested that the sketch of Christian teaching contained in 
this chapter is in any way a complete or even a well-proportioned 
view of the Christian faith ; for we have necessarily thrown into 
the background those elements of the new religion which are 
drawn from Judaism^=^ or from the personality of the Founder. 
Xor have we found in Paul a Stoic philosopher : it remains for 
a more direct and profound study to determine which of the 
forces which stirred his complex intellect most exactly represents 
his true and final convictions. No man at any rate ever admitted 
more frankly the conflict both of moral and of intellectual 
cravings within himself: no man ever cautioned his followers 
more carefully against accepting all his words as final. With 
these reservations we may perhaps venture to join in the hopes 
of a recent writer who was endowed with no small prophetic 
insight : 

' The doctrine of Paul will arise out of the tomb where for centuries it has 
lain buried. It will edify the church of the future ; it will have the consent 
of happier generations, the applause of less superstitious ages. All will be 
too little to pay the debt which the church of God owes to this "least of the 
apostles, who was not fit to be called an apostle, because he persecuted the 
church of Godi'«."' 

487. When that day comes, it will be recognised that 
Stoicism in Stoicism is Something more than what the Church 
the present. FatHgTs-Tneant when they described it as part of 
the ' preparation of the gospel ' ; that it may rather be regarded 
as forming an integral part of the Christian message, or (as 
it has been recently called) a 'root of Christianity^'^' If this 
view is correct, Stoicism is not dead nor will it die ; whether it 
is correct or not, the study of Stoicism is essential to the full 
understanding of the Christian religion, as also to that of many 

"'' Amongst these elements we include all that Christianity has drawn from 
Persism through Judaism. We have indeed referred to the Persian beliefs embodied 
in the ' Lord's prayer ' ; but it has lain outside our scope to discuss the Eschatology 
which figures so largely in popular conceptions of Christianity, but is now thought to 
be but slightly connected with its characteristic message. On this point see especially 
Cd^rX Cl&Taen, Religioftsgesckicktliche Erkldj-ung des Neuen Testaments (Giessen, 1909), 
PP- 90-135- 

1^ Matthew Arnold, St Pazd and Protestantism (Popular edition, p. 80). 

159 The full title of Winckler's book from which we have often already quoted is 
Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenihums. 

28—2 



436 ROMAN STOICISM 

other fundamental conceptions of our modern life. Still the 
Christian churches celebrate yearly in quick succession the twin 
festivals of Pentecost and Trinity, in which the groundwork 
of the Stoic physics is set forth for acceptance by the faithful in 
its Christian garb ; whilst the scientific world has lately in hot 
haste abandoned the atomic theory as a final explanation of the 
universe, and is busy in re-establishing in all its essentials the 
Stoic doctrine of an all-pervading aether. In the practical 
problems of statesmanship and private life we are at present too 
often drifting like a ship without a rudder, guided only by the 
mirages of convention, childishly alarmed at the least investiga- 
tion of first principles ; till the most numerous classes are in 
open revolt against a civilisation which makes no appeal to their 
reason, and a whole sex is fretting against a subordination which 
seems to subserve no clearly defined purpose. In this part of 
philosophy we may at least say that Stoicism has stated clearly 
the chief problems, and has begun to pave a road towards their 
solution. But that solution will not be found in the refinements 
of logical discussion : of supreme importance is the force of 
character which can at the right moment say ' yes ' or say ' no,' 
In this sense also (and not by any more mechanical interpre- 
tation) we understand the words of the Founder of Christianity : 
' let your language be " Yes, yes " or " No, no " ; anything in 
excess of this comes from the Evil one^^*^.' To the simple and 
the straightforward, who trust themselves because they trust a 
power higher than themselves, the future belongs. 

160 Matt. V 37. 



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A. 29 



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Erlangen, 1858. 



GENERAL INDEX. 



The ttumbers refer to the pages and notes. 



Abstract ideas, 136 sqq. 

Academy, 55 sqq. ; influence on 
Stoicism, 69, 93, 94, 100, 103, 106, 
192, 302. Essential difference 
between the two schools, 153. 

accessio, 292, 316. 

acer^us, 147. 

Achilles, 339. 

A90KA, 15. 

Acquirements, 305. 

ACTE, 347 n. 1 10. 

Action, 59. 

Active and passive, 69, 156, 172. 

Adam (and Eve) 278, 427. 

Adam, J., 30 n. 2, 30 n. 3, 32 n. 16, 
34 n. 25, 37 n. 43, 46 n. 76. 

Addison, J., 176 n. 9. 

adfectus, see ' Affections.' 

adsensio^ adsensus, see ' Assent ' ; 
adsensu7n sustinere, see ' Suspense 
of judgment.' 

Adultery condemned, 276, 347. 

Advantages, 72, 290, 319 sqq. ; re- 
jected by Aristo, 82. 

aegritudo., 331 ; aeg. anitni, 338. 

Aeneas, 297, 391. 

Aeschylus, 38. 

Aesculapius, 233. 

aestimatio., 72, 289. 

Aether, 180, 183, 186, 436; as first 
principle, 70 n. 61 ; as god, 219. 

Affection for children, 341. 

Affections, 332 sqq., 352 ; good affec- 
tions, 323 ; in Jesus, 412. 

ngitatio pritna^ 351. 

Agriculture, 369, 372. 

Agrippinus, Paconius, 399. 

Ahura Mazda, 8. 

Air, 180 sqq. 



Alcestis, 142. 

Alexander, 13, 62, 339. 

Alexandria, 20, 64, 80, 83, 1 10. 

alienatio, 256, 322. 

AUegorism, 112, 151,411. 

amarus, 335. 

amor., 317. 

Analogy, in logic, 134; in grammar, 

145. 
Anaxagoras, 40, 44, 156. 
Anaximander, 33. 
Anaximenes, 33, 158 ; on elemental 

qualities, 173. 
Angels, 8, 11, 21, 31; guardian 

angels, 233, 264. 
Anger, -i'i'i) sqq- 
a/lima., 168, 242 ; in St Paul, 420. 

an. inflamniata., 181, 243 n. 23. 
Animals, 186 sqq. ; their place in the 

universe, 205 ; have no rights, 274 ; 

St Paul's view, 417 n. 55. 
Animism, 241. 
aftimus., 242. 
a?t7tt{s, ttzagnus, 193. 
Anomaly, 145. 
Ant, 187. 
anticipatio, 1 36. 

Antigonus Gonatas, 75, 79,- 311. 
Antiochus (of Ascalon), 109 sqq., 

152. 
Antipater (of Tarsus), 96 ; on the 

criterion, 141 ; gives way to Car- 

neades, 144 ; on definition, 148 ; 

definition of God, 222 ; of virtue, 

283 ; on advantages, 292 ; on 

marriage, 318. 
Antipater (of Tyre), 108, 186, 317; 

teacher of Cato, 386. 
Antiphon (sophist), 40. 



452 



GENERAL INDEX 



Antipodes, 175. 

Antiquarianism, 306. 

Antisthenes, 48 sqq. 

Antoninus, M. Pius, 402 sqq. 

Apathy, 324. 

Apocalypse, 24 n. 64, 413 n. 24. 

Aphrodite, 231. 

Apollo, 231. 

Apollodorus (of Athens), 97. 

APOLLdDORUS (of Seleucia, called 
Ephillus), 97 ; on the criterion, 
141 ; on pleasure, 315. 

Apollonides, 108. 

Apollonius (of Tyre), 108. 

Apollophanes, 84. 

appellatio, 145. 

appetitio^ appetitiis^ 256, 314 ; app. 
recta, 256. 

Aquilius, C. Gallus, 385. 

Aratus, 80 ; view of the universe, 
182 : influence on Virgil, 389 ; on 
St Paul, 409. 

arbitriirm liberuni, 210. 

Arcesilaus, 63 ; converses with 
Zeno, 6g n. 48 ; opposes Zeno, 
74 ; opposes Cleanthes, 90 ; influ- 
ence on Chrysippus, 93. 

Archedemus, 97 ; on pleasure, 315. 

Areius, iio, 343. 

Aristarchus, 146 n. 104, 179. 

Aristippus, 50. 

Akisto, 79, 82 sqq., 129; inclines to 
Cynism, 82 ; opposes art, 153 
n. 148 ; rejects precepts, 357. 

Aristocrkon, 97. 

Aristophanes, 10, 175 n. i. 

Aristotle, 58 sqq. ; on active and 
passive principles, 156; on sub- 
stance and quality, 165 ; on the 
categories, 59, 164, 169 ; on the 
solar system, 182 ; on the micro- 
cosm, 61, 240; on slavery, 271, 
279; on pleasure, 316; on anger, 

333- 
Arius, see 'Areius.' 
Arnim, H. von, 86 n. 59, 119 n. 123. 
Arnold, Matthew, 435 n. 158. 
Arria (the elder), 393. 
Arria (the younger), 399. 
Arrianus, 121. 
Art disparaged, 153. 
Artemidorus, 401. 
Artemis, 112. 
Arts {artes)y 140, 144, 305, 306 ; are 

passing conditions of soul, 168. 
articuliis, 145. 



Arulenus Rusticus, 401, 

Asceticism, 258, 362, 409. 

Assent {adsensio, adsensus), in logic, 

68, 132, 249; in morals, 256. 
Astrology or Astronomy, 6, loi, 306. 
Atheism, of Socrates, 46 ; of the 

Cynics, 48 sqq. ; of Zeno, 217, 

234- 

Athene, 231. 

Athenodorus Calvus, 109. 

Athenodorus (of Soli), 84. 

Athenodorus (of Tarsus), (i) the 
elder, 98, 107 ; denies that sins 
are equal, 355 ; teacher of Cato, 
386 ; (2) the younger, 1 10. 

Atoms, 41, 159, 189, 436. 

Attalus, III, 347. 

Augustus, i 10 ; encourages flattery, 
370 ; longs for leisure, 377. 

Aurelius, M., 122 sqq.; belief in 
providence, 123 ; view of the 
future life, 125, 270 ; on sufficiency 
of virtue, 293 ; devotion to pagan- 
ism, 124, 405 ; persecutes the 
Christians, 405. 

Austerity, 356. 

Avesta, 11. 

Babylonians, 3, 5. 

Bacon, Francis, 335 n. 27. 

Balbus, L. Lucilius, 385. 

Balbus, Q. Lucilius, 109, 386. 

Barea Soran.us, 399. 

Basilides, 98. 

Baths, 372. 

'Bear and forbear,' 126, 350. 

Beard, 259, 365. 

Beauty of the universe, 204, 226 ; of 
body and soul, 312 ; of women, 
319; of virtue, 325. St Paul not 
appreciative, 417. 

Beneficence, 307. 

Bertholet, D. a., 21 n. 57. 

Bigotry of Cleanthes, 90 ; of M. 
Aurelius, 405. 

Blessedness, 61. 

Blossius, C, 382. 

Body, the ultimate existence, 157 ; 
definition, 157 ; not the same as 
matter, 157 ; moves and has life, 
159; moves through body, 159, 
169 ; how known, 242 n. 17 ; is 
soul, 257 ; in St Paul, 416. Human 
body, 257 ; is a temple, 259 ; its 
humble parts, 254, 259, 313, 426. 
See also ' Flesh.' 



GENERAL INDEX 



453 



BOETHUS (of Sidon), 95 ; on the 

criterion, 143. 
BoiSSiER, G., 397 n. 95. 
bo7ium^ 281 ; sutnmum bomnn or 

ultinium bonortn/i, 281, 422. 
BowEN, Lord (translation by), 265, 

266. 
Boy-favourites, 287, 425. 
Brevity {brevitas), 149. 
Brutus, M. Junius, iio, 388. 
Buddhism, 14 sqq., 54, 295 n. 159. 
Burial, 66, 278. 

Caesar, C. Julius, his clemency, 
370. 

Callipho, 64. 

Callippus, 84. 

Cannibalism, 278. 

car it as, 423. 

Carneades, 63, 96 ; his visit to 
Rome, 100 ; on the criterion, 142 
n. 86 ; influence on Antipater, 96, 
144 ; criticizes the conflagration, 
192. 

CaSSIUS LONGINUS, 398. 

Castor, 232, 233. 

Categories of Aristotle, 59 ; of the 
Stoics, 164 sqq. 

Cato, M. Porcius, 108, 109, 
386 sqq. ; his marriage relations, 
277, 387 ; his death, 310, 388 ; as 
' wise man,' 297 ; honoured by the 
'old Romans,' 397. 

Cause (causa), in Aristotle, 60, 162 ; 
in Stoicism, 162 ; causa aniecede7is, 
c. principalis, c. proxima, 212 ; 
first cause, 219. 

Caution [cautio), 323 ; in court life, 
371 ; in Jesus, 412. 

Celibacy, advocated by Epictetus, 
368 ; by St Paul, 425. 

Ceres, 231. 

Chaldaism, 5, 6, 170, 182, 199. 

Chance, 199 sqq.; Epicurean theory 
ridiculed, 226. 

Chaos, 44, 194. 

Chastity, 348. 

Children, without speech, 146 ; with- 
out reason, 138, 260 ; their training, 
360 sqq. 

Christianity, 23 sqq. ; its Stoic strain, 
408 sqq. 

ChrySippus, 91 sqq. ; on the cri- 
terion, 141, 143; on anomaly, 145; 
on fallacies, 147 ; on definition 
and rhetoric, 148 ; defines the 



'universe,' 177 ; on the conflagra- 
tion, 192 ; on possibility, 201 ; on 
fate, 202 ; on particular providence, 
205 ; on evil, 207 ; on limitations 
of divine power, 208 ; no action 
without cause, 214 n. 92; on the 
' higher Being,' 224 ; on the uni- 
verse as a moral standard, 240 ; 
that soul is body, 242 ; wise souls 
only survive, 267 ; law the moral 
standard, 273, 275 ; on burial, 278 ; 
on slavery, 279; defines 'virtue' 
and ' nature,' 282 ; on diseases of 
the soul, 286 ; calls advantages 
' good,' 290 ; on wise men, 298 ; 
distinguishes arts and acquire- 
ments, 305 ; on justice, 307 ; on 
pleasure, 315, 316; on reputation, 
320 ; on political life, 338 n. 53 ; 
on drunkenness, 346 ; approves of 
the rod, 361 n. 39 ; on the profes- 
sions, 369. 

Cicero, ,M. T., recounts death of 
Cyrus, 10; meets Posidonius, 104; 
life, 108 ; criticism of Stoic dia- 
lectic, 152 ; in exile, 376. Acade- 
mica, 109; de Ajuiciiia, 382; de 
Divittaiione, 227 ; de Finibus, 109, 
283, 303, 388 ; de Natura Deortnn, 
105, 109, 386; de Officiis, 109, 283, 
303, 313; Paradoxa, 151; de Re 
publica, 280, 383, 386 ; de Senectiite, 
377 ; Tuscidanae disputatioites^ 
278. 

Circe, 31. 

City life, 371 sqq. 

Claudius (princeps), 113, 119. 

Cleanthes, 84 sqq. ; hymn to Zeus, 
85 ; on tone or tension, 89, 160 ; 
on the tabula rasa, 135 n. 52 ; on 
rhetoric, 148 sqq. ; on solar system, 
179; on moon and stars, 183; on 
fate, 202 ; on the soul's future, 
267; on woman, 270 n. 174; de- 
clines Athenian citizenship, 275 ; 
on obedience to God, 283 ; as 
wise man, 296 ; praise of virtue, 
299 ; on daily duties, 302 ; on 
pleasure, 315 ; that pain is a good, 
338. 

Clearness, 132. 

Clemen, C, 435 n. 157. 

Clemency, 340. 

Clemens, 432. 

Cleomenes 1 1 1, guided by Sphaerus, 
80, 311. 



454 



GENERAL INDEX 



Clothing, 66, 362, 365. 

COERANUS, 399. 

Cohesion, 189, 243 ; in the body, 
257. 

Cold, 181. 

collatio rationis, 135. 

Comets, 183. 

co/ninoda, 290. 

Common sense {sensiis communis), 
366. 

Commotions {emotiones)^ 351, 352 ; 
in Jesus, 412. 

composition 1 34. 

Comprehension icompi'ehetisid)^ 68, 
82, 249; how qualified, 74; de- 
fended by Chrysippus, 93 ; as the 
criterion, 141. 

coiiatus, 318 n. 109. 

concenius, 225. 

Conceptions, 135 sqq., 170. 

conclusion JT, n. 80. 

Condensation, 158, 167 sqq. 

Conditional sentence, 147. 

confatalian 201. 

Conflagration {conflagratio), 95 sqq., 
105, 190 sqq. ; denied by Panae- 
tius, 103 ; in Christianity, 417. 

Conformity, 45, 217, 404. 

conittncta, 167. 

coniiuictio tiaturaen 227 n. 67. 

Conjunction [coniunctio), 145. 

Conscience, 220, 320 ; in St Paul, 
415. 

Consent, common, 143 ; illustrated, 
223, 325. 

Consistency, 71, 282, 291. 

Consolations, 40, 342 sqq. 

Constancies {constantiae)^ 323 ; in 
Pauline writers, 412 n. 20, 423. 

Constellations, 5. 

constitution 260 n. 116. 

Constitutional theory, 46 ; in Aris- 
totle, 62 ; in Panaetius, 101 ; in 
the Roman Stoics, 280. 

continuatio nattirae, 227 n. 67. 

Contrary twist, 335, 364. 

convetiientiUn 71. 

Conversion {conversio)n 139, 327. 

CoRDUs, Cremutius, 392. 

Cornelius, Fidus, 341. 

cornutus, 112, 231, 395. 

Cosmology, 193 sqq. ; Christian, 417. 

Cosmopolis, 66, 196, 274, 284; levels 
race and sex, 271 ; in the Roman 
empire, 382 ; in Christianity, 423. 

COTTA, 104. 



Country life, 372. 

Courage, in Plato, 58; in Stoicism, 

294, 308; defined, 311; in women, 

362 ; at death, 378. 
Court life, 370. 
Crantor, 342. 
Crates, 65, 318. 
Crates (of Mallos), 98; teacher 

of Panaetius, 100 ; advocates 

'anomaly,' 146. 
Cratippus, 64. 
Creation, 60, 193 ; Pauline view, 428 ; 

compared with procreation, 254. 
Creator, in Plato, 57 ; in Aristotle, 

60; as the Logos, 161 ; in popular 

theology, 194. 
Crinis, 98. 
CRISPINUS, III. 
Criterion, 75, 130, 131, 141. 
Critolaus, 100. 
Cronos, 112, 231. 
Crossley, H., 17 n. 51. 
Cruelty, 336. 
Cupid, 231. 
Cynics, 16, 48 sqq.; their theory of 

morals, 288 ; freedom of speech, 

322. 
Cynism, a short cut to virtue, 97, 

365. . 
Cyrenaics, 50. 
Cyrus, 9 sqq. ; conquest of Ionia, 

34? yi ; described by Xenophon, 

50 ; a ' wise man,' 296. 

Daemons, 232, 264. 

Daily duties, 301 sqq. 

DamaSIPPUS, III. 

Dardanus, 107. 

Darius conquers Ionia, 37. 

Davidson, W. L., 27 n. 75, 262 

n. 133- 
Death, 261 ; of children, 343; how to 

be met, 333, 378 sqq. 
Decency, 312. 

decorum 312, 348; in speech, 149. 
Definition {de/initio), 148; in 

Sphaerus, 80. 
Deification, 79. 
Demeter, 231. 
Demetrius (Cynic philosopher), 

400. 
Demetrius (bishop), 434. 
Democritus, 41 ; theory of atoms 

and void, 156. 
Departure, reasonable, 309 sqq. 
Descartes, 242 n. 17. 



GENERAL INDEX 



455 



Determinism, 200. 

Dialectic, 129 sqq., 148; rejected by 
the Cynics, 49. 

di ivunortales^ 220. 

Diana, 231. 

DiCAEARCHUS, 64. 

Dido, 391. 

DiELS, H., no n. 75. 

difficilis, 335, 344 n, 94. 

dilatatio, 294 n. 148. 

Dill, S., 99 n. i, 380 n. i, Apo 
n. 108, 404 n. 126. 

DiO (of Prusa), 118. 

DlODORUS (Megarian), 51; against 
free will, 148; the 'master-argu- 
ment,' 201. 

DlODORUS (Peripatetic), 64. 

DiODOTUS, 108. 

Diogenes (the Cynic), 16, 48 sqq., 
274; on labour, 160; as 'wise 
man,' 296. 

Diogenes (of Seleucia), 96; visit to 
Rome, 100; his style in speaking, 
150; on music, 234; on the divine 
immanence, 240; on constitutions, 
280 ; definition of virtue, 283, 303 ; 
on reputation, 320. 

DiONYSlus (of Cyrene), 107. 

DIONYSIUS (of Heraclea), 84. 

Dionysus, no n. 76. 

DiOSCORIDES, 96. 

Dis, 231. 

Disadvantages, 322. 

Disappointment, 338. 

Discipline, 112; of pain, 338. 

Discontent, 331. 

Diseases of the soul, 332, 353. 

Disposition, 167. 

Divination, suggested by Socrates, 
43, 198; denied by Panaetius, 103; 
accepted by Posidonius, 105 ; an 
argument for the existence of 
gods, 227. 

Dog, 187. 

Dogmatism, 74; of St Paul, 415. 

DoMiTlAN expels the philosophers, 
120. 

Drinking, 304, 314, 317, 346. 

Driver, S. R., 9. 

Druidism, 24. 

DrUSUS, III. 

Dualism, 2>2> n. 22. Of Zarathustra, 
38 ; of Anaxagoras, 40 ; of Socrates, 
44 ; of Aristotle, 60 ; of Zeno, 69, 
172; of Clean thes, 88; of the 
Stoics, 157; of soul and body, 



157; of force and matter, 172; 

ot active and passive, 172; of 

good and bad men, 354. 
Duty, 301 sqq., 328 ; towards the 

gods, 237 ; daily duties, loi, 301 

sqq. 
Dyroff, a., 83 n. 42. 

Earth revolves on its axis, 178; 

round the sun, 179; a gross 

element, 225. 
Eating, 304, 314, 317, 345. 
Eclecticism, 106, 404. 

ECPHANTUS, 178. 

Education, 358; of children, 360; of 
slaves, 374. 

Egnatius Celer, 400. 

Ego, 125, 246. 

Eleatics, 34. 

Elements {elementd)^ 12, 156, 173, 
179, 196, 225; are divine, 219; in 
Empedocles, 41 ; their qualities, 

173- 

Elephantine, 9 n. 25. 

Emotions, see 'Commotions.' 

Empedocles, 41, 173. 

enodatio^ 137. 

Epictetus, i 19 sqq. ; on the soul's 
absorption, 125; defines dialectic, 
130; on certainty, 144; rejects 
divination, 228 ; on hymns, 235 ; 
on self-examination, 236; on 
obedience to God, 284 ; on the 
sufficiency of virtue, 293 ; on the 
' wise man,' 298 ; on the relation- 
ships, 307 ; on ' free departure,' 
311 ; on family affection, 341 ; 
consolations, 343 ; women to be 
avoided, 350; on celibacy, 368; 
on court life, 370; in exile, 401. 

Epicureans, 54, 93. 

Epicurus, 74; his logic, 137; theory 
of atoms, 159; on the gods, 225. 

Eratosthenes, 83. 

Eristics, 69. 

Eros, 231. 

essentia^ 158, 165. 

Ethics, 273 sqq. 

Etruscans, their monotheism, 10, 
221 ; reject images, 234. 

EUCLIDES (of Megara), 51. 

EUDOXUS, 182. 

EUDROMUS, 98. 

EUMENES II, 98. 

Eupathy, 324. 

Euphrates, 118. 



r 



456 



GENERAL INDEX 



Euripides, 39. 

eventa, 167. 

Evil, 206 sqq., 213 sqq., 330; in 

St Paul, 418. 
excessus rationalis, 309. 
Exercise, 359. 
Exhalations, 183, 260, 264. 
Exile, 376. 
exitus^ 309. 
experientia, 1 34. 

Fabius (Cunctator), 334. 

Fairweather, W., 21 n. 58, 23 
n. 62. 

Faith, 415. 

Fallacies, 51, 147. 

Fame, 320. 

Fannia, 393, 400. 

Fannius, C, 383. 

Fasting, 364. 

Fate {fattitn), in Chaldaism, 5 ; in 
Homer, 30; in Stoicism, 199 sqq. 

Favorinus, 360 n. 23. 

Fear, 331, 333 sqq. 

Fire, sacred to the Persians, 13; in 
Heraclitus, 35; with Zeno, 70; 
with Cleanthes, 89 ; tends up- 
wards, 180; elemental and primary, 
180; is divine, 219; is a refined 
element, 225. 

Flesh, 258; in St Paul, 416 sqq. 

Fleury, Amedi^-e, 433 n. 151. 

Flood, 278. 

Forcefulness, in Socrates, 42 ; in 
the Cynics, 49 ; in Crates, 65 ; in 
Epictetus, 120 ; in Stoic ethics, 
247 ; identified with virtue, 285 ; 
of Ulysses, 296; of Jesus, 411. 
forinido, see ' Fear.' 
fortitudo, see ' Courage.' 

Fortune, 199, 209. 

Fowler, W. Warde, 380 n. i, 

385 n- lil)- 
Freedom, 281, 304; of the will, 17, 

210. 
Fretfulness, 337. 
Friedlander, M., 23 n. 63. 
Friendship, 366. 
Furius, L. Philus, 280, 382. 
fusio universa. 169. 

Galileo, 179. 

Gallio, 406. 

Gallus, C. Aquilius, 385. 

Games, 360, 361. 

Garnett, R., 434 n. 156. 



gaudhivi, 324. 

Gautama, 14 sqq. 

Geldner, K., 7 n. 17; 12 n. 31. 

Gellius, a., 117; on Seneca, 114. 

Generation, see ' Procreation.' 

genius^ 232. 

Gentlemanliness, 61, 312. 

Geometry to be studied, 306. 

Germans, 272. 

Girls, education of, 362 ; girl students 
are disputatious, 367. 

Gladiator as ideal, 120, 363. 

Gladisch, a., 37 n. 45 ; 38 nn. 45 a 
and 45 b. 

gloria, 320. 

God, 218 sqq.; in Persism, 8; in 
Stoicism, 17, 218 sqq.; in Judaism, 
21 ; in Homer, 30; in Xenophanes, 
34; in Cynism, 48; with the Me- 
garians, 51 ; in world-literature, 
229; in Jesus, 411; in St Paul, 
419. His fatherhood, 30, 80, 221, 
409. His immanence, 181, 240, 
418; he dwells in heaven, 411. 
His limitations, 208, 212. Four 
proofs, 90, 223 sqq. Definitions, 
222. 

Gods, in Homer, 30 ; in Posidonius, 
104; in Cornutus, 112; Stoic inter- 
pretation, 40, 229 sqq. ; classified, 
384 ; in Virgil, 390. Rustic gods, 
229, 405. 

Golden age, 194. 

GoMPERZ, Th., 5 n. 3, 16 n. 48, 
30 n. 2, 32 n. 16, 33 nn. 19 to 21, 
34 n. 24, 35 n. 29, ^7 n. 44, 39 
nn. 47 and 48, 42 n. 59, 46 nn. 76 
and 78, 49 n. 85, 52 n. 92, 83 n. 43, 
277 n._29, 278 n. 41, 295 n. 159. 

Good, in Plato, 57; defined by 
Diogenes, 96; is bodily, 158; in 
Stoicism, 281. See also 'Virtue.' 

Gospel to the Hebrews, 430 n. 142. 

GOTTLING, C. W., 49 n. 85. 

Gracchi, 382. 
Graecinus, Iulius, 393. 
Graces {Grafiae), 231. 
Grammar, 144 sqq. 
Great year, 193. 
Greatheartedness, 308, 311. 
Greed, 331, 333 sqq. 
Greediness, 345. 
Grief, 331, 336. 
Grote, G., 46 n. 78. 
Gruppe, O., 430 n. 142. 
Gymnasia forbidden, 276. 



GENERAL INDEX 



457 



Gymnastics, 259, 359. 
Gymnosophists, 13 sqq. 

Habit {habitus)^ 168, 353. 

Hadrian, 121, 404. 

Haeckel, E., 252 sqq. 

Hatch, E., 20 n. 54. 

Health of soul, 247, 285, 286; of 

body, 261, 286 
Hearing, 250. 

Heat, 181; is rarefied body, 159. 
Heaven, home of the gods, 7, 21, 

222, 41 1, 419. 
Heberden, Dr, 433 n. 151. 
Hebraists, 428. 
Hecato, 105; on pleasure, 315; on 

wealth, 321 n. 130; his love-charm, 

366 n. 72. 
He'.nze, O., 23 n. 61, 161 n. 36. 
Heliocentric theory., 34, 90, 178 

sqq. 
Hell disbelieved, 223, 265. 
Hellenes, 9, 48, 83; not a superior 

race, 271, 274. 
Helvidius Priscus, 399. 
Henderson, B. W., 117, 395 n. 85, 

398 n. 96, 399 n. 99. 
Hera, see 'Juno.' 
Heraclides (of Pontus), 178. 
Heraclides (of Tarsus), 98 ; denied 

that sins are equal, 355. 
Heraclitus, 35 sqq. ; followed by 

Zeno, 70; by Cleanthes, 88 ; on the 

universe, 177; on the aether, 183; 

on the conflagration, 190, 191 ; on 

the microcosm, 240; on exhala- 
tions, 261 ; as 'wise man,' 296; 

on length of life, 309 n. 54. 
Hercules, personifies activity, 160; 

deified, 233, 296; as 'wise man,' 

295. 
Heredity, 251. 
Herillus, 81. 
H erodes Atticus, 403. 
Herodotus, 9. 
Hesiod, 31, 232, 364, 372. 
Hicetas, 178. 
Hicks, R. D., 133 n. 39, 139 n. 70, 

143 n. 89, 193 n. 130. 
Hierocles, 108. 

HiERONYMUS, 64. 
Hilarity, 331, 345 sqq. 
HiPPARCHIA, 65, 318. 

HiPPiAS (of Elis), 40. 
Hippocrates, on primary qualities, 
173- 



Hirzel, R., 81 n. 26, 83 n. 42, 88 
n. 67, 265 n. 145, 266 n. 150, 318 
n. 109. 

Hoffding, H., 227 n. 63. 

Homer, 30 sqq. 

Horace, hi, 389. 

Huet, p. D., 433 n. 151. 

hutnanitas^ 300, 381. 

Humour, 340, 342. 

Hylozoists, 32, 156. 

Hymns, of Cleanthes, 85 sqq.; of the 
Stoics, 234, 359; Christian, 419. 

id quod diciiur, 146. 

id quod est^ 158, 170. 

Idea, in Plato, 56 sqq. ; in Aristotle, 

59; not really existent, 136. 
ignava ratio, 200. 
ignavia, 332 n. 5. 
Images disallowed by the Persians, 8, 

9; by the Jews, 21 ; by Xenophanes, 

34; by Antisthenes, 48; by the 

Tuscans, 234; by Zeno, 66, 234, 

275. 
Immanence of the deity, 181, 240, 

418 ; in St Paul, 420. 
Immortality, 8, 262 sqq. 
impetus, 256. 
inaestiniabile, 289. 
Incest, 277. 
inclinatio, 286. 
incommoda, 290. 

Incontinence {incontinentia), 348 sqq. 
incorporalia, 1 70. 
Indians, 3 ; sympathy for animals, 

274 n. 10; disposal of the dead, 

278 ; asceticism, 359. 
indifferentia, 40, 289, 315. 
indoles bona, 326 n. 160. 
Induction, 56, 136. 
Inference, 135. 
Ingoldsby Legends, 434. 
iniustiiia, 332 n. 5. 
inopinata, 150. 
insipientia, 332 n. 5. 
intellegentiae incohatae, 138 n. 65. 
intemperantia, -332 n. 5. 
intentio, see ' Tone.' 
Intention {intentio), 87, 286. 
ifitolerantia, 349. 
Intuitionism, 49. 
ira, 333 sqq. 
iracundia, 335. 
iuncta Jato, 201. 
itis gentium, 385. 
iustitia, 231. 

29—5 



458 



GENERAL INDEX 



Jerusalem, 9. 

Jesus, 410 sqq. 

JEVONS, F. B., 241 n. 13, 426 n. 119. 

John (saint), 24, 431. 

Joy, 324- 

Judaism, 20 sqq. 

Julia Domna, 404. 

Julius Graecinus, 393. 

Junius Mauricus, 401. 

Juno, 112, 230, 278. 

Juppiter, 10, 221, 230; in Virgil, 390. 

See also 'Zeus.' t/o oA'VC 

Jurists, 384 sqq., 402 sqq. I 
Justice {iustitid)^ 58, 294, 307. 
Justin (Martyr), 421 n. 80, 432 

n. 149. 
Juvenal, 235, 402. 

Kanus Iulius, 393. 
Keble, J., 12 n. 32. 
Kingdom of heaven, 411; of the soul, 

238 sqq. 
Kingship, 369 sqq. 
Knowledge, 129, 140. 

Laelius, C, 381; as 'wise man,' 
297. 

laetitia, 316, 331 ; lael. gestiens or 
nttma, 316 n. lor. 

Language, its origin, 146. 

Lateranus Plautus, 399. 

LattJiitas, 1 49. 

Law, 71, 273, 276; in Virgil, 390; 
universal Law is divine, 36, 220, 
328 ; first laws of nature, 302 sqq. 
Law as a profession, 306. Roman 
law codified by Scaevola, 384 ; 
developed by the Antonini, 402. 

Lawcourts condemned, 276. 

Leisure, 2>77- 

Leucippus, 41. 

lex commutiis, 273 ; lex naturae, 385. 

'Liar' fallacy, 147. 

Liber, 233. 

Liberal arts, 306. 

Liberality, 373. 

Liberty {libertas) of the Cynics, 49 ; 
an advantage, 322 ; sought by 
slaves, 375; of the 'old Romans,' 

397- 
libido, 256, 331, 333. 
Life an advantage, 309; 'eternal' or 

'spiritual,' 414, 415, 422, 434. 
LiGHTFOOT, J. B., 24 n. 66, 29 n. i, 

354 n. 148, 380 n. I, 409 n. 2, 425 

n. 112. 



LiviA, III, 343. 

Locke, on the tabula rasa, 135 

n. 52. 
Logic, 128 sqq.; its use, 306; its 

danger, 115, 120, 151 sqq., 403. 
Logos, in Persism, 12, 19; in Philo, 

23 ; in Heraclitus, 35 sqq. ; in 

Zeno, 17, 70 ; in Cleanthes, 88 sqq. ; 

in Posidonius, 105. As creator, 

161 ; as the active principle, 172 ; 

as fate, 202 ; as Providence, 203 ; 

is God, 219; as bond of the state, 

273, 275 ; in Christianity, 417 sqq., 

431 sqq. 
Long, G., 206 n. 46. 
Love, 317 sqq. ; in the State, 67, 275 ; 

in St Paul, 423. 
LUCAN, 112, 395 sqq.; account of 

Druidism, 25 ; pupil of Cornutus, 

112. 
Lucidity, 149. 

Lucilius, C. (poet), visited Posi- 
donius, 104; on style, 150; his 

poems, 383. 
Lucilius, C. (official), 397. 
LucuLLUS, L. LiciNius, 109. 
Lucretius on fortune, 199 n. 3; on 

procreation, 251. 
luctus, 344. 
Luna, 231. 
Luxury, 362, 364. 

Maccabees iv, 23. 

Macrocosm, 61, 90, 238, 240. 

Magi, 3, 6, 7. 

magnitiido aniini, 308. 

Mahaffy, J. P., 15 n. 46, 16 n. 47, 

27, 54 n. 2, 80 n. 15, 84 n. 44, 174 

n. 113. 
Maine, Sir H., 277 n. 29, 402 

n. 122. 
Man, his position in the universe, 

186; his erect figure, 391; 'all 

men are equal,' 403. 
Marcia (wife of Cato), 387. 
Marcia (daughter of Cremutius), 

342, 392- 
Marriage, approved, 276 ; a social 

duty, 284, 318 ; discourse by Anti- 
pater, 318 ; by Musonius, 367. 

Stoic marriages, 383. 
Mars, 231. 
Mary (Virgin), 23 1 n. 83 ; as Wisdom, 

430 n. 142. 
'Master-argument,' 148, 201 sqq. 
materia, 44, 60, 157, 172. 



GENERAL INDEX 



459 



Materialism, 41, 157, 253; limited 

by the Stoics, 242. 
mathematici^ 6. 
Matter {maleria), with Socrates, 44 ; 

in Aristotle, 60; Stoic views. 157, 

173- 

Maudsley, H., 351 n. 131. 

Maunder, Sir E. W., 5 n. 5. 

Mayor, J. E. B., 295 n. 159. 

Mayor, J. B., 182 n. 58, 209 n. 68, 
225 n. 54, 249 n. 62. 

Megarians, 51. 

Memory, 134. 

meiiliens, 147. 

vietus, 331, 333 sqq. 

Microcosm in Aristotle, 61 ; in 
Cleanthes, 90 ; Stoic view, 238, 
240. 

Milton, J., 425 n. 112. 

Mind-picture, 68, 131. 

Minerva, 231. 

Miracles do not happen, 434.. 

Misanthropy, 344. 

Mithra-worship, 184. 

Mnesarchus, 107. 

Modesty, 313, 326. 

MOMMSEN, Th., 217 n. I. 

Monarchy, favoured by Socrates, 46 ; 
by Sphaerus, 80 ; by the Stoics, 396. 

Monism, ■^j, n. 22 ; in Xenophanes, 
35; in the Megarians, 51 ; in Zeno, 
70 ; in Cleanthes, 88 ; in the 
Pythagoreans, 104; of the Cynics, 
220 n. 24 ; of mind and matter, 
134; of soul and body, 157 ; of the 
existent, 170. 

Monotheism, see 'God.' 

Montesquieu, 27 n. 74. 

Moon, 182. 

Motherhood, 255, 375. 

Motion, 159, 180. 

motus levis, 351. 

Mourning, 344, 424 n. 100. 

mundus, see ' Universe.' 

MUSONIUS, 116 sqq. ; against relaxa- 
tion, 285; on greediness, 345; on 
marriage, 367, 368 ; on kingship, 
370 ; on pastoral life, 372 ; on old 
^S^i 377 '■> discourages sedition, 
399 ; attacks Egnatius, 400 ; ex- 
empted from exile, 401. 

Mythology, Christian, 428. 

tiatura, (i) growth, 168, 242; (2) 
category of e3?istence, 179, 218. 
See also 'Nature.' 



Nature, as standard of morals, 95, 
240, 282 ; common to all philoso- 
phies, 385. 

Neatness, 320, 365. 

Necessity (iiecessitas naturalis), 200, 
208, 224, 344. 

Neptunus, 231. 

Nero, 113, 117, 394 sqq. 

Nerva, 404. 

Nestor (philosopher), 392. 

Nettleship, H., 385 n. 28. 

Newman, J. H., 12 n. ■},^. 

Nicanor, jig n. 76. 

Nobility, 320; in Euripides, 39. 

nomen (noifn), 145. 

Nominalism of the Cynics, 49 ; of 
Zeno, 68; of the Stoics, 136. 

Notions {iiotiones), 135; not. com- 
mtmes and insitae, 138. 

Obedience to God, 283, 363 ; to 
parents, 363 ; to natural law, 385. 

Object {obiectum), 157; is existent, 1 72. 

Ocean, its exhalations, 183. 

OCTAVIA, 343. 

odium generis hteynani, 345. 

Odyssey moralized, 31. 

offensio, 353. 

ojfficium., loi, 301 sqq. ; off. perfectum, 
326. 

Old age, 261, 309, 2,77 sqq. 

Old Romans, 381 sqq. 

Opinion {opiitio)., 68, 133. 

oratio pellucida., 149. 

Origen, 420 n. ^^, 430 n. 132, 432 ; 
excommunicated, 434. 

Orphic fragments, 32. 

Ovid, 391 ; on the golden age, 195. 

Paconius Agrippinus, 399. 

Paetus, Caecina, 393. 

Paetus, Thrasea, 394, 399. 

Pagan revival, 405. 

Pain, to be met with Courage, 308 ; 
is no evil, 2)37, 364- 

Pan, 112. 

Panaetius, 100 sqq. ; abandons the 
'conflagration,' 103; on advocacy, 
144; on the planets, 182 ; questions 
divination, 227 ; and immortaHty, 
267 ; on slavery, 279 ; on govern- 
ment, 280; definition of virtue, 
283 ; on social duty, 284 ; on the 
'sufficiency,' 292; on daily duties, 
303 ; on anger, 2)33 "• 9 ; letter to 
O. Tubero, 337. 



460 



GENERAL INDEX 



Pantaenus, 432. 

Pantheism, in Hesiod, 32 ; of Aratus, 
80 ; of Cleanthes, 90 ; limited by 
the Stoics, 18, 185, 219 ; by St 
Paul, 418. 

Paradox, 150. 

Paradoxes, 151;' body moves through 
body,' 159, 169; 'soul is body,' 
69, 157, 241 ; is an animal, 243 ; 
'virtues are bodies,' 158; 'if there 
are altars, there are gods,' 227 ; 
'man is god,' 248; 'no man sins 
willingly,' 45, 49, 257; 'virtue can 
be taught,' 285 ; 'sin is ignorance,' 

331 ; 'virtue is sufficient,' 291; 
'is knowledge,' 44, 45, 49, 257, 285 ; 
'is the true nobility,' 320; 'cannot 
be lost,' 295 ; 'wise man is a king,' 
66, III, 299, 338; 'is a good 
general,' 79; 'never errs,' 102; 'is 
a lover,' 318, 348 ; 'needs nothing,' 
293 ; ' is happy on the rack,' 299 ; 
'is a god,' 299; 'he who is not 
wise is a fool,' 355 ; 'is a slave,' 
424; 'he who has one vice has all,' 

332 n. 5, 355; 'all sins are equal,' 
354^ 'affections must be extir- 
pated,' 332, 354; 'riches are not 
a good,' 321 ; 'pain is no evil,' 
102, 337 ; ' is a good,' 338 ; 'death 
is no evil,' 309, 344; 'is a boon,' 
309 ; ' these three are one,' 433. 

Parts of philosophy, 128 ; of speech, 

145- 

Passion, 59. 

Pastoral hfe, 372. 

Paul (saint), 24, 409 sqq. ; education, 
414; theory of 'body,' 416; of sin, 
418; of human nature, 419; of 
immortality, 421 ; of tabus, 423 ; 
breach with Hebraists, 428 ; on 
birth of Jesus, 430. 

Paulina, 367. 

Peace, see ' Tranquillity.' 

Pearson, A. C, 70 n. 61, 75 n. 90, 
85 n. 58, 86 n. 59, 94 n. 102, 133 
n. 34, 141 n. 81, 162 n. 39, 194 
n. 132, 195 n. 139, 196 and 197, 
222 n. 32, 227 n. 63, 264 n. 144, 
292 n. 127, 315 n. 92, 326 n. 160, 
346 n. 104. 

peccatum^ 330, 425 n. in. 

Pedanius Secundus, 398. 

Penetration, 159, 169; by the deity, 
181, 189 ; by the soul, 259 ; in 
marriage, 319. 



Perceptions, 135 sqq. 

Pergamus, 99. 

Peripatetics, 63 sqq. ; on Anger, 

333- 

Persaeus, 79, 311. 

Persecution of Christians, 405. 

Persephone, 231. 

Persism, 6 sqq. ; influence on Hera- 
clitus, 37 ; on the evil spirit, 232 ; 
on body and soul, 241 ; on future 
rewards, 264 ; disposal of the dead, 
278 ; men good and bad, 354 ; 
influence on Christianity, 435 
n. 157. See also 'Angels,' 'Zara- 
thustra.' 

Persius, 112, 395. 

Person {persona), 246 n. 42 ; 433 

n. 154. 
perspicicitas, 132. 

Perturbation {perturb atio), 332, 351 
n. 131, 352. 

Peter (saint), 428 ; his popularity, 
429. 

Phantasm, 132. 

Pharisees, 21 n. 56, 411. 

Philo, 23 ; follows Posidonius, 105. 

Philonides, 80, 311. 

Philosophy, its subject-matter, 2 ; 
derived from the East, 3 ; its parts, 
128; becomes ill-defined, 106; is 
unpopular, 356 n. 159; persecuted, 
393 ; established, 404 ; absorbed in 
Christianity, 413 sqq. 

Philus, see ' Furius.' 

Phrase, 146. 

Physicians respected, 286, 369. 

Physics, 155 sqq. ; value of the study, 
306. 

Picture (of Samos), 231 n. 83. 

PiSO, conspires against Nero, 117. 

Pity, 340. 

Place, 59. 

Planets, 182. 

Plants, 186, 188. 

Plato, 26, 55 sqq.; theory of ideas 
still-born, 56 ; view of the solar 
system, 179, 182 ; on the soul, 255 ; 
on slavery, 279 ; commentary on 
the Timaeiis by Posidonius, 104, 
134 n. 40 ; the P/iaedo, 245 ; the 
Republic, 66, 274. 

Plautus, 230 n. 79 ; 232 n. 95 ; 236 
n. 125. 

Plautus Lateranus, 399. 

Pleasure, 314 sqq., 331. 

Pluto, 231. 



GENERAL INDEX 



461 



POLEMO, 63 ; teacher of Zeno, 69 ; 

taught 'first lessons of nature,' 302. 
Politics, of Socrates, 45 ; of Plato, 

58; of Aristotle, 61 ; of the Stoics, 

280; participation a duty, 43, 284; 

sometimes avoided, 116, 338 sqq. ; 

as a profession, 369. 
POLLIO, 117. 
Pollux, 232, 233. 
POLYBIUS, lOI, 280. 
POLYGNOTUS, 71. 

Polytheism, 218. 

POMPEIUS, S. (uncle of Magnus), 
386. 

POMPEIUS (Magnus), meets Posi- 
donius, 104. 

Pontius Pilatus, 405. 

PORCIA, 388. 

Porter, W. H., translation oi Hymti 
of Cleanthes^ 85 to 87 ; other trans- 
lations, 395, 396. 

POSIDONIUS, 104 sqq. ; on general 
consent, 143; opposes heliocentric 
doctrine, 179; view of the solar 
system, 182; adheres to the 'con- 
flagration,' 192; on the 'golden 
age,' 194, 195 ; on fate, 200 ; 
religious sentiment, 217; defends 
divination, 227 ; belief in daemons, 
232; on hymns, 235; on sight, 250; 
on immortality, 267; lays stress on 
precepts, 357 n. 3. 

POSIDONIUS (of Alexandria), 84. 

Possibility, 201. 

Poverty, 375. 

praecipua, praelata, praeposita, 290. 

praesumptio^ 1 36. 

Prayer, of Socrates, 45 ; with the 
Stoics, 213, 235 sqq. ; Lord's 
prayer, 23, 411. 

Precepts, 357 ; must be few and easy, 
358. 

Preconception, 136; of deity, 224. 

Predication, 146; is true or untrue, 
172. 

Presumption, 136. 

Principate {prmcipale^ principatus), 
89, 90 n. 81, 130; of the universe, 
186; of animals and plants, 188; 
in man, 245 sqq.; as 'spirit' in 
St Paul, 420. 

principia (i) in physics, 173 ; (2) pr. 
naturae^ in ethics, 302. 

Probability, 143; the guide of daily 
life, 303 n. 13. See also 'Reason- 
ableness.' 



Probationer, 102, 294. See also 
' Progress.' 

Procreation, 251 sqq.; in Lucretius, 
251; in Haeckel, 252; these 
theories inadequate, 253; its taint, 
427 ; spiritual procreation, 428. 

Prodicus, 39; 'choice of Hercules,' 
299. 

producta, 290. 

Professions, 313, 369. 

prqpdejis, see ' Probationei",' ' Pro- 
gress.' 

Progress {progressio), 102, 294, 
325 sqq. ; in St Paul, 424. 

proloqiiiuin^proniintiatuni^ 146 n. 1 1 1. 

Prometheus, 112. 

promota, 290. 

Property justified, 307. 

proportion 1 34. 

Proposition, 146. 

proprietas^ 1 49. 

Proserpina, 231. 

Proverbs, 361. 

Providence, taught by Socrates, 44 ; 
by Panaetius, 103 ; by the Stoics, 
203 sqq. ; particular providence, 
205 ; the human body its master- 
piece, 44, 259 ; belief of M. 
Aurelius, 123. 

prudentia^ 306 sqq. 

Ptolemy II (Philadelphus), 16. 

Ptolemy III (Euergetes), 80, 83. 

Ptolemy IV (Philopator), 143. 

Punishment, 336. 

Purgatory, 67, 265 sqq. 

Pythagoras, ■^■^ ; belief in the 
Kd(r/xos-, 170; on self-examination, 
236. 

Pythagoreans, on the monad, 104; 
heliocentric theory, 178 ; the 'great 
year,' 193. 

Quality {qualitas)^ 59, 164 to 166;. 

in Aristotle, 59; of the elements, 

173; is body, 166. 
Quantity, 59. 
Quiddity {qiiid)^ 171. 
qtiinta essentia^ 60. 
QuiNTiLlAN, on Seneca, 114; on 

Stoic oratory, 149 n. 132. 
qiiod est, 170. 

Rabbis, 410. 
rabiosus, 335. 
Race-suicide, 375. 
Rarefaction, 33, 158, 167 sqq. 



462 



GENERAL INDEX 



ratio ^ 135 ; r. probabilis, 63 n. 17 ; 
r. vera, yi, 273 ; ra/io atqtie oratto, 
2)7, 187, 275 ; collatio rationis, 135 ; 
r. ignava, 200 ; r. 7inivcrsa, 224. 
See also 'Logos' and 'Wisdom.' 

Readiness, 324. 

Realism of Plato, 57. 

' Reaper,' 148. 

Reason, see 'Logos,' 'ratio,' Wisdom.' 

Reasonable departure, 309. 

Reasonableness, 63, 81, 143 ; ad- 
mitted by Chrysippus, 93, 303 ; 
advocated by Diogenes, 96, 303 ; 
by Panaetius, 103; in ethics, 283, 

325- 
recte factum, 294. 
Reichel, O. J., 20 n. 54. 
Reid, J. S., 63 n. 15, 104 n. 34, 108 

n. 62, 109 n. 68, no n. 72, 137 

n. 63, 178 n. 26. 
reiecta, 290. 
Relation, 59. 
Relationship, duties of, 106, 169, 

307 ; in the Paulists, 424. 
Relative position, 168. 
Relaxation, 285, 361. 
Relij^ion, 216 sqq.; in St Paul, 419. 

See also 'God,' 'Prayer,' 'Hymns.' 
remota, 290. 
Renan, E., 402, 403 n. 123, 406 

nn. 129 and 131. 
Renuall, G. H., 17 n. 51, 20 n. 54, 

87 n. 61, 123 to 127, 170 n. 85, 

288 n. 107, 405. 
renovatio, 193. 
Republic of Plato, 58, 66, 274; of 

Zeno, 66, 274 sqq. ; of Jesus, 411. 
reptels", 338. 
Reputation, 320. 
res familiar is, 321, 369. 
res quodafnmodo se habens, 167. 
Resignation, 120, 126, 343. 
Restlessness, 339, 353. 
Resurrection, Pauline view, 416, 

420 sqq., 430. 
Rewards, future, 263. 
Rhea, 231. 

Rhetoric, 129, 148, 150. 
Rhodes, 99. 

Rhys Davids, T. W., 295 n. 159. 
Rigveda, 232, 427. 
Roman law, 281, 384, 402. 
Romulus, 233. 

RUBELLIUS PLAUTUS, I 1 7, 399. 

Ruffling, 332, 351; shown by tears, 
391 n. 71. 



RUSTICUS, Q. lUNIus, 121 sqq. 
RUTILIUS, P. RUFUS, 297, 384, 386. 

Saal, N., 83 n. 42. 

Sachau, Dr, 9 n. 25. 

sacrametitum, 364. 

Sacrifices, condemned by Zeno, 66; 
by Seneca, 234; by Jesus, 411; 
by the Paulists, 419. 

Sanctity, 324. 

Sandys, J. E., 98 n. 133; 145 nn. loi 
and 103. 

sapientia, 306. 

SCAEVOLA the augur, 383. 

SCAEVOLA the pontif^x, 383 sqq. 

SCHMEKEL, A., 100 n. 5, loi n. 17, 
102 n. 24, 103 nn. 25, 27 and 29, 
104 nn. 32 and y:,, 105 n. 39, 107 
n. 55, 142 n. 86, 179 n. 33, 182 nn. 53 
and 54, 185 n. 76, 192 n. 123, 193 
n. 129, 195 nn. 136 and 137, 245 
n. 38, 258 n. 103, 267 nn. 152 and 
156, 280 n. 50, 298 n. 179, 342 
n. 74, 383 n. 18. 

Schmidt, R., 145 n. 103. 

Science {scientia), 68, 140, 306. 

SCIPIO, 20, loi, 280, 297, 381. 

Scott, Sir W., 6. 

SCYLAX, loi n. 18. 

secta, 99 n. 2. 

Seed-powers, 161, 195, 251, 254; in 
St Paul, 421. 

Seleucus (of the Tigris), 96. 

Seleucus (the astronomer), 179. 

Self-examination, 236, 360. 

se77ien, 161. 

Seneca, 113 sqq.; on wealth, 115, 
322 sqq. ; on 'tone,' 115; on general 
assent, 1 43 ; on the causes, 1 62 sqq. ; 
admiration of the heavens, 176; on 
the heliocentric theory, 178 n. 28; 
condemns sacrifice, 234; on self- 
examination, 236; on Tartarus, 
265 ; on immortality, 268 ; on woman, 
270; on climate, 271; on usury, 
276 n. 23 ; on obedience to God, 
284; calls 'advantages' good, 290; 
on 'sufficiency of virtue,' 293; on 
the ' wise man,' 298 ; on suicide, 
311; on anger, 334; on cruelty, 
336; consolations, 342; on drunken- 
ness, 346 ; to Lucilius, 358 ; on 
neatness, 365 ; married life, 367 ; 
exile, 376 ; part in political life, 

113, 394- 
Senecio, 401. 



GENERAL INDEX 



463 



>^ 



Sensation (sensus), 130, 249. Sensa- 
tions are always true, 131. 

Sense, common, 137 n. 59. 

Senses {sensics), 130; their weakness, 
144. 

Sensibility, 340. 

Sensitiveness, 341. 

senteniiae, 361. 

Septimius Severus, 404. 

Sermon of Benares, 15; on the 
mount, 24, 429. 

Servilia, 399. 

Sexual appetite,' 304, 314, 317, 347; 
revolting to St Paul, 425 sqq. 

Shame, 324. 

Shipwreck, 379. 

Sight, 130, 249. 

Sign {signimi)^ 147. 

silva^ 158. 

Similitude, 134. 

Simple life, in, 364. 

Sin, 330 sqq. ; is ignorance, 331; is 
sickness, 332 ; hateful to the Stoics, 
354; to St Paul, 418, 423. 'Sins 
are equal,' 354; are curable, 355. 

Sirens, 31. 

Skeat, W. W., 99 n. 2. 

"lavery, 279, 374, 397 sqq., 403 sqq.; 
in Euripides, 39. 

Sleep, 132 n. 28, 261. 

Smell, 250. 

Smiley, C. N., 150 n. 137. 

Smith, V. A., 16 n. 47. 

Soberness, 58, 294, 312 sqq.; made 
dominant by Panaetius, 103. 

Social duty, 284. 

Society, 366. 

Socrates, 10, 41 sqq., 274, 275, 310. 

Softness, 362. 

Soldier as ideal, 363. 

Solecism, 149. 

Solitude, 366. 

Sophistry as a profession, 369. 

Sophists, 39. 

Sophocles, 39. 

SoRANUs, 399. 

SoTiON, 113. 

Soul, 168; is divine, 32; in Plato, 57; 
in Aristotle, 61; is body, 69, 157; 
in man, 238 sqq.; its parts, 242, 
245 ; consists of hot air, 243 ; is 
fed by the body, 260; future ab- 
sorption, 269; its health, 285; in 
St Paul, 420. 

Space, 158. 

Speech, 146. 



Spes, 231. 

Sphaerus, 80, 143, 311. 

Spirit, favourite conception of 
Cleanthes, 89; its destiny, 125; 
in sensation, 130; in rarefaction, 
158; equivalent to tone, 160; the 
principle of life, 181; its gradations, 
186, 243; in the sense-activities, 
245, 250; in St Paul, 415 sqq.; as 
mother of Jesus, 430. 

Spiritism, 241. 

Spirits, see ' Angels.' 

Stars, are divine, 184; as divine 
spies, 232. 

Staseas, 64. 

Statements, are true or false, 146, 
171; are not bodily, 170. 

Steigmuller, H., 178 n. 27. 

Stein, L., 71 n. 64, 88 n. 67, 133 
n. 39, 135 n. 52, 161 n. 36, 240 
n. 2, 243 n. 23, 244 n. 31, 245 
n. 35, 258 n. 103, 260 n. 118, 261 
n. 123, 262 n. 133, 273 n. i. 

Stertinius, hi. 

Stilo, L. Aelius, 385. 

Stilpo, 51, 67. 

Stobaeus, no, 117. 

Stoicism, 17 sqq. ; estimates of its 
value, 26 sqq.; inclines to the 
Academy, 94, 106, 152; to Cynism, 
121; amongst the poor, 380; its 
kindly temper, 340 n. 66 ; es- 
tablished, 404; its collapse, 406. 

stojnachosus, 335. 

Strain, 160. See also 'Tone.' 

Stuff, 157. 

Style, 148 ; of Laelius, 382 ; of 
Rutilius, 384; of Cato, 386; of 
Brutus, 388. 

Subject {subiectum), 157. 

sublatio animi, 316. 

Substance, in Aristotle, 59 ; in 
Stoicism, 164 sqq. 

Siibslratiim, 158, 166. 

Sufficiency of virtue, 49, 105, 291 sqq.; 
taught by the Cynics, 49; by Hecato, 
106 ; by Posidonius, 105 ; questioned 
by Antipater, 97 ; in St Paul, 425. 

Suicide, 309; its dangers, 310. 

SULPICIUS, S. RUFUS, 342, 385. 

Summers, W. C, 244 n. 31. 

summum bomnn, 281. 

Sun, 182; his divinity, 90, 184; fed 
by Ocean, 184; is principate, 184. 

Suspense of judgment, 120, 133, 

■ 144- 



464 



GENERAL INDEX 



Syllogism, in Aristotle, 60; in Zeno, 
73 ; in Chrysippus, 92. Its varieties, 
147. 

tabula rasa, 135 n. 52. 

Tabus, 287, 423, 426. 

Tannery, P., 178 n. 27. 

Tarsus, 24 n. 65, 91, no, 414 n. 28. 

Tartarus discredited, 223, 265, 378. 

Taste, 250. 

Teaching profession, 369. 

Temperament, 244. 

Temperance, see ' Soberness.' 

temperatiira, 244. 

Temples, condemned by Zeno, 66, 

234, 275; by Jesus, 411. 
Tension, see ' Tone.' 
Teuffel, W. S., Ill nn. 80 and 82. 
Thales, y:,. 
Theognis, 373. 
Theology, its four dogmas, 218. 

THEON, III. 

Theophilus, 432 n. 150. 
Theophrastus, 64, 179; on anger, 

333 n- II- 
Thrasea Partus, 394, 399. 
Tiberius, 6 n. 12, 392. 
Time, 59, 159. 
titillatio, 316. 

Tolstoy, Leo, 153 n. 148. 
Tone {intentio), 89, 115, 160, 243, 

260, 285 ; of seeds, 188; in morals, 

247. 
Touch, 250; 'inward touch,' 139, 

242. 
Trajan, 404. 

Tranquillity, 247 n. 54, 356. 
ti'ansitio, 1 34. 
translatio, 1 34. 
Transmigration, 34. 
Trinity, 432 ; alleged suggestion by 

Seneca, 433. 
TUBERO, Q., 337, 382. 
Tylor, E. B,, 241 n. 13. 
Tyrant, 46, 280, 308 ; may be slain, 

336. 

Uberweg, Fr., yj n. 45, 55 n. 3, 61 
/ n. II. 

iiltimnm bo7torum, 281. 

Ulysses, 31, 296. 

unitas, 168, 189, 243 ; of the universe, 
226. 

Universe, 170, 175 sqq.; is rational 
and divine, 184; destined to perish, 
190; two meanings, 191; its equi- 



librium, 196; its beauty, 204; is 
possessed of will, 240; in St Paul, 
414. 

Uranus, 231 n. 88. 

Usury condemned, 276 n. 23. 

Varro, M. T., 109, 185, 190 n. 107, 
195, 388. 

Vegetarianism, 34. 

Venus, 231. 

verbum, 145. 

verecundta, 313, 324, 326. 

Vespasian, 117, 118, 400. 

Vexation, 331. 

Vice, 213, 332, 351, 353 sqq. ; in 
St Paul, 423. 

Virgil, debt to Aratus, 80 ; on fate, 
199; on fatherhood of God, 221 ; 
on purgatory, 265 sqq. ; on Cato, 
388 ; on government of the uni- 
verse, 390. 

Virgin birth, 231, 430. 

Virtue [virtus), is knowledge, 44, 45, 
67, 257, 285 ; can be taught, 44, 
285 ; in Plato, 58 ; defined iDy 
Sphaerus and Herillus, 81 ; is one, 
281 ; is a body, 158, 168 ; is the 
end, 281 ; is in the aim, 286, 291 ; 
is health of soul, 285 ; is sufficient, 
291 ; permits no addition, 292 ; is 
one and many, 293, 305 ; cannot 
be lost, 295 ; its praise, 299; its 
attraction, 325 ; how attained, 
326 sqq. 

Virtues, the four, in Aristo, 83 ; in 
Panaetius, 103 ; in Stoicism, 294 ; 
longer lists, 305 n. 30; in St Paul, 
423 ; are permanent dispositions, 
168, 323. 

vis divina, 220. 

visu?n, 68, 249. 

vitiiun, see Vice. 

Voice, 250. 

Void, 159, 170. 

voluntas, (i) 'will' 286 ; (2) 'readi- 
ness,' 324. 

Voss, Otto, 178 n. 27. 

Vulcan, 231. 

Walking, 89, 250. 
War is useful, 207. 
Wealth, 115, 320 sqq. 
Westcott, B. F., 420 n. 'JT. 
Weymouth, R. F., 410 sqq. 
Will, 68, 246, 256 ; its freedom, 
210 sqq. 



GENERAL INDEX 



465 



Williams-Jackson, A. V., 7 n. 15, 
8 n. 18. 

Will-making, 378. 

WiNCKLER, H. A., 24 n. 66, 262 
n. 133, 269 n. 166, 408 n. i, 409 
n. 2, 435 n. 159. 

Wine-drinking, 346. 

Wisdom in Persism, 12; in Wisdom 
of Soloftion, 22 ; in Plato, 58 ; as 
cardinal virtue, 58, 294 ; as daily 
duty, 306 ; identified with the 
Virgin Mary, 430; included in the 
Trinity, 432. 

Wisdom of Solomon, 21 sqq. 

Wise men, 105, 295 sqq., 325 ; in 
Horace, 389; men wise without 
knowing it, 327. 

Women equal to men, 270 ; to wear 
the same clothes, 288, 365 ; to be 
in common, 66, 276; to be fled 
from, 350; need the four virtues, 
362 ; to dress their hair, 365 ; in 
life of Cato, 387 ; in Ovid, 392 ; 
in St Paul, 417; the hair tabu, 
426. See also 'Chastity,' 'Love,' 
and ' Marriage.' 

Word, see ' Logos.' 

Wordsworth, W., 328 sqq. 

World-order, see ' Universe.' 

World-religions, 4 sqq. 

Worship, 233 ; a proof of deity, 226. 

Worth, 72, 289. 

Xenocrates, 63, 128. 
Xenophanes, 34. 
Xenophon, 10, 46, 50. 
Xerxes, 339. 

Yama and YamI, 427. 
Youth, 363 sqq. 



Zarathustra, 7 sqq. ; followed by 
Heraclitus, 37. 

Zeller, E., 26, 55 n. 4, 80^. 17, 
88 n. 66, 96 n. 114, 129 n. 9, 
135 n. 51, 146 n. 107, 151 
n. 141, 164 n. 48, 167 n. 64, 185 
n. 78, 193 n. 128, 228 n. 70, 256 
n. 96, 262 n. 133, 273 n. i, 288 
n. 107. 

Zeno, 17, 64 sqq.; his Republic, 66 ; 
turns to Stilpo, 67 ; to Polemo, 69 ; 
to Heraclitus, 70; theory of virtue, 
72 ; use of syllogisms, J2> j O"^ tone, 
160 ; on the active and the passive, 
172 ; on fate, 200, 202 ; on the 
Logos, 219 n. 3; on piety, 227, 
234 ; on the macrocosm, 240 ; on 
future punishments, 264 n. 143 ; 
on the Cosmopolis, 274 sqq. ; de- 
clines Athenian citizenship, 275 ; 
on marriage, 276 ; on advantages, 
289; on sufficiency of virtue, 292 ; 
on progress, 294 n. 152; as wise 
man, 296 ; on ' wise men,' 298 ; 
on daily duties, 302 ; on wisdom, 
306; on pleasure, 315; on drink- 
ing, 346; on dressing the hair, 

365- 
Zeno (of Sidon : Epicurean), 84. 
Zeno (of Sidon: Stoic), 84. 
Zeno (of Tarsus), 84; questions the 

conflagration, 96. 
Zenodotus, 97. 
Zeus, in Homer, 30; in the Orphic 

poems, 32 ; in Aeschylus, 38 ; in 

Socrates, 45 ; in Aratus, 80 ; in 

Cleanthes, 85; as Creator, 194; 

as the one God, 221. See also 

' Juppiter.' 
Zoroaster, see ' Zarathustra.' 



GREEK INDEX. 



ayaTTT], 423' 

dyufia, 324. 

adiacpopia, 83. 

dSiKta, 332 n. 5. 

■al8d}s, 30, 324, 326. 

alaa, 3°- 

a'lcrdria-is, 130, 249. 

alaBrjTTjpia, 1 30, 249. 

aladrjTov, 130, 1 57. 

atrt'a, see ' Cause.' 

alav (derivation), 146. 

aKaToXrjylrla, 388 n. 55. 

uKoXaata, 332 n. 5. 

aXAoicotrts, 131 n. 1 9. 

ap.dpTrjfia, 330. 

djiaprla, 1 33, 425 n. II. 

afxercnrTcoaia, 327 ri- 1 68. 

dvaOvpiaais, 1 83, 260, 264- 

avaiTiov^ 2(4' 

dva\yrj(rla, 324 n. 1 53. 

di'aAoyt'a, 134* 

dvBpda, 308, and see ' Courage.' 

dvrjKOVTa, 424 n. I02. 

dvTiXr]\p-is, 133 n. 38. 

a^t'a, 72, 289 ; d^i'av e;^oi'7-a 289 n. 109. 

d^i<jop.a, 146. 

ddpicrrof, 145- 

aTrddeia, 324 n. 1 53; cf. 48 n. 80. 

dva^'ia, 289, 323. 

direipov, T,2>-, 57- 

aTToSet^ts, 139- 

dirovia, 315 n. 92. 

diToiTporjypiva, J2, 290. 

dTrocTTratr/ia, 254 n. 86. 

dpyos Xoyos, 200. 

dpeTT], see 'Virtue'; dp. o'lKtia, 63, 

« 95- 

apdpov, 145- 
appaarrjixaTa, 353. 

«pa:«''' 173- 

aaKijais, 345. 

dacb/itaro, 1 70. 

avTapKfia, see ' Sufficiency.' 

avTOKivrjTov, 244. 

avTop-aTov, 214. 

d(j)oppT] (ah'dnatz'o), 256. 

d(f)poiTvvr], 332 n. 5. 



ISovXrjais, 286, 324. 

daifxcov, 31. 
SetAt'a, 332 n. 5. 
8r]iJLLovpy6s, 57- 
Std(9eo-ts', 168, 323, 353. 
diaKocrp-rjais, 195. 
diaXeKTiKT], 148 n. 126. 
Stdvota, 246. 

8taT/3ij3at, 117) 121, 358. 
dia'^evSeadai, 1 33. 
StKaioavvT), see 'Justice.' 

S/kt;, 231. 

Sd^a, 68, 133, 320. 

dvvapLLi, 245 n. 34, 305, 423 n. 98. 

Svi'ard, 202 n. 17, 211 n. 81. 

iyKpareia, 423 n. 98. 

eyo), 125, 246 n. 41. 

eiSos-, 162. 

eip.app.ivri, 200 sqq. 

elpcofeia, 47- 

eicuXicns, 322, 356. 

eKTTvpaiais, 95- 

eXevdepla, 322. 

'EXX/^i'tcryxds', 149- 

eXTTiy, 231. 

ipLTTfipia, 1 34. 

evavTLuiaLS, 1 34- 

evdpyeia, 1 32. 

evvoLa, 135; KOtval eVj/., 138; ep.(f)vTOt 

eW., 138. 
evdTiqpa, I42 n. 85. 
eVros d^iy, 1 39, 242. 
e^ayayr] evXoyoi, S^9- 
e^is, {i) = tim7as, 167, 178, 189, 243, 

■z^T, (^\\)=^habitus, 167, 353. 
eTTaycoyr], 59- 

€Tr aKoXovdripara, 209 n. 68. 
€7TaKTiKo\ Xd-yot, 43- 
eirapa-is, 3 1 6, 345. 
iiTi^oXr], (i) = ' attention,' 133; (ii) = 

'reasonable efifort,' 256 n. 94, 318 

n. 109. 
eTTLyevvrjpa, 3^6. 
iTTidvpr^TiKov, 57, 333. 
eTrtdvp.ia, 256, 33 1, 333. 



GREEK INDEX 



467 



(TTifieXfia, 345- 

eTria-TTjfjLr], 68, 1 40, 306. 

evoxi], 133- 

epo)?, 317. 

evdaifxovia, 61, 327 n. 168. 

evBviiia, 247 n. 54, 286 n. 97. 

€v6vpprj^<jveiv, 313 n. 85. 

evKpaala, 94. 

€v\dl3eLa, 323, 412. 

fyXoyio-Tia, 96 n. I18, 325. 

€i;Xoyoi/, 81, 93 n. 99. 

evvofxia, 231- 

€V7rddfLai, 323. 

evpoLO, 72 n. 71, 94- 

fiiTovLU, 94) 285. 

€V(j)pO<TVVT], 324 n. 151. 

€v(f)via, 326 n. 160. 
e(^' 17/iti', 214. 

Zeuy, see 'Juppiter,' 'Zeus.' 

rjyepoviKov, 89, 246 ; Tjy. ttws e)(Ov, 

246. 
Tjyovfxevov, 1 47. 
Tjhovr], see ' Pleasure.' 
"Hpa, see 'Juno.' 
jjo-uX^C"'') 133- 

^edy, 220. 

^erriy, 63 n. 1 5, 146, 277, 282. 

SvpLoeides, 57. 

tSea, 57, 59. 

tSl'cO? TTOld, 167, 177. 

tKai/orT;?, 425 n. I lO. 

IcTovop-ia, 196. 

tV^i'S', see ' Forcefulness.' 

Kadapais^ 61. 

KadrjKov, loi, 301 sqq., 424 n. 102; 

Kad. TeXfiov, 326. 
KUKci, 332 n. 6. 
KaKt'a, 332 ; see also ' Vice.' 
KoKos KayaBos, 61. 
Kavmv, 130, 131, 273 n. 5. 
Kapbia, 245 n. 38. 
KaTo.Xrjyj/'is, 133, 249; Kar. (pavracria, 

133- 

KaraanevT), 1 49. 
KaTriy6pr]p.a, 1 45. 
KaTopdcofjia, 294. 
Koivcos TTOld, iGy. 

KOKKOi, 421 n. 80. 

(cocr/xoTToXts-, 196, 274. 

Kocrp-os, I jo; k. peyas, k. piKpos, 61, 

240. 
Kpd(Tis, {i) = mtx^Hra, 169; Kp. Si' 



oXo)!/, 169, 189; see also 'Penetra- 
tion,' (i'l) = /empera/ura, 244. 
KpiTTjpLou, 75, 130, 131, 141. 

KUpifl^COI/, 148, 201. 

KvpioXoyia, 1 49. 

XeKToi/, 146, 170 j ^' avTOTfXes, 146 

n. 112. 
X^-yov, 147. 
XoyicrriKoi', 57- 
Xoyoy, see 'Logos'; dpyos \6yos, 200; 

X. evdidderos, 146; koivos Xoyor, I38, 

224; 6/3^6? Xdyoj, 71, 142, 273; X. 

7rpo<popiK6s, 146J Xoyoi (TTTeppaTiKoi, 

see 'Seed-powers.' 
^^^'7, 331- 

paUVTlKT), AfJ. 

pavTiKT], 43, 228 n. 70. 

pdvcoa-is, 33, 158. 

p.eyaXo\l/vxia, 308. 

pede^is, 56. 

pfaoTTjs, 145. 

pera^oXr], 327. 

ixerddeais, 134' 

perpioTrjs, 58. 

piprjpa, 85 n. 58. 

piprjuis, 56. 

p-l^i-s, 1 69. 

pvTjpr], 134 nn. 43 and 46. 

/xotpa, 30. 

p,ovds, 104. 

i/d/ioy Koti/d?, 273, 328, 385. 
v6(Tr]pa, 353 n. 140. 
voiis, 242, 246. 

686? «va) Koro), 35, 196. 
o'Xoi/, 170. 
opoiorris, 134- 
opoXoyia, 7 1 • 

6p.oXoyovpivci>s CWj 7^ n. 70. 
oV, 170. 
ovopa, 145. 
6py)7, see 'Anger.' 
ope^tj, 256, 356. 
opp,^, 256, 314, 356. 
opos, 148. 

ovcria, 158, 165; airoios ova:, 165 ; 
ou. rwi/ oXojj', 177- 

Tradrjpara, 61. 

Trddos, 352, 412; Kpla-eis rd nddr], 332 

n. 4.^ 
TratStKO, 287. 
TTaXiyyej/ecrta, 1 93. 
Traj/, 170. 



468 



GREEK INDEX 



Trapu8o^a, 1 50. 
TrapddecTLS, 1 69. 
TTcipaKoXovdrjo-is, 207. 
irapprjcria, 322. 
TrepioSos-, 193. 
irepLTTTaais, 136 n. 55. 
iricTTis, 415- 
TTpevpa, see ' Spirit.' 

TTOtOV, irOlOTTjS, 164, 166; KOIVCOS TT., 
iSt'wS TT., 167, 177. 

TToXtret'a, 66. 

TroXvTraidia, 375- 

TToj/oy, (i) = pain, (ii) = toil, 338 n. 47. 

npiTTov, 149, 312, 348. 

npoaipf(Tis, 286 n. I02, 326 n. 161. 

TrpoTjypeva, see 'Advantages.' 

TrporjyovpevTj, 212. 
TrpoOecns, 133, 356. 
wpoKarapiiTiKT], 212. 
TTpoKOTrrj, see ' Progress.' 

7rp6\ri^is, 136, 331. 

Trpovoia, 203. 

TrpoTTiTrreiJ/, 1 33. 

■n-poarj-yopia, 145. 

Trpos rt TTCoy '^xov, 1 64, 1 68. 

irpocTKOTrr], 353- 

TTpaiTa Kara (pvcnv, 302. 

TTTcocreiy, 1 45. 

TrvKvaxris, 33^ '5^* 

TTcbs e'xoi', i64j 167. 

P^^«» 145- 

prjTopiKT], 148 n. 126. 

aacjirji'eia, 1 49. 

(TTjpaivopeva, 146. 

arjpaivovTa, 1 46. 

aijpeiov., 147- 

CTKOTTos', 291. 

o-o^i'a, 58, 306, 430. 

(To<pi(rpaTa, 147- 

(T0(f)6s, see 'wise men'; (To<f)6s Slu- 

\e\r]6ws, 328 n. 174. 
aireppa, 161, 42 1 n. 80. 
(TTeprja-is, 1 34. 
CTToot TroiKiXrj^ yi. 

(TTOLXeloV, 60, 173, 1795 TTepTTTOV (TT., 60. 

o-vyKaTCideais, 68, 1 32, 249- 

(ri)'y;^u(rts, 169. 

o-DAXoytcrp)?, see ' Syllogism.' 

(TvpfSejdrjKora, 167. 

(TvpiradiLa tS>v oXav, 225, 227 n. 67 ; 

Twi" fxepav, 239. 
(Tvpiroaiov, 346- 
(TVpTTTccpaTa, 167. 
(Tvp(pvais, 250. 



crvpcfxovia, 94. 

criu/aTrro/xei'tt, 209 n. 68. 

CTuvSefT/^os', 145. 

(rvveidijais, 415. 

(Tvvdeats, 134. 

crvvrjfj.pevov, 147- 

crvfTopia, 149. 

(TiKTTaaLs, 260 n. 116. 

a-va-TTjpa, 1 40. 

(TxeVis, (i) = ' variation,' 83 n. 39 ; 

(ii) see ' Relationship.' 
<Ta>p,a, see ' Body ' ; aapa 8ia wco/xarosr 

Xa>pel, 169. 
(ra>piTT]s, 51, 1 47. 
crcoippoavvr], 58, 3 12 sqq. 

WAoy, 58, 281, 422. 

Texvat, 140, 305. 

Ttva, 171. 

rdi/os, see 'Tone'; r. TrvevpariKos, 161. 

Tinr(o(Tis, 131 n. 19. 

i!^'7, 33» 60, 157, 158,^^ 165, 166; i'X7 
TrpwTTj, 158 n. 10; cLTTOios vXtj, 165. 
VTrapxov, 132 n. 25, 142 n. 84, 157, 158. 
UTTo^eo-iy, 57- 
vnoKeipevov, 164 tO 166. 
VTToXrj^is, 133 n. 34. 

VTTOpOVT], 423 n. 98. 

VTToreXtf, 81. 

(j)avTa(ria, 6S, 131, 135,212,249; (pavr. 
KaTaXrjTTTtKr], 68, 133' 4"^^'''' ^PM' 

TlKTj TOV Ka6r]K.0VT0S, 256 n. 97- 

(f)dvTa(rpa, 1 32. 

<^Xo^, 89. 

(jyojSoi; see 'Fear.' 

cjipovrjais, 306. 

^ii(riy (i) = «(T:/?ifr(2, 'growth,' 168, 177, 
188, 242, 257; (ii) as a moral 
standard, 63 n. 15, 275, 315; ra 
Kara (f)vaiv, 72, 290, 310; npSoTa 
Kara (pvaiv, 81, 3^2. 

^covTj (derivation), 146. 

X«o^) 44> 194- 
Xopa, 324. 
xopvyi-a, 64. 

Xpelat, 117, 361. 
XprjpaTicrpos, 369. 

■v|/'eiiSo/ievo$', 5 1) I47» 

^ii^is, 260. 

•\j!/'vx»?', see 'Soul'; ■v//'tix'7 0X0709, 187 

n. 91, 242; XoyiKi], 246; derived 

from x//-!)^!?, 260. 



CAMBRIDGE : PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 



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